risks was not a transaction of commerce, within | or even involved the defendant in circumstances the meaning of the two clauses of the Constitu- which rendered that right unavailing for his tion cited. It had no reference to the clause giv-protection. If the defendant does not ing to citizens of other States the right of liti- avail himself of the right given to him of havgation in the United States courts, and certain- ing an issue made up and the trial by jury, ly had no bearing upon the right of corpora- which is tendered to him by the Act, it is pretions to resort to those courts, or the power of sumable that he cannot dispute the justice of the State to limit and restrict such resort. the claim." We are not able to discover in this case any countenance for the Statute of Wisconsin which we are considering. On this branch of the case the conclusion is this: It was not intended to impair the force of the language used by Mr. Justice Curtis in Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How., 407, 15 L. ed., 452, where he says: "A corporation created by Indiana can transact business in Ohio, only with the consent, express or implied, of the latter State. 1. The Constitution of the United States seThis consent may be accompanied by such con- cures to citizens of another state than that in ditions as Ohio may think fit to impose, and which suit is brought an absolute right to rethese conditions must be deemed valid and ef- move their cases into the Federal Court, upon fectual by other States, and by this court; pro-compliance with the terms of the Act of 1789. vided, they are not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, or inconsistent with those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each State from, encroachment by all others, or that principle of natural justice which forbids con457*1 demnation without opportunity for *defense." Nearly the same language is used by Mr. Justice Nelson in Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall., 410, 19 L. ed. 972. None of the cases so much as intimate that conditions may be imposed which are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, or inconsistent with those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each State from encroachment by others. 2. The Statute of Wisconsin is an obstruction to this right; is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the laws in pursuance thereof, and is illegal and void. 3. The agreement of the Insurance Company derives no support from an unconstitutional statute and is void, as it would be had no such statute been passed. We are of opinion, for the reasons given, that the Winnebago County Court erred in proceeding in the case, after the filing the petition and the giving the security required by the Act of 1789, 1 Stat. at L., 73, and that all subsequent proceedings in the state court are illegal and should be vacated. The judgment in that court. and the judgment in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, should be reversed, and the prayer of the petition for removal should be granted. And it is ordered accordingly. Mr. Chief Justice Waite, dissenting: I cannot concur in the judgment which has just been announced. A State has the right to exclude foreign insurance companies from the transaction of business within its jurisdiction. Such is the settled law in this court. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., 181, 19 L. ed., 360; Ducat v. Chicago, supra; Bk. v. Earle, 13 Pet., 586. The right to impose conditions upon admission follows, as a necessary *consequence, from [*459 the right to exclude altogether. The State of Wisconsin has made it a condition of admission that the Company shall submit to be sued in the courts she has provided for the settlement of the rights of her own citizens. That is no more than saying that the foreign company must, for the purposes of all litigation growing out of the business transacted there, renounce its foreign citizenship and become pro tanto a citizen of that State. There is no hardship in this, for it imposes no greater burden than rests upon home companies and home insurers. The case of Bk. v. Okely, 4 Wheat., 235, is relied upon by the court below to sustain the statute and the agreement in question. In that case it was provided in the 14th section of the charter of the bank that whenever a borrower of the bank should make his note by an agreement in writing negotiable at the bank and neglect its payment when due, the president of the bank should cause a demand in writing to be served upon the delinquent, and if the money was not paid within ten days after such demanu it was made lawful for the bank to present to the county clerk the note so unpaid, with proof of the demand, and to require him to issue an execution or attachment against the debtor. Before such execution could issue, the bank was required to file an affidavit of the amount due on the note. "If the defendant shall dispute the whole or any part of the debt (the statute adds) on the return of the execution, the court shall order an issue to be joined and a trial to be had, and shall make such other proceedings that justice may be done in the speediest manner." This statute was sustained in the case cited. Mr. Key, for the plaintiff, argued in its support on the theory that the whole effect of the provision was to authorize the commencement of a suit by attachment instead of the usual common law process. Mr. Jones, contra, contended