Partnership.— Bad character, drunkenness, and dishonesty do not authorize one partner, of his own motion, to treat partnership as ended and to take to himself all benefits of their joint labor, p. 557.

Cited, arguendo, in Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U. S. 337, 42 L. 490, 18 S. Ct. 139, holding, where partner has dissolved partnership of his own motion, he is liable to account to his co-partner for all profits subsequently acquired. See note, 69 Am. St. Rep. 421, 430.

Partnership.— Where member of partnership, with aid of another party, has obtained patent, which should belong to firm, a court of equity will decree that he holds as trustee for partnership, p. 559.

Cited and relied on in Pearce v. Ham, 113 U. S. 593, 28 L. 1070, 5 S. Ct. 680, and Miller v. O'Boyle, 89 Fed. 143, both holding one partner could not, without consent of his co-partner, exclude latter from benefits of a contract in which they were equally concerned; Ambler v. Choteau, 107 U. S. 587, 591, 27 L. 323, 324, 1 S. Ct. 557, 560, affirming 1 Fed. Cas. 590, a case growing out of same cause of action.

Distinguished in Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U. S. 673, 32 L. 578, 9 S. Ct. 203, where it was held party who had agreed to assign all patents he might obtain for certain improvements, could not be compelled to assign a patent which he had caused to be procured by a third person and assigned to him.

Miscellaneous.- Miscited in Roman v. Mali, 42 Md. 558.

20 Wall. 560-571, 22 L. 423, INSURANCE CO. v. COLT.

Insurance.- Corporate charter provision that every contract or agreement for insurance shall be in writing and signed by officers of corporation, with corporation seal affixed, held, to apply only to policies, and not to initial or preliminary arrangements, p. 567. Reaffirmed in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Ryland, 69 Md. 447, 16 Atl. 111, 1 L. R. A. 550, where similar charter was construed; arguendo, in Westchester Ins. Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich. 150, 152.

Insurance. A contract to insure, as distinguished from a contract of insurance, need not be in writing to be valid, p. 568.

Cited and applied in Eames v. Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 627, 24 L. 300, and Preferred Ins. Co. v. Stone, Kan. - 58 Pac. 988, where certain correspondence was held to create a valid contract on part of company to issue a policy of insurance, and company was held liable in amount agreed on, although policy had not been issued at time of loss; Home Ins. Co. v. Adler, 71 Ala. 524, and Stockton v. Insurance Co., 33 La. Ann. 580, where it was held a valid contract of insurance may be made by parol; Sanford v. Insurance Co., Mass. - 54 N. E. 884, holding a preliminary con

tract for insurance, which may be performed within a year, is not within the statute of frauds; Croft v. Insurance Co., 40 W. Va. 512, 52 Am. St. Rep. 903, 21 S. E. 855, holding an oral executory contract for fire insurance, valid; Crawford v. Insurance Co., 125 Cal. 611, 58 Pac. 178, reaffirms rule; arguendo, in Sproul v. Western Assur. Co., 33 Or. 101, 54 Pac. 181, and Laclede Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 60 Fed. 359, 363, 19 U. S. App. 510, agent may make an ancillary agreement; Emery v. Boston, etc., Ins. Co., 138 Mass. 412. Cited in Mich. Pipe Co. v. Insurance Co., 92 Mich. 491, 52 N. W. 1073, 20 L. R. A. 289, and n., without special application. See note, 19 Am. Rep. 309.

Insurance.- Agents are, by general usage, authorized to allow credit for premium, p. 568.

Cited and applied in Frankle v. Insurance Co., 9 Fed. Cas. 708. where company was held bound on policy delivered to insured by its agent, without payment of premium, although policy contained clause that company would not be bound unless premium had been paid; Jones v. Insurance Co., 13 Fed. Cas. 939, and American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Fordyce, 62 Ark. 570, 54 Am. St. Rep. 307, 36 S. W. 1053, both holding general agent of insurance company may waive the condition of policy for a cash premium; Home Ins. Co. v. Gilman, 112 Ind. 14, 13 N. E. 121, and Croft v. Insurance Co., 40 W. Va. 517, 52 Am. St. Rep. 907, 21 S. E. 856, reaffirm rule; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Meier, 28 Neb. 132, 44 N. W. 99, where agent issues policy and agrees to deduct premium from money in his possession belonging to assured, such an agreement is a receipt of premium and company is bound thereby. Referred to, arguendo, in Insurance Co. v. Munger, 49 Kan. 196, 33 Am. St. Rep. 368, 30 Pac. 123, and German Ins. Co. v. Amsbaugh, Kan. App. 55 Pac. 483, as bearing on subject of general powers of insurance agents. Cited in Merserau v. Insurance Co., 66 N. Y. 278, where it was held, fact that person was authorized by foreign insurance company to solicit and take applications for insurance, to issue and deliver policies and receive premiums and give receipts therefor, does not constitute him a general agent, with power to waive conditions in policy as to payment of premiums. See note, 42 Am. Rep. 622.

