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56 N. W. 272, 20 L. R. A. 319, reviewing authorities, Instruction that carrier must use only ordinary and reasonable care, erroneous. Cited also in extensive notes in 43 Am. Dec. 363, 62 Am. Dec. 681, 684, and 50 Am. Rep. 558.

Distinguished in Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Walton, 3 N. Mex. 540 (384, 385), 9 Pac. 354, proof of killing of mule did not raise presumption of negligence.

Carriers.- Plaintiff, having shown injury while passenger on defendant's railroad, in exercise of ordinary care, latter must show that its whole duty was performed, and that injury was unavoidable by human foresight, pp. 346, 350.

Approved and applied in Gleeson v. Virginia, etc., R. Co., 140 U. S. 443, 35 L. 463, 11 S. Ct. 862, reviewing authorities, as to injury caused by collision with landslide; Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. v. Love, 01 Ala. 434, 24 Am. St. Rep. 928, 8 So. 715, Southern Kan. Ry. Co. ▼. Walsh, 45 Kan. 659, 26 Pac. 47, and Cloudy v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 85, citing authorities, and approving instruction to same effect; Montgomery, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mallette, 92 Ala. 216, 9 So. 365, and Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 521, 30 Am. St. Rep. 71, 9 So. 725, collecting numerous authorities, where, after proof of injury, burden was on carrier; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ritter, 85 Ky. 372, 3 S. W. 592, Stevens v. E. & N. A. Ry., 66 Me. 77, Smith v. St. Paul City Ry., 32 Minn. 5, 50 Am. Rep. 552, 18 N. W. 829, and Madden v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 50 Mo. App. 675, all holding burden on carrier, after proof of injury. Cited also in elaborate notes in 43 Am. Dec. 355, and 20 Am. St. Rep. 491.

Distinguished in Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Walton, 3 N. Mex. 540 (884, 385), 9 Pac. 354, proof of killing mule, raised no presumption of negligence.

Negligence.- Ordinary care is that degree of care which may reasonably be expected under circumstances, pp. 346, 350.

Cited in Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 417, 36 L. 489, 12 S. Ct. 683, collecting authorities, approving instruction to same effect. Cited also in extensive note in 55 Am. Dec. 672.

Carriers of passengers, by rail, must use greatest possible care and diligence, pp. 346, 350.

Carriers of passengers, by rail, bound to use best precautions and Improvements in known practical use, pp. 346, 350.

Approved in Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 456, 26 L. 144, holding railroad company liable for injury caused by falling berth in sleeper; Madden v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 50 Mo. App. 675, demurrer to evidence overruled.

Negligence. If negligence of plaintiff contributed to the injury, so that injury would not have occurred had he not been negligent, there can be no recovery, pp. 347, 350.

Approved in Dougherty v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 9 Mo. App. 486, holding demurrer to plaintiff's evidence improperly sustained.

Carriers. Proof of injury to passenger standing in slowly-moving sleeping-car, through sudden jerk, which threw her against seat, held sufficient to justify court in leaving case to jury, p. 350. Approved in Dougherty v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 9 Mo. App. 482, reviewing authorities, where injury was caused by starting of horse-car before passenger was seated; Nelson v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 88 Va. 979, mere fact that plaintiff was standing on car, did not show contributory negligence; Lane v. Spokane, etc., Ry. Co., Wash., 57 Pac. 370, whether standing in aisle was contributory negligence, properly left to jury. See note in 62 Am. Dec. 684.

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Trial. Request to charge jury is properly refused where it involves determination of facts by court, concerning which there is conflict of evidence, p. 350.

Cited and applied in Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. 8. 417, 96 L. 489, 12 8. Ct. 683, collecting authorities, and holding question of negligence properly left to jury; Pyle v. Clark, 79 Fed. 747, 49 U. S. App. 264, and Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Chambers, 68 Fed. 151, 32 U. S. App. 253, citing cases, where question of contributory negligence was properly left to jury; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Charless, 51 Fed. 576, 7 U. S. App. 359, Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Jarvi, 53 Fed. 70, 10 U. S. App. 439, and Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Peterson, 55 Fed. 943, 12 U. S. App. 254, reviewing authorities, affirming trial court's refusal to direct verdict for defendant.

