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is this type of service that fills the lean months for the gunsmith or the sporting goods dealer and also the manufacture of shooting accessories. In addition, there is no question in the writer's mind that many times a person will buy the $20 or $30 sporting firearm and it will cerate enough enthusiasm that he will also purchase additional commercial firearms.

In the United States we have a do-it-yourself craze where a person likes to fix up a piece of equipment, whether it be a firearm, boat, lawn, or a back porch. He likes to point with personal pride to his accomplishment. This leads to a tremendous amount of sales to dealers and distributors and I feel it is an important economic fact in our American economy. It is buying and more buying that keeps America going. To curtail the sale of the miltary surplus rifles would hurt the entire firearms industry. Most certainly the sales of bazookas, cannons, or big, heavy field pieces should not be to civilian consumption. Everyone agrees on this-but don't get rid of the good military rifles but rather crack down on the sales of field pieces.

I am sure that your subcommittee is doing a very fine job. I am also certain that it is a tremendously big job. Bill S. 1592 has a lot of good points. Since there has been so many changes made on it since the first transcription that the writer has seen, it would be impractical to try to cover it point by point. I would rather try to point out some of the things that the sportsmen throughout the country do not want, and they are summarized as follows:

1. Do not prohibit the sale of firearms to nonresidents.

2. Do not make the licensing prohibitive to the small part-time operators. 3. Do not prohibit the sale of the better surplus military rifles.

4. Do not, under any circumstances, call for national registration of firearms. 5. Do not put the American public at the mercy of a few hoodlums who will not obey the laws anyway.

Respectfully submitted.

WILLIAMS GUN SIGHT Co.
BOYD R. WILLIAMS.

ARTICLES SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

[From the Association of the Bar of the City of New York]

PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO CONTROL THE INTERSTATE SALE OF FIREARMS (By the Committee on Federal Legislation)

INTRODUCTION

The assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, with a rifle reported to have been purchased by the accused assassin through the mails, brought public and congressional scrutiny to bear on the availability of firearms in the United States through mail orders and other uncontrolled channels of distribution. However, consideration of this problem had preceded that tragic event; concern with juvenile crime in which the use of mail-order weapons was an incerasing factor led to hearings by the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary during early 1963, and legislation directed at the types of weapons used by juvenile criminals was introduced in August 1963 by Chairman Dodd and other members of the subcommittee. The assassination brought the introduction of numerous other bills, the expansion of the Dodd bill, and greater concern about this problem.

S. 1975, 88th Congress, 1st session, was introduced on August 2. 1963 by Senator Dodd for himself and other members of the Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee. Following the assassination Senator Dodd proposed certain amendments to that bill, and the text discussed in this report is that of the bill as amended. Other legislation proposing varying techniques for controlling the interstate shipment of firearms has also been introduced in the House of Repre sentatives and in the Senate, and reference will also be made to such bills. In addition, resolutions have been introduced in the House of Representatives authorizing an investigation of the sale of firearms in interstate and foreign commerce.1

1 E.g., H. Res. 584, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963) (Representative Farbstein).

HISTORY OF FEDERAL FIREARMS LEGISLATION

Federal action directed at the control of firearms originated, for modern purposes of criminal control, in the National Firearms Act of June 26, 1934, which is now set out in sections 5801-5862 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This act, passed in reaction to the gang wars of the prohibition era and the postprohibition crime waves, was directed at preventing criminals from obtaining firearms, such as machineguns, cane guns, sawed off shotguns, silencers, and similar weapons, which were particularly suitable for criminal use. The act provides for special licensing taxes on importers, manufacturers, dealers and pawnbrokers dealing in such arms, imposes heavy transfer taxes on the transfer of such arms, requires the registration of such arms upon transfer and the registration of persons possessing such arms. Although written as a revenue measure, it was clearly intended to control the criminal commerce in firearms of a criminal character and provided penalties of up to 5 years' imprisonment. The Federal Firearms Act of June 30, 1938 (15 U.S.C. secs. 901-909) was designed to suppress crime by regulating the traffic in firearms and ammunition, and applied to all firearms. Its legislative history shows particular concern with "roaming racketeers and predatory criminals who know no State lines-a situation beyond the power of control by local authorities to such an extent as to constitute a national menace." United States v. Platt, 31 F. Supp. 788, 790 (S.D. Tex. 1940); see hearings on H.R. 9066 before House Committee on Ways and Means, 73d Congress 2d session (1934). The act requires a dealer to obtain a Federal dealer's license by filing an application with the Internal Revenue Service and paying a fee of $1. However, because of the simplicity of this requirement and of the other recordkeeping required by the law, this act has been called a mail-order operation in itself. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Congress, 1st session, part 14, at 3209 (1963).

