hands of the publisher. The State of Ohio was admitted into the Union in 1802, and all of the opinions of the Supreme Court of that State are contained in seventy or seventy-two volumes. "The reason of this great disparity in the numbers of reports in the two States is, that in Ohio many of the cases are decided without either writing or filing opinions. The recent Evangelical Church controversy was pending at the same time in the courts of several States, all of the cases involving the same questions. The Supreme Court of Ohio decided the case by a mere order of affirmance. No other record was made.

"There has been a steady increase in the importance of the litigation in this State. It is safe to say that the amounts of money or property involved are now greater by fifty per cent, in any given number of cases, than those of ten This arises from the increased years ago. value of real property and the accumulation of large estates, the settlement of partnerships, and the litigation arising over corporate rights.

Courts and lawyers are conservative in matters of practice and procedure, and a suggestion of any change in methods is invariably met with. opposition. The life work of the lawyer consists largely of controversy, contention and debate. One reason for the failure of some lawyers of large experience in the profession to make acceptable judges is that they are partisans by education and practice, and cannot divest themselves of that trait of character however they may strive to do so.

"It is important that the law pretaining to the rights of property be settled and firmly

this kingdome. And therefore it is necessary to define what a monopoly is. A monopoly is an institution, or allowance by the King, by his grant, commission, or otherwise, to any person or persons, bodies politique, or corporate, of or for the sole buying, selling, making, working or using of anything, whereby any person or persons, bodies politique or corporate, are sought to be restrained of any freedome or liberty that they had before, or hindred in their lawful trade.' Counsel contend that this definition, as explained by the derivation of the word, may be applied to all cases in which 'one person sells alone the whole of any kind of marketable thing, so that only he can continue to sell it, fixing the price at his own pleasure,' whether by virtue of legislative grant or agreement; that the monopolization referred to in the act of Congress, is not confined to the common law sense of the term as implying an exclusive control by authority, of one branch of industry without legal right of any other person to interfere therewith by competition or otherwise, but that it includes engrossing as well, and covers controlling the market by contracts securing the advantage of selling alone or exclusively all or some considerable portion of a particular kind of merchandise or commodity to the detriment of the public; and that such contracts amount to that restraint of trade or commerce declared to be illegal. But the monopoly and restraint denounced by the act are the monopoly and restraint of interstate and international trade or commerce, while the conclusion to be assumed on this record is that the result of the transaction complained of was the creation of a monopoly in the manufacture

We print in this number of the LAW JOURNAL the argument presented to the judiciary committee of the Senate by the committee on law reform of the New York State Bar Association in regard to the continuance of the Miscellaneous State Reports of the Official Series. This is the first time that any mention of this subject has been made in these columns, and is a most delicate question to handle, involving, as it does, the proposition as to whether certain reports shall be preferred to others. The interest of the lawyers demands that the great number of reports which are now published should be modified in some way, either by a general recognition by the courts of the fact that the opinions should be shortened, or by the judges lessening the number of opinions which are handed down and deciding more cases without written opinions. The theory of the Official Series has been that not only that the reports were edited by persons who are recognized by the State, but also that all decisions of the courts of the State of New York should be in

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was made to the recorder; who sent for and examined the attending physician, in the presence of the district-attorney and of the defendants's counsel. He gave a description of what had taken place and of what he had done. gave his opinion that the attack had been caused by the mental strain, and he thought the juror might be able to come to the court after a while. Later in the evening, the juror having improved, was brought over and took his seat, with his as

much or little the profession has recognized the value of these reports, the continuance of all as a symmetrical whole is demanded by the bench and bar and certainly by those people who have started with almost the assurance of the State that the books which they have purchased will be made of value and practical interest by the addition of all the later volumes of each report.

The Court of Appeals, on Tuesday, February 26, 1895, handed down a most important decision in the case of People v. Robert W. Buchanan. It will be remembered that the defendant was indicted by the grand jury of the city and county of New York for the crime of murder in the first degree in killing Anna Buchanan, his wife, with poison administered to her. On the trial of the indictment he was found guilty as charged. Judge Gray writes a most clear and well-expressed opinion, reviewing the facts and stating with great accuracy and interest the testimony of the experts who, it will be recalled, examined the body of the victim forty-two days after it had been interred, and who advanced many theories as to the cause of death in the analysis of the partly decomposed body of the woman. Aside from the literary quality of the opinion, perhaps the most important and most interesting point involved is in regard to the illness of a juror, which, it seems, took place after the jury had determined upon their verdict. The facts are so plainly stated by Judge Gray that we simply print his opinion on that point. He says:

