senting opinion in Bolton v. Las Camas, etc., Co., 10 Wash. 257, 38 Pac. 1047, majority holding legal title to homestead did not vest until patent issued.

Taxation.- Contingent right of pre-emption, in public lands granted to Pacific railway, conferred no exemption from taxation, whether land was patented or not; Railway v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603, 21 L. 373, overruled on this point, p. 462.

Approved in Board v. Central Colo. Imp. Co., 2 Colo. 635, holding confirmed Mexican grant subject to tax; generally in Northern Pacific Ry. v. Myers, 172 U. S. 598, 19 S. Ct. 279, Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Moseley, 52 Miss. 135, and Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 55, 8 N. W. 835.

Public lands.- Payment of costs of survey of land granted to Pacific railroad, was condition precedent to company's right to receive title from government, p. 462.

Cited and principle applied in New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 124 U. S. 131, 31 L. 386, 8 S. Ct. 421, reviewing authorities, to same effect, though costs were incurred before grant was made; Ankeny v. Clark, 148 U. S. 356, 37 L. 479, 13 S. Ct. 621, affirming S. C., 1 Wash. 557, 20 Pac. 587, citing cases, holding title of grantee of Northern Pacific Railroad Company, imperfect.

Limited in Washington, etc., Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 2 Idaho. 519, 21 Pac. 660, and Tarpey v. Salt Co., 5 Utah, 499, 17 Pac. 633, both holding a grant to railroad held to be in præsenti, vesting equitable interest; Central Branch v. Wilcox, 14 Kan. 268, company had assignable interest, and held subsequently-acquired patent in trust for assignee.

Taxation. When grant of public lands has been perfected by issue of patent, State's right to tax is complete, p. 463.

Cited in Central Pacific R. Co. v. Nevada, 162 U. S. 519, 40 L. 1059, 16 S. Ct. 886, to same effect; Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 55, 8 N. W. 835, reviewing numerous authorities, holding State might exempt such lands for terms of years.

Miscellaneous.- Cited generally in dissenting opinion in Barden v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 154 U. S. 348, 38 L. 1009, 14 S. Ct. 1046, and Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Walker, 47 Fed. 682.

22 Wall. 464-479, 22 L. 752, HUNNEWELL v. CASS COUNTY. Taxation.- Nebraska statute seems to fix March 1st as criterion to determine who shall pay personal property tax, and what county shall receive for it, p. 477.

Cited in County Commrs. v. Wilson, 15 Colo. 95, 24 Pac. 505, collecting authorities, property brought into State after date fixed not taxable for that year.

Taxation.- Where, at time bill to enjoin levy of State tax on railroad lands was filed, United States had no interest in said lands which would forbid the tax, and it was not clear that such interest existed at time assessment was made, court refused injunction, p. 478.

22 Wall. 479-491, 22 L. 789, TAYLOR v. THOMAS.

War.- Act of Mississippi legislature of December 19, 1861, authorizing issue of "cotton notes," was an act passed in aid of the Rebellion and void, and such notes are not receivable for taxes, p. 486.

War.- Act passed in aid of Rebellion is void, though passed by legislature elected before secession, and otherwise innocent of any treasonable act, pp. 488, 489.

States. Legislature of Mississippi, after that State became member of insurrectionary Confederacy, ceased to represent the State as constitutional member of Federal Union, p. 489.

Approved in Pennywit v. Foote, 27 Ohio St. 622, 22 Am. Rep. 354, reviewing authorities, judgment of court in rebel State not within full-faith-and-credit clause of Constitution.

War.- Acts necessary to peace and good order among citizens are valid, when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful government, p. 489.

Distinguished in Bragg v. Tuffts, 49 Ark. 562, 6 S. W. 161, collecting authorities, and holding treasury warrants, issued as war measure, vold.

War.― Judicial and legislative acts of Confederate States, hos tile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to authority of national government, or which impaired rights of citizens under the Constitution, are void, p. 491.

Approved and applied in Isaacs v. Richmond, 90 Va. 31, 39, 17 S. E. 761, 763, currency notes issued by Richmond held void.

22 Wall. 492-496, 22 L. 736, UNITED STATES v. SAUNDERS. Statute should be construed according to its intent and meaning as evidenced by state of law previous to its enactment, as well as its language, pp. 494-496.

Cited in School Directors v. School Directors, 81 Wis. 433, construing word " "credits" in act concerning erection of counties; State v. Shove, 96 Wis. 9, 65 Am. St. Rep. 20, 70 N. W. 314, 87 L. R. A. 146, citing cases, where certificate of deposit payable in future, was issued for money banked, such money was deposit."