THE PENDING LEGISLATION

S. 1975 would amend the Federal Firearms Act in order to place stricter limitations on interstate transactions in lethal weapons, principally the so-called mailorder purchases of guns. It would apply the provisions of the act to all firearms, prevent their shipment in interstate commerce to juveniles under the age of 18 and require notice to carriers that guns are being shipped. It would also require that a purchaser of guns by mail order enclose a notarized affidavit with his purchase order, setting forth his age, name, address, any felony convictions, whether he has complied with local and State firearms laws, and the name and address of the principal local law enforcement authority in his community. A copy of this affidavit and a description of the gun being sold must be forwarded by the seller to the law enforcement officer by registered mail, return receipt requested.

An alternative approach is contained in S. 2345, 88th Congress, 1st session (1963) (Senator Scott), which provides that no manufacturer or dealer may ship a firearm in commerce unless the purchaser has delivered a certificate executed by a designated local law enforcement officer indicating the purpose for which the firearm is sought, any criminal record of the purchaser, whether he is a fugitive from justice, and any information available to the local law enforcement officer as to the probable mental competence and stability of the purchaser and his reputation for observance of law.

Other proposals would require that interstate shipments of firearms be consigned to the purchaser through the chief local law enforcement officer, H.R. 9390, 88th Congress, 1st session (1963) (Representative Glenn), or would bar all interstate shipments of firearms except to licensed dealers, H.R. 9471, 88th Congress, 1st session (1963) (Representative Karsten).

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

It was brought out at the hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate Juvenile Delinquency that like many other articles in commerce, whether or not useful for criminal purposes, firearms are regulated in different ways in each of the 50 States, and it is possible for almost any individual in any jurisdiction to acquire almost any weapon which he chooses. The power of the Federal Government to legislate with respect to the control of firearms has

been challenged under the 1934 and 1938 acts as improperly curtailing the right to bear arms under the second amendment to the Constitution:

"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed."

Since the basic purpose of this amendment is regarded as the preservation and efficiency of a well-regulated militia, in the absence of a showing that the possession or use of a specific type of firearm has a reasonable relationship to that end, firearms control legislation has been upheld. United States v. Miller (307 U.S. 174 (1939)); see Cases v. United States (131 F. 2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942)), cert. denied sub nom. Velazquez v. United States (319 U.S. 770 (1943)). Thus, the National Firearms Act of 1934 was held not to violate the second amendment in the Miller case, in the absence of a showing of any reasonable relationship between the individual possession of what amounted to a sawed-off shotgun and the preservation of a well-regulated militia. The 1964 act was based upon the taxing power, and in Sonzinsky v. United States (300 U.S. 506 (1937)), the Supreme Court refused to speculate as to the motives which moved Congress to impose the tax, and rejected the contention that the act's levy was not a true tax but a penalty imposed to suppress traffic of a type best left to regulation by the States. In addition, in United States v. Fleish (90 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Mich. 1949)), the Court rejected an attack on the 1934 act as an unconstitutional invasion of the power of the States to regulate the sales of firearms within their borders, and thus as exceeding the powers of Congress. The Court, quoting Miller, and the numerous cases cited therein, concluded that no valid objection could be made to a constitutional exercise of a congressional power (i.e., the power to tax) merely because such exercise "may be attended by the same incident which attends an exercise by a State of its police power." Id. at 275.

As indicated in Cases v. United States, the constitutional basis for the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 was clearly intended by Congress to be the commerce clause. although the constitutionality of the statute on that ground was not a necessary determination in the case. The case involved the conviction of Jose Cases Velaz quez in the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico for violation of the Federal Firearms Act, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in reviewing the conviction, did not have to meet the issue of constitutionality under the commerce clause:

"It is clear that in enacting the Federal Firearms Act Congress was exercising the power conferred upon it by the commerce clause, but it is equally clear that Congress meant to deal comprehensively with the subject and to exert all the power which it had in respect thereto. * * * Since its power as we have seen, as to a territory like Puerto Rico is plenary, except as limited by express constitutional restrictions, Congress is not fettered by the commerce clause, Constitution, article I, section 8, clause 3, in its power to legislate for Puerto Rico.” (131 F. 2d at 923.)

