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that if this contract were between the company and a private firm or person the impost laid by the Government would afford any ground of complaint against the validity of the tax or the continuing force of the contract as between the parties. The act would be valid and would have to be complied with.

But he urges that because, in fact, the impost is laid by the Government acting through its legislative department upon business done under a contract to which the Government in its capacity as a proprietor is a party, therefore the Government is exercising an arbitrary and unjust power in its own favor to the injury of the other party to the contract. No doubt an act of Congress which should single out any individual with whom it had contractual relations and impose upon him or upon his especial business new and peculiar exactions by way of tax or impost, whereby the value of his contract was impaired and the compensation reserved to him under the contract to be paid by the Government was either directly or indirectly reduced in a material degree, would violate fundamental principles of justice. It can not be supposed that Congress would pass such an act. This case is not of that kind. The impost is not peculiar to this company nor to its business. It is general, uniform, and has no exceptions. It applies to all cases where previous .contracts exist between the company and its shippers. It does not assume to nor does it in fact violate or impair a single condition of the contract. It does not authorize the Treasury Department to withhold the sums due under the contract to meet the dues to the Government, as was the case in Murray v. Charleston (96 U. S., 432). The full amount of the agreed compensation will be paid to the company by the Government as it would have been had the war-revenue act never been passed. The act merely imposes upon the company a duty as to the issue of a receipt and the cancellation of a stamp, which are the methods for securing the payment of the impost intended to be laid for the high purpose of sustaining the Government in time of

war.

No case is cited nor do I know of any principle or decision which is in the remotest degree authority for the position

that a government having the power to tax can not exercise it upon ordinary subjects of taxation, either property or business, which are under contractual relations to the Government. Could it be contended that a government could not tax a building which it occupied as a tenant because the payment of the tax would lessen the owner's net income from the rent? In levying an income tax would it be unjust or unconstitutional to tax the income derived by a citizen from a contract to erect a public building, or dredge a river, or transport troops? The immediate answer would be in the negative. And yet every objection urged against this exaction of a stamp impost upon this particular business of the United States Express Company could be with equal applicability urged against the Government in each case I have suggested.

So long as the contractor is taxed uniformly with all others in the same line of business, upon the same transactions, and the tax is levied for appropriate objects of taxation, he can not complain merely because his compensation or profits under his contract with the Government are thereby indirectly reduced. The contract is not affected. The business of the contractor is taxed, and it is not material whether that business is with private persons or with the taxing government itself.

As bearing upon the principles herein enunciated, I refer to Murray v. Charleston (96 U. S., 432), Gaslight Co. v. Taring District (109 U. S., 398), Railroad Co. v. New Orleans (143 U. S. 192.)

You are therefore advised that the United States Express Company is not by reason of its contract exempt from the requirements of the war-revenue act in the transportation of money, securities, etc., for the Government.

Respectfully,

JOHN W. GRIGGS.

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

MAILS-LOTTERY.

An advertising circular, containing a picture and description of a slot machine designed for the purpose of gambling or the distribution of prizes dependent upon lot or chance, can not be excluded from the mails of the United States under the lottery law of September 19, 1890.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 29, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of yours of the 24th instant, inclosing copy of advertisement of C. S. Turner & Co., of Wilkesbarre, Pa., and desiring an opinion as to whether or not this advertisement should be excluded from the mails of the United States under the lottery law approved September 19, 1890 (26 Stats. L., 465).

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The facts as given in your letter are as follows:

The advertisement is headed "The Boomer," and it is a picture of a slot machine, a description thereof, and an offer for its sale. You state further that the machine is designed for the purpose of gambling or the distribution of prizes dependent upon lot or chance, and you base this conclusion upon the following clause of the advertisement, namely:

"A nickel is dropped in the top of the frame, and causes the hand to revolve several times on the face of the dial, finally stopping at a number which denotes the quantity of articles to which the customer is entitled."

You then cite me to the following provisions of the law above referred to:

"That no * *

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or

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*

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* circular concerning any lottery enterprise offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance shall be carried in the mail or delivered at any post-office."

I do not think that the advertisement which you inclose and describe is excluded from the mail of the United States under this law. The advertisement is not a "circular concerning a lottery or enterprise offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance." It is an advertisement for the sale of a piece of machinery which anyone, who desires, can buy. There is no lot or chance connected with the purchase of this machine. No matter what its purpose may be when put

into operation. It may be that the machine itself is a contrivance purporting to offer chances for gain; and, when a purchaser gets it and places it where it can be used, it is probable that it will be patronized because of the fact that when a nickel is dropped into the slot the person dropping it expects to procure a prize, and yet there can be no semblance of a lottery or chance in proposing to sell the machine itself.

I therefore hold that the advertisement which you inclose for the sale of this contrivance called "The Boomer," which is a slot machine into which a nickel may be dropped as described, is not an advertisement concerning a lottery or enterprise offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance within the meaning of the statute which you have cited.

Respectfully,

JAMES E. BOYD

Acting Attorney-General.

The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

ARMY OFFICERS-RETIREMENT.

An officer of the Regular Army holding at the same time a commission in the Volunteer Army, may continue to hold and exercise his commission in the Volunteer Army after having been placed upon the retired list by reason of the age limit.

The act of June 20, 1882, relative to retirement, applies to an officer of the Regular Army who is 64 years of age, temporarily serving under a volunteer commission without affecting his status in the volunteer service, but does not apply to a volunteer officer not being in the Regular Army who is 64 years of age.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
August 30, 1898.

SIR: Acknowledging the receipt of your communication of July 23, 1898, calling my attention especially to that portion of the act of June 20, 1882 (22 Stats., 117), which provides that when "an officer is 64 years of age he shall be retired from the active service and placed on the retired list," and requesting my opinion on the question whether when an officer of the Regular Army serving for the time being in the Volunteer Army, under the provisions of the act of April 22,

1898, becomes 64 years of age, the said act of 1882 requires that he be retired from active service and placed upon the retired list, I have the honor to state in response, that my opinion, addressed to you under date of August 3, replying to the request of your communication of July 14, substantially answers this query. But as in your letter of July 23 you place the question in the alternative form, "or whether the law of 1882 is in abeyance during the time the officer is performing duty in the Volunteer Army," I have the honor to state that, in my opinion, the law of 1882 is not in abeyance, but takes effect at the due time quoad such officer's status in the regular service, leaving his status in the volunteer service unaffected. I therefore repeat the conclusion reached in my former opinion, viz, “that an officer of the Regular Army holding at the same time a commission * in the Volunteer Army, may continue to hold and exercise his commission in the Volunteer Army after having been placed upon the retired list by reason of the age limit."

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You also ask my opinion on the question whether the act of June 20, 1882, applies to any officer of the Army, regular or volunteer, who is 64 years of age.

The significant portion of the act in question (22 Stats., p. 118) provides:

"That on and after the passage of this act, when an officer has served 40 years either as an officer or soldier in the regular or volunteer service, or both, he shall, if he make application therefor to the President, be retired from active service and placed on the retired list, and when an officer is 64 years of age, he shall be retired from active service and placed on the retired list."

This provision and similar provisions of the statutes (sec. 7, act June 18, 1878, 20 Stat., 145, 150) are in case of the officers and enlisted men of our armies, and were not intended to draw after them a burden, and operate to restrict future eligibility to service in such an emergency as has arisen, nor to limit their rights to office under appointment to a new volunteer service, nor further, it may be added, to limit the right of the President so to appoint. In other words, the volunteer service contemplated by these acts, to be computed for the benefit of officers and soldiers in arriving at

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