REBELLION.

SEE BONDS, 3, 4.

BILLS AND NOTES, 14.

840

CONFEDERACY, 1, 2.

CONFISCATION, passim.

CONTRACTS, 31.

9. A motion of one defendant to transfer the
cause, as to himself, from the State to the Circuit
Court, cannot be granted unless there can be a final
determination of the case, so far as it concerns him,
without the presence of the other defendant as a
party.

Gardner v. Brown,

527

by plaintiff, the scizure by the marshal on a writ of
de retorno habendo, and tender of the property to
plaintiff, satisfied the bond and the judgment.

Douglass v. Douglass,

479

2. If the defendant injured the property or cul-
pably suffered it to become injured, while it was in
his possession, a remedy cannot be had in a suit on
the bond.

Idem,

479

3. If a writ de retorno habendo had issued, it
would have been the duty of the defendant to seek
the plaintiff and deliver the property to him if
he would receive it.

Idem,

479

4. Where logs cut from the lands of the State
without license, have been intermingled with the
logs cut from other lands, so as not to be distin-
guishable, the State is entitled, under the law of
Minnesota, to replevy an equal amount from the
whole mass.

Schulenberg v. Harriman,

551

5. In a suit on a replevin bond, the defendants
cannot avail themselves of the failure of the court
to render in the replevin suit the alternative judg-
ment for the return of the property or for its value,
even if that were an error.

Sweeney v. Lomme,

RES JUDICATA.

727

1. One will be bound by a decree of the state
court if he was a party to the proceedings.
Williams v. Bankhead,
184

and upon its receivers, when they were parties and
2. A judgment is conclusive upon a corporation,
contested the claim, and, subsequently, the at.or-
ney for the receivers consented to its entry.

Habich v. Folger,

307
3. Where a point has been decided in a state
court, it is res judicata between the parties, and
cannot be litigated anew on the same contract in a
Federal Court.

331

Tioga R. R. Co. v. B. & C. R. R. Co.
4. A decree of the District Court in a bankruptcy
case is as conclusive as the decree of any other
court of general jurisdiction, and cannot be im-
peached except in the court where it was entered.
or by some direct proceeding in some other court of
competent jurisdiction.

Michaels v. Post,

520

5. Whenever a judgment or decree is procured
through fraud, or by collusion of the parties, for
the purpose of defrauding some third person, such
ceeding, the fraud or collusion by which the judg-
third person may show, even in a collateral pro-
ment was obtained.

Idem,

RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

520

on the question whether his use and enjoyment of
the water to the extent of the original appropria-
tion, has been impaired by the acts of the other
parties.
Idem,

452
3. Whether upon a bill asserting that the prior
rights of the first appropriator have been invaded,
a court of equity will restrain the acts of the party
complained of, will depend upon whether the in
jury alleged be irremediable; whether an action at
law would afford adequate remedy; whether the
parties are able to pay the damages and other con-
siderations which govern a court of equity in is-
suing injunctions.

Idem,
452
4. By the Act of Congress of July 26, 1866, the
customary law with respect to the use of water,
which has grown up among occupants of the public
land, is recognized as valid.

Idem,

SALES.

SEE ATTORNEY, 4.

VENDOR AND VENDEE, 1-4.

452

1. Upon a sale of personal property, the price to
be fixed by arbitration, if the arbitration be ren-
dered impossible by the act of the vendee, the
price must be fixed by the jury on a quantum vale-
bat.

Humaston v. Telegraph Co.,

279
2. Where the vendee agreed to pay for personal
property, certain shares of stock which he failed to
deliver, and is sued on the agreement, the value of
the stock, when the bargain was concluded and not
at any other time, is the evidence of the price of
the property.
idem,

SALT SPRINGS.

SEE LANDS, 28.

SALVAGE.

279

A return to a summons by the sheriff, that he has
served the defendant personally therewith, is suf-
ficient without stating that the service was made in
his county.
70

Knowles v. Logansport Gas-Light Co.,
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

1. Specific performance is never decreed, where
the party can be otherwise fully compensated.
Memphis v. Brown,

264
2. To justify a decree for the specific perform-
ance, by vendor, of a parol contract for the sale of
real estate, the contract sought to be enforced, and
its performance on the part of the vendee, must
be clearly proved.

Rogers Locomotive, etc., Co. v. Helm, 563
3. The agreed price, a description of the real es-
tate agreed to be sold and payment of such price,
must be shown.
Idem,

STAMP ACT.