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United States. Act of July 28, 1866, providing for addition of 20 per cent. to salaries of certain government employees, did not include superintendent of public garden of agricultural department, p. 496.

22 Wall. 496-513, 22 L. 858, PITAT'S ADMR. v. UNITED STATES. Evidence.- Parol evidence of what passed between parties be fore contract was put in writing, or while it was in preparation, is not, in general, admissible to vary terms of written contract, p. 506.

Evidence. Subsequently to reducing contract to writing, and before breach, parties may, by new contract, waive same, annul it or vary it in any way, which new contract may, in proper case, be proved partly by original written agreement and partly by subsequent verbal terms, p. 506.

Cited in extensive notes in 87 Am. Dec. 153, 161, and 56 Am. St. Rep. 662.

Contracts. A benefit to defendant, and loss to plaintiff, directly resulting from defendant's promise, is sufficient consideration moving from plaintiff to enable him to maintain action on the promise, pp. 507, 508.

Evidence.-Where army contractor furnished rations for some time, under written agreement, when, government being unable to carry out its part of contract, said written contract was abandoned, and pursuant to oral agreement with secretary of war, he continued to furnish rations at a different rate, parol evidence was admissible to prove the new contract, p. 507.

United States.- Commissioners appointed by Congress to audit and adjust claims against government do not possess judicial power to bind parties; but if claimants appear and accept terms awarded as final settlement without protest, they preclude themselves from further claim and litigation, p. 509.

United States. Where commissioners are forbidden by law to allow claimant more than specified amount, it would be unreasonable to suppose Congress meant that he should relinquish large balance found to be due him, p. 510.

Miscellaneous-Miscited in State v. Whitworth, 8 Lea, 623.

22 Wall. 513-527, 22 L. 758, ROBINSON ▼. ELLIOTT.

Chattel mortgage which simply allows mortgagor to retain possession and use of property until breach of condition is, when duly recorded, prima facie valid in Indiana, p. 521.

Cited and principle applied in Juvell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 434, 31 L. 193, 8 S. Ct. 195, collecting cases, question of fraud in sale to

bona fide creditor one of fact; Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U. S. 260, 34 L. 927, 11 S. Ct. 337, citing cases, holding mortgage of patent, by recorded assignment, valid; Frankhouser v. Ellett, 22 Kan. 147, 31 Am. Rep. 177, collecting authorities, holding stipulation for retention of possession not even prima facie fraudulent; Reichert v. Simons, 6 Dak. 242, 42 N. W. 658, fact that chattel mortgagor remained in possession, not fraudulent.

Chattel mortgage containing provisions which vitiate whole instrument, is not rendered even prima facie good against creditors by recording it, p. 521.

Cited in Means v. Dowd, 128 U. S. 284, 287, 32 L. 435, 436, 9 S. Ct. 68, 70, assignment, with beneficial interest reserved to insolvent debtor, held void; Lutz v. Kinney, Nev. 49 Pac. 455, and Pelser v. Peticolas, 50 Tex. 646, 32 Am. Rep. 623, mortgage void, where mortgagor retained possession with unrestricted power of disposition.

Chattal mortgages.— Whether chattel mortgage is on its face vold as against creditors is question for court; provision of statute that fraudulent intent shall be deemed question of fact applies to cases of actual fraud, p. 522.

Followed in Sparks v. Mack, 31 Ark. 671, conveyance with reservation to insolvent debtor held void as to creditors; Leopold v. Silverman, 7 Mont. 276, 16 Pac. 582, Greeley v. Winsor, 1 S. Dak. 622, 48 N. W. 215, and Wineburgh v. Schær, 2 Wash. Ter. 334, 335, 5 Pac. 300, 301, holding mortgages void as matter of law.

Chattel mortgage in Indiana, by which mortgagor is permitted to retain possession of goods, and to sell same for express purpose of applying proceeds on mortgage debt, would seem to be valid, p. 524.

