(a) Provide additional defense against submarines and air attack. This will include the installation of blisters and incidentals thereto, the removal of underwater torpedo tubes, and the installation of above water tubes. (b) Reboiler, install new turbines, improve oil-burning equipment and main propulsive machinery. (c) Increase elevation of turret guns. (d) Install new tripod fire-control mast. (e) Modernize fire-control systems. (f) Provide new airplane launching and handling facilities. (g) Install 5-inch antiaircraft battery. (h) Other miscellaneous alterations and repairs. The following is the estimate of cost under the cognizance of the various bureaus of the Navy Department. In view of the foregoing, the Navy Department recommends that either the bill H. R. 12964 or H. R. 12965 be enacted. Sincerely yours, C. F. ADAMS, Secretary of the Navy. NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, June 27, 1930. The CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS, MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At a hearing held before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, on the bills H. R. 12964 and H. R. 12965, "To authorize alterations and repairs to certain naval vessels," the Secretary of the Navy was requested to inform the committee that formal approval of this proposed legislation had been made by the Bureau of the Budget. On June 14, 1930, the Navy Department submitted to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget a proposed draft of a bill to authorize the modernization of the U. S. S. New Mexico, Mississippi, and Idaho, at a total cost not to exceed the sum of $30,000,000 in all. This proposed draft was in the exact wording of the bills H. R. 12964 and H. R. 12965. On June 27, 1930, the Secretary of the Navy received a letter from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, dated June 27, 1930, stating that in so far as the financial program of the President is concerned, there is no objection to the submission of this proposed legislation to Congress for its consideration. Sincerely yours, C. F. ADAMS, Secretary of the Navy. MINORITY VIEWS Modernizing a battleship can be properly compared to the overhauling of an old automobile. The more money one expends on the same the more certain he is that it will never be possible to make it as efficient as a new ship or a new car. We have taken the position that nothing further should be done to our battleships until it is known whether or not the terms of the London treaty now under discussion in the United States Senate are going to be accepted or rejected. If the treaty should be rejected, then, according to the mandatory terms in Article XXI of the Washington agreement concluded in 1922, it will be necessary that the United States invite certain other major nations to participate in another conference, and it is very probable that the same will take place in 1931. The provision is as follows: In view of possible technical and scientific developments, the United States, after consultation with the other contracting powers, shall arrange for a conference of all the contracting powers, which shall convene as soon as possible after the expiration of eight years from the coming into force of the present treaty to consider what changes, if any, in the treaty may be necessary to meet such developments. The Washington conference resulted in a program which caused our new ships under construction to be scrapped and the old ones retained. Such a policy is considered by many to have been foolish and favorable to the shipbuilding interests, which according to the views of many have had a strangle hold on certain Navy officials up to the time this fact was brought out after the Geneva conference. Several hundred million dollars worth of property was scrapped and the only persons benefited by such a program were the shipbuilding corporations. We also wish to say that according to Article XXIII of the Washington agreement should any one nation who was a party to the same decide to withdraw from such an agreement, then it would be necessary for the other nations to meet in conference. The provision is as follows: Within one year of the date on which a notice of the termination by any power has taken effect, all the contracting powers shall meet in conference. According to the terms of the London agreement, we are to scrap three battleships with the privilege of retaining one for training purposes. The Florida, Utah, and Wyoming are the ones that have been tentatively selected for this purpose. These ships have been modernized at a cost of $11,176,000, which represents an expenditure of money that will do us no more good than if the same had been taken out and dumped in the sea. In addition, a total sum of $64,023,177 has been used for the purpose of overhauling old battleships, and it 5 is now proposed to expend approximately $30,000,000 in addition for the purpose of overhauling or modernizing the New Mexico, Mississippi, and Idaho. During the World War, if we are correctly informed, all of our battleships with the exception of four were anchored as far up the York River as possible to protect the same from submarines, and the four that went across for the purpose of joining the Grand Fleet never left our shores until after the German Fleet had been destroyed. Therefore it is reasonable to deduct that the thought uppermost in the minds of the Navy officials at that time was that battleships were so slow and cumbersome that it would be impossible for them to escape if attacked by submarines. We think it can safely be said that since the World War the tendency of thought in the minds of all progressive nations is that battleships are too slow to successfully combat an up-to-date fleet of the faster type of ships. It will also be remembered when the Battle of Jutland was fought bombing planes capable of carrying projectiles weighing as much as 500 pounds had not been constructed. In fact, no planes of this type were used by either the German or the English, and it is reasonable to conclude that if such had been available they would have played an important part in this engagement. Moreover, it is now known that any type of ship can be sunk with bombs dropped from heavierthan-air machines. Therefore, when it comes to modernizing a type of ship that has been proven to the satisfaction of many to be obsolete, we doubt the advisability of expending any more money for the so-called purpose of modernizing or overhauling a lot of old ships that are, in our opinion, only fit for peace-time maneuvers. Prior to the convening of the London conference approximately 70 members of the House of Commons gave out a statement in which they voiced an opinion that battleships would no longer be used as a weapon of