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all persons affected by fraud proper parties to suit based on fraudulent conspiracy. Cited generally in Randall v. Lower, 98 Ind. 262: dissenting opinion in Wilhelm v. Byles, 60 Mich. 575, 29 N. W. 116, majority holding other creditors not necessary parties in creditors' suit to enforce execution of assignee's trust.

Parties. One interested in controversy but who will not be directly affected by decree made in his absence is not an indispensable party, but should be made one if possible, and court will not proceed without him if he can be reached, p. 571.

Cited in Hays v. Humphreys, 37 Fed. 284, holding proper party residing in State should be joined; Union Mill Co. v. Danberg. 81 Fed. 90, tenant in common may sue in equity to restrain infringement of water rights without joining co-tenants; Sioux City Ry. v. Trust Co., 82 Fed. 126, 49 U. S. App. 531, holding court may permit dismissal as to unnecessary parties when retention would oust jurisdiction.

Parties. One not interested in controversy between immediate litigants, but having interest in subject-matter which may be conveniently settled in the suit, may be made a party or not, at complainants' option, p. 571.

Cited and applied in Goldsmith v. Gilliland, 10 Sawy. 618, 24 Fed. 157, holding party in possession may maintain suit to quiet title against any or all claimants of undivided interests; Hicklin v. Marco, 56 Fed. 553, 15 U. S. App. 55, holding grantees of purchaser on foreclosure not necessary parties in action to cancel mortgage; Columbia Finance Co. v. Kentucky Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 796, 22 U. S. App. 54, holding party not affected by decree unnecessary; Donovan v. Campion, 85 Fed. 72, 56 U. S. App. 391, holding agent employed to purchase and convey to principal neither indispensable nor proper party to bill against principal to vacate deed; Pollard v. Lathrop. 12 Colo. 176, 20 Pac. 254, holding agent who effected settlement not necessary party in action to establish trust; Supervisors v. Walbridge, 38 Wis. 188, holding where grounds of action alleged against several defendants arise from same transaction, bill not multifarious.

Equity. Where equity proceeding concerns disposal of specific fund, one claiming same is an indispensable party, p. 572.

Miscellaneous.- Branson v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 11 Or. 167, 2 Pac. 90, no application.

19 Wall. 572-577, 22 L. 162, STEVENSON v. WILLIAMS. Removal of causes.- Act of 1867 authorizes removal to Federal courts only where application is made before final judgment in the State court of original jurisdiction, d. 575.

Cited and principle applied in Lowe v. Williams, 94 U. S. 651, 24 L. 216, holding suit pending in State appellate court cannot be removed; Ayers v. Watson, 113 U. S. 597, 28 L. 1094, 5 S. Ct. 642, holding mistrial by disagreement of jury does not take away right of removal; Brice v. Somers, 1 Flipp. 578, F. C. 1,856, holding case cannot be removed after appeal from State court of original jurisdiction; McCallon v. Waterman, 1 Flipp. 653, F. C. 8,675, remanding case where removal was sought after entry of default; Fisk v. Henarie, 13 Sawy. 49, 32 Fed. 425, holding application may be made any time during pendency for trial, irrespective of mistrials; Kellogg v. Hughes, 3 Dill. 358, 359, F. C. 7,662, holding action removable after reversal by appellate court and before commencement of new trial; In re Frazer, 9 Fed. Cas. 730, holding application for removal made after entry of decree, too late; Darst v. Peoria, 13 Fed. 564, holding application after appeal and affirmance and cause remanded with instructions, too late; Field v. Williams, 24 Fed. 514, holding cause removable after ruling on demurrer; Sharp v. Gutcher, 74 Ind. 363, holding removal may be had any time before final hearing; Du Vivier v. Hopkins, 116 Mass. 129, 17 Am. Rep. 145, holding claim against estate, pending on appeal from decision of probate commissioners, not removable; Jackson v. Gould, 74 Me. 574, to point that Federal court will proceed as if action had been there commenced. See 3 Dill. 356, note, F. C. 8,802, on final determination of controversy; 12 Am. Rep. 552, and 22 Am. Rep. 80, notes on removal before trial.

Courts. Judgment of one State court annulling that of another on ground that notes on which former was rendered were given for loan of Confederate money presents no Federal question, and is not reviewable by Supreme Court, p. 576.