Cited and principle applied in Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U. S. 272, 274, 35 L. 174, 175, 11 S. Ct. 567, 568, and Meyer, etc., Co. v. Shenkberg Co., S. Dak., 80 N. W. 128, reviewing authorities, holding mortgage valid, where net proceeds were so applied; Overman v. Quick, 8 Biss. 136, 137, F. C. 10,624, a case such as stated in rule; Maish v. Bird, 22 Fed. 579, and Murray v. McNealy, 86 Ala. 236, 11 Am. St. Rep. 34, 5 So. 566, reviewing authorities, Bannon v. Bowler, 34 Minn. 418, 26 N. W. 238, Red River Nat. Bank v. North Star, etc., Co., 8 N. Dak. 442, 79 N. W. 885, and Langert v. Brown, 3 Wash. Ter. 107, 13 Pac. 704, mortgage sustained where proceeds of sales were so applied; Lepin v. Coon, 54 Neb. 666, 74 N. W. 1080, power of sale did not per se render mortgage invalid; Wilson v. Sullivan, 58 N. H. 264, mortgage valid, where proceeds of sales were so applied, though power of sale did not so provide; Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 221, where mortgagor was to sell and account for proceeds to mortgagee.

Chattel mortgage of stock of goods, authorizing retention of possession and sale of same for sole benefit of mortgagor (e. g., to replenish stock with new goods to which lien shall attach), on its face shows that its legal effect is to hinder and delay creditors; the law imputes to it a fraudulent purpose, regardless of parties' motives, and equity will not enforce it against creditors, pp. 523, 524, 526.

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Cited and relied upon in following cases: Means v. Dowd, 128 U. S. 284, 287, 32 L. 435, 436, 9 S. Ct. 68, 70, and Sparks v. Mack, 31 Ark. 670, 671, reviewing authorities, assignment, with beneficial interest reserved to insolvent debtor, held void; Crooks v. Stuart, 2 McCrary, 17, 18, 7 Fed. 803, 804, setting aside mortgage, where mortgagor continued business on his own account, with mortgagee's assent; Simon v. Openheimer, 20 Fed. 556, Rumsey v. Town, 20 Fed. 567, and Jewett v. Lundback, 5 S. Dak. 124, 58 N. W. 25, mortgage void as to persons dealing with mortgagor, after its execution, and before recording; In re Bloom, 3 Fed. Cas. 726, and Lyon v. Council Bluffs Sav. Bank, 29 Fed. 573, 575, 576, 578, reviewing numerous authorities, Wilson v. Voight, 9 Colo. 617, 619, 13 Pac. 728, 729, Logan v. Logan, 22 Fla. 566, 567, 1 Am. St. Rep. 215, 216, Lewiston Nat. Bank v. Martin, 2 Idaho, 705, 706, 23 Pac. 921, 922, Mobley v. Letts, 61 Ind. 20, Harman v. Hoskins, 56 Miss. 148, Leopold v. Silverman, 7 Mont. 275, 276, 277, 278, 16 Pac. 582, 583, Rocheleau v. Boyle, 11 Mont. 461, 462, 463, 466, 28 Pac. 875, 876, 877, Lutz v. Kinney, Nev. 49 Pac. 455, and Greeley v. Winsor, 1 S. Dak. 622, 48 N. W. 215, all following rule upon similar state of facts; In re Foster, 9 Fed. Cas. 525, such mortgage a fraudulent conveyance, under bankrupt act; Wells v. Langbein, 20 Fed. 184, 185, reviewing cases, possession, taken under such mortgage, void against subsequent attachment; Benedict-Hall Co. v. Renfro Bros., 75 Ala. 124, 125, 127, 51 Am. Rep. 429, 430, 432, reviewing numerous authorities, mortgage void against creditors, where such power was necessarily implied; McDermott v. Eborn, 90 Ala. 260, 7 So. 752, and Eckman v. Munnerlyn, 32 Fla. 374, 13 So. 924, reviewing authorities; Stein v. Munch, 24 Minn. 394, Spiegelberg v. Hersch, 3 N. Mex. 283, 284 (205, 205), 4 Pac. 706, Bank v. Cooke, 3 Okl. 547, 549, 551, 41 Pac. 633, 634, and Orton v. Orton, 7 Or. 483, 33 Am. Rep. 720, cases in which mortgagor in possession continued sales for his own benefit under verbal agreement; Dougherty v. Bogy, Ind. Ter., 53 S. W. 549, where mortgage operated to delay creditors, actual purpose was immaterial; McCarthy v. Miller, 41 Mo. App. 205, though valid on face, court of equity declared mortgage fraudulent upon evidence; Leopold v. Silverman, 7 Mont. 275, 276. 277, 278, 16 Pac. 582, 583, mortgage void, though mortgagor was to account for sales; Peiser v. Peticolas, 50 Tex. 646, 647, 32 Am. Rep. 623, 625, and Wineburgh v. Schær, 2 Wash. Ter. 334, 335, 5 Pac