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less there is in the will, or in some codicil to it, a clear indication of an intention on the part of the testator that any of his devisees are not to have the enjoyment of the property he has devised to them until they attain twenty-five, but that some other person is to have that enjoyment, or unless the property is so clearly taken away from the devisees up to the time of their attaining twenty-five as to induce the court to hold that, as to the previous rents and profits, there has been an intestacy, the court does not hesitate to strike out of the will any direction that the devisees shall not enjoy it in full until they attain the age of twenty-five years." The point seems, in the first instance, to have been rather assumed than decided. It was apparently regarded as a necessary consequence of the conclusion that a gift had vested, that the enjoyment of it must be immediate on the beneficiary becoming sui juris, and could not be postponed until a later date unless the testator had made some other destination of the income during the intervening period. It is needless to inquire whether the courts might have given effect to the intention of the testator in such cases to postpone the enjoyment of his bounty to a time fixed by himself subsequent to the attainment by the objects of his bounty of their majority. The doctrine has been so long settled and so often recognized that it would not be proper now to question it. Wickens, V. C., when this case came before him in 1871, intimated an opinion that the rule in Saunders v. Vautier was inapplicable where the beneficiaries were charitable corporations or the trustees of charities. I have carefully considered the reasons which he adduced for this opinion with the respect due to any opinion of that learned judge, and certainly with no indisposition to give effect to the intention of the testator if I could see my way to do so. But I am unable to find any sound basis upon which a distinction can be rested in this respect between bequests to charities and those made in favor of individual beneficiaries.

So much has recently been said about the decision of Judge Goff over the registration law of South Carolina that it should be remembered that many cases have arisen where federal judges have interfered with or prevented the

execution of State laws which were unconstitutional. In speaking on this subject, the Nation cites the case of Yick Wo, and gives a very interesting summary on this subject, which we print.

"Now that it is settled that the controversy over the registration laws of South Carolina will be carried up to the Supreme Court for a a final decision on Judge Goff's ruling, it is worth while to recall the judgment of that tribunal in the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, nine years ago, as showing its view of the scope of federal interference in matters of State and even municipal legislation.

"Yick Wo. a native of China, went to California in 1861, and engaged in the laundry business, which he carried on from the first in the same premises, under licenses from the fire and health officials. In 1880 there were about 320 laundries in the city and county of San Francisco, of which about 240 were owned and conducted by subjects of China. Of the whole 320, about 310 (Yick Wo's among them) were constructed of wood, like nine-tenths of the houses in the city. The capital thus invested by Chinamen was not less than $200,000 and they paid annually, for rents, licenses, taxes, gas, and water, about $180,000.

In 1880, ordinances were enacted making it unlawful for any person to establish or carry on a laundry within the corporate limits of the city and county "without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone;" and punishing any violator of the ordinance by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both. Yick Wo and 200 countrymen who carried on their business in wooden houses, under licenses from the fire wardens and health officer, petitioned the supervisors for permission to continue in the same premises which they had been occupying in some cases for more than twenty years. All such petitions of Chinamen were denied. At the same time, all petitions of laundrymen who had wooden buildings, but were not Chinese, were granted, with a single exception. Scores of Chinese laundrymen were then arrested for carrying on business without the required legal consent, and their business was practically

ruined. Yick Wo was tried in a police court, found guilty of violating the ordinance, and sentenced to pay a fine of ten dollars, and in default of payment to be imprisoned at the rate of one day for each dollar of fine until the fine should be satisfied.

"The case was carried to the State Supreme Court, which sustained the local ordinance. Appeal was taken to the federal Supreme Court, which pronounced judgment on the 10th of May, 1886, the late Justice Matthews delivering the opinion. The court reversed the judg

to regulate laundries with a view to the protection of the public against such dangers as those of fire, but the federal court found nothing in the ordinances under review which pointed to such a regulation. On the contrary, the supervisors were granted a purely arbitrary power. Yick Wo had complied with every requisite deemed necessary by law for the protection of neighboring property from fire or as a precaution against injury to the public health. No reason whatever except the will of the supervisors was assigned why he and his two hun

ment of the State court, and rested its decision | dred fellow-countrymen should not be permitted

upon that clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution, which says:

""Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris diction the equal protection of the laws.'

