D

Cited and principle followed in Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 684, 26 L. 276, in holding legislation lessening the value of coupons to State bonds, does not affect coupons separated from bonds; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 696, 26 L. 530, and New York, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 645, 38 L. 852, 14 S. Ct. 958, reaffirm the rule; Miller v. Berlin, 13 Blatchf. 250, F. C. 9,562, and Trustees, etc. v. Lewis, 34 Fla. 428, 43 Am. St. Rep. 212, 16 So. 326, 26 L. R. A. 746, both holding severed coupons possess all the attributes of commercial paper; also to same effect is Evertson v. Bank, 66 N. Y. 18, 23 Am. Rep. 11; arguendo, in Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. Blair, 45 Md. 110. Cited incidentally in Brooke v. Struthers, 110 Mich. 573, 68 N. W. 275, 35 L. R. A. 542, and n. See note, 14 Am. Dec. 425. See monographic note, 64 Am. Dec. 430, 432; also note, 23 Am. Rep. 16, 17.

Bonds. Interest coupons, when severed from bonds, become independent claims, and do not lose their validity, if for any cause the bonds are cancelled or paid before maturity, p. 589.

Approved in Stewart v. Lansing, 104 U. S. 510, 26 L. 868, but holding burden is on holder of coupons to show that he is a bona fide purchaser for value. See note, 14 Am. Dec. 426.

Distinguished in Bailey v. Buchanan County, 115 N. Y. 301, 22 N. E. 156, 6 L. R. A. 564, and n., and Lane v. Railroad Co., 13 Lea, 549, both holding, while coupons remain in hands of holder of bonds, they remain mere incidents thereof, and have no other effect than the stipulation for payment of interest contained in bonds.

Bonds.- Coupons, when severed from bonds to which they were originally attached, are in legal effect equivalent to separate bonds for the different installments of interest, and action may be brought on same when they respectively fall due, p. 589.

Cited and applied in United States Mortgage Co. v. Sperry, 138 U. S. 341, 34 L. 980, 11 S. Ct. 330 (reversing S. C., 26 Fed. 729), New Eng. Security Co. v. Vader, 12 Sawy. 71, 28 Fed. 272, and Humphreys v. Morton, 100 Ill. 602, in holding it proper to allow interest on matured coupons; to same effect is Bowman v. Neely, 137 III. 447, 27 N. E. 759, but holding this practice an exception to general rule that interest will not be allowed on interest; Conger v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 1255, holding the payment of a coupon, severed from its bond, is no acknowledgment of the debt represented by the bond. Approved, arguendo, in Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 473, 25 L. 230, Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 183, 23 Am. Rep. 266, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Allegheny R. Co., 48 Fed. 142, and Granniss v. Cherokee Township, 47 Fed. 430, without special application. Oited, arguendo, in Sanborn v. Clough, 64 N. H. 320, 10 Atl. 680, where it was held that under a bequest of bonds, unattached coupons, belonging thereto, passed with the bonds. See monographic note, 64 Am. Dec. 441.

Limitation of actions.-Iowa statute of limitations begins to run against interest coupons, severed from bonds to which they belong, from time they mature, p. 590.

Cited and relied on in Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 474, 475, 476, 25 L. 230, 231, and Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 669, 26 L. 887, affirming S. C., 4 Fed. 374, both holding same rule applies, although coupons remain attached to bond representing principal debt; Nash v. El Dorado County, 11 Sawy. 89, 24 Fed. 255, reaffirms the rule in construing California statute; Huey v. Macon County, 35 Fed. 482, and Griffin v. Macon County, 36 Fed. 887, 2 L. R. A. 355, and n., the time having elapsed after maturity of coupons which would bar right to recover on bonds after maturity, the right to recover on coupons la barred. Cited in Kershaw v. Hancock, 18 Blatchf. 384, 10 Fed. 542, and Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 124 N. C. 493, 70 Am. St. Rep. 619, 32 S. E. 808, as authority for holding the statute of limitations applicable to sealed instruments is applicable to unsealed coupons; Goodwin v. Bath, 77 Me. 464, 1 Atl. 245, and McClelland v. Norfolk R. R. Co., 110 N. Y. 477, 6 Am. St. Rep. 402, 18 N. E. 241, 1 L. R. A. 302, and n., in holding a coupon an incident of the bond to which it belongs, and not an independent undertaking. See notes, 64 Am. Dec. 445, and 8 Am. St. Rep. 206.

Miscellaneous.- Erroneously cited in Toothacker v. Boulder, 18 Colo. 225, 22 Pac. 470, May v. School District, 22 Neb. 206, 3 Am. St. Rep. 267, 34 N. W. 377, and State v. School District, 30 Neb. 526, 27 Am. St. Rep. 424, 46 N. W. 614.

20 Wall. 590-642, 22 L. 429, MURDOCK v. CITY OF MEMPHIS. Statutes. In passing the act of 1874, revising the laws of the United States, it was intent of Congress that no change in existing law should be made, p. 617.

