an honest man and he sought to follow the instructions of the court, but one of the jurors said that he was in favor of the plaintiff recovering anyway no matter whether the required notice had been given the defendant or not; the foreman said, "We cannot do that, because the court said that service of the notice was prerequisite to the plaintiff's recovery "; then said the other juror, “This man is entitled to recover anyhow, no matter what the court said."

Now, my idea is that in civil jury trials a jury should never be required to find a general verdict; but it should always be required to find the facts generally in the case, and return those facts, and then the judge should pronounce the law of the case upon those facts so found by the jury. For that reason I am in favor of this proposition, and I should be opposed to inserting a provision to the effect that when the judge does this he must render his judgment according to the equities of the case, because it would be giving to the judge too much discretion. It should be according to the law as applicable to the fact so found.

At this point the President relinquished the Chair to Edgar H. Farrar, of Louisiana.

Frederick W. Lehmann, of Missouri:

The general phase of matters presented by the report of this committee is one of particular concern to myself and the representatives present here from the state of Missouri, and is of particular concern also to the gentleman from Texas and the representatives of that state. I am in favor of the trial of every case according to the law of the land. This report does not propose that any case shall be tried otherwise than according to the law of the land. But the report proposes to establish what the law of the land shall be, and to put it upon a different footing from what it is now in some of the states. If the trial judge were so far to disregard the rights of litigants before him as to arrogate to himself the trial of a case which the Constitution gives to a jury, no appellate tribunal would for one moment

hesitate to set aside his judgment; or if he were grossly to invade the province of the jury in the manner indicated by the gentleman from Texas; the same result would follow. We are not dealing with propositions of that kind, nor are those the propositions which imperil the administration of justice in this country.

Let me put in concrete form what is aimed at by this report. A man having a young woman under his protection as his ward ravishes her. Upon indictment by the grand jury and upon trial by a petit jury he is found guilty. Upon appeal the conviction is set aside, because by carelessness of the draughtsman of the indictment or by the oversight of a copyist the definite article the was omitted from the concluding phrase of the indictment. Suppose then a similar crime were committed in my neighborhood, and the natural resentment such a crime provokes in the breast of every man would kindle the people to mob violence against the offender. Let me come out and try to quiet that mob and say: "Take not justice into your own hands, but leave it to the orderly administration of the law." What do you think would be the answer? "We have no respect for a law which puts the definite article the in sanctity above the chastity of our wives and daughters." That is what is aimed at in this report. That is the purpose of it, to make an end of those things which bring the law into contempt and disrepute, and which make you and me ashamed of it when we are arraigned at the bar of the common sense of mankind. It is a duty that we owe to ourselves and to our country to bring the law of the land into harmony with its good sense and its best conscience. That is the purpose of this bill and no other. We invade no constitutional rights. We simply stand upon the rights of society and insist that they shall be regarded here. I submit that you will deal a severe blow to the utility of this Association if you go upon record as continuing through this generation not the substance of the common law, but the casuistry and frailties imposed upon it in the dark days of the past. It is our duty to relieve the law from them, and that is the purpose of this report.

The Chairman:

The question before the House, gentlemen, is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas as further amended. by the gentleman from Kentucky.

James Quarles:

I understood the President to hold, Mr. Chairman, that my amendment was really not an amendment, but that it presented a question which would arise on the motion to adopt the report as a whole.

M. A. Spoonts:

As the proposer of the amendment, I wish to say a few words in reply to the remarks of the distinguished gentleman who has just taken his seat.

The Chairman:

One moment. Is this your amendment: To amend by striking out all after the word "reserved," in Section 2, next to the last line, and insert in lieu thereof: "as the justice of the case may require, or to grant a new trial where the verdict is insufficient to enable the court to enter a correct final judgment?"

M. A. Spoonts:

Yes, sir; that is the amendment that I proposed.

The Chairman:

The question before the house is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas.

Everett P. Wheeler:

A question was put to me by the gentleman from Texas that some of my associates on the committee think has not been sufficiently answered. I answer it thus: The bill as we propose it does not repeal existing provisions of law in regard to the granting of new trials. Those are all retained. The only effect of the bill is to enlarge the power of the appellate court, but not to subtract from it. If the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Texas were adopted it seems to us that it would restrict

that power. The provision is that a new trial may be granted where the verdict is insufficient to enable the court to render final judgment. But there are other cases in which a new trial could be granted. It seemed to us better not to have any provision in this section on that subject, but to leave it to the existing law.

M. A. Spoonts:

Before the question is put I would like to conclude the discussion on this amendment. My attention has just been called to the fact that there is a section of the federal statute to which this is an addition. I have not the statute before me. The only thing I am seeking to preserve by this amendment is that the judgment of the appellate court, if a right has been denied that was not passed upon by the jury in the case, should be a reversal. The gentlemen who have discussed this entire procedure have not devoted their remarks to a discussion of the question involved in that matter; but in view of the fact that the gentlemen who proposed this measure and who will perhaps submit it to Congress will protect the very point that I had in view in proposing the amendment, and in view of the further fact that they say that my construction of the act is not what they contemplate, I will with the consent of my second withdraw the amendment.

The Chairman:

Then the question before the house is on the motion to approve the provisions of the bill to regulate the judicial procedure of the courts of the United States.

Walter George Smith, of Pennsylvania:

As I understand it, some gentlemen are in favor of Section 1 and are opposed to Section 2. I thought the ruling of the President at the time this debate began was that a vote should be taken upon the bill section by section.

The Chairman:

Is it the pleasure of the house that the question shall be put

as stated by the Chair, or that there shall be a division of the question and each section taken up separately?

Henry H. Ingersoll, of Tennessee:

I think there should be a division, and without debate.

Walter George Smith:

I move that we now take a vote upon Section 1.

Henry H. Ingersoll:

I second that motion.

The motion was adopted.

The Chairman:

The motion is carried, and Section 1 of the bill is now before the house.

Francis Fisher Kane, of Pennsylvania:

I move that Section 1, as recommended by the committee, be now adopted.

Walter George Smith:

I second that motion.

Section 1 was adopted.

The Chairman:

Now the question before the house is Section 2.

Epaphroditus Peck, of Connecticut:

I move the adoption of Section 2.

The motion was seconded.

W. B. Swaney, of Tennessee:

I want to ask whether or not that section is susceptible to the criticism that it is applicable to criminal cases; that the trial judge in any case may submit to the jury the questions of fact arising upon the proofs? If so, I should amend that by saying "civil" cases.

Everett P. Wheeler:

The power to render a general verdict is not taken away by