21. The Act of Congress of May 15, 1856, grant- ing lands to Iowa for railroad purposes authorized a sale of 120 sections in advance of the construc- tion of any part of the road to be constructed and the purchasers thereof took a good title, although no part of the road was constructed when their sale was made. The conditions, as to completion of the road imposed by the State were conditions subsequent.
Railroad Co. v. Courtright,
582 22. There was no restriction upon the State as to the place where the 120 sections should be se- lected, except that they should be within twenty miles of the road.
25. A legislative confirmation of the claim to land is a recognition of the validity of such claim, and operates as effectually as a grant, or quit claim from the government, and a subsequent patent is only documentary evidence of that title. If the claim be to quantity and not to a specific tract ca- pable of identification, a segregation by survey will be required, and the confiirmation will then imme- diately attach the title to the land segregated. Idem.
606 26. An adverse possession of the premises by the defendant, under claim and color of title made in good faith, with payment of the taxes assessed thereon, after the title of the heirs was perfected by congressional confirmation and before the patent is- sued, continued for the period prescribed by the Statute of Limitations of the State was a bar to any recovery by the heirs upon the patent. Idem,
27. Every confirmation of a Mexican land claim is limited by the extent of the claim made. A con- firmation of a claim to part of a grant does not in- volve a recognition of the validity of the whole grant.
622 28. It has been the uniform policy of the govern- ment since the inauguration of our land system in 1790, to reserve salt-springs from sale, for the use of the future States, and the same policy was ex- tended to the territory embraced by the States of Kansas and Nebraska.
32. But where the claimant presented before the Board, besides the original title, evidences of de- rivative title, and the commissioners decided upon both, the confirmation operates as a grant to the claimant, although his name was omitted in the form of confirmation. Idem,
LEGACY.
See WILLS, 2, 3.
LIENS.
SEE CONFISCATION, 3.
MARITIME LAW, 3, 5, 10.
STATE LAWS AND DECISIONS, 9. TAXES AND TAX SALES, 12. USURY, 4.
Belle of the Sea v. Johnson,
259 3. A ship is not discharged from a bottomry lien, unless the bond is actually paid. What is not pay- ment. 362 4. A person having a lien upon property does not lose it by taking a bill of sale of the same property, the bill of sale being voidable, and there being no evidence of intent to abandon the lien.
5. Material men, furnishing repairs and supplies to a vessel in her home port do not acquire thereby law, as received in the United States. any lien upon the vessel by the general maritime
6. Liens granted by the laws of a State in favor of material men for furnishing necessaries to a ves- sel in her home port in said State are valid, al- though the contract to furnish the same is a mari- time contract and can only be enforced by proceed- ings in rem in the District Court of the United States.
7. To create for future services of a contractor a lien upon particular funds of his employer, there must not only be the express promise of the em- ployer to apply them in payment of such services, upon which the contractor relies, but there must be some act of appropriation of the fund on the part of the employer.
673 8. By the Joint Resolution of Jan. 21, 1843, the Legislature of Pennsylvania intended to give to an unpaid contractor a priority of lien on the proper- ty of a railroad company, over a mortgage made after the debt to the contractor was incurred.
9. The contractor's lien continues a prior incum- brance so long as the debt it was given to secure remains unsatisfied. A judgment does not extin- guish it. If the lien of the judgment expires that of the debt remains.
7. The general system of maritime law, when the Constitution was adopted, was referred to when it was declared in that instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Thus adopted, it became the maritime law of the United States, operating uniformly in the whole country. Idem,
654 8. The question as to the true limits of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction is exclusively a ju- dicial one.
Idem, 654 9. But the courts cannot change maritime law; changes must be made by the legislative depart- ment. Where Congress has not exercised this power, States may, in particular cases, legislate. Idem, 654
10. Any person having a specific lien on or a vested right in a surplus fund in court, may apply by petition for the protection of his interest under the 43d Admiralty Rule.