"After the jury had retired, an incident occurred, which has been made much of and which constituted the basis, in part, of a motion for a new trial. The jury retired in the after noon of April 25. In the evening of the day following, they were taken over to a hotel for their dinner. Paradise, one of their number, was taken suddenly ill and fainted. A physician was called in, who found him first unconscious and then delirious. He had him removed to another room, where he treated him professionally. A report of the occurrence

had agreed upon a verdict before the illness; but the recorder thought it inadvisable, under the circumstances, to then receive their verdict; advising them to again retire and confer. They did so, and shortly returned with their verdict. Upon the facts, as they were made to appear, there was nothing to warrant the trial-judge in refusing to receive the verdict. Subsequently, however, upon the hearing of the motion for a new trial, certain other facts were made to appear, which we have considered carefully, with the view of ascertaining whether they furnish any sufficient reason for believing that the verdict of the jury was not properly or fairly reached. One branch of the motion was based on the ground that there had been an illegal separation of the jurors. Affidavits were read, showing that upon the removal of the sick juror from the room, in which he and his fellow jurors were dining together, the other jurors separated; some running to and from the sick man's room and others going in other directions and alone. In opposition were read the affidavits of the jurors and of the court officers, to the effect that the jurors were always in charge of the officers; that none of them were ever alone, and that no communication was had with them by any person in reference to the case. Upon these proofs, it was discretionary with the trial court to order a new trial or not, and with the exercise of its discretion we will not interfere. (Code Crim. Proc., § 465, subd. 3.) It was a question of fact, and I think the judicial discretion of the learned recorder was well exercised, in having regarded the involuntary separation of the jurors as working no possible prejudice to the defendant. The second branch of the motion for a new trial was based on the ground that the attack, which the juror Paradise suffered from, was an expression of a generally deranged judgment, and that his mind could not have been clear and sound, or capable of judgment, for some hours before and after. In support of that ground, the affidavits of several distinguished physicians and alienists were produced and read. It was their opinion, upon the statement of the physician who attended the said juror, of the juror's son and of others, detailing what had occurred, that the attack was epileptic in character. They, in substance, thought it evidenced a confirmed epileptic condition, and indicated a mental disturbance, which must have existed for several hours and must have rendered his mental action unreliable and valueless. In opposition to these opinions, were read affidavits by several other physicians, expert in mental diseases, who had made a personal examination of the juror, and who gave it as their opinion that there was no perceptible indication of epilepsy, or of paresis, and that he was in full possession of his faculties. Upon Paradise's statements as to his past life, they were of the opinion that he had never suffered from epilepsy or insanity. They thought the symptoms of his attack were those of nervous exhaustion and of hysteria, induced by the close confinement and the long-continued strain upon him in the performance of his duties of a juror. His own affidavit was read, denying ever having suffered from epileptic attacks. He narrated the occurrences in the jury room and stated that after the first ballot, when he had voted "not guilty," he had upon each subsequent ballot voted "guilty" and that the jury had agreed upon their verdict before they went to the hotel for their meal. He stated that he felt well when he came back to court and was able to deliberate. He gave the facts about his past life and he showed that the day after the conclusion of the trial he had gone away on business and remained away till June, being in the full possession of his health and faculties, The affidavits of physicians, who had known and attended him in the past, stated that he had never manifested any epileptic symptoms, or any form of nervous disease. Other affidavits by his employer and by his fellow-jurors were read, to show his mental competency. The recorder, in denying a new trial, had before him the conflicting opinions of the experts, the facts stated in the affidavits and those within his own observation. It cannot be said that the defendant made out a case of mental incompetency in the juror. While the opinions of the physicians, secured by him, seemed to give support to his theory of a mental or nervous disease in the juror, which incapacitated him to deliberate or confer upon his case, they were not based on any personal examination, but were premised upon the statements given them. In view of the evidence as to his physical and mental condition upon actual examination; as to the facts of his past life and of his condition for weeks

after the trial, the learned recorder could not well have decided otherwise than he did and I think we must agree with him that the opinions of the experts for the People were warranted by the evidence; while those of the defendant's experts were not."

Among the, shall we say, "reform measures," introduced in the Assembly is one by Mr. Vacheron to amend section 1756 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to divorces.

There seems to be no practical, valid reason for such a measure since divorce in some places is so easy and the only difficult parts of it are the journey to and from the State where marital infelicities are quickly cured and the wherewithal to pay the freight. One of the few clear parts of our code is the substantive law and procedure of divorce, the former of which was placed there, presumably because any stray bit of law is put in the Civil Code so that it cannot be readily found in its proper place when wanted. The general waste rubbish style of the code may have induced the author of the

bill to believe that such substantive law would be pleasing to the people of the State if put in the code, and this happy disposition of such a statute is its only beneficial feature. The bill is as follows:

"Section 1756 of article 2 of title 1 of chapter 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure is hereby amended by adding thereto the following: where husband and wife have been alienated and estranged so as to willfully refuse and decline to have sexual intercourse with each other for a continuous period of over fifteen years, during potency, an action for divorce may, upon that ground, be maintained, and a divorce granted in case the husband and wife each voluntarily ask therefor, provided there be no minor children living from their wedlock. The husband and wife shall be competent witnesses to such estrangement, but corroboratory evidence thereof shall be also required."

