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Taxation. There is no presumption in favor of relinquishment of taxing power; reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of State, and language claimed to exempt property from taxation must leave no room for controversy, p. 226.

Cited and applied in Central R. R., etc., Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 675, 23 L. 761, and St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Berry, 41 Ark. 517, reviewing authorities, where consolidation did not extend exemption to corporation not possessing immunity; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 686, 40 L. 854, 16 S. Ct. 717, reviewing authorities, holding railroad not authorized to purchase competing line; Dauphin, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kennerly, 74 Ala. 589, holding company not exempt from taxation; Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v. Bourbon County, 82 Ky. 502, exemption from State taxation held not to affect taxation by county; Bangor v. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 433, 40 Am. Rep. 370, holding Masonic lodge not exempt as charitable institution; Yazoo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 65 Miss. 562, where, though exempt after completion, railroad was not so during construction; Boody v. Watson, 63 N. H. 321, statute authorizing exemption for ten years, held not to authorize exemption for second period; Dow v. Railroad, 67 N. H. 48, 36 Atl. 534, reviewing authorities, and applying principle to repealing power; Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah, 249, 48 Pac. 1100, holding mortgages not exempt.

Taxation. Act granting railroad immunity from taxation for certain period, after which it should "be subject to taxation," etc., did not exempt from any tax whatever, after expiration of that period, pp. 227, 228.

Approved in dissenting opinion in Savannah v. Jesup, 106 U. 8. 571, 27 L. 278, 1 S. Ct. 518, majority holding statutes exempted railroad from municipal tax.

Distinguished in Savannah v. Jesup, 106 U. S. 569, 27 L. 278, 1 8. Ct. 517, holding property of railroad exempt from municipal tax.

Taxation.—Where, in amendment to charter of railroad company, special provision is made for ascertaining tax due State, silence on subject of taxation for other purposes cannot be construed as waiver of State's rights in that regard, pp. 228, 229.

Cited in Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 327, 29 L. 643, 6 S. Ct. 342, reviewing authorities, authority granted company to fix rates did not deprive State of right to pass on their reasonableness.

Distinguished in Pingree v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 118 Mich. 329, 76 N. W. 640, reviewing authorities, and holding State had comferred contract right on company to fix tolls.

Taxation. Provision in charter of railroad company requiring president to make sworn statement of cash value of its property, held not to deprive State of right to change manner of assessment. p. 230.

Followed in Moore v. Holliday, 4 Dill. 53, F. C. 9,765, to same effect; State Board v. Morris, etc., R. Co., 49 N. J. L. 222, 7 Atl. 840, States not concluded by similar provision.

Taxation.- Legislature having provided method of assessment of State tax, by company's charter, it must be followed until another be appointed, p. 230.

Courts.- Decision of highest court of State, as to whether or not method pursued in assessment and collection of taxes is in conformity with law of State, is controlling in Federal courts, p. 231.

Approved and principle applied in Hawes v. Contra Costa W. Co., 5 Sawy. 289, F. C. 6,235, citing cases, adopting decision of State court as to water company's obligation to furnish free water to municipality; Reclamation District v. Hagar, 6 Sawy. 570, 4 Fed. 369, collecting authorities, following State court's construction of statutes as to assessment of district; Daniels v. Case, 45 Fed. 845, following State court's ruling as to validity of tax deed; Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 552, 39 Am. St. Rep. 201, 36 N. E. 631, 23 L. R. A. 670, collecting authorities, and holding binding the construction of local statutes by court of another State; Perry v. Wheeler, 12 Bush, 552, reviewing authorities, and following decision of board of reference of Episcopal church, as to matters within its jurisdiction; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 236, 28 Am. Rep. 143, holding decree of divorce, by another State court. binding, the parties having been citizens.

22 Wall. 231-238, 22 L. 799, FRENCH v. HAY.

Contracts- Judgments.- Where party executed assignment of certain judgments, in consideration of $5,000, and a power of attorney to dispose of same, transaction was at most an executory agreement to assign, and transmission of title and payment were intended to be contemporaneous, p. 236.