At about the time that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Cases, it de clared unconstitutional section 2(f) of the 1938 act which created the presumption of interstate shipment of a firearm after the effective date of the act from possession of the firearm by a person with a previous conviction. Tot v. United States (319 U.S. 463 (1943)). Although not dealing with the status of the rest of the act, the Court made passing reference to the commerce clause:

"The Government * urges that Congress, in view of the interstate commerce in firearms, might, in order to regulate it, have prohibited the possession of all firearms by persons heretofore convicted of crimes of violence: it is plain that Congress, for whatever reason, did not seek to pronounce general prohibition of possession by certain residents of the various States of firearms in order to protect interstate commerce, but dealt only with their future acquisition in interstate commerce." Id. at 472.3

We believe that the vast body of authority under the commerce clause supports further Federal control of the distribution of firearms by means of interstate commerce, and that prohibition of the interstate sale of firearms to specified groups. such as those convicted of felonies or those under a certain age, appears clearly within the power of Congress. We do not regard the second amendment, which

2 The scope of the second amendment has not been determined and it has been suggested will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis "like cases under the due process clause Cases v. United States (131 F. 2d at 922).

After the Tot decision, Velazquez again challenged the constitutionality of the 1928 act by a motion for habeas corpus, but his contentions were again rejected by the court without reaching the constitutional question. Velazquez v. Hunter (159 F. 2d 606 (10th Cir. 1947), certiorari denied, 330 U.S. 846 (1947).

involves the right to have arms from the standpoint of maintaining a militia, as preventing reasonable regulation of interstate traffic in firearms in the interest of public safety.

As this committee has shown in recent reports, Federal legislation can be validly founded on the commerce clause even if it is regarded as directed in large measure at a "social" evil which is also the subject of State regulation under the police power. Thus, the commerce power may be used to reach a variety of noneconomic activities deemed to violate public policy although its exercise "is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the States." United States v. Darby (312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)).

SPECIFIC CONTROLS

The committee does not regard itself as sufficiently knowledgeable to comment on which of the various proposed control techniques might be most effective. We are, however, concerned about the provisions of S. 2345 which require a certificate by a local law enforcement officer with respect to the person seeking to receive a firearm in interstate commerce. The certificate is to include "any information available to such law enforcement officer with respect to the person seeking to receive a firearm in interstate commerce. The certificate is to include "any information available to such law enforcement officer as to probable mental competence and stability of such person, and his reputation for observance of law."

While it can be generally accepted that there is substantial public danger from possession of firearms by a person who is not mentally stable, the requirement that a local law enforcement officer furnish information as to the "probable mental competence and stability" of a purchaser seems to us to call upon such local officers to perform a function beyond their qualifications. Both that provision and the provision that the local law enforcement officer report information regarding the "reputation for observance of law" of a purchaser encourages resort to the grossest hearsay with no opportunity for the applicant to respond and no opportunity to evaluate the reliability of the source. The concomitant requirement that such information be delivered to a manufacturer or dealer, who has no obligation to keep it secret, adds to the evil of the requirement. Indeed, the files required to be maintained by the manufacturer or dealer, containing such statements as to probable mental competence, stability, and reputation, are to be available for inspection by duly authorized representatives of any law enforcement officer or agency of any governmental subdivision in the United States, without any showing of necessity.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that Congress has ample power to meet such need as it may reasonably determine to exist for additional regulation of the sale and shipment of firearms by means of interstate commerce, and that the second amendment does not preclude Congress from extending the regulatory pattern.

THE TRUTH ABOUT GUNS

(By Robert M. Price)

Since the first neanderthal man picked up a rock and a stick to make a stone ax, men have been fascinated by weapons. Man, puny in body and slow of foot in comparison to most other animals on this planet, has long since become the dominant species because he had the intellect to develop weapons which gave him a lethal extension of his powers. And men, too, of all ages and for whatever reasons they felt they needed them, have managed to obtain weapons.