Cited and relied upon in In re Dana, 68 Fed. 899, holding act of 1874 did not extend the class of offenses referred to in section 33 of the judiciary act; arguendo, to this effect, in Thommasen v. Whitwell, 21 Blatchf. 63, 12 Fed. 903, and in The Schooner L. W. Eaton, 9 Ben. 302, F. C. 8,612.

Statutes. Where Congress passes two acts on same subject, and the new law embraces all that was intended to be preserved of the old, it will be construed to operate as a repeal of the earlier act, p. 617.

Reaffirmed in Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 538, 27 L. 428, 2 S. Ct. 712, in construing a State statute; United States v. Auffmordt, 122 U. 8. 209, 30 L. 1185, 7 S. Ct. 1186 (affirming S. C., 19 Fed. 897), and United States v. Cheeseman, 3 Sawy. 429, F. C. 14,790. in construing Federal statutes relating to revenue; District of Columbia v. Hutton, 143 U. S. 27, 36 L. 62, 12 S. Ct. 372, holding act relating to police force of District of Columbia was repealed by subsequent VOL. VIII-23

act providing permanent form of government for District; The Aurania and The Republic, 29 Fed. 103, in determining the effect of the act, adopting the international rules of navigation on rules previously existing; La Republique Francaise v. Schultz, 57 Fed 40, where later treaty was held to have repealed earlier; City of Gladstone v. Throop, 71 Fed. 347, 37 U. S. App. 481, and Roche v. Jersey City, 40 N. J. L. 261, both holding, where statute covers whole ground occupied by earlier statute, it repeals by implication the former, even if there be no repugnance; Treadwell v. Yolo County, 62 Cal. 564, holding an amendment of a statute will operate as though subject-matter had been incorporated in statute amended, as to actions had after amendment is made; Hanley v. Six teen Horses, 97 Cal. 184, 32 Pac. 11, State v. Carbon Hill Co., 4 Wash. 423, 30 Pac. 728, Mack v. Jastro, 126 Cal. 133, 58 Pac. 373, Strickland v. Geide, 31 Or. 377, 49 Pac. 983, Attorney-General v. Commissioner, 117 Mich. 481, 76 N. W. 70, Feige v. Mich. Cent. Ry. Co., 62 Mich. 8, 28 N. W. 688, and Barnard v. Gall, 43 La. Ann. 961, 10 So. 6, all holding, where it appears that an act was intended as a substitute for a former act, it operates as a repeal of the former without express words; State v. Elizabeth, 40 N. J. L. 282, where supplement to city charter, prescribing new method of levying assessments, was held to repeal, by implication, earlier act on same subject; Collins v. State, 3 S. Dak. 24, 51 N. W. 778, holding, where legislature appropriates as salary for a State officer, a sum less in amount than it had previously fixed as his salary, it thereby signifies its intention to reduce the salary to the amount appropriated. Cited, arguendo, in Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S. 560, 28 L. 997, 5 S. Ct. 637, United States v. Jordan, 2 Low. 543, F. C. 15,498, United States v. Claflin, 14 Blatchf. 58, F. C. 14,799, and Opinion of Justices, 66 N. H. 669, 33 Atl. 1097. See note, 14 Am. Dec. 210.

Distinguished in Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 601, 27 L. 253, 1 S. Ct. 438, where differences between earlier and later acts were not antagonistic.

Courts. Twenty-fifth section of judiciary act of 1789, was repealed by second section of act of 1867, p. 617.

Statutes. By omitting, in act of 1867, clause in act of 1789, limiting Supreme Court to consideration of Federal questions in cases removed from State court, Congress did not intend to enact affirmatively the thing which that clause prohibited, p. 619.

Cited and rule of construction applied in Cortesy v. Territory, 7 N. Mex. 100, 32 Pac. 508, 19 L. R. A. 357, in construing act relating to sale of liquors on Sunday; arguendo, in Destrehan v. Louisiana, etc., Co., 45 La. Ann. 926, 40 Am. St. Rep. 270, 13 So. 232.

Courts. Act of 1867, providing that judgments of State courts may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in Supreme Court, on writ of error, and that writ shall have same effect as if judgment

complained of had been rendered in Federal court, does not authorize Supreme Court to examine other than Federal questions, p. 622.

Approved, arguendo, in Nashville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 175, and Nelson v. Lowndes County, 93 Fed. 542, in discussing office of writ of error.

Courts. Act of 1867, in making jurisdiction of Supreme Court, in causes removed from State courts, dependent on decision of certain questions by court below, against right set up under Federal law or authority, conveys strongest implication that these questions alone are to be considered when case is brought before Supreme Court for revision, p. 626.

Cited in Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 20 Wall. 645, 22 L. 448, and McLaughlin v. Fowler, 154 U. S. 663, 26 L. 176, 14 S. Ct. 1193, both holding, until Supreme Court has decided State court decided erroneously Federal question involved, it can go no further into examination of cause.