563

10. Where the constitutionality of a state Act au-
thorizing the issue of bonds, by a municipality, has
been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State,
such decision is binding upon this court.
517

Chambers Co. v. Clews,

11. The Pennsylvania Act of May, 1868, does not
impair any obligation of the State not to impose a
tax upon the Erie Railway Company, created by
the several Acts in relation to that Company.

Erie Ry. Co. v. Pa.,

595

12. An Act, general in its language as to a sub-
ject is valid, although special legislation is for-
bidden in the State Constitution.

2. The writ of error may be served at any time
before, or simultaneously with, the filing of the
bond.
Telegraph Co. v. Eyser,
43
3. Where a judgment has been stayed by super-
sedeas before it has been enforced by execution, no
new supersedeas is necessary.

Commissioners v. Gorman,

148

4. A supersedeas stays proceedings only from the
filing of the bond. It prevents further proceeding
under an execution which has been issued, but
does not interfere with what has already been done.
Idem.
226

5. Where the bond was filed too late to prevent
the removal of defendant from his office in pur-
suance of the authority of the judgment, this court
cannot order him to be restored.

Idem,

TAXES AND TAX SALES.

SEE BANKRUPTCY, 24.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 8-10.
EVIDENCE, 43.

INJUNCTIONS, 1.

MANDAMUS, 2.

RAILROADS, 11.

STATE LAWS AND DECISIONS, 7.

226

1. The appropriate remedy against a municipality
for neglect to collect the tax to pay a judgment
against it, is a writ of mandamus commanding the
municipality to levy and collect the tax. A new
writ may issue as often as the occasion rèquires.
Rees v. Watertown,

72

72

3. The Internal Revenue Act of July 13, 1866,
authorizes the levy and collection of a tax upon the
accumulated earnings of a savings bank, carried to
the contingent fund.

Savings Bank v. United States.

80
4. An action of debt is maintainable in the cir-
cuit court by the United States for the recovery of
the taxes.
Idem,

80

5. No other assessment than that made by the
statute was necessary to determine the extent of
the bank's liability.

Idem,

So
6. The Legislature of a State can provide for the
taxation of the owners of shares of the capital
stock of a national bank, at the place within the
State, where the bank was located, without regard
to their places of residence.

Tappan v. Merchant's National Bank,

189
7. The power of taxation by any State is limited
to persons, property or business within its jurisdic
tion.

Idem,

189
8. Personal property, in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, follows the person of the owner,
and has its situs at his domicil. But, for the pur-
poses of taxation, it may be separated from him,
and he may be taxed on its account at the place
where it is actually located.

Idem,

189

9. Shares of stock in a national bank are person-
al property, and the law which creates them may
separate them from the person of their owner for
the purposes of taxation, and give them a situs of
their own.
Idem,

189
10. The State within which a national bank is
situated has jurisdiction, for the purposes of tax-
ation, of all the shareholders of the bank, both
resident and non-resident, and of all its shares, and
may legislate accordingly.

Idem,

Heine v. Levee Comrs.

189

11. The power to levy and collect taxes does not
belong to a court of equity.
223
12. Taxes are not liens unless declared so by
the Legislature.
223

Idem,

22. The Erie Railway Co. is liable to the tax im-
posed by the Pennsylvania Act of May, 1868.
Idem,
595

23. The term "capital," employed by a banker in
the business of banking, in the 110th section of the
Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, does not include
moneys borrowed by him from time to time tem-
porarily, in the ordinary course of his business, and
such moneys are not liable to taxation as capital.
Bailey v. Clark,
651

24. The contingent right of pre-emption in lands
granted to the Pacific Railroad Company, does not
constitute an exemption of those lands from state
taxation.
747
Union & P. R. R. Co. v. McShane,
25. But the lands on which the costs of survey
have not been paid, and for which the United
States has not issued a patent to the company, are
exempt from state taxation.

28. Where the depositors in a savings bank con-
tracted not for a rate of interest upon their de
posits, but for a share of the profits, although the
profits were derived from interest, yet the portion
divided to each was a dividend, and liable to a
tax, under the Act of 1864, as amended in 1866.
Cary v. Savings Union,
779

29. Where the United States granted lands to a
State to aid in the construction of railroads and
the State accepted the grant, it cannot tax the land
while the title remained in the United States, nor
while it held them as the trustee of the United
States.
S05

Tucker v. Ferguson,

30. But when the State proceeding in the execu
tion of the trust, had transferred its entire title to
a railroad company, and the company had per-
fected their title and acquired the right to sell the
lands, they were subject to state taxation.
805

Idem,

31. A state Act which imposes a tax with refer-
ence to the railroad itself, does not im ose a tax
upon the lands owned by the company not used nor
necessary in operating the road.