Senator Dodd presents his latest bill as a giant step toward controlling the criminal use of modern weapons-firearms. The bill merits serious consideration only due to the danger it represents. If you finish this article, you will agree. There are many points to cover, but since this is about Senator Dodd's antigun law (Senate bill 14) let's first look at Senator Thomas J. Dodd. Senator Dodd

"Proposed Federal Civil Rights Laws Relating to Public Accommodations," two reports of committees of NYCBA, concerned with Federal legislation 41 (1963), 18 records of NYCBA, 593 (1963); "Proposed Federal Legislation Relating to Equal Employment Opportunity,' three reports of committees of NYCBA concerned with Federal legislation 1 (1964), 19 record of NYCBA 230 (1964).

is a conscientious, hardworking, dedicated, well-intentioned man. He is not a Nazi, a Communist, or a political nut. His law is intended to reduce crime by making it more difficult for undesirables, particularly juvenile delinquents, to obtain weapons by mail. But the sweeping changes the Senator would usher in would leave even him sadly disappointed in the tangible results. For example, half the murders in the United States annually are already committed with weapons other than guns, according to FBI statistics. Therefore, the theoretical effectiveness of the bill is immediately cut by 50 percent and would have to be further pared to allow for substitution of other weapons (knives, blunt objects, etc.), guns obtainable from other sources, firearms already in people's hands, and so forth. Senator Dodd is trying to eradicate a problem which cannot be eradicated; i.e., weapons in the hands of undesirables. Notice that mail order guns was not mentioned, for guns are just the instrument and mail order just one (and the most publicized) method of obtaining them. The problem is the undesirables-those who should not have guns-and that must be remembered. However, the problem can be brought to an irreducible minimum-the best that could be expected under any law-and with far less effort and stringency than the Senator proposes. That will be discussed later.

The reason the Senator has been labeled with various titles of the political extremes, and this author is taking the Senator's word for he has personally heard no such comments, is because such a law is antiethical to our American heritage. As a political example, Senator Dodd listed a number of civilized countries which have strict registration and/or antigun laws: he neglected to mention, however, that Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany had antigun laws, as well as present day Russia, China, and the various satellite nations. To many people, though it is not Senator Dodd's intention, the law smacks of totalitarian government. The Senator also neglected to mention Sweden, where many private citizens own fully operable machineguns and participate in government subsidized shooting matches, and Switzerland, where every male citizen joins the army and takes his rifle home with him and remains a part of the national defense. Incidentally, neither nation has experienced any rise in crime rate and both have avoided being in wars for a long time. The Senator neglected to mention that when Hitler's legions were goosestepping their way across Europe they used the convenient registration lists to confiscate the few privately owned weapons, drastically curtailing resistance efforts until the United States and England could parachute drop weapons. During the Battle of Britain, England was so short of weapons that most of the homeguard and portions of the army were armed with pitchforks and shovels, and spears and battle-maces liberated from the ancient museums. In this day of thermonuclear guided missiles, such talk may seem foolish, but the Communist Party of the United States is on record as favoring strict registration laws. It should also be mentioned that not only does no totalitarian government in the world today allow the free, private ownership of firearms, no dictatorship has ever been imposed without first making the people register their weapons.

Senator Dodd also bemoans the lack of support for his bill. He states the National Rifle Association was behind him as it is a reputable gun group, but insidious "gunrunners" and "vested interests" lobbied behind the scenes for his bill's defeat. The National Rifle Association is a reputable organization of long standing, but it was not truly behind the Senator. It gave his bill grudging support as the least offensive before Congress at the time. It recognized that there was some merit in the bill, which will be discussed later. The additional lack of support is quite understandable when one looks at the last few paragraphs of his article: "The bill that I propose is only a beginning. It must be followed by appropriate laws and regulations in our States and in our communities***. It is time for America to wake up."

To a gun collector, this reads as a promise, if he is foolish enough to support this law, of harsher ones to come. And that is exactly what the Senator promises. For example, New York's Sullivan Act is often held up as a "model law." Supposedly this law keeps guns out of the hands of criminals by establishing a permit and registration system, but there are numerous cases on record of honest citizens-stable, with no criminal record, and even experienced in the use of weapons, being denied the permits because the law depends too largely on bureaucratic whim. The law has a notorious history: Big Tim Sullivan was a political crook who forced his antigun law through the legislature in 1911. In 1912 be was committed to a mental hospital. Reportedly, his henchmen were encountering too many armed citizens in their efforts to shake down the local merchants, which

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