"This provision was held to apply equally to Yick Wo and other Chinamen in like case, because the treaty between the United States and China guarantees to the latter's subjects in this country the same rights, privileges, immunities,

zens of the most favored nation; and the Re-
vised Statutes provide that all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to have the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and be subject to like punish-
ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and ex-
actions of every kind, and to no other. It was
contended by Yick Wo's counsel that the
ordinances for the violation of which he was
sentenced were void on their face, as being
within the prohibition of the fourteenth amend-
ment; and, if not so, that they were void by
reason of their administration "operating un-
equally, so as to punish in the present petition-
ers what is permitted to others as lawful, with-
out any distinction of circumstances
unjust and illegal discrimination, it is claimed,
which, though not made expressly by the ordi-
nances, is made possible by them. This lat-
ter position was sustained by the Supreme

to carry on their business in wooden buildings while eighty others not Chinese subjects were allowed to carry on the same business under similar conditions. The fact of discrimination against the Chinese was admitted, and no reason for it could be imagined except hostility to their race and nationality.

With reference to the principles that govern such cases, the Court said:

"The cases present the ordinances in actual

and exemptions as may be enjoyed by the citi- operation, and the facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of the equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Though the law itself is fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the amendment. The discrimination is therefore illegal, and the public administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. The imprisonment of the petitioner is therefore illegal, and he must be discharged."

Court.

,

an

"The Supreme Court of California had held that the city had the right to make ordinances

This seems to be a broad assertion by the highest court in the land of the power to investigate the workings of any local law, and to interfere for the protection of a citizen against the unjust administration of any statute. The South Carolina registration law requires any man whose name has never been on the list to make an affidavit setting forth his full name, age, occupation, and residence when the act of 1882 was passed, or at any time thereafter when he became old enough to vote, "and the place or places of his residence since the time when he became entitled to register," and this must be supported by the affidavits of two "reputable" citizens who were each twenty-one years old in 1882, or at the time when the applicant became entitled to register. The registrar is given authority to determine whether the citizens who make the supporting affidavits are "reputable." If it should be established that this discretionary power has been abused, the decision in the case of Yick Wo would indicate that the Supreme Court of the United States might claim the right of the federal authorities to interfere.

Chief Justice Fuller of the United States Supreme Court, with Judges Hughes and Seymour, constituting the Circuit Court of Appeals, recently at Richmond, Va., overruled the injunction granted by Judge Goff to prevent the election of the constitutional convention in South Carolina on the principle that it was not within the province of the Federal judiciary to interfere in the conduct of elections when there is no evidence to show that the constitutional rights of a citizen have been infringed, or that the matter in issue has anything to do with the federal election and when it does not properly distinguish between protection and privilege. While the court might afford relief in the case of an individual, the injunction in question comprehended more. Judge Hughes read the opinion of the Court, which is a clear and emphatic determination of the rights conferred by the Constitution and is an explicit expression of the true functions of the various departments of government. On this subject Judge Hughes says:

policy, and it is essential to its existence that each of these departments shall be independent of the other. The division is fundamental and organic. It would be just as dangerous to its stability for the judicial department to override the others as for the executive or legislative departments to do so. Hence, while the right of the judiciary to pass upon the constitutionality of the laws is undoubted, it has that right simply as an incident to its protection of private rights. It has not that right as a mere means of sealing abstract questions; and even in the enforcement of private means of settling abstract rights it has not the power to interfere with the discretion vested in the other departments in the exercise of the political powers of those departments. It seems to me that it is a dangerous encroachment upon the prerogatives of the other departments of government if the judiciary be intrusted to exercise the power of interfering with the holding of an election in a State. If the supervisor of one county can be enjoined from the performance of the duties imposed upon him by the election laws of the State from whom he holds his commission, those of the other counties can be also.