It can be easily and readily seen what the bill if passed would lead to, as it would only be necessary later to shorten the time during which the husband and wife had not lived together, and insert a little joker in some act striking out the provision as to minor children. If society regards matrimony and divorce as a condition or release from condition which can be entered into at the will or

a

pleasure of the parties concerned, then an even more broad statute should be passed than the one under discussion, but until such a degree of depraved intellectual morality arises in the State there is no place, even in the code, for such a piece of legislation.

the bank books were discovered, there came into the office a variety of claims, which revealed the confidence and discernment of the creditors of the deceased. An undertaker alleged that he had furnished a funeral, which included a magnificent casket worth $1,000, and which, with a few extras, made his bill $1,450. A physician had carefully attended him for years, performed one or two serious operations, but had never troubled to send in his bill, which had grown to be $2,600. A nurse was so devoted to the care of her patient that she had taken no thought for the morrow, and had left her charge to amount to $1,700, while one of our profession detailed the exact dates upon which he had been consulted professionally upon important hypothetical questions, which left the deceased owing him a balance of $295 upon an aggregate charge of $300. All these people substantiated their claims under oath, but suffice it to say have not yet collected their accounts.

An old lady living in what might literally be denominated a hovel, complained some years since to the police that she had been robbed of a considerable amount of money. A careful examination on the part of the police afterward led them to believe from the apparent poverty of the woman that there could be no possible foundation for the claim. She absolutely failed to inform them of the possession on her part of any savings which might have been the subject of such a theft, but after death, within this building was found more than $1,200 in gold and bills and nine savings bank books, some of which showed deposits made more than twenty years before, and upon which books there was entered neither any credit of interest nor any draft, showing that the pass-books had never been within the bank during that period of time.

In the midst of the preparations for burial which a charitable church society proposed to give to one who had for many years been living upon their alms, they accidentally found between the mattresses of the bed on which she died a savings bank book in which deposits of very trifling amounts, saved out of the pittance of charity she had received, had made an aggregate of over $1,300.

The number of those estates wherein no next of kin are ultimately found are comparatively few, and in my experience have not averaged five per cent of the cases which have been administered in this department. An elderly Frenchman, who had lost his wife many years before, had occupied a single room in a building for more than ten consecutive years, and daily passing in and out, had left no knowledge of who might be interested in him by ties of blood or affection. Stricken down one morning in one of our business thoroughfares, he was carried into a store, an ambulance was sent for, and he was

conveyed to a hospital. Death came without the return of consciousness upon his part, and in his pocket was found a bond and mortgage and several bank books aggregating an estate of more than $15,000. Among the few trifling papers in his room was a letter bearing the subscription, "Your loving sister, Julie," dated in the city of Marseilles, France. Careful inquiry and advertisement there failed to elicit evidence of the existence of this sister, but after the money had been paid into the hands of the treasurer of the State of New York, a niece appeared, proved her relationship and obtained the money.

Not always is the claim of relationship so well sustained. A man who passed under the name of Wilson, and who had for years served a newspaper route, taken down with disease, caused himself to be carried to one of our hospitals as a paid patient. The physicians advised him of the imminence of death, and urged him to make such preparation in his affairs as might be needed. He scorned their advice, and one morning he passed away, leaving under his pillow bank books and ready money representing over $5,000. The story of this incident passed into the daily papers, but by an accident his name was given as Nilson. Inside of six weeks eight letters from different portions of the United States reached me, telling the pathetic story of the death of "a dear old uncle," "a brother," or some other relative of the name of Nilson in Brooklyn, whose property they were entitled to share, or anxiously asking me for information of the whereabouts of a dear old gentleman of that name, who had been long lost sight of. Sufficient to say that none of these shared in the distribution of his estate.

Sometimes the flood of relatives, however veritable, seems never likely to stop. A thrifty old gentleman who had presided over a ferry gate and carefully saved his earnings, had accumulated a considerable amount of money (perish the thought that any of it had been taken from the corporation improperly), and died without any known relatives. Some months passed away, when an elderly lady, a young woman and a baby presented themselves at the office. They anxiously inquired whether the estate of "A" was in the hands of the public administrator. Assured that it was, the old lady claimed to be his only sister and sole surviving relative, and desired an immediate accounting. Told that the harsh provisions of the law compelled that time should elapse to afford any creditors an opportunity to present their claims and to enable her to establish more fully her relationship, she finally returned to Cincinnati, Ohio. Some more months elapsed, and another elderly female came in, interested in the same estate. She, too, declared that she was the sole sister and only next of kin of the