11. Libels for supplies furnished at the home port
4. Where a person will be directly affected by a decree, he is an indispensable party, unless the par- ties are too numerous to be brought before the court. 184
241 6. Combined results are not necessarily a novel result. Idem, 241 7. No one, by bringing together several old de- vices without producing a new and useful result, the joint product of the elements of the combina- tion and something more than an aggregate of old results, can acquire a right to prevent others from using the same devices, either singly or in other combinations, or, even if a new and useful result is obtained can prevent others from using some of the devices, omitting others, in combination.
8. A well known device applied to stoves long be- fore the patent for it was granted, is not invention. Idem, 241
9. Walker's patent for clothes wringers consid- ered. What is not an infringement thereon. Washing Machine Co. v. Tool Co., 303 10. Blair's invention of "a new and useful rubber head for pencils" was not patentable as there was nothing new in it.
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 410 11. An idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device, by which it may be made practically useful is. 410
12. Under the Patent Act of 1837 disclaimers can be made as well after as before the commencement of the suit, but the court should, when a disclaimer is made after suit commenced, impose such terms as justice might require. 566
Smith v. Nichols,
19. A recorded assignment of a perfected inven- tion, made before a patent has issued, carries with it the patent when issued, and by an assignment of an imperfect invention with all improvements on it that an inventor may make, the assignee be- comes the equitable owner of a patent granted upon the perfected invention.
20. Where the assignment is upon condition that it shall cease and be void in case the assignee shall, after a reasonable notice, neglect to make and sell the patented article, there can be no forfeiture for a neglect to make and sell, until after reasonable notice of the default.
21. Letters patent may be granted for an inven- tion which consists entirely in a new combination of old ingredients, if the new combination of old in- gredients produces a new and useful result.
22. Re-issued patents, in order that they may be valid, must be for the same invention as the sur- rendered originals. Invalid and inoperative pat- ents may be surrendered and re-issued for the same invention. 699
23. A patentee cannot surrender a patent for a combination of old ingredients, and amend the specification by striking out one of the ingredients and inserting in lieu thereof other devices without an allegation that they are the equivalents of the one stricken out. 699
25. A party who merely substitutes another old ingredient for one of the ingredients of a patented combination, is an infringer if the substitute per- forms the same function as the ingredient for which It was substituted, and was well known at the date of the patent as a proper substitute for the omitted ingredient. Idem, 699
26. If the ingredient substituted was new or per- formed substantially a different function, or was not known at the date of the plaintiff's patent as a proper substitute for the one omitted, he does not infringe. 699
1. The pleadings must show the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction as to the parties in an action.
100 2. One, who has under the Act for the adjust- ment of land claims in Louisiana, filed a bill for certain lands, and afterwards discovered that the true right to the lands claimed existed not in him self but in another, cannot by a supplemental petition, allege such other title in support of his bill, especially where such other title was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
202 3. An answer to be good, must overcome the case made by the complainant. If the facts in the com. plaint are admitted, it must state other facts, suffi- cient, if true, to defeat the action.
U. S. v. Innerarity's Heirs,
4. Where the answer to an action on an appeal bond alleged the taking of the appeal, but no- where averred that it had been perfected nor that at the time of the commencement of the action it was still pending, the answer contains no defense, it being averred in the complaint and not denied in the answer, that the judgment was affirmed on the appeal.
387 Idem, 5. Where a plea, although to the whole indict- ment, met only part of it, it will be held bad upon demurrer.
653 6. A demurrer to a bill in equity does not admit the correctness of averments as to the meaning of an instrument set forth in or annexed to the bill. Dillon v. Barnard,
APPEAL AND ERROR, PRACTICE ON, passim. EXCEPTIONS, 1, 2.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES, passim. SHERIFF.
SUPERSEDEAS, 1-5.
116 3. New matter in an answer, not responsive to
anything in the bill, must be sustained by proof to be of any avail as a defense.