"Thus a single citizen in each county (and in the case at bar he is not even a qualified voter) can enjoin an election thoughout the entire State, and thus deprive thousands of their rights to vote. If a court has power to do this, free elections are at an end. If elections are improperly held, their are appropriate means provided by law for questioning their results, and remedying wrongs, without the exercise of this dangerous power by the courts. A candidate who has been defeated may contest; a voter whose right to register has been denied may proceed to compel the enforcement of that right, and these privileges give what the Legislature deem sufficient protection to the injured; but, in my judgment, one citizen cannot, under pretense of righting his own wrongs, disfranchise others. I do not think a court has jurisdiction to interfere by injunction or otherwise the enforcement of laws by officers holding and deriving their powers from these laws; certainly not to the extent in which it is attempted to be done by this bill."

"The division of our government into the legislative, executive and judicial departments By this decision it is clearly set forth that is a distinguishing feature of our American I elections in this country are the business of the people and that it is not the province of the federal courts to interfere with or hamper in any way the right that so belongs to the citizens, for as Judge Hughes says, once the power to do this is assumed, "Free elections are at an end."

A case which has aroused considerable interest was argued before the Court of Appeals in the early part of June. It is undoubtedly one of the most novel causes that has ever been argued before the court of last resort. The case was the outcome of suits brought by Elser C. Foster against Salvator Cantoni. The facts of the matter appear as follows:

"According to her statement, Mrs. Foster, as she calls herself, has five daughters dependent upon her. Three, she says, are her daughters by a husband from whom she has obtained a divorce and the remaining two are the defendant's children.

"Her present sole income, as she gives it, is derived from keeping a boarding house. On the other hand, it is alleged, the defendant is a banker of large wealth. Mrs. Foster says that she formed the acquaintance of Mr. Cantoni in July, 1884. At that time she was twenty-two years old and living in Brooklyn with her husband, David C. Brennan.

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They had three daughters, and were a contented and happy family. Mr. Cantoni represented himself to her as an unmarried man, and vowed that he was desperately in love with her. He begged her to get a divorce from her husband, and as an inducement told her that he was a banker and a millionaire. He promised if she would leave her husband to give her $5,ooo a year, take care of her and her children as long as she lived and provide in case of his death for the payment of the same annuity to her as long as she lived.

are now living. In May, 1892, Mr. Cantoni told her that he had a wife living and that their marital relations would have to cease.

"At this stage a son-in-law of the defendant, whose name is not given, came to Mr. Cantoni's, and she charges the two with having conspired to get rid of her. The conspiracy was to get her to go with the children to California, in the belief that an account of her death would soon follow. She, however, lived to come back and bring the present action, and she claims, on account of her present 'miserable and wrecked life,' $100,000 damages. The plaintiff also demands $70,000 more for alleged services for the defendant as his house-keeper for seven

years.

"The answer to the complaint is a general denial of the allegations in the complaint. It is asserted that the defendant is not only a wealthy Italian banker, but that he has been specially honored by the King of Italy in being knighted and made a cavalier of the Order of the Crown. As the story goes, he was a courier in his younger days in Italy, and acted as courier for Mrs. Ben Halliday when her husband was running his transcontinental 'pony express.' He afterward, it is said, became the private secretary of Mr. Halliday, and thus laid the foundation of his present fortune."

In Chilton v. The Progress Printing & Publishing Co., 72 L. T. Rep. 442, the opinion is of more than usual interest on account of the increasing number of cases arising in this country at the present time over infringments of copyrights. The defendants had published the names of horses which the plaintiffs had picked out to win in a number of races and which he

daily made up and issued in a pamphlet. In the opinion of Lord Halsbury he says:

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If you look at what is the real thing here, you find that it is not the casting into printed words the result of the plaintiff's investigation which has enabled him to form his opinion. It is not that which is sought to be protected. What is really sought to be protected is the plaintiff's opinion, and he had published his opinion. It is admitted that that opinion is susceptible of being handed down in any way except in writing. If the plainiff chooses to print his opinion, and thereby make a copy of

