ages therefor, the jury were rightly instructed that he was entitled to a verdict which would fully compensate him for the injuries sustained, and that in compensating him the jury were authorized to go beyond his outlay in and about this suit, and to consider the humiliation and outrage to which he had been subjected by arresting him publicly without warrant and without cause, and by the conduct of the conductor, such as his remark to the plaintiff's wife." The second objection of the Colombian Government turns upon the use of the word "trifling." To term the injuries "trifling" is to beg the question. If they were "trifling," this Government would not present a claim based upon them. No government entitled to respect regards as "trifling" the wanton arrest and imprisonment of its citizens upon the whim of a foreign functionary. A money indemnification for such an outrage is the usual reparation demanded and received. (2 Phill. Int. Law, 4; Bluntschli Droit Int., art. 380.) Very respectfully, Approved: JOHN K. RICHARDS, JOHN W. GRIGGS. The SECRETARY OF STATE. ARMY-ENLISTMENT-PARDON. Congress has no power by legislation to abridge the effect of the President's pardon. A person convicted of desertion from the military service and afterwards pardoned by the President, under section 1118, R. S., would be restored by reason of the pardon to all the rights and privileges of a citizen which he had anterior to such conviction. While the President's pardon restores a criminal to his legal rights and fully relieves him of the disabilities legally attaching to his conviction, it does not destroy an existing fact that his service was not faithful and honest. A recruiting officer has the right to reject a candidate for enlistment in the Army whose service during his previous term was not honest and faithful, notwithstanding the President's pardon of the offense. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of August 26 ultimo, in reference to the case of Daniel T. Thompson. It appears that said Thompson was a private in Company A, Seventh United States Infantry, that he was tried by a court-martial, convicted of desertion, and sentenced to be dishonorably discharged from the service of the United States, forfeiting all pay and allowances due him, and to be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may direct for the period of one year. This sentence was carried into execution, except that after Thompson had served the greater part of the period of imprisonment the remainder was remitted, and he subsequently received a full pardon from the President. Thompson has applied to reenlist in the Army, and you ask my opinion as to whether the effect of the pardon in Thompson's case has been to restore his eligibility for reenlistment. You also call to my attention that part of the act of Congress of August 1, 1894 (28 Stat., 216), which reads as follows: "No soldier shall be again enlisted in the Army whose service during his last preceding term of enlistment has not been honest and faithful." There can be no doubt as to the effect of the President's pardon to one who has been charged with, or convicted of, an offense against the laws of the United States. In Knote v. United States, 95 U. S., 149, 153, the court declares the effect of a pardon to be as follows: "It releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the offense, and restores to him all of his civil rights. In contemplation of law, it so far blots out the offense that afterwards it can not be imputed to him to prevent the assertion of his legal rights. It gives to him a new credit and capacity, and rehabilitates him to that extent in his former position." The same doctrine is plainly declared by the court in Spencer's Case, 22 Fed. Cas., 921. Judge Deady, delivering the opinion of this case, says: "And when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense." These opinions are fully sustained by Blackstone's Commentaries, book 4, ch. 31, 4. In Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 334, the court in its opinion deals very explicitly with the question of the effect of the President's pardon, and after citing the section of the Constitution from which the President derives the authority to grant pardons, says (p. 380): "The power thus conferred is unlimited with the exceptions stated (except in cases of impeachment). It extends to every offense known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him can not be fettered by any legislative restrictions." The court says further in this opinion: "Such being the case, the inquiry arises as to the effect and operation of a pardon, and on this point all the authorities concur. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense." Authorities to any number may be quoted to sustain this position, but the principle declared is so well settled that their citation is unnecessary. The question, then, which remains to be considered is as to whether these principles shall govern the recruiting authorities of the United States Army in cases of application for reenlistment on the part of persons convicted of desertion during a previous term of service and afterwards pardoned by the President. It can not be questioned that under section 1118 of the Revised Statutes a person convicted of desertion from the military service of the United States and afterwards pardoned by the President would be restored by reason of the pardon to all the rights and privileges of a citizen which he had anterior to such conviction, but Congress, by the act of August 1, 1894, has added a condition which must exist as to persons applying for reenlistment in the Army. It is not in the nature of an inhibition on account of the commission of a criminal offense which the President would have the right to pardon, but it relates to previous conduct in service and affects the personal rather than the criminal character of the applicant. It is true that a soldier who has been guilty of the crime of desertion has not given honest and faithful service, and yet a failure to perform honest and faithful service on the part of a soldier does not necessarily involve a crime or an offense against the military laws of the country. There are many acts of a soldier which may be regarded under the strict rules of the requirements of the military service as unfaithful or dishonest, but of which a military court-martial would not take cognizance. The President would not be called upon to pardon such acts of a soldier, because they do not reach that grade of offense which would authorize the exercise of executive clemency, though if the soldier, during his previous term of service, has been guilty of such want of honest and faithful service, he is disbarred from reenlistment by the statute referred to. I have pursued this line of reasoning in order to draw a distinction between a crime or offense to which the Executive clemency might be applied and the want of honest and faithful service on the part of a soldier during his term, and whilst Congress has no power, by legislation, to abridge the effect of the President's pardon, yet Congress has the right to prescribe qualifications and conditions for enlisted men, and to forbid those not possessing such qualifications, and as to whom such conditions do not exist, to enter the military service. So, whilst the President's pardon restores the criminal to his legal rights and fully relieves him of the disabilities legally attaching to his conviction, it does not destroy an existing fact, viz, that his service was not honest and faithful. I therefore, in answer to your question, advise you that in an application for reenlistment the officers recruiting for the military service of the United States can, under the act of Congress, inquire if the applicant has, during his previous term, performed honest and faithful service, and, if he has not, reject his application; and this authority pertains to the recruiting service and is not affected by the pardon of the President. Respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. JOHN W. GRIGGS. POSTAGE STAMPS-SUPPLIES. Postage stamps are supplies within the meaning of section 3709, Revised Statutes. The word "security" as used in the act of 1877 (1 Supp. R. S., 136) is an evidence of public debt, as a bond, or a certificate of deposit, or other subject of investment. When the word “securities" is used in the property sense, it refers to bonds, mortgages, certificates of deposit, certificates of stock, etc. In this sense postage stamps are not investments or securities. The definition given to the words "obligation or other security of the United States" in Revised Statutes, section 5413, is not intended to be general, but is limited in its application. The transfer of a separate statute, or part thereof, from a particular act to a general revision, does not ordinarily alter its significance. Statutory meaning, so far as it is artificial and not the natural and usual meaning, can be applied only to the exact phrase defined and to the whole of it, not to a selected portion. Revised Statutes, section 5600, relative to the construction to be placed upon a statute, does not prevent the application of the ordinary principles which permit the courts to resort to the context and the subjectmatter of the sections immediately associated with it. Revised Statutes, section 5413, does not apply to and limit the meaning of the words "other securities of the United States," as used in paragraph 4 of the act of March 3, 1877. The Postmaster-General should advertise for proposals for the work of engraving and printing United States postage stamps, for which work the Bureau of Engraving and Printing may be permitted to compete. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, February 11, 1898. SIR: You having requested my opinion as to the law governing the engraving and printing of United States postage stamps, and whether it is necessary for you to advertise for proposals for such work or to have it done at the Treasury Department, I have the honor to advise you as follows: Section 3709, Revised Statutes, directs that all purchases and contracts for supplies in any of the Departments of the |