that it was in violation of the provision of the Constitution of Maryland and The state court had jurisdiction to try the of the United States securing to parties the question of citizenship upon the petition to right of trial by jury when the value in contro- transfer. Upon the facts I think it was authorversy exceeded $20. In rendering the decisionized to find that the Company was, for all the the court say: "This court would ponder long purposes of that action, a citizen of Wisconsin, before it would sustain this action if we could and refuse the order of removal. be persuaded that the Act in question produced 458*] a total prostration of the trial by *jury, This Insurance Company accepted this condition, and was thus enabled to make the contract sued upon. Having received the benefits of its renunciation the revocation comes too late. I concur in this dissent. D. Davis, J. WALTER D. SPROTT, Appt., v. UNITED STATES. (See S. C., 20 Wall., 459-474.) Captured and Abandoned Property Act-when claimant cannot recover under-Acts of Confederate States and Government. *1. A purchaser of cotton, from the Confederate States, who knew that the money he paid for it went to sustain the rebellion, cannot in the Court of Claims recover the proceeds when it has been captured and sold under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act. 2. The moral turpitude of the transaction forbids that, in a court of law, he should be permitted to establish his title by proof of such a transaction. 3. The Acts of the States in rebellion, in the ordinary course of administration of law, must be upheld in the interest of civil society, to which such a government was necessary. 4. But the Government of the Confederacy had no existence except as an organized treason. Its purpose, while it lasted, was to overthrow the law ful Government and its statutes, its decrees, its authority can give no validity to any act done in its service, or in aid of its purpose.. [No. 359.] II. The cotton was captured in May, 1865, and the proceeds or some portion thereof are in the treasury. *The Court of Claims upon the fore-[*461 going facts decided as conclusions of law: 1. The Government of the Confederate States was an unlawful assemblage without corporate power to take, hold, or convey a valid title to property, real or personal. 2. The claimant was chargeable with notice of the treasonable intent of the sale by the Confederate Government, and the transaction was forbidden by the laws of the United States, and wholly void, so that the claimant acquired no title to the property which is the subject of suit. We do not think it necessary to say anything in regard to the first proposition of law laid down by that court. Whether the temporary government of the Confederate States had the capacity to take and hold title to real or personal property, and how far it is to be recognized as having been a de facto government, and if so, what consequences follow in regard to its transactions as they are to be viewed in a court of the United States, it will be time enough for us Argued Apr. 22, 1874. Decided Nov. 9, 1874. to decide when such decision becomes necessary. The case is stated by the court. Messrs. Geo. Taylor and R. M. Corwine, for appellant. Mr. C. H. Hill, Asst. Atty--Gen., for the United States. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: the There is no such necessity in the present ease. *We rest our affirmance of the judgment [*462 of the Court of Claims upon its second proposition. either by exchanging its bonds for the cotton, or when that failed, by forced contributions. So long as the imperfect blockade of the Southern ports and the unguarded condition of the Mexican frontier enabled them to export this cotton, they were well supplied in return with arms, ammunition, medicine and the necessaries of life not grown within their lines, as well as with that other great sinew of war, gold. If the rebel government could freely have exchanged the cotton of which it was enabled to possess itself, for the munitions of war or for gold, it seems very doubtful if it could have been suppressed. So when the vigor of the blockade prevented successful export of this cotton, their next resource was to sell it among their own people, or to such persons claiming outwardly to be loyal to the United States, as would buy of them, for the money necessary to support the tottering fabric of rebellion which they called a government. It is a fact so well known as to need no finding of the court to establish it, a fact which, like many other historical events, all courts support of the rebellion, so far as pecuniary aid take notice of, that cotton was the principal This is an appeal from the judgment of the Government early adopted the policy of collectwas necessary to its support. The Confederate Court of Claims against the appellant, rejecting large quantities of cotton under its control, ing his claim to the proceeds of the sale of cotton, under the Act in regard to captured and abandoned property. That court made the following findings of facts and conclusions of law: I. At different times during the years 1864 and 1865, large quantities of cotton were purchased by the agents of the Confederate States for the treasonable purpose of maintaining the War of the Rebellion against the Government of the United States. Of cotton thus purchased by various agents in Claiborne County, Mississippi, three hundred bales were sold to