4. Where the judge who made the order of sale of property was the judge to approve the claim, the order is presumptive proof of the requisite ap- proval.
254 5. Where no exception was taken to a reference to a master, nor to his account, an objection to its result is not good.
8. A withdrawal of appearance by defendant without prejudice to plaintiff in an attachment proceeding after a rule to plead had been served. leaves the plaintiff at liberty to enter a personal judgment against defendant, as upon default after appearance.
9. Evidence, in order to raise a question of law upon it, must be incorporated in the bill of ex- ceptions, or an agreed statement of facts.
10. A jury to find facts is never required, where there is no traverse of those alleged, and where a defendant has defaulted.
13. Under the Civil Practice Act of Montana, in an action to recover personal property, there can be no judgment for the value if there can be a deliv- ery of the property; but a judgment is not errone- ous if the alternative is not expressed upon its face. If a delivery cannot in fact be made, a judg ment for the value is sufficient. Boley v. Griswold,
375 14. When the error assigned is to the rejection of evidence, the specification must quote the full substance of the evidence offered. 406
17. Objections to a deposition which relate to de fects and irregularities which might have been ob- viated by retaking the deposition, must be noted when the deposition is taken, or be presented by a motion to suppress before the trial is begun, and when such objections are withheld until the trial is in progress they must be regarded as waived, and the deposition should be admitted in evidence.
476 18. The service of a summons on a President of of the Board of Trustees of a city, is sufficient service on the corporation.
1. A stipulation in the charter of a railroad com- pany, that the company shall pay to the State a bonus, or a portion of its earnings, is not repug- nant to the Constitution of the United States
2. Such a stipulation is not a tax on the trans- portation of goods or persons from one State to another. The latter is an interference with and a regulation of commerce between the States, and beyond the power of the State to impose. former is not.
3. The stipulation in the charter of the Balti- more and Ohio Railroad Company, that the Com- pany, at the end of every six months, shall pay to the State one-fifth of the whole amount received for the transportation of passengers, is not re- pugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Idem. 678
4. A person owning part of bonds against a rail- road, secured by a mortgage, has no right so to use them as to become the owner of the property mortgaged at the lowest possible price, leaving the bonds held by his associate holders unpaid.
5. He has no right to enter into an agreement to purchase the railroad and mortgaged property at the lowest possible price, for the exclusive benefit of the parties to the agreement, with no reference to the other bond holders.
6. Where the printed form of a bond, with its blank spaces, was signed by a surety, and delivered to the principal with authority to fill the blanks and perfect and deliver the instrument as a bond to secure his faithful service in the office of collector of internal revenue, such surety, when sued on the 6. The decision of the Supreme Court of Penn- bond is estopped from claiming, as against the gov.sylvania, that the Erie Railway Company was doing ernment, the benefit of his private instructions to business in that State, in the sense of the State Act such principal, or a private agreement with him, of May, 1868, is conclusive upon this court and is as to another penalty to be inserted in the bond, or approved by it, although only forty-two miles of it as to other sureties than those actually inserted by lie within that State. him. 614
7. If a return be awarded in a replevin suit, the surety in the replevin bond is liable on the condi- tion of the bond to return, and this without execu- tion or other demand for its return. The judgment establishes the liability.
727 8. The liability of the surety in the replerin bond is not restricted to the value of the interest of the defendant in the property seized by the sheriff. The value of the property itself at the time it was re- plevied limited by the debt still due on the attach-
7. An agreement to pay dividends on preferred stock of a railroad, out of the net earnings of the road, refers to future net earnings of the current year, and the company may, after the agreement. incur new obligations which diminish the net earn- ings applicable to such dividends, and if, in that condition of things, there are no net earnings ap- plicable to the dividends, the company cannot be required to pay them. 743
St. John v. Erie R. Co., 8. A railroad company may subject itself to the obligations of a carrier beyond its own line, and in
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