Appeal and error.- Under act of 1867, Supreme Court, on error to State court, may look into opinion of court below, when properly authenticated, to ascertain what was decided, especially in cases coming from Louisiana, p. 633.

Cited and applied in Crossley v. New Orleans, 108 U. S. 105, 27 L. 667, 2 S. Ct. 300, and Crescent Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 146, 30 L. 617, 7 S. Ct. 474, reaffirming rule, as to cases coming from Louisiana; Gross v. Mortgage Co., 108 U. S. 485, 27 L. 798, 2 S. Ct. 944, where opinion of Illinois Supreme Court was examined to ascertain whether judgment involved the denial of a right asserted under Federal law; Phil. Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U. S. 116, 30 L. 346, 7 S. Ct. 111, applies rule to case brought up from New York; Kreiger v. Shelby Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 44, 31 L. 678, 8 S. Ct. 755, where cause came up from Supreme Court of Kentucky; Scudder v. Comptroller, 175 U. S. 36, holding Supreme Court cannot take jurisdiction of writ of error from State court unless it appears some Federal question was involved in decision of State court. Approved, arguendo, in United States v. Taylor, 147 U. S. 700, 37 L. 337, 13 S. Ct. 481.

Modified in Moore v. Mississippi, 21 Wall. 639, 22 L. 654, and Citizens' Bank v. Board, 98 U. S. 142, 25 L. 115, both holding, where record shows on its face a Federal question was not necessarily involved, the Supreme Court will not go outside of it to ascertain whether one was in fact decided.

Appeal and error.- Where appeal is taken to Supreme Court, un der revised statutes, section 709, if Federal question involved ap pears to have been rightly decided, opinion of court below must be affirmed without further examination, p. 636

t

Reaffirmed in Myrick v. Thompson, 99 U. S. 297, 25 L. 327, Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 595, 26 L. 846, Wiggins Ferry Co. v. St. Louis, 107 U. S. 378, 27 L. 424, 2 S. Ct. 267, Allen v. McVeigh, 107 U. S. 437, 27 L. 574, 2 S. Ct. 561, Traer v. Clews, 115 U. S. 542, 29 L. 471, 6 S. Ct. 161, Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Wright, 116 U. S. 236, 29 L. 628, 6 S. Ct. 378, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 269, 29 L. 620, 6 S. Ct. 586, and Hannibal, etc., Ry. Co. v. Packet Co., 125 U. S. 273, 31 L. 736, 8 S. Ct. 881, in all of which the writ of error was dismissed on it appearing the Federal question was rightly decided below.

Courts. On error, from Supreme to State court, it must appear that latter decided against a right claimed or asserted by plaintiff in error, under Constitution, treaties, laws or authority of United States, p. 636.

Cited and principle applied in Bachman v. Lawson, 109 U. S. 664, 27 L. 1068, 3 S. Ct. 482, and Dale Tile Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U. S. 53, 31 L. 686, 8 S. Ct. 759, where, it appearing, from argument, no Federal question was involved, writ of error was dismissed; Chouteau v. Gibson, 111 U. S. 200, 28 L. 400, 4 S. Ct. 340, and Detroit Ry. Co. v. Guthard, 114 U. S. 136, 29 L. 118, 5 S. Ct. 812, and this must appear affirmatively on face of record; Adams County v. Burlington, etc., Ry. Co., 112 U. S. 127, 28 L. 680, 5 S. Ct. 79, where record shows judgment below rested on a decision of a non-Federal question, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review; Brooks v. Missouri, 124 U. S. 400, 31 L. 458, 8 S. Ct. 446, it appearing that the decision of the alleged Federal question was not necessary to the judgment rendered, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction over cause; Weatherby v. Bowie, 131 U. S. ccxv (appendix), 25 L. 607, reaffirms rule; Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U. S. 486, 34 L. 274, 10 8. Ct. 906, holding Supreme Court has jurisdiction over cause where State court, in rendering judgment, necessarily denied a right claimed by defendant under homestead laws; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 144, 40 L. 649, 16 S. Ct. 460, holding Supreme Court has not jurisdiction when decision of State court was in favor of right claimed under Federal law. Approved, arguendo, in dissenting opinion in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 283, 25 L. 657.

Apparently modified in Gross v. Mortgage Co., 108 U. S. 484, 27 L. 797, 2 S. Ct. 943, where court examined opinion of lower court to ascertain whether judgment involved a right asserted under Federal law. Distinguished in Bank v. Tennessee, 163 U. S. 421, 41 L. 213, 16 S. Ct. 1115.

Courts.-Fact that State court has erroneously decided against right claimed under Federal laws will not warrant reversal in Supreme Court, if judgment is sustainable on other grounds, p. 636.

Cited and relied on in Jenkins v. Loewenthal, 110 U. S. 222, 28 L 129, 3 S. Ct. 639, and Hale v. Akers, 132 U. S. 564, 565, 33 L. 446, 10