Limited in Pyle v. Clark, 79 Fed. 747, 49 U. S. App. 264, collecting cases, being no conflict, question of contributory negligence properly determined by court.

Trial. Where evidence submitted by plaintiff is sufficient to justify court in leaving case to jury, non-suit is properly refused, p. 350.

Witnesses. In Federal courts, parties to suit are admissible to testify for themselves and compellable to testify for the others, p. 350.

Cited in Lowery v. Kusworm, 66 Fed. 540, compelling plaintiff to attend, with certain papers, and testify at defendant's instance.

22 Wall. 351-381, 22 L. 716, WOODSON v. MURDOCK.

Constitutional law. Every clause of Constitution must have reasonable interpretation, p. 369.

Trusts. A trustee may have no right to give up security for claim, and yet be at full liberty to settle and adjust or sell claim itself, p. 871.

Constitutional law. Provision of State Constitution that " general assembly shall have no power, for any purpose, to release lien held by State upon any railroad," construed to mean that while debt remains, legislature may not let go security for it, and not to forbid sale or compromise of claim for less than total indebtedness, pp. 369, 370.

Cited in Cleveland City Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 94 Fed. 408, collecting cases, statute did not forbid city to modify contract with company as to rates; State v. Chappell, 74 Mo. 347, construing later constitutional provision further restricting power of legislature.

Railroads.- Missouri act of 1868, providing for sale of Pacific railroad and foreclosure of State's lien thereon, not repugnant to provision of Missouri Constitution forbidding legislature to release State's lien on any railroad, nor with railroad ordinance adopted with Constitution; compromise or sale of State's claim against said road and release of lien, under said act, held valid, pp. 371, 372, 873.

Cited in Ketchum v. Pacific R. R., 4 Dill. 85, F. C. 7,739, declaring lien of county on earnings of road, under provisions of said act.

Statutes. Act having many details, but all relating to one general subject, held not repugnant to constitutional provision requiring that no law shall relate to more than one subject, which shall be expressed in title, p. 373.

Cited and applied in State v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 33 Fed. 766, collecting authorities, upholding statute relative to disposal of certain lands on Chicago water front; Cantini v. Tillman, 54 Fed. 975, reviewing authorities, upholding "dispensary act," under Constitution of South Carolina; Block v. State, 66 Ala. 495, and Howell v. State, 71 Ga. 230, 51 Am. Rep. 263, reviewing authorities, statute prohibiting sale of liquor in two localities, held valid; Carson v. State, 69 Ala. 240, citing cases, prohibition statute valid, though more liquors mentioned in act than in title; Wilson v. Benton, 11 Lea, 56, particulars of assessment and collection stated in act for collection of revenue.

Distinguished in Ballentyne v. Wickersham, 75 Ala. 536, reviewIng authorities, act containing two independent subjects, held invalid; County Commrs. v. Aspen, etc., Co., 3 Colo. App. 225, 32 Pac. 718, where interpolation of new section was not permissible, under title of amendatory act.

States. Bill against governor to enjoin sale of railroad under lien, in favor of State, already released, entertained by Circuit Court, and injunction granted, p. 374.

Approved and principle relied upon in Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea, 259, reviewing authorities, suit against funding board not forbidden as against State.

Railroads. A railroad mortgage, in favor of State, and existing by virtue of statute, incidentally recognized as valid, p. 374.

Cited to this point in note in 4 Am. St. Rep. 702.

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Constitutional law. Fundamental principles of government, found in Constitutions, must necessarily be declared in terms very general, because they must be very comprehensive, Miller, J., dissenting, p. 381.

Approved in Opinion of the Justices, 66 N. H. 655, 33 Atl. 1090, reviewing numerous authorities, holding property of railroad could not be taken for less than its value without owner's consent.

Miscellaneous.- St. Louis, etc., Ry. v. Loftin, 30 Ark. 701, not in

point.

