lost otherwise as a result of the construction of the project and the spreading of the waters in the reservoir. 59-465 An appropriation for salaries and other expenses of subdivisions of a department which has been created by the valid exercise of the executive power vested in the head of such department is an appropriation for purposes authorized by law. 60-111 ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE INTERIOR The authority of the Secretary under section 439, Revised Statutes, to prescribe the duties of the Assistant Secretary has like application with respect to the First Assistant Secretary. 52-230 Where the statute authorizes an Assistant Secretary of an executive department to perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the Secretary, he acts with full power equal to that of the Secretary within the scope of his assignment, but has no power beyond that prescribed; when acting as Secretary he is authorized to perform the duties of the head of the department. 52-230 its status as public land, but one who has held and occupied it for many years under claim or color of title may acquire title thereto under the act of Dec. 22, 1928 (45 Stat. 1069) or under some other applicable public-land statute as against one attempting to enter it under the homestead law. 54-102 Following Federal survey, certain undisposed of subdivisions of United States public lands in Nebraska bordering upon the Missouri River were washed away by that river, either as the result of erosion or avulsion, and later restored, augmented by other land, the result of accretion. Held, That title to the surveyed lands so restored or uncovered and to the lands added thereto by accretion is in the United States and not in the owners of the back lands which were for a time the shore lands. 54-455 The Farmers Banco, comprising 583.4 acres of land, was cut from Mexico by a flood of the Colorado River in 1905. In the next year the Bureau of Reclamation took possession of the banco and commenced improvements. Under the provisions of conventions between the United States and Mexico, the International Boundary Commission on Sept. 18, 1926, decided to make an order for the elimination of the banco to the United States on the ground it was cut from Mexico by avulsion. The order was issued Oct. 26, 1927. Between Sept. 18, 1926, and Oct. 26, 1927, the Mexican government by an instrument dated Oct. 22, 1927 granted the land in the banco to one, Alvarez. There had arisen a difference of opinion between the Department of State and the Attorney General as to whether the Republic of Mexico or the United States was the sovereign proprietor of the land at the time the former made its grant to Alvarez, but it was agreed that the question was one for the determination of the courts. At the instance of the State Department the Congress passed the act of May 6, 1937 (50 Stat. 131.) By this act payment was authorized to the Government of Mexico of $20,000. The Government of Mexico declined to give the assurances provided in the act and furnished evidence that on Apr. 28, 1937, Alvarez had transferred all the rights pertaining to him under his claim against the United States to one, Diaz. Requests were made by certain holders of farm units under the reclamation acts for patent. Held: (1) That the issuance of a patent would not be justified without a determination by a court of competent jurisdiction that Alvarez had no rights in the land. (2) That the act of May 6, 1937 (50 Stat. 131) would not affect the right of the United States to maintain a suit to remove a cloud on its title created by the grant to Alvarez. (3) That a suit by the United States to quiet title was maintainable on two theories, one being, that it acquired sovereignty over the banco when it was cut from Mexico by avulsion in 1905 by virtue of the decision of the International Boundary Commission and the grant to Alvarez was therefore invalid, and the other being, that if the title of Alvarez was good when made, the United States had now a valid title by adverse possession under applicable statutes of limitations. 57-236 According to the plat of survey of 1845 two tracts of public land in Arkansas had for their east boundary the west bank of the Mississippi River. Between 1843 and 1880 the waters of the river gradually eroded and submerged all of the land within the tracts and land to the west thereof and the main channel of the river ran west of the tracts, but following this submergence, land in the form of a sand bar reappeared within the boundaries and to the full extent of the tracts, the reappearance being caused by the westerly recession of the waters and by accretion to private land in Tennessee which in 1880 had attained an elevation of from 5 to 10 feet above the river. By an avulsive change in the course of the river in 1912, the main channel of the river ran southeast of the land. The boundary of the Mississippi River between Arkansas and Tennessee was fixed by the Supreme Court on June 3, 1940. A supplemental survey by the General Land Office disclosed that but 2.02 acres of one of the tracts were in Arkansas, the remainder of the two tracts being in Tennessee. In April 1934 homestead entry was allowed for the two tracts according to the original plat of survey, which subsequent to the filing of supplemental plat of survey was reduced to the 2.02 acres remaining in Arkansas. Held: (1) That the reappearance of the land was the result of gradual accretion to the land in Tennessee before the avulsive change in the river channel and the avulsion was not the cause of its reappearance. (2) That when the land became a part of the bed of the Mississippi River, the title thereto became vested in the State or States within whose boundaries it was situated, and upon its reappearance, the title to the land was governed by the State law. (3) That neither the laws of Arkansas nor Tennessee, as interpreted by its highest court, afford sufficient basis for holding that the reappeared land became the property of the United States, and if the Department should so hold, its holding would not bind