hence does not make the latter a judicial question. New Orleans v. LeBlanc, 139 La. 113, 71 So. 248.

See 2 La. Dig. p. 225.

Jury Commissioners. An act which confers upon the district judges the power to appoint jury commissioners, is constitutional, the duty thus imposed upon them being judicial. State v. Miles, Man. Unrep. Cas. 180.

Acts conferring power on the jury commissioners in the selection of jurors. are not unconstitutional as attempting to confer on such commissioners judicial power. State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940, 37 So. 883.

The fact that the Legislature delegated to the Governor the right to appoint the jury commissioners for Orleans parish did not necessarily impress the power of appointing with an executive character; for while the Legislature undoubtedly had the right to give the Governor this power, still the selection of a jury commission is more in the nature of a judicial function, as it is intimately connected with the organization of the court. State v. Jackson, 134 La. 599, 64 So. 481, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 27.

Judicial Encroachment on Legislature. The Constitution does not vest in the judiciary supervisory jurisdiction over the general assembly, or authorize it to remedy inaction on its part, and until its action is affirmatively unconstitutional it can not be reached by the courts. (State v. Robira, 118 La. 253, 42 So. 792, cited.) State v. Hageman, 123 La. 802, 49 So. 530.

Courts have no power to promulgate, or order others to promulgate laws. This is a Legislative prerogative. State v. Deslonde, 27 La.Ann. 71.

The judiciary, recognizing the right and duty of the Legislature to construe and determine primarily its own power under the Constitution, will never overrule that determination, unless clearly convinced of such radical inconsistency between the law and Constitution that the two can not be reconciled. Excelsior Planting &c. Co. v. Green, 39 La.Ann. 455, 1 So. 873.

Where the Constitution gives the Legislature a discretion, the courts will not undertake to control the exercise of it. Houston v. Jumel, Man. Unrep. Cas. 362.

The fact, whether a law has regularly passed through all the stages necessary for its passage as a law, up to promulgation, does not belong to judicial inquiry. Louisiana Lottery Co. v. Richoux, 23 La.Ann. 743, 8 Am. Rep. 602. Whited v. Lewis, 25 La.Ann. 568, 569.

A court can not find, elsewhere than in the Constitution itself, the right to control the exercise of a legislative power expressly granted; it can not add one jot or tittle to its terms; it can not, by glosses and interpretations. subtract one particle from its substance; and it would be rebellion in a judge to say, that a plain and unqualified grant of power by the Constitution to a particular department was null, because against common right. State v. Hufty, 11 La.Ann. 303.

Perhaps a court may go behind the Constitution to seek an unwritten bill of rights, which is said to lie at the foundation of every free government, and there find a principle on which to check legislative action not specially or by necessary implication inhibited by the Constitution; like the right of revolution, such a power is sometimes obscurely hinted at in judicial opinions. But it is obvious, that a flagrant case of wrong and hardship must be made out before a court can thwart the legislative will, without a direct warrant in the Constitution itself. In re New Orleans Drainage Co., 11 La.Ann. 338.

The judiciary has no arbitrary prerogative to correct the abuses of power by the co-ordinate departments, against which the Constitution itself has furnished no security. However disastrous the consequences of a course of legislation, it can not for that cause be arrested by the judiciary, whose only guide is the Constitution, a violation of which by the other departments, equally sworn to its support, will be only pronounced where the clearest conviction of such violation is forced upon the conscience of the court. New Orleans v. Cordeviolle, 9 La.Ann. 548; New Orleans v. Graihle, 9 La.Ann. 561, 562.

A judicial decree interpreting a contract authorized by legislative will can not prevent the legislature from further legislation, authorizing the parties to alter or amend this contract, or to annul the existing and make a new and a different contract. Conery v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 41 La.Ann. 910, 7 So. 8.

Perhaps a court may arrest legislative action, although not directly or impliedly unconstitutional. Such a stretch of judicial power, however, can be exercised only in flagrant cases of wrong. And such is not the case at bar; on the contrary there is a strong equity in favor of the company. Without legislative intervention the work could not have been achieved. Nor was it any greater tyranny for the legislature to do this thing through a company, than it would have been tyranny for a majority of proprietors to do it under legislative sanction. The company claims only reimbursement for actual expenditures as the measure of contribution. In re New Orleans Drainage Co., 11 La.Ann. 338.

Courts of justice, which act only upon and under the law, can not give vitality to laws which have become by paramount authority, inoperative and void. Austin v. Sandel, 19 La.Ann. 309.

The control, administration and disposition of state property and appropriation of state funds are exclusive powers of the Legislature, and can not be delegated to or exercised by the judiciary. Carter v. State, 42 La.Ann. 927, 8 So. 836, 21 Am. St. 404.

See 2 La. Dig. p. 230.

Taxation. The departments of government must be kept distinct. The assessment of taxable property and the collection of taxes are legal, not judicial proceedings or process. If these proceedings take place illegally, the functions of the judiciary may be invoked but not otherwise. Union Co. v. Bordelon, 7 La.Ann. 192, 193; Duncan v. State, 7 La.Ann. 377.