claimant by one agent, in March, 1865, for ten cents a pound in the currency of the United States. The sale was made by the agent as of cotton belonging to the Confederate States, and it was understood by the claimant, at the time of the purchase, to be the property of the Rebel Government, and was purchased as such. The agent had been specially instructed by the Confederate Government "To sell any and all cotton he could, for the purpose of raising money to purchase munitions of war and supplies for the Confederate Army;" but the purpose of the sale was not disclosed to the claimant, whose purpose was not to aid the Confederate States, buying the cotton at its market value, and regarding it as a mere business transaction of "cotton for cash." The cotton was delivered to him at the time when the money was paid, he then being a resident of Claiborne County, within the Confederate lines. Headnotes by Mr. Justice MILLER. it The cotton which is the subject of this controversy was of this class. It had been in the possession and under the control of the Confederate Government, with claim of title. was captured during the last days of the existence of that government by our forces, and sold by the officers appointed for that purpose, and the money deposited in the treasury. The claimant now asserts a right to this money on the ground that he was the owner of the cotton when it was so captured. This claim of right or ownership he must prove in the Court of Claims. He attempts to do so by recognition and administration to the existence The recognition of the existence and the va lidity of the Acts of the so-called Confederate Government, and that of the States which yielded a temporary support to that government stand on very different grounds, and are governed by very different considerations. The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed. Mr. Justice Clifford: I concur in the judgment of the court, solely upon the ground that the purchase of the cotton and the payment of the consideration necessarily tended to give aid to the rebellion, and that all such contracts were void, as contrary to public policy. All such portions of the opinion as enforced that view had their concurrence, but that they dissented from the residue of it as unnecessary to the conclusion. Mr. Justice Davis: Justice Clifford. 1 concur in the judg Mr. Justice Field, dissenting: The latter, in most, if not in all instances, ment in this case on the grounds stated by Mr. merely transferred the existing state organizations to the support of a new and different national head. The same constitutions, the same laws for the protection of property and personal rights remained and were administered by the same officers. These laws, necessary in their I am compelled to dissent from the judgment of the court in this case, and from the reasons stated in the opinion upon which that judgment is founded. The opinion appears to me to pro ceed upon the assumption that this is an action only question, is, whether the cotton seized by to enforce a contract which was illegal in its the forces of the United States in May, 1865, inception and, therefore, without standing in was at the time the property of the claimant. 466*] a court of justice. And the *cases off it was his property, then he is entitled to its Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall., 342, 20 L. ed., 439, proceeds, and the judgment of the Court of and Hanauer v. Woodruff, 15 Wall. 439, 21 L: Claims should be reversed; and in determining ed., 224, are cited in support of the position that this question we are not concerned with the contracts of this character will not be upheld. consideration of his loyalty or disloyalty. He Those authorities do establish the position that was a citizen of Mississippi and resided within contracts entered into for the purpose of aiding the lines of the Confederacy, and the Act forthe late insurrectionary government are illegal bidding intercourse with the enemy does not and void, and will not be enforced by the Federal apply to his case. He was subject to be treated, tribunals. In the first case the action was upon in common with other citizens of the Confedtwo promissory notes, the consideration of eracy, as a public enemy during the continuance which consisted in part of stores and supplies of the war. And if he were disloyal in fact, furnished the defendant, an army contractor of and if by his purchase of the cotton he gave aid the Confederate Government, with knowledge and comfort to the rebellion, as this court adthat they were to be used in aid of the rebellion, judges, the impediment which such conduct preand in part of due-bills issued by the contractor viously interposed to the prosecution of his to other parties for similar supplies, and taken claim was removed by the Proclamation of Parup at his request; and the court held that the don and Amnesty made by the President on the sale of the goods, being made with the vendor's 25th day of December, 1868. He was included knowledge of the uses to which they were to be within the terms of that beneficent public Act applied, was an illegal transaction and did not of the Chief Magistrate of the United States, as constitute a valid consideration for the note of fully as if he had been specifically named therethe purchaser, and that the due-bills given by in. The pardon and amnesty did not, of course, him for similar goods, being taken up by third and could not *change the