an adverse claimant. (4) That considering the act of Aug. 7, 1846 (9 Stat. 66), ceding to Tennessee the public land south of the Congressional Reservation Line and the legislative history of the act, it is believed to have been the intent and purpose of Congress, in order to settle all controversy with the State and to rid the Federal Government of all administration of the remnants of public lands in the State, to divest itself of all ownership and jurisdiction over the public lands in Tennessee at once and forever, and though the act of cession at the time of its enactment passed the title only to land ceded by North Carolina, it seems improbable that it was the intention that the United States was to retain its ownership and apply its system of disposition under the public land laws to such small fragments of public lands in Arkansas that were washed away by gradual changes in the channel of the river, but subsequently reappeared in the State of Tennessee. (5) That it had not been satisfactorily shown that either the lands in Arkansas or Tennessee are public lands subject to disposition under the public land laws, and there was no sufficient reason for surveying any part of them as such. 58-242 Where the medial line of a nonnavigable stream constitutes the boundary between Indian land and public land, and the river channel shifts during a sudden, heavy flood to a new location, the change does not affect the boundary line, and the land lying between the old medial line of the ple of the United States for the greatest good to be derived from the project and excludes confinement of the benefits of Boulder Dam power to one locality out of the many that comprise the "region" capable of service. 53-1 The discretionary authority of the Secretary of the Interior under the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1057) is to be controlled by the public interest which requires conservation and utilization of the navigation and water resources of the region, the financial security of the United States, and equality of access to Boulder Dam power by areas comprising the region in proportion to the needs of the applicants, provided that their plans for its utilization and conservation are equally well adapted. 53-2 The preference conferred by subsection (c) of section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1057) is limited to the States named therein, but aside from that preference those States are merely on a parity with municipalities under the Federal Water Power Act, except as between a State and one of its own municipalities in which event the State's right is paramount. 53-2 The preference of a State or municipality for allocation of power in conflict with a privately owned public utility under subsection (c) of section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1057) and in conformity with the policy expressed in the Federal Water Power Act is a preference in consumptive right within the borders of the State or municipal corporation, but outside of their respective limits the State or municipality is merely on a parity with any other public utility company furnishing power in that territory. 53-2 The purpose of subsection (c) of section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1057) was not to bestow upon a State two separate preference rights, one under the exception clause of that subsection, and another under section 7 of the Federal Water Power Act (41 Stat. 1063), but merely to place a State in a preferred position, as opposed to a competing municipality, in view of the possible parity of these two classes of applicants under the latter act. 53-2 The time limit fixed by subsection (c) of section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1060) within which a State may contract under the preference accorded to it has reference to the special exception in that subsection which gives preference to a State over a competing municipality, but no time limit is placed upon the power of a State to contract where that preference is not invoked. 53-2 The Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1057) does not grant a preference to the city of Los Angeles over other municipalities in the award of power. 53-3 The fact that all of the stock of a corporation is owned by a State is not a sufficient reason for bringing the corporation within the preference right provision of subsection (c) of section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1060). 53-3 The preference accorded a State is limited to power which the State proposes to use within its borders, whether the application be presented under section 7 of the Federal Water Power Act (41 Stat. 1067) or under subsection (c) of section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1060), and the Secretary of the Interior may incorporate in the allocation to the State a stipulation to that effect. 53-3 That portion of section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1060), which provides for general and uniform regulations contemplates that one of the primary responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior shall be the fixing of financial requirements and rigid examination of the financial status of competing bidders, whether municipalities or privately owned public utilities. 53-3 The preference right accorded a State by subsection (c) of section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1060) is not assignable either before or after the execution of a contract by a State, but a contract obtained in exercise of the preference is assignable, subject, however, to all restrictions and conditions contained in the original contract, and without diminution of the States' liability to the United States and without waiver of the requirement of financial and legal capacity of the assignee. 53-3 The proviso to subsection (c) of section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1060), which protects a State or political subdivision thereof from foreclosure of its right to file an application because of nonauthorization of or failure to market a bond issue, until the expiration of a reasonable time therefor, does not preclude the Secretary of the Interior from determining what is a reasonable time or of granting an application to another during the interval, so long as the right of the preference claimant to contract is preserved. 