It is a legislative question to determine whether the alluvial lands of the state subject to overflow can be reclaimed by drainage and levees, and it is also the legislative function to prescribe the rule and objects of taxation to effect this reclamation. No court can set aside the legislative determination in this respect, unless the legislation violates the organic law. Hill v. Fontenot, 46 La.Ann. 1563, 16 So. 475.

License Tax. The amount of a license tax to be imposed on hawkers and peddlers is a consideration addressing itself to the Legislature, and not to the courts. Flournoy v. Walker, 126 La. 489, 52 So. 673.

The judiciary can not revise a license tax, imposed by the Legislature. State v. Merchants Trading Co., 114 La. 529, 38 So. 443.

Judicial Encroachment on Executive and Administrative Departments. Under the division of powers as laid down in the federal and state Constitutions, the judiciary department has no jurisdiction over, or right to interfere

with, the independent action of the chief executive, in the exercise of the functions of his office, even though the act he is required to perform be purely ministerial in its character. The question whether an act coming within the range of the duties of the chief executive is ministerial or political can not be determined judicially. It must rest, with and be determined by the chief executive himself. State v. Warmoth, 22 La.Ann. 1, 2 Am. Rep. 712.

Constitutional executive officers are not exempt from judicial authority to compel them to perform specific duties imposed upon them by law. State v. Houston, 40 La.Ann. 393, 4 So. 50, 8 Am. St. 532.

Under the division of powers, as laid down in the federal and state Constitutions, the judiciary department has no jurisdiction over the chief executive, in the exercise of the functions of his office, even if the act he is required to perform, be purely ministerial in its character. The chief executive must determine whether the act is ministerial or political, and not the courts. State v. Warmoth, 22 La.Ann. 1, 2 Am. Rep. 712; State Nav. Co. v. Warmoth, 24 La.Ann. 351, 13 Am. Rep. 126.

It is the bounden duty of the judiciary to give some prima facie force to the acts of the executive; his acts are not presumed to be illegal and utterly wrong. State v. Judge, 48 La.Ann. 1501, 21 So. 94.

Whenever, by the Constitution and laws of a state, officers of the executive branch of the government are vested with discretionary powers and functions in the performance of civil duties, or when political powers and responsibilities are devolved upon them, they are not amenable to judicial process. In such case, their acts are only politically examinable. State v. Board of Liquidation, 42 La.Ann. 647, 7 So. 706.

The courts have no power to compel by mandamus, an executive officer to perform an act which is discretionary with him. State v. Dubuclet, 28 La.Ann. 85.

Where the Governor is invested with power and discretion to issue proclamation of the incorporation of a village, the courts have no power to review his action. State v. Ehret, 135 La. 643, 65 So. 871.

When official acts to be performed by the executive branch of the state government are divided into ministerial and political, and courts assume the right to enforce the performance of the former, it opens a wide margin for the exercise of judicial power. The judge may say what acts are ministerial, and what are political. Circumstances may arise, and conditions may exist, which would require the Governor, in the proper exercise of his duty, and with due regard to the interests of the state, not to perform a plain ministerial act. Is the judge to arbitrarily determine his duty in such a case, and by mandamus seek to coerce its performance? State v. Board of Liquidation, 42 La.Ann. 647, 7 So. 706.

A court of the United States will not compel, by injunction, the officers of a state to execute the laws of the state. To do so would be an attempt by the court to administer the state government. McCauley v. Kellog, 2 Woods (U. S.) 13.

The judge a quo did not err in refusing to receive testimony in regard to the election of Governor Kellog and the validity of his official acts, on the ground that the right of an officer to a position which he holds can not be inquired into, or his action be declared null in a suit between third parties. McMillen v. Anderson, 27 La.Ann. 18, 95 U. S. 37, 24 L. ed. 335.

The courts disclaim any general supervision over the two boards in the

exercise of the impeaching power, which the law has intrusted solely to their sound discretion. If they err, they are responsible to the public by whom they are elected. State v. Ramos, 10 La.Ann. 420.

Acts authorizing the judge to suspend the sheriff from office, are not unconstitutional. State v. Richmond, 29 La.Ann. 705, 708.

See 2 La. Dig. p. 231.

Removal of Officers by Governor. The Governor being given the power to remove an officer for cause, the exercise of such power rests in his sound discretion, over which the courts will exercise no control. State v. Cahen, 28 La.Ann. 645.

The removal by the governor of an officer occupying an office created by the legislature, and removable under certain circumstances, is not subject to the revision of a court; the executive is distinct and separate from the judiciary. State v. Doherty, 25 La. Ann. 119, 120, 13 Am. Rep. 131.

The courts will not pass on the question of whether the Governor, in removing a public officer, whom he had power to remove, acted improperly and without cause. State v. Rost, 47 La.Ann. 53, 16 So. 776; State v. Rost, 47 La.Ann. 65, 16 So. 780.