warfare, and when it is taken into consideration the very marked progress that has been made in aircraft and the further fact that no invading fleet can ever come within 100 miles of a major nation without being destroyed by a superior land air force, it seems foolish to continue wasting the people's money by patching up a lot of old ships that in case war was declared would immediately be put in some safe harbor until the hostilities were over. Our battleships at the present time carry only small spotting and observation planes. If some kind of arrangement could be provided so as to make it possible for these ships to carry large bombing planes, then their efficiency would be greatly enlarged, as with planes capable of carrying 500 or 1,000 pound bombs, an enemy could be attacked at a distance of several hundred miles before it came within striking distance of our 14 and 16 inch guns. We first brought this idea to the attention of the committee on or about March 5, 1928, hoping that some of the progressive minds in Congress or elsewhere would assist me in sponsoring such an idea. However, nothing was done until recently when the Associated Press carried the following article: Plans for a drastically different hybrid fighting ship are occupying the Navy's designers. It would be a complete combination cruiser and aircraft carrier, capable of engaging in a running battle as well as launching more than two dozen airplanes for scouting or combat. It would be of a radical design, in that its large guns and their number would place it in the fighting class, yet a landing platform on its deck would equip it to carry from three to six times as many airplanes as the most modern cruisers now afloat. Instead of launching its planes from a distance and running from an attack, as the existing carriers must, the proposed cruiser-carriers might get into the melee and let its brood bomb and harrass the enemy while it joined orthodox cruisers and battleships in battle. While some "old-line" naval officers have expressed opposition to the cruisercarrier because its effectiveness might be lessened by a reduction in armour to allow for the weight of airplanes, the Bureau of Aeronautics said that a 10,000ton or even a 7,050-ton cruiser-carrier is the vessel that all nations soon will be building because of the increased effectiveness of airplanes in battle. Tentative plans for the vessel provide for as many as ten 6-inch guns, as well as storage space of the planes. About 70 per cent of the deck would be devoted to a landing platform while the necessary superstructure and two triple or quadruple gun turrets or houses would be grouped in the bow. Other guns would be at the stern, while the antiaircraft batteries would be on platforms at the sides of the landing platform. A ship of this type, naval designers say, would not come under the London naval treaty definition of a carrier. The treaty classifies as a carrier any ship "designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft." By June of 1932 the 5-year naval aeronautics program will have been completed. There will be more than 1,000 useful airplanes available, more than 500 on ships. Completion of the authorized 13,800-ton carrier would increase the total fleet strength to 575 and the construction of cruiser-carriers would bring the total aerial strength afloat to a minimum of 800 airplanes. For the reason our Navy is now considering carrying out in part our ideas along this line, we have suggested to the committee that if they would carry in this bill an amendment which would make it possible for the Bureau of Construction and Repairs, if feasible, to place certain additions on battleships in order that bombing planes might be carried and launched that it would not be against any provision of the Washington treaty or the proposed London agreement, as no new idea would be involved in such additions other than storage facilities in the way of a skeletonized deck reaching out above the turrets, which could be properly hinged in such a way as to be removed away from the big guns in case it was necessary to use the same. The argument has been presented that the explosion from such guns would destroy this superstructure. However, when it is remembered that the turrets do not contact the deck and are separate units such an opinion does not seem to be well founded, and even if such was the case, it must be remembered that if all our battleships could carry six or eight large bombing planes and could launch them from a skeletonized deck they would be able to contact an enemy at a distance of more than 100 miles, thereby, in all probability, destroying the enemy, and not make it necessary to depend on turrets that only shoot a distance of approximately 20 miles. It is to be regretted that the minds of those charged with certain responsibilities in the Navy are not willing to accept with favor new ideas for the purpose of bringing about efficiency, and this is probably the reason why no one in our Navy had any confidence in submarines at the beginning of the World War. Because of this fact Germany came awfully close to defeating what could be said practically the entire strength of the world. We have offered the following amendment with the hope that it would be adopted, thus justifying the support of the legislation if such additions were made, provided that the London treaty goes into effect. Provided, That the Bureau of Construction and Repairs shall, if feasible, present recommendations for the construction of suitable facilities on each ship consisting of a skeleton deck or some similar addition for the carrying of bombing planes and the term "modernization" shall be construed to include necessary equipment for the launching of such bombing planes. However, the committee rejected the same, probably because all of the so-called experts in the Navy were opposed to any additions of this kind on battleships. In conclusion, we desire to say that the hope for security of any nation in the future must depend upon those charged with certain responsibilities being willing to accept at all times new ideas, as this is an age of machination and speed will be the determining factor in the future. Therefore, instead of expending our money on a lot of old, superannuated, obsolete types of ships let us benefit by the lessons of the last war and only authorize the construction of such types of ships in the future as will be needed for the protection of our Nation. In view of the fact that the committee is not willing to modernize these battleships in such a way as to take care of aircraft, and in all probability the other nations of the world will so equip their battleships, we do not feel that further expenditures of money should be made for this purpose. O J. V. MCCLINTIC, |