53-3 The right conferred by section 16 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1065) upon commissioners duly authorized under the laws of any ratifying State is that of advising and coordinating in the correlation of the present Boulder Dam undertaking with reference to future development, and to have access to the records with that end in view; but they are not to direct the Secretary of the Interior in the administration of the present work nor is that officer in any wise obligated to act upon their advice contrary to his own judgment. 53-4 Authority to contract to deliver water from a canal to be constructed of necessity carries with it authority to contract for a canal capacity sufficient to carry the water to be delivered in addition to any other water to be carried, if said canal is to carry other water. 54-414 Nowhere in the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1057) is there any specific limitation upon the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior in determining the use to which the All-American Canal shall be put other than the specific direction that the water carried therein shall be for the reclamation of public lands and for other beneficial uses exclusively within the United States. 54-414 Since the Boulder Canyon Project Act provides that reimbursement to the Government for outlay for the canal and appurtenances provided by the act shall be "in the manner provided in the Reclamation law," payment in advance by the city of San Diego is not required, but, instead, the plan followed in the Reclamation Service, namely, payment without interest extending over a period not to exceed 40 years, is acceptable. 54-414 Use by the city of San Diego, California, of water obtained from the All-American Canal, will be, in the language of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, a beneficial use and exclusively within the United States, and accordingly, a contract made by the Secretary of the Interior with the city of San Diego, whereby the carrying capacity of said canal is to be increased, the work to be performed by the United States with provision made for repayment of the cost by the city, is permissible under the terms of the said act. 54-414 By the terms of Section 4(a) of the Act of Dec. 21, 1928 (45 Stat. 1058) commonly known as the Boulder Canyon Act, it is provided that the State of California shall have, each year, for beneficial consumptive use, not to exceed 4,400,000 acre-feet of water from lower basin of the Colorado River, in accordance with Article III (a) of the Colorado River Compact, and it is further provided that no person shall obtain said water from the Colorado River except by contract entered into with the Secretary of the Interior and approved by that official. Held, That the provisions of the Act, considered in the light of the compact, must be interpreted as forbidding the Secretary from entering into a contract for the storage of water in the reservoir contemplated which could render impossible of fulfillment the allotment yearly to the State of California of 4,400,000 acre-feet of water. 54-593 Section 7 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (act of Dec. 21, 1928, 45 Stat. 1062) provides that the net proceeds from any power development on the All-American Canal shall be paid into the canal fund until the equivalent of operation, maintenance, and construction costs shall have been paid. The PWA and REA proposed making loans for the construction of power systems, on condition that the gross revenue of such systems be applied to the operation and maintenance costs and payment of bonds securing the loans. Held, That the United States is entitled to the net proceeds from the power system after deductions have been made for operation and maintenance costs, for payment of principal and interest of the bonds, and for the one-year reserves for such payments as authorized in the above-mentioned loan agreements. 56-116 The provision in section 14 of the act of Dec. 21, 1928 (45 Stat. 1065), that "claims of the United States arising out of any contract authorized by this act shall have priority over all others" entitles the United States thereto only so long as the net proceeds from power development are in the hands of the irrigation district. 56-116 BOUNDARIES (See also Accretion; Avulsion; Reliction; Surveys of Public Lands) Where the definition of boundaries is needed to give precision to a railroad grant, requiring a survey to exclude mineral lands, the cost of such survey must be paid by the grantee and the Government can withhold patent until the costs are paid; the provisions of paragraph 108 of the mining regulations imposing the costs of survey upon the Government are inapplicable. 52-81 In a township where the interior section corner monuments cannot be found the proper method of determining what land passed from the Government by patent or grant is by proportionate measurement between existing and properly restored corners on the township boundaries without regard to incidental items of topography. 52-452 Items of topography in the interior of sections are based upon estimates by the surveyor rather than upon actual measurements, and represent only an approximation of the actual positions of natural monuments and are not to prevail over courses and distances. 52-452 Giving to the words "valley of the Gila River" their ordinary and usual interpretation when employed in the Executive order of Aug. 5, 1873, restoring to the public domain certain lands formerly embraced within the San Carlos Indian Reservation, an entire drainage area is not intended, the word "valley" being limited to its usual meaning as embracing lowlands in contradistinction to mountain slopes and ridges. 55-560 In determining the boundaries of an Indian reservation the recognition by the In |