Cited in Winona, etc., R. R. v. Plainview, 143 U. S. 393, 36 L. 200, 12 S. Ct. 538, holding jurisdiction arises only when State court has given effect to statute impairing obligation of prior contract; arguendo in New Orleans Water-Works v. Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U. S. 34, 35, 31 L. 613, 8 S. Ct. 750, and Kreiger v. Shelby R. R., 125 U. S. 46, 31 L. 678, 8 S. Ct. 756, both holding error does not lie to highest State court on ground that contract obligation has been impaired unless decision involves construction of some law.

19 Wall. 577-581, 22 L. 208, OSBORNE v. UNITED STATES. Internal revenue.- Object of section 8, act of 1868, respecting distillers' bonds, being to protect the government, not sureties, it did not make the United States a guarantor to sureties that distillery property was free from incumbrances, p. 581.

Followed in Hart v. United States, 95 U. S. 318, 24 L. 480, a similar

case.

Cited and applied in United States v. De Visser, 10 Fed. 648,

holding statutes designed only to aid government officers in performing duties form no part of sureties' contract. See 63 Am. St. Rep. 337, monographic note on discharge of sureties.

19 Wall. 581-584, 22 L. 201, PEETE v. MORGAN.

Commerce.- Power to establish quarantine laws rests with States, p. 582.

Cited in Norfolk, etc., Ry. v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 757, 57 Am. St. Rep. 832, 24 S. E. 839, 34 L. R. A. 108, upholding law prohibiting running trains on Sunday.

Commerce. States have no power to levy tonnage duties for defrayment of quarantine expenses on vessels entering their ports, p. 584.

Cited and applied in Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 581, 22 L. 420, holding tonnage tax on steamboats as compensation for use of wharf, unconstitutional; Inman S. S. Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 245, 24 L. 122, holding tonnage tax on ships entering New York, void; Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 465, 26 L. 1068, holding specific tax on messages transmitted beyond State unconstitutional; Booth v. Lloyd, 33 Fed. 598, holding Maryland statute, exacting tonnage duty on oyster boats, unconstitutional; Ferrari v. Board of Health, 24 Fla. 413, 5 So. 4, holding quarantine charge based on tonnage invalid; Harbor Commrs. v. Pashley, 19 S. C. 321, 323, holding harbor charge graduated according to vessel's length and not for services, invalid. See extended note in 27 Am. St. Rep. 557, on State regulation of commerce; 47 Am. St. Rep. 549, monographic note on quarantine regulations.

Distinguished in Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 86, 24 L. 380, upholding city wharfage charge proportioned to tonnage; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 284, 25 L. 415, holding steamboats may be taxed as personal property by city where owner resides; Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 678, 25 L. 755, upholding tax on all sewing-machine peddlers without regard to place of manufacture; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 376, 27 L. 423, 2 S. Ct. 266, upholding license fee on ferry-boats landing in State, irrespective of tonnage; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg. 107 U. S. 698, 27 L. 587, 2 S. Ct. 737, upholding wharfage fee based on tonnage; Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 462, 463, 30 L. 241, 6 S. Ct. 1118, affirming S. C., 36 La. Ann. 669, 671, upholding provision for payment of fixed fee for examination by all vessels passing quarantine; Keokuk v. Keokuk Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 208, upholding fee for use of wharf, graduated by vessel's tonnage.

19 Wall. 584-590, 22 L. 173. RAILROAD CO v. RICHMOND. Contracts valid when made, continue valid and enforceable so long as peace lasts between governments of contracting parties, VOL. VIII— 18

notwithstanding changes in conditions which led to their creation, p. 589.

Cited generally in Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 128 Mo. 246, 27 8. W. 571.

Commerce power was vested in Congress in order to secure freedom in commercial intercourse against discriminating State leg. islation; it is not to be so exercised as to interfere with private contracts, not designed, when made, to create such intercourse; hence, railroad's agreement that a certain elevator company should handle its grain at a certain point, is not terminated by the building of a bridge rendering elevating of the grain unnecessary, nor is the enforcement of the agreement an interference with the commerce power, p. 590.