Distinguished in Beardsley v. Beardsley, 138 U. S. 267, 34 L. 929, 11 S. Ct. 319, where transaction was held to be sale, with reservation of security.


Contracts. Rule that in equity time is generally not considered as of essence of the contract, is inapplicable in case of offer that requires acceptance to make a contract, p. 236.

Equity.- Bill alleging assignment of judgments, and that assignor has wrongfully collected same and now holds money for use of complainant, shows a complete remedy at law; bill not being for discovery, aid of equity is not needed, p. 237.

Judgment. Since no one but owner of judgments may cause valid acknowledgments of satisfaction to be made, satisfaction caused to be entered by owner's assignor does not affect former's rights p. 238.

Bankruptcy. In order to bring security for debt given within four months of bankruptcy, within prohibition of bankruptcy law, it is necessary that all prescribed conditions should occur, p. 177.

Doctrine relied upon in Harmanson v. Bain, 1 Hughes, 201, F. C. 6,072, dismissing bill to set aside fraudulent transfers for want of necessary parties; Matthews v. Westphal, 1 McCrary, 447, 48 Fed. 665, holding chattel mortgage given more than four months prior to filing of petition not fraudulent; So. Car. Loan, etc.. Co. v. McPherson, 26 S. C. 438, 2 S. E. 271, holding failure to record mortgage did not make it fraudulent within meaning of bankruptcy act.

Bankruptcy. Exchange of securities within four months is not fraudulent preference within meaning of bankruptcy act, if security given up is a valid one when exchange is made, and of equal value with one substituted for it, pp. 177, 178.


Applied in Sawyer v. Turpin, 91 U. S. 121, 23 L. 237, sustaining substitution of chattel mortgage for bill of sale, though latter was never recorded; Douglass v. Vogeler, 6 Fed. 57, holding exchange of mortgages valid as against assignee; Hutchinson Murchie, 74 Me. 191, substitution of mortgage for bill of sale affecting same property; Stewart v. Hopkins, 30 Ohio St. 532, holding payment of mortgage by insolvent not a preference where mortgage gave full security; Colt v. Sears Com. Co., 20 R. I. 65. 37 Atl. 312, holding transfer of indebtedness and securities to another not fraudulent preference; Akers v. Rowan, 33 S. C. 474, 12 8. E. 173, 10 L. R. A. 716, and n., where mortgage was merely renewed, held valid.

Distinguished in Morey v. Milliken, 86 Me. 481, 30 Atl. 108, holding replacing of securities already lost not an exchange, and, therefore, fraudulent.

Bankruptcy.-Assignee in bankruptcy takes estate subject to rights, legal and equitable, of all other parties, p. 178.

Cancellation of instruments.- Equity will annul cancellation of notes, etc., and revive securities, where there has been failure of consideration, fraud, or mistake, p. 178.

Usury. If security, fatally tainted with usury, and founded upon prior one free from it, but given up and cancelled, is de clared void, prior one will be revived, p. 179.

Approved and followed in Quint v. First Nat. Bank, Kau. App. 一, 58 Pac. 1012, holding usurious interest in renewal notes did not affect legal interest previously charged; Rountree v. Brinson, 98 N. C. 110, 3 S. E. 748, allowing plaintiff to recover on former debt, though bond sued on was usurious; dissenting opinion in Frederick Inst. v. Michael, 81 Md. 508, 32 Atl. 342, 33 L. R. A.

636, and n., majority holding surety's obligation on original note discharged by substitution of securities with knowledge of debtor's financial condition.

22 Wall. 180-198, 22 L. 863, THE ELGEE COTTON CASES.

War. No one is allowed to sue in Court of Claims for proceeds of captured or abandoned property, unless he can prove ownership, his right to proceeds, and that he never gave aid or comfort to the Rebellion, p. 186.

Affirmed in Scudder v. Ames, 142 Mo. 243, 43 S. W. 675, action over same subject-matter.

Sale. Whether property passes or not is dependent upon intention of parties to contract to be gathered from its language, p. 187.