In the exercise of the power, given to him by law, of removing public officers for certain causes, the Governor is the sole judge of the existence of such causes and his action of removal is final and irreversible by the judiciary. (See State v. Abbott, 41 La.Ann. 1096, 6 So. 805.) State v. Lamantia, 33 La.Ann. 446.

Judicial Encroachment on Police Juries. A court can not compel a police jury to impose a tax, in obedience to a law directing it so to do. Claiborne v. Police Jury, 7 Mart. (O. S.) 4, 5.

It would amount to an invasion of the domain of the executive department by the courts to interfere with the acts of police juries in the expenditure of money for court house purposes except to prevent fraud, oppression or a gross abuse of power. Murphy v. St. Mary Parish, 118 La. 401, 42 So. 979.

Encroachment on City Government. Courts are not vested with power to frame a budget for the city of New Orleans; to assume the administration of its affairs; to constitute themselves, in effect, the mayor and common council, for the purpose of determining what are or are not reasonable allowances for the performance of particular duties. Those matters are confided by the law to the discretion and control of the corporate authorities. (Moore v. City of New Orleans, 32 La.Ann. 726, cited.) State v. New Orleans, 52 La.Ann. 1263, 27 So. 572.

The courts are without constitutional power or authority to interfere with an ordinance of the mayor and aldermen of a village, fixing the bond and salary of the village marshal, or to substitute their judgment and discretion in lieu of those of the body to which they have been legally confided. State v. Dodson, 123 La. 903, 49 So. 635.

Statute 1856, conferring judicial functions upon the mayor of Baton Rouge, is not unconstitutional. Baton Rouge v. Dearing, 15 La.Ann. 208.

See infra, Art. 5, § 1.

Policy and Propriety of Laws. The wisdom or propriety of a law is a matter that concerns the Legislature, not the courts. State v. Rose, 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643.

The policy or justice of the Employers' Liability Act is a question for the

Legislature, not for the courts. 68, 83 So. 381.

Colorado v. Johnson Iron Works, 146 La.

Courts may not inquire into the motives of the Legislature in adopting a law. State v. New Orleans, 142 La. 73, 76 So. 244.

The decisions by the Legislature of a question of public policy will not be revised by the courts. State v. Flanders, 24 La.Ann. 57.

The Supreme Court is not charged with the function of determining either the morality or the expediency of legislation. Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 140 La. 1078, 74 So. 559.

It is not the function of the courts to take issue with lawmakers as to the wisdom of a statute or ordinance enacted under the police powers, and their judicial authority to annul them is limited to abuses of police power under pretense of promoting public health, safety or morals. Shreveport v. Sullivan, 142 La. 573, 77 So. 286.

The judiciary department is not authorized "to set aside a legislative enactment, whether before it becomes operative or afterward, on the ground that it is unreasonable, impolitic or unjust." It is otherwise with municipal ordinances. These are adopted under powers delegated by the Legislature. and the courts have power to inquire whether the conditions on which the grant is based have been complied with, i. e., whether they are “reasonable, impartial, fair and general in their application." New Orleans R. Co. v. Vidalia, 117 La. 561, 566, 42 So. 139. See note to Art. 3, § 17.

All legislation called for by the public welfare is within the scope of the legislative power and whether such welfare calls for particular legislation is a question primarily for the Legislature, and the courts can only override its decision when, after every allowance is made, no sufficient basis therefor is found. State v. Cullom, 138 La. 395, 70 So. 338.

The reasonableness of the time fixed by act of the Legislature for contesting an election is a matter within the discretion of the Legislature, and not the judgment of the court. (Guillory v. Avoyelles R. Co., 104 La. 11, 28 So. 899; Gray v. Bourgebois, 107 La. 671, 32 So. 42; Dimmick v. Opelousas &c. R. Co., 123 La. 123, 48 So. 767; Board of Commissioners v. Wilkins Co., 125 La. 127, 51 So. 91, cited.) Bone v. Sixth Ward & Crowley Drainage Dist., 128 La. 847, 55 So. 478.

See 4 La. Dig. Laws, p. 629.

Legislative or Judicial Construction. The Legislature can not fix by a declaratory act or otherwise, a construction of the Constitution, which will bind the judicial department. If courts occasionally rely upon legislative construction of acts of ordinary legislation, it is because, as to them, the Legislature may repeal or modify them or settle their construction in cases of ambiguity by a declaratory act. Cotton v. Brien, 6 Rob. 115; Parish v. Municipality No. 2, 8 La.Ann. 145; Parish v. Municipality No. 2, 8 La.Ann. 170.

The construction of the Constitution is the peculiar province of the courts. and to them belongs the final decision; but legislative construction will be acquiesced in if it is a reasonably possible construction, and apparently correct. State v. Röss, 144 La. 898, 81 So. 386.

The preamble of Act February 7, 1850, declares its object to be the removal of doubts upon a point of law. So far as the future is concerned, this the Legislature could do. But the power of expounding the law, which includes the great and responsible duty of declaring, whether the legislative assemblies, state and municipal, have transcended, in their past action, the limits