Cited and applied in Bowman v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 125 U. S. 484, 31 L. 706, 8 S. Ct. 698, holding will of Congress is that transportation of commodities between States shall be free, except as restricted by Congress; Illinois Central R. R. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 154, 41 L. 111, 16 S. Ct. 1101, holding State cannot impair usefulness of facilities for interstate traffic by requiring stoppage at certain places; Kentucky Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. R., 37 Fed. 629, 633, 2 L. R. A. 324, 326, holding section 5258, revised statutes, imposes no duty to make through rates with one connecting line, because it has with others; United States v. Addyston Pipe Co., 78 Fed. 717, holding anti-trust act of 1890 does not affect contracts restraining trade not interfering with interstate commerce; Richmond v. Railroad, 40 Iowa, 275, similar suit on same contract; State v. Railroad Co., 24 W. Va. 796, 798, 49 Am. Rep. 299, 300, upholding State Sunday law; generally in Express Co. v. Richmond, etc., R. R., 111 N. C. 472, 32 Am. St. Rep. 806, 16 S. E. 393, 18 L. R. A. 395, and n., Higgins v. Rinker, 47 Tex. 390, and State v. Kansas, etc., Co., 96 Fed. 366.

Distinguished in Addyston Pipe Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 227, 233, holding Congress may enact laws declaring void, contracts calculated to regulate interstate commerce.

19 Wall. 591-594, 22 L. 210, UNITED STATES v. COOK.

Indians. Right of Indians in public land reserved for their use is that of occupancy alone, fee remaining in United States, p. 592. Cited and principle applied in Leavenworth, etc., R. R. v. United States, 92 U. S. 742, 23 L. 638, holding grant of land to aid in building railroad cannot embrace land reserved for Indians; Beecher V. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 525, 24 L. 441, holding fee of United States in Indian reservations in Wisconsin passed to State on admission: Goodfellow v. Muckey, 16 McCrary, 244, F. C. 5.537, holding Indians had not sufficient title to pass conveyance; Shepard v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 40 Fed. 350, holding, on extinction of Indian right of

occupancy, land passed under grant covering same; Muse v. Arlington Hotel Co., 68 Fed. 646, holding Indian right of occupancy sacred until extinguished by cession to government; United States v. Alaska Packers' Assn., 79 Fed. 156, holding government, as original proprietor, may dispose of lands within reservation without Indian's consent; California, etc., Co. v. Worden, 85 Fed. 96, holding Indians may use right of use and occupancy at their discretion; United States v. Four Bottles Sour-Mash Whiskey, 90 Fed. 723, holding Indian right of occupancy extinguishable at any time by Congress; Snell v. Dubuque, etc., Ry., 78 Iowa, 94, 42 N. W. 590, holding swamp land grant of 1850 vested title to fee in State, subject to Indian right of occupancy; Veale v. Maynes, 23 Kan. 24, 28, holding patent passed title, notwithstanding prior allotment to Indian; Roberts v. Missouri, etc., R. R., 43 Kan. 106, 22 Pac. 1007, holding government may dispose of fee in lands reserved for In dians; Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y. 271, holding Indians have no power to convey soil of reservation; dissenting opinion in Leavenworth, etc., R. R. v. United States, 92 U. S. 755, 23 L. 643, majority opinion supra.

Distinguished in Caldwell v. Robinson, 59 Fed. 655, holding whites may settle on lands in Indian country outside of reservations; Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 8, holding effect of Chippewa treaty of 1863 was to vest alienable fee to chief.

Indians occupying public land reserved for their use may cut such timber as is necessary for improvement of the land, and sell timber so cut, p. 593.

Cited in Shiver v. United States, 159 U. S. 498, 40 L. 233, 16 S. Ct. 57, and Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 194, 42 L. 133, 17 S. Ct. 784, holding homestead locator may cut timber necessary to clear land prior to patent; United States v. Murphy, 32 Fed. 379, holding one holding under homestead entry may cut timber only for purposes of clearing.

Indians occupying public land reserved for their use have no right to cut timber thereon for purposes of sale, p. 594.

Cited in Shiver v. United States, 159 U. S. 498, 40 L. 233, 16 S. Ct. 57, in case of homestead locator, after entry, but before patent; United States v. Pine River Co., 89 Fed. 912, 61 U. S. App. 81, denying right of Indians to dispose of timber on reservations; generally in Larsen v. Oregon, etc., Nav. Co., 19 Or. 247, 23 Pac. 977; dissenting opinion in United States v. Loughrey, 172 U. S. 223, 19 S. Ct. 160, majority holding no action lay for timber cut on land conditionally granted State to aid railroad.

Distinguished in Sullivan v. Schultz, 22 Mont. 544, 57 Pac. 280, holding, under revised statutes, section 2319, stone may be removed from public land.

Indians. Rights of Indians in lands of their reservations are those of life tenants upon lands of remainderman, p. 594.

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