Idem,

Idem,

805

32. A provision in a state Act exempting the
lands specified from local taxation for three years,
where there was no consideration, was the promise
of a gratuity spontaneously made, which might be
kept, changed or recalled at pleasure.
805
33. The taxing power may be restrained by con-
tract in special cases for the public good.
Idem,
805
34. Where the contract exists it is to be rigidly
scrutinized, and never permitted to extend, either
in scope or duration, beyond what the terms of
the concession clearly require.
Idem,
805

35. Certificates issued by a railroad company to
its stockholders declaring that such stockholders
are entitled to 80 per cent. of the capital stock
held by them, with dividends thereon, are dividends
of scrip within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Act levying a tax on dividends, and liable to such
tax.
840

Bailey v. R. R. Co.,

36. It is too late to object that the notice of the
assessment was irregular, after an appeal.
Idem,

840

37. Where, by the charter of a railroad company,
exemption from taxation was given until the road
was in operation two years, after such two years
such road was liable to county and municipal taxa-
tion.
850

Bailey v. Magwire,

38. An intention of the State to surrender the

5. A trust cannot fail for want of a trustee, or
by the refusal of all the trustees to accept the
trust. The court of chancery will appoint new
trustees.
Idem,

504

6. Where one conveyed certain lands to trustees
for certain purposes, the deed to become void by
its terms if a certain railroad was not completed
within one year from its date; in an action of
ejectment, by the grantors against persons in pos-
session, began more than eight years after said
year when the deed was to become void, a recon-
veyance of the premises by the trustees to the
grantor will be presumed in equity and at law.
French v. Edwards,
534

7. The trustees being bound to reconvey, it is
to be presumed they discharged that duty, rather
than that they violated it, and it is not necessary
that the presumption should rest upon proof that
the conveyance had been executed. It is made be-
cause right and justice require it.

Idem,

534

8. Where there was no understanding or agree-
ment between the purchaser at a public sale, and
the trustee making the sale, and no collusion be-
tween them, and no fraud in fact, and the duties
of the trustee have since ended, and the sale has
been confirmed by the court, the circumstance
that years afterwards the trustee bought the prop-
erty from the purchaser in good faith and for a
fair price paid to him, does not vitiate and annul
the public sale.

Stephen v. Beall,

USURY.

786

3. If a security founded upon a prior one be fa-

Idem,

tally tainted with usury, and the prior one were
free from it but given up and canceled, and the lat
ter one thereafter be adjudged void, the prior one
will be revived, and may be enforced as if the lat-
ter one had not been given.
766
4. A vendor's lien may be revived under the same
circumstances. In the same suit, wherein there is
a failure to recover upon the void security by rea-
son of the usury, the valid one, on account of which
it was given, may be enforced.

Idem,

VENDOR AND VENDEE.

SEE SALES, 1, 2.

766

1. On sale of real estate by contract, the title
remains in the vendor, and the possession passes to-
the vendee, and an equitable interest vests in the
vendee to the extent of the payments made by him.

Jennison v. Leonard,

539

2. When the contract price is fully paid, the en-
tire title is equitably vested in the vendee, and he
may compel a conveyance of the legal title by the
vendor, his heirs or assigns. The vendor is a
tent of his payment.
trustee of the legal title for the vendee to the ex-
539

Idem,

2. Whatever puts an end to the equitable interest
of the vendee-as notice, an agreement of the par-
ties. a surrender, an abandonment-places the
vendor where he was before the contract was made.
539

Idem,

4. It does not alter the effect of a surrender or
abandonment that the contract contains no clause
of re-entry, or that the vendor has sought to en-
to him before the surrender and abandonment.
force payment of the amounts which became due
Idem,
539

Hamilton v. Dillin,

528

7. By the Act of July 13, 1861. the President
was authorized in his discretion to license and per-
mit commercial intercourse with any such part of
such States, to be carried on only in pursuance of
rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of the Treasury.

Idem,

528

8. The "condition of hostility" remained im-
pressed upon the territory of the States declared
to be in insurrection until it was authoritatively