"Enticed, as she further says in her complaint, she began proceedings and in 1887 received a decree from Judge Dyckman at White Plains. Mr. Cantoni furnished the money for prosecuting the divorce suit, and at his solicitation no application was made for alimony. The decree being obtained, they began living together. She supposed that she was his wife, but at his wish they assumed the name of Mr. and Mrs. Fortunay. They lived together seven years and had four children, only two of whom I it, can that be protected from infringment? Is the thing subject-matter of copyright ? I am of opinion that it is not. It is nothing in the nature of literary composition. Then comes the extended interpretation of what a "book" is to be for the purposes of the act. I can find no provision which properly indicates that such a matter as we are now dealing with is to be subject-matter of copyright. I, therefore think that there is nothing here which can be treated as protected by the language or by the policy of the act. There is no subject-matter of copyright. That is the view which appears

to me to be the true view of this case.

Then with reference to the question of infringment I have very great difficulty in dealing with it;

not that in this case I have the least doubt, for I have not. But the difficulty is to give in

been actively engaged in legal work, and reminds us of the work he has performed for the English bar. He was born on the 27th day of November, 1812, in Oxfordshire, and in 1830 received a scholarship at Oxford. There he acquired a reputation as a scholar, and won many prizes and awards. He entered the chambers of Mr. Booth, a well-known conveyancer, and later on was with several large legal firms. At the bar he rose rapidly, and quickly made his mark. In 1872 he succeeded Lord Hatherley as lord chancellor. In this office he carried out many important changes which were of great aid to the English judicature. He made an effort to reform legal education, but

in this he did not succeed. He took an active interest in the founding of the Legal Associadogmatic form a proposition which will justify tion, of which he was the first president, and at

all times strove most earnestly to raise the standard of legal training at the bar. The effort which was later made for improvement in this direction was the result of his efforts, though he really took no active part in the reformation. He was a scholar of rare ability, and was an earnest student of the classics.

my refusal to consider what the defendants have done an infringment by any rule of law. The real difficulty arises in this way: Assume a copyright to be protected. What is or is not an infringment of that copyright must in all cases depend upon the particular facts with which you are dealing. Any attempt to give in spoken or written language a definition which will include all cases must be a failure from the very nature of the thing with which one is dealing. I observe that Jervis, C. J. remarks, in the case to which I referred in the course of the argument of Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B. 459, that it is undoubtedly exceedingly difficult, and perhaps absolutely impossible, to lay down any general rule upon this subject. He says (at p. 481), "I do not assent to the argument urged by Mr. Lush that every publication of a portion of a work in which there is subsisting copyright will afford ground of action. It is a question of degree which must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.' That I believe to be emphatically true, and it supports the reason which I said rendered it impossible for me to give any abstract proposition which can comprehend all cases. All that I say in this case is, that there is no subject-matter of copyright; but that, if it was the subject-matter of copyright, I think that there has been no infring- ter's failure to repudiate their action, or to re

inent of it.

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The death of the Earl of Selden on the 4th of June brings to an end one whose life has

Sir James Bacon, having reached the age of ninety-seven years, is another of the distinguished jurists who have recently died in England. His death recalls the fact that many of the members of the English bar have reached an extreme old age. Sir Edward Coke died in his eighty-third year; Sir John Maynard lived to be eighty-nine; the Rt. Hon. James Fitzgerals was over ninety years old at the time of his death; the Rt. Hon. Thomas Lefroy, who was lord chief justice of Ireland, died in his ninetyfirst year; Lord Norbury, an Irish chief justice, died at the age of ninety-two years; Lord Plunkett, lord chief justice of Ireland, died in his ninetieth year, and the Hon. Francis Blackburn was in his eighty-sixth year when, in 1866, he was appointed for the second time to the office of lord chancellor of Ireland.

In McCarthy v. Roswald (Ala. Sup. Ct.) it was held that, where persons converted property on which a landlord had a lien for rent, the lat

ply to their letter proposing to pay for what they had appropriated, was not a ratification of their act.

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