care; however, these facilities are also used by noncontract patients. The noncontract patients are charged fees for use of the facilities, and petitioner has not disputed that noncontract patients also pay for certain services on a fee-for-service basis. Additionally, AFVW can receive reimbursement from Medicare and HMO insurance for care given to noncontract patients. These fee-for-service and reimbursement proceeds are included as revenue in AFVW's books. Although these proceeds are not used specifically to offset expenses in the noncontract patient expense accounts, the revenue relates to care given to noncontract patients in the SNF, ALU, and SCU, and we believe that the expenses of these facilities should be reduced to accurately reflect the portion of the monthly service fees paid for care of AFVW residents. In substance, this treatment is consistent with the subtraction of SNF, ALU, and SCU noncontract patient fees from total costs and medical expenses. We have reviewed the figures used by Mr. Powell and find them consistent with AFVW's financial information and acceptable for purposes of this calculation.36 D. The Court's Application of the Percentage Method Mr. Dalton and the ad hoc committee applied the allocation percentage to a weighted average of monthly service fees paid by occupants of ILUS. Mr. Dalton's calculations provide a deduction per residence while the ad hoc committee's calculations are per resident. Mr. Powell applied the percentage based on the actual monthly service fees paid by petitioners and calculated an allocable amount per residence.37 Although respondent states that Mr. Powell's application of the percentage methodology is correct, respondent argues that a weighted average should be used because it provides some consistency among ILU residents and is fair and objective. Petitioners argue that the allocation percentages should be applied to the actual fees they paid. 36 We are unable to derive the amount for 1998 for SNF ancillary services, Medicare, and HMO billings for noncontract patients from the 1998 financial document that should have been included in the Health Facility Information report. Therefore, like Mr. Powell, we rely on the 1998 information contained in the report. 37 This application of the percentage method appears at odds with a statement in the section of Mr. Powell's report providing an overview and criteria for the evaluation of the different methods. In his report, Mr. Powell states that similar residents have the same expected health care usage and thus should receive the same deduction regardless of the size of their accommodations or the fees they pay. We believe that the more appropriate application of the percentage method is to allocate to each resident the same amount for purposes of determining the appropriate medical deduction related to the payment of monthly service fees. If we accepted petitioners' approach, single residents and residents of double-occupancy ILUS that are larger than the average ILU (and thus pay higher monthly service fees) would get a larger medical expense deduction based solely on the number of occupants of the ILU or the square footage of the unit. We fail to see the relationship between the health care expenses of residents and the size and cost of their ILUS. Accordingly, we hold that the allocation percentage must be applied based on the number of residents and the average weighted monthly service fees (or weighted annual service fees in the case of residents living in ILUS for the entire year). On the basis of the undisputed assumptions by AFVW and our findings above, we have calculated the amounts allocable to ILU residents of Village West for medical care related to their monthly service fees. Our calculations show that the amounts of $7,766 and $8,476 paid by petitioners as service fees for 1997 and 1998, respectively, were for medical care. The details of our calculations are contained in the attached appendix. IV. Deductions for Use of Pool, Spa, and Exercise Facilities Petitioners claim that they are entitled to deductions for Mr. Baker's use of the pool, spa, and exercise facilities because: (1) The use of the facilities was necessary to alleviate his chronic illnesses; and (2) a portion of the monthly service fees is properly allocable to the operation and maintenance of these facilities. Respondent argues that no deductions are allowable because Mr. Baker's use of the facilities was personal in nature, any expense related to use of the facilities would otherwise have been incurred by AFVW residents, and the methodology used by petitioners to allocate a portion of the monthly service fees to the operation and maintenance of the facilities is flawed and should be disregarded. Deductions for expenditures for medical care are confined strictly to expenses incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness. Haines v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 644, 647 (1979); sec. 1.2131(e)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs. An expenditure which is merely beneficial to the general health of an individual, such as an expenditure for a vacation, is not an expenditure for medical care. Sec. 1.213–1(e)(3)(ii), Income Tax Regs. An important condition that must be satisfied for the claim to succeed is whether the expenditure would have been made even if there had been no illness. Jacobs v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 813, 819 (1974); Lepson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-304. Petitioners introduced a calculation by Mr. Baker for allocating a portion of the monthly service fees to the cost of providing the facilities. Mr. Baker applied varying allocation percentages to gross expense figures from eight different expense categories to arrive at a total allocation amount. He then divided this amount by the number of occupied ILUS in 1997 and 1998 to arrive at an allocation amount per residence. Petitioners did not explain or introduce credible evidence how Mr. Baker arrived at the specific allocation percentages for each expense category or the relevance of those specific categories. Although we are permitted in certain circumstances to estimate a deductible amount, Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543–544 (2d Cir. 1930), we can only do so when the taxpayer provides evidence sufficient to establish a rational basis upon which an estimate can be made, Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 743 (1985). In this case, even assuming that all other requirements for deductibility under section 213 have been established, petitioners have failed to provide evidence upon which we can make a rational estimate. Additionally, we note that the facilities were available for recreational use by petitioners and their family, and petitioners have failed to establish what portion of Mr. Baker's use was for medical purposes. Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are not entitled to deductions for Mr. Baker's use of the pool, spa, and exercise facilities. Contentions we have not addressed are moot, irrelevant, or meritless. To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered under Rule 155. Medical expenses divided by total costs equals an allocation percentage of 27.93 percent. The number of ILU residents was 574, and they paid a total annual service fee of $7,979,906, or an average of $13,902. Applying the allocation percentage of 27.93 percent to the weighted average annual service fee of $13,902 results in a medical care allocation of $3,883 per resident. Medical expenses divided by total costs equals an allocation percentage of 30.07 percent. The number of ILU residents was 591 and they paid a total annual service fee of $8,329,241, or an average of $14,093. Applying the allocation percentage of 30.07 percent to the weighted average annual service fee of $14,093 results in a medical care allocation of $4,238 per resident. JOYCE E. BEERY, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF Docket No. 7452-03L. Filed March 1, 2004. On Aug. 14, 2002, R issued to P a final notice disallowing her claims for relief from joint and several liability on a joint return for the taxable years 1989 to 1994. On Nov. 12, 2002, P filed with the Court a timely petition at docket No. 1759702 challenging R's final notice disallowing her claims for relief from joint and several liability under sec. 6015, I.R.C. The "stand alone" I.R.C. sec. 6015 case, Joyce E. Beery, Petitioner, Jerome G. Beery, Intervenor, docket No. 17597-02, is currently pending before this Court. Meanwhile, on Nov. 6, 2002, R issued to P a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing for the taxable years 1989 to 1994. On Nov. 15, 2002, R issued to P a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing for the taxable |