actual fact of [*468 parties with knowledge of the purpose for which previous disloyalty, if it existed, but, as was they were issued, were equally invalid as a con- said in Carlisle v. U. S., 16 Wall., 151, 21 L. ed., sideration for his note in their hands. In the 428, "They forever close the eyes of the court second case the action was upon a promissory to the perception of that fact as an element in note, the only consideration of which consisted its judgment, no rights of third parties having of certain bonds, issued by the Convention of intervened." In legal contemplation the execuArkansas which attempted to carry that State tive pardon not merely releases an offender from out of the Union, and issued for the purpose of the punishment prescribed for his offense, but it supporting the war against the Feueral Govern- obliterates the offense itself. ment and styled "war bonds" on their face, and one of the questions presented for our determination was, whether the consideration was illegal under the Constitution and laws of the United States. And the court answered that it did not admit of a doubt that the consideration was thus illegal and void; that "if the Constitution be, as it declares on its face it is, the supreme law of the land, a contract or undertak-ernment. He was in possession of the property ing of any kind to destroy or impair its supremacy, or to aid or encourage any attempt to that end, must necessarily be unlawful and can never be treated, in a court sitting under that Constitution and exercising authority by virtue of its provisions, as a meritorious consideration for the promise of any one." 467*] **In both of these cases the aid of the courts was sought to enforce unexecuted contracts which were illegal and void in their inception, because made in aid of the rebellion, and all that they decide is that contracts of that character can never be enforced in the courts of that government against which the rebellion was raised. In those courts such contracts stand on the same footing as other illegal transactions; they will not be upheld nor enforced. In both of those decisions I concurred, and in the second case I wrote the opinion of the court. I still adhere to the views expressed in both cases. But, with great respect for my associates, I am compelled to say that, in my judgment, neither of those cases has any just application to the case at bar, or to any question properly involved in its decision. This action is not brought to enforce an unexecuted contract, legal or illegal; there is no question of enforcing a contract in the case. The question, and the In the present case, therefore, the question of the loyalty or disloyalty of the claimant is withdrawn from our consideration; and as the Nonintercourse Act does not apply to his case, it does not concern the United States whether he acquired the property from another public enemy or from one of the States of the Confederacy, or from an agent of the Confederate Gov at the time of the seizure, asserting ownership to it; and no one then disputed, and no one since has disputed his title. Who, then, owned the property if he did not? The United States did not own it. They did not acquire by its seizure any title to the property. They have never asserted any greater rights arising from capture of property on land in the hands of citizens engaged in the rebellion than those which one belligerent nation asserts with reference to such property captured by it belonging to the citizens or subjects of the other belligerent. All public property which is movable in its nature, possessed by one belligerent, and employed on land in actual hostilities, passes by capture. But private property on land, except such as becomes booty when taken from enemies in the field or besieged towns, or is levied as a military contribution upon the inhabitants of the hostile territory, is exempt from confiscation by the general law of nations. Such is the language of Mr. Wheaton, who is recognized as authority on all questions of public law. And "this exemption," he adds, "extends even to the case of an absolute and unqualified conquest of the enemies' country." Law of Nations, Lawrence ed., 596. In Brown v. U. S., 8 Cranch, 152, the ques 469*] tion arose whether *enemy's property Assuming that the Confederate Government found on land at the commencement of hostili- was thus incapable of acquiring cr transferring ties with Great Britain, in 1812, could be seized title to property, the result claimed by the Atand condemned as a necessary consequence of torney General, and held by the majority of this the declaration of war; and the court held that court, would not in my judgment, follow. That it could not be thus condemned without an Act organization, whatever its character, acted of Congress authorizing its confiscation. The through agents. Those agents purchased and court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, sold property. The title of the vendors passed said that it was conceded that war gives to the to somebody; if it did not vest in the Confedsovereign full right to take the persons and con-erate Government, because that organization fiscate the property of the enemy wherever was incapable of taking the property, it refound, and observed that the mitigations of this mained with the agents. The sale of the vendrigid rule, which the humane and wise policy of ors was a release and quitclaim of their intermodern times has introduced into