Insurance. Where agent, after making preliminary contract of insurance, is authorized by company to fill up blank policy, duly attested by company's officers, company is bound from time agent might have done so, and his negligence will not release company In case of loss, p. 569.

Cited and applied in Tennant v. Insurance Co., 31 Fed. 324, where the filling out and signing of a receipt for the renewal of a policy by the agent was held binding on company; Weeks v. Insurance Co., 29 Fed. Cas. 582, holding the authority given agents to fill up and deliver blank policies, includes the authority to make a preliminary contract to do so. See note, 65 Am. Dec. 571.

Insurance. In cases where application is made, and terms agreed on, but policy is not issued until after goods are destroyed, if policy be so framed as to make risk take effect from date of application, recovery may be had thereon, p. 570.

Cited in Western Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 40 Neb. 8, 58 N. W. 599, as authority for doctrine that an act done at one time may take effect as of a prior date by relation back.

Distinguished in Home Ins. Co. v. Adler, 71 Ala. 527, holding. where policy was not made to take effect at any time prior to its issue, there can be no recovery on proof of an anterior parol agreement variant from terms of policy; Crawford v. Insurance Co.. 125 Cal. 611, 58 Pac. 178, where there was no evidence of a prior agreement binding on parties, the issue of policy after goods have been destroyed gives no effect to the instrument.

Miscellaneous. Cited in Magic Ruffle Co. v. Elm City Co., 13 Blatchf. 158, F. C. 8,949, not in point.

20 Wall. 571-575, 22 L. 387, GILLETTE v. BULLARD.

Appeal and error.- - If appeal is not perfected and prosecuted, its effect as a supersedeas ceases, p. 574.

See note, 38 Am. St. Rep. 719.

Appeal and error.- Affirmance of judgment of lower court fixes liability of sureties on bond on appeal, p. 575.

Cited to this effect in Babbitt v. Finn, 101 U. S. 15, 25 L. 822.

20 Wall. 575-577, 22 L. 451, LONGSTRETH v. PENNOCK.

Landlord and tenant.- Under Pennsylvania statute, if property liable to distraint is seized and sold on execution, the rent, not exceeding one year, must be first paid; provisions of this statute apply to seizures by assignees in bankruptcy, p. 577.

Cited and principle applied in Austin v. O'Reilly, 2 Woods, 672, F. C. 665, where a landlord, in bankruptcy proceedings, was held to have a priority over other general creditors; Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills, 85 Fed. 910, where there was a similar holding, under similar South Carolina statute; In re Robinson, 20 Fed. Cas. 985, holding landlord is not entitled to priority over other creditors of tenant, in absence of statute to that effect; Ex parte Barnes, S4 Ala. 543, 4 So. 770, without special application.

Distinguished in Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 228, 9 Atl. 635, where rent fell due subsequent to time tenant's goods passed from his control.

20 Wall. 577-583, 22 L. 417, CANNON v. NEW ORLEANS.

Commerce.- New Orleans ordinance, requiring all steamboats landing or mooring at port of New Orleans, to pay a certain sum, measured by tonnage of vessel, is a tonnage tax, and void, p. 581.