22 Wall. 381-394, 22 L. 796, MORGAN v. CAMPBELL.

Landlord and tenant.- At common law, landlord could distrain any goods found on premises at time of taking, but had no lien until actual seizure, p. 390.

Cited in note in 41 Am. Dec. 211.

Liens. Statutory lien implies security upon the thing before warrant to seize it is levied; levy and sale are only means of enforcing it, p. 390.

Cited in Rosenberg v. Shaper, 51 Tex. 142, where statutory lien of landlord attached independently of distress warrant.

Landlord and tenant.- In Illinois, landlord has no common-law lien on goods of tenant for rent, and no statutory lien, except as to growing crops, p. 392.

Cited in First Nat. Bank v. Adam, 138 Ill. 499, 28 N. E. 957, reviewing cases, provision of lease did not give lien superior to subsequent mortgage; Kellogg v. Newspaper Co. v. Peterson, 162 Ill. 161, 53 Am. St. Rep. 303, 44 N. E. 412, sale of goods, held valid, as against subsequent levy of distress warrant for rent.

Bankruptcy.- Assignment in bankruptcy relates back to commencement of proceedings, and vests title to bankrupt's estate, in assignee, though it is then attached on mesne process as property of bankrupt, p. 393.

Approved in Cunningham v. Hall, 69 Me. 354, collecting cases, composition did not discharge attachment lien on property never conveyed to assignee; Hirshiser v. Tinsley, 9 Mo. App. 342, holding summons in creditor's suit such mesne process.

Bankruptcy.- Main purpose of bankrupt act to distribute property of bankrupt equally among creditors, and creditor, who has not security which binds property, at time proceedings are begun, is prevented from obtaining it, p. 393.

Approved in Trow v. Lovett, 122 Mass. 573, filing of bill to apply property to execution, gave no such lien.

Bankruptcy.

There is no good reason why law should protect Men of landlord, under distress warrant, levied after petition filed, and repudiate equally meritorious creditor in levy of attachment, D. 393.

Approved in In re Robinson, 20 Fed. Cas. 985, where urban landlord had no right to priority, under Texas statute.

Bankruptcy. Where, after filing petition in bankruptcy, and before decree, distress warrant for rent is levied on bankrupt's goods, landlord acquires no right to said goods as against assignee, pp. 393, 394.

Cited in Sage v. Wynkoop, 21 Fed. Cas. 149, levy of attachment, relinquished before filing of petition, created no lien against assignee.

Distinguished in Wood v. McCardell, etc., Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 435, 24 Atl. 229, under local statutes, landlord entitled to priority; Cowan ▼. Dunn, 1 Lea, 72, lien acquired by filing bill to apply property to judgment, not dissolved.

22 Wall. 395-406, 22 L. 801, AMSINCK v. BEAN.

Bankruptcy.- Where all partners become bankrupt, separate es tate of one may not claim against joint estate, in competition with firm creditors, nor shall joint estate claim against separate in competition with separate creditors, p. 402.

Cited in elaborate note in 43 Am. St. Rep. 369.

Bankruptcy. Solvent partner cannot prove separate debt against separate estate of bankrupt partner, in competition with joint creditors of firm, p. 402.

Bankruptcy. Solvent partner cannot prove against separate estate of bankrupt partner, in competition with his separate creditors, until all joint creditors of firm are paid or fully indemnified, except to firm purposes, or distinct trade is prosecuted by one or more members of firm, pp. 402, 403.

Bankruptcy. After bankruptcy of one partner is decreed, solvent partners retain full power and authority over firm property, as though bankruptcy of partner had not occurred, p. 403.

Cited in In re Jewett, 7 Biss. 334, F. C. 7,306, same parties, as members of different firms, adjudicated bankrupt in different districts.

Bankruptcy.- Debts due by bankrupt partner, to firm, entitled to priority over debts due his separate creditors; and if joint funds are insufficient to discharge debt to firm, solvent partners may prove deficiency against separate estate of bankrupt, p. 403.

Partnership. When individual partner is decreed bankrupt, firm is dissolved, but joint property remains in hands of solvent partner

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