Cited with approval in Hatch v. Oil Co., 100 U. S. 136, 25 L. 558, holding intention proved that title to staves should pass upon being piled and counted; Byles v. Colier, 54 Mich. 6, 19 N. W. 567, holding title might have passed without delivery, and even though further inspection was necessary; Rail v. Little Falls, etc., Co., 47 Minn. 425, 50 N. W. 472, holding property in logs vested without delivery or payment.

Sale. When by agreement vendor is to do anything to goods to put them into deliverable state, performance of those things shall be taken as condition precedent to vesting of property p. 188.

Cited in Commonwealth v. Greenfield, 121 Mass. 41, holding title to liquor did not pass until delivered at L.

Sale. Where anything remains to be done to goods to ascertain price, as by weighing, measuring, etc., performance of these things shall be condition precedent to transfer of property, although individual goods are ascertained, e. g., cotton to be paid for when weighed, pp. 188, 189.

Followed in Blackwood v. Cutting, etc., Co., 76 Cal. 217, 218, 18 Pac. 251, 9 Am. St. Rep. 203, 204, holding no sale until apricots could be identified and weighed or measured; New England, etc., Co. v. Standard, etc., Co., 165 Mass. 329, 52 Am. St. Rep. 518, 43 N. E. 112, collecting authorities, holding title to wool did not pass until separated from larger mass.

Sale. Where buyer is by contract bound to do anything, as consideration, either precedent or concurrent, on which passing of property depends, title will not pass until condition be fulfilled, though buyer has possession, p. 188.

Applied in Beardsley v. Beardsley, 138 U. S. 266, 34 L. 929, 11 S. Ct. 319, executed contract of sale of stock with reservation of security by vendor: Hull v. Pitrat, 45 Fed. 100, holding conveyance

of land free from incumbrance condition precedent to passing of title to patent; Daugherty v. Fowler, 44 Kan. 632, 25 Pac. 41, 10 L. R. A. 316, holding payment condition concurrent to passing of title to butterine.

Sale. Property may be in one person and risk in another, p. 194.

Sale-Earnest money is of small importance in consideration of its effect on transfer of title, p. 195.

Miscellaneous.- Cited as res adjudicata in suits over same subject-matter, Bouchard v. Parker, 32 La. Ann. 539, and Scudder v. Ames, 142 Mo. 240, 43 8. W. 674.

22 Wall. 198-208, 22 L. 769, FRETZ v. STOVER.

Appeal and error.- Objection that there is no replication in record cannot be made for first time on appeal to Supreme Court, p. 204.

Approved in Southern R. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 86 Fed. 424, presuming on appeal that pleadings were complete where part of record was destroyed; Woodward v. Sloan, 27 Ohio St. 597, holding it too late to insist that there was no denial of adverse possession set up in answer.

Equity. No formal replication is required to avoid effect of answer to bill of revivor, for no new defenses set up in such answer can be considered, p. 204.

Approved in Mason v. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 19 Fed. 56, allowing bill of revivor without considering merits; Newcombe v. Murray, 77 Fed. 493, determining necessary parties in bill to revive. Cited generally in Mackaye v. Mallory, 79 Fed. 2, 45 U. S. App. 741.

Principal and agent.- Agent in Virginia has no authority to take Confederate paper worthless in Pennsylvania, to discharge debts due his principal, a citizen of Pennsylvania, p. 206.

Approved in Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 430, 432, 24 L. 455, holding tender of premium to one who had ceased to act as agent during war, not good; McBurney v. Carson, 99 U. S. 572, 25 L. 382, and Opie v. Castleman, 32 Fed. 514, holding devisees not bound by act of executor in accepting Confederate money in payment of land; Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 476, 28 L. 760, 5 S. Ct. 232, holding investment in Confederate currency by guardian unlawful; Dorr v. Gibboney's Exrx., 3 Hughes, 386, 390, F. C. 4,006, holding trustee could not pay debt to creditor residing in loyal State with Confederate notes; Bynum v. Barefoot, 75 N. C. 581, holding judgment could not be paid in Confederate money during war. Cited, arguedo, in Hendry v. Benlisa, 37 Fla. 622, 20 So. 802, 34 L. R. A. 286. See notes, 15 Am. Dec. 133, and 47 Am. Dec. 848.

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