practice, est, and when that took place the property was might more or less affect the exercise of this not derelict and abandoned. Whatever title exright, but could not impair the right itself. isted to the *property was, therefore, in [*471 "That," said the court, “remains undiminished, the agents if their assumed principal had no and when the sovereign authority shall choose to existence, and by their sale passed to purchasers bring it into operation, the judicial department from them. Undoubtedly, larceny could be almust give effect to its will." "But," added the leged against one who feloniously took the propcourt, "until that will shall be expressed, no erty from such purchaser. The taker would power of condemnation can exist in the court." not be allowed in any court which administers It may be doubted whether the right to con- justice to escape punishment by showing that fiscate property of the enemy wherever found, no title passed to the purchaser because his which is here stated to have been conceded, vendor was the agent, or assued to be the would at this day be admitted without some agent, of a government which had no legal exisqualification excepting private property on land tence. And it is equally clear that the purchasnot engaged in actual hostilities or taken as er could have maintained an action for injuries booty, or levied as a military contribution, as to the property thus purchased, or for its restated by Mr. Wheaton. Be that as it may, the covery if forcibly removed from his possession decision is emphatic that until Congress, by by a third party. The plea that the property some legislative Act, directs the confiscation of was not his because obtained from the agent, or private property on land, none can be ordered by a person assuming to be the agent of an the courts. unlawful political organization, would not be held a justification for the injuries or the detention. But I do not desire to place my objection to the decision of the court upon this view of the case. I place it on higher ground, one which is recognized by all writers on international law, from Grotius, its father, to Wheaton and Phillimore, its latest expounders, and that is, that a government de facto has, during its continuance, the same right within its territorial limits to acquire and to dispose of movable personal property which a government de jure possesses. And that the Confederate Government, whatever its character in other respects, possessed supreme power over a large extent of territory, embracing several States and a population of many millions, and exercised that power for nearly four years, we are all compelled to admit. As stated by this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Nelson, Mauran v. Ins. Co., 6 Wall., 14, 18 L. ed., 842, it cannot be denied that, by the Now, Congress has only provided for the confiscation of private property of persons engaged in the rebellion, by the Act of August 6, 1861, 12 Stat. at L. 319, and that of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. at L. 589. Both of these Acts require legal proceedings resulting in a judicial decree of condemnation before the title of the owner can be devested. The present case is not brought under either of these Acts. No proceedings for 470*] the condemnation *and forfeiture of the cotton seized, or of its proceeds, have ever been instituted by the Government. The title of the claimant remains, therefore, at this day, as perfect as it did on the day the cotton was seized. In the case of U. S. v. Klein, 13 Wall., 136, 20 L. ed., 522, this court had occasion to consider the rights of property, as affected by the war, in the hands of citizens engaged in hostilities against the United States, and it held, after mature consideration, that the effect of the Act of Congress of March 12, 1863, to provide for use of unlawful and unconstitutional means, "a the collection of captured and abandoned property in insurrectionary districts, under which government in fact was erected greater in territhe present action is brought, is not to confistory than many of the old governments in Europe, complete in the organization of all its cate, or in any case absolutely devest, the prop parts, containing within its limits more than erty of the original owner, even though disloyal, eleven millions of people, and of sufficient reand that by the seizure the Government constisources in men and money to carry on a civil tuted itself a trustee for those who were by that war of *unexampled dimensions; and dur- [*472 Act declared entitled, or might thereafter being all which time the exercise of many belligerrecognized as entitled to the proceeds. ent rights were either conceded to it, or were But it is contended that the Confederate Gov-acquiesced in by the Supreme Government, such ernment, being unlawful in its origin and con- as the treatment of captives both on land and tinuance, was incapable of acquiring, holding sea as prisoners of war; the exchange of prisonor transferring a valid title to the property. ers; their vessels captured, recognized as prizes The court below so held in terms, and this court of war and dealt with accordingly; their propso far sustains that ruling as to declare that the erty seized on land referred to the judicial triclaimant could not acquire any title to the cot-bunals for adjudication; their ports blockaded, ton seized by purchase from that Government. and the blockade maintained by a suitable force, |