Cited and relied on in Inman S. S. Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 244, 24 L. 122, where a similar statute of the State of New York was held void; Northwestern, etc., Packet Co. v. St. Paul, 3 Dill. 455, F. C. 10,346, where same construction was placed on a like ordinance of the city of St. Paul; The Lizzie E., 30 Fed. 878, Shreveport v. Coast Line, 37 La. Ann. 566, 55 Am. Rep. 508, and Cape Girardeau v. Campbell, 26 Mo. App. 15, all holding a city cannot exact wharfage from a vessel which makes fast at a place on bank where no facilities are furnished for securing vessel or landing goods; Booth v. Lloyd, 33 Fed. 598, holding a Maryland statute, imposing a tonnage tax by way of license fee on vessels engaged in oyster trade, is invalid; People v. Pacific Mills Co., 60 Cal. 327, holding, to impose wharfage in advance of construction of wharves, is illegal; Webb v. Dunn, 18 Fla. 726, where Florida statute, imposing port fees on every vessel entering port of Pensacola, was held void; also Board v. Pashley, 19 S. C. 320, 321, where there was a like holding in construction of similar statute; St. Louis v. Schulenburg Co., 13 Mo. App. 60, holding a city cannot collect wharfage for goods landed beyond its wharf, in time of high water. Cited, arguendo, in Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 465, 26 L. 1068, as authority for holding taxes on vessels according to measurement, without reference to value, are taxes on tonnage; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 376, 27 L. 423, 2 S. Ct. 266. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 698, 27 L. 587, 2 S. Ct. 738, and Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 550, 30 L. 491, 7 S. Ct. 317, in discussion as to what constitutes a duty of tonnage." Approved, arguendo, in Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 86, 24 L. 380, dissenting opinion in Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 708, 27 L. 591, and Ferrari v. Board, 24 Fla. 413, 5 So. 4, and dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Ferry Co., 98 Pa. St. 125, the majority holding a foreign ferry corporation, doing business within State, liable for taxes, under statute imposing tax on foreign corporations transacting business within State. See note, 27 Am. St. Rep. 556, 557.

66

Distinguished in Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 89, 24 L. 381, Leathers v. Aiken, 9 Fed. 681, and Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 428, 25 L. 690, where it was held within power of municipality to impose wharfage dues proportioned on tonnage of vessel; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 284, 25 L. 415, where State statute, taxing steamboats engaged in interstate commerce, as personal property in city where company owning them has its principal office, was held valid.

Wharves. Reasonable compensation may be exacted for use of wharves erected by private enterprise, p. 582.

Reaffirmed in The Dora Matthews, 31 Fed. 619, The Wm. H. Brinsfield, 39 Fed. 216, and De Bary Baya, etc., Line v. Jacksonville, etc., Ry. Co., 40 Fed. 394; also People v. Roberts, 92 Cal.

664, 28 Pac. 691, and such a charge is not a duty on tonnage, within meaning of section 10, article I, of the Federal Constitution; Indian Steamboat Co. v. East Coast Co., 28 Fla. 433, 29 Am. St. Rep. 272, 10 So. 492, but the owners of such wharves have no right to entirely exclude the public from the use thereof; Farnum v. Johnson, 62 Wis. 625, 22 N. W. 754, holding village board has power to grant franchise to collect wharfage for use of pier. Cited, arguendo, in Construction, etc., Co. v. Railroad Co., 49 La. Ann. 548, 21 So. 898, 37 L. R. A. 667, without special application.

Distinguished in Ellerman v. Railroad Co., 34 La. Ann. 703, holding neither the city of New Orleans nor its lessee has right to collect wharfage from docks not owned by itself.

Wharves. State may regulate charge which shall be demanded for right to land at a wharf owned by an individual, or by a municipal or other corporation, p. 582.

Cited and applied in Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. 8. 85, 24 L. 380 (reaffirming 8. C., 45 Iowa, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 214), and Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 562, 26 L. 1170, where it was held a municipality might charge and collect from steamboats landing at wharves constructed by it, wharfage proportioned to their tonnage; to the same effect is Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 697, 27 L. 587, 2 S. Ct. 737, holding further, a suit for relief against exorbitant wharfage cannot be maintained in the Circuit Court; Johnson v. Chicago Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 400, 30 L. 451, 7 S. Ct. 259, where a State statute, giving a lien on vessels for certain causes, was held valid; Morgan S. S. Co. v. Louisiana Board, etc., 118 U. S. 462, 463, 30 L. 241, 6 S. Ct. 1118, affirming S. C., 36 La. Ann. 670, where State statute, imposing fees on vessels for services rendered under quarantine laws, was held valid. Cited, arguendo, in Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 172, 26 L. 1017, as to the ground of the right of a city to collect wharfage; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 211, 38 L. 966, 14 S. Ct. 1089, as an example of case where jurisdiction of States and Federal government is concurrent; The Geneva, 16 Fed. 876, and Mayor v. Steamer Mary Lewis, 32 La. Ann. 1294, both holding municipality, claiming right to exact wharfage for use of public wharf, must show plain legislative grant of franchise; Silver v. Tobin, 28 Fed. 547, where remedy, in case charges are excessive, is pointed out.

Distinguished in Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 512, 35 Am. St. Rep. 518, 33 N. E. 695, holding State power over munici pal property does not extend so far as to enable the legislature to require a transfer, without compensation, to a private person or corporation.

20 Wall. 583-590, 22 L. 427, CLARK v. IOWA CITY.

Bonds. Interest coupons, when severed from bonds, are negotiable and pass by delivery, p. 589.