It appears that several depositions were taken before Fred A. Murdock, one of the justices of the peace of Oneonta township, within the city, in John Doe proceedings, entitled in the City Court, for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person who was claimed by the people to have committed the crime of arson in the first degree in a certain dwelling house known as No. 2 Academy street, city of Oneonta, in which there were human beings at the time; that thereafter a warrant was issued by Justice Murdock, acting as city judge, for the arrest of the relator, Gage, who was thereafter apprehended thereon, and confined in Otsego County Jail where he is now awaiting the action of the grand jury. Gage, it seems, is a married man, and there had been domestic troubles between himself and his wife, who was residing at the time in the house where the fire is alleged to have taken place. He had left her, it is claimed, and before going threatened.to "get her" some time, she says, or words to that effect; and it may be fairly inferred from all the circumstances that the husband had become jealous of the wife. The only other evidence taken before the magistrate which in any way tended to connect the relator with the commission of the alleged crime of arson was given by one Lee Babcock, a Delaware & Hudson trainman, of the age of 19 years, who states that he saw Gage on his train the morning of the fire, between East Worcester and Richmondville stations, on the road mentioned, about 35 or 40 miles from Oneonta. Babcock states he had only seen Gage on one other occasion some eight months previous thereto. The fire took place about 1:30 o'clock a. m., and it is not contended that Gage was seen in Oneonta either before or after the fire, or at any recent time. This case, therefore, presents a question of right upon a writ of habeas corpus, which is well-termed the greatest writ of the common law, because it assures and secures personal liberty by simple and direct process available to every citizen, and the value of which is not left to rest for security upon general and abstract declarations, but is a right which the courts are always zealous to assert cannot be abrogated or impaired by legislation. [1] It may be conceded that the crime of arson is one of the most serious of all the crimes known to our criminal jurisprudence, but after a careful review of the evidence presented in the records before me, I am of the opinion that it simply tends to raise a suspicion only that the defendant may possibly have been guilty of the crime charged, but it does not connect him directly or indirectly with the commission of the crime set forth in the warrant. In all cases of habeas corpus, the court will look into the depositions and the testimony to ascertain as to whether or not a crime has been proven against the defendant, and as to whether there is probable cause to believe that he committed the crime; and, if there is not sufficient evidence as to the person who committed it, it is the duty of the court to discharge. People ex rel, Bungart v. Wells, 57 App. Div. 147, 68 N. Y. Supp. 59. If there was not sufficient evidence from which it might fairly be found that there was probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime charged, then the court had not jurisdiction, and the reviewing court on the return of the writ may determine this question. People ex rel. Hubert v. Kaiser, 206 N. Y. 46, 99 N. E. 195. It, therefore, follows, as a matter of law, that the city court was without jurisdiction to hold the defendant here for the grand jury. It is the duty of all courts and its officers to be diligent in the protection of the public from crime, and especially from the commission of the crime of arson, and the district attorney, in whom the court has every confidence, has been so diligent, but it is likewise an obligation resting upon the court to protect the individual in the enjoyment of his personal liberty, and to see to it that he is not unjustly or unlawfully deprived of the same, without due process of law. [2, 3] I, therefore, conclude that the defendant must be discharged for the reason that the city court was acting without jurisdiction. The application is, in all respects, decided upon the merits. There are also other reasons why the defendant would have to be discharged. The informations upon which the warrant was issued are upon information and belief, and in each instance fail to state the source of information. The rule requiring affidavits which are upon information and belief to state the source thereof is indeed too elementary to require the citation of authorities. After a careful examination of the City Charter, I have reached the conclusion that Justice Murdock was without jurisdiction to sign the warrant, within the limits of the city of Oneonta. City courts in cities of the second and third class are clearly distinguished from courts of justices of the peace in towns, by article 17, section 6, of the Constitution, and are given separate and special statutory jurisdiction. Justice Murdock, therefore, had not the right to act as city judge of Oneonta at any time. For the reasons stated, the defendant must be discharged from custody. Órdered accordingly. (86 Misc. Rep. 61) PEOPLE v. NIAGARA FALLS POWER CO. (Niagara County Court. June, 1914.) 1. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 13*)-LABOR LAW-POLICE POWER. Laws 1913, c. 740, which added section Sa to the Labor Law (Consol. Laws, c. 31), requiring the setting apart for employés of one day in the week where they are required to work on Sunday, was a valid exercise of the police power. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 14; Dec. Dig. § 13.*] 2. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 13*)-VIOLATION OF LABOR LAW. Where an electrical corporation failed to allow an employé 24 hours of rest in every 7 consecutive days, it was guilty of a violation of Laws 1913, c. 740, adding section 8a to the Labor Law (Consol. Laws, c. 31). [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 14; Dec. Dig. § 13.*] Appeal from Police Court of City of Niagara Falls. The Niagara Falls Power Company was convicted of a violation of the Labor Law, and appeals. Affirmed. For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes F. L. Lovelace and Arthur Killian, both of Niagara Falls, for appellant. Fred M. Ackerson, Dist. Atty., of Niagara Falls, and Burt Duquette, of Lockport, for the People. FISH, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Police Court of the City of Niagara Falls, convicting the defendant of a violation of section 8a of article 2 of the Labor Law of this state, on account of its failure to allow Frank J. Long, a person employed in its factory, 24 consecutive hours of rest in every 7 consecutive days. The defendant is a corporation organized under chapter 83 of the Laws of 1886, and owns and operates an electric power plant in the city of Niagara Falls, N. Y., in which electric energy is generated. This electric energy is distributed to and used by the International Railway Company, the Niagara Junction Railway Company, and various other nonrailroad public service corporations and other corporations. The portion thereof distributed to the International Railway Company is used by it to operate its electric railroad and the portion distributed to the Niagara Junction Railway Company is used by it to operate its railroad. The said International Railway Company and said Niagara Junction Railway Company are each domestic railroad corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the public service commission under article 3 of the Public Service Commissions Law (Consol. Laws, c. 48), and are each operated wholly and exclusively by electric energy generated in the said power plant of the defendant. A portion of said power plant is devoted to the generation of electric energy for the use of said International Railway Company, and a further portion is equipped with electrical machinery exclusively used for transforming and delivering electric energy for the operation of the railroads of said railroad corporations. The defendant is under contract to furnish approximately 30 per cent. of its output of power to said railroad corporations, although, in actual practice, a considerable portion of this 30 per cent. is delivered from the power plant of an allied company of the defendant. The said Long was engaged in that part of defendant's plant where electric energy is transformed for the said International Railway Company to the proper voltage for its use, and his duties were to record readings of meters, watch the machinery and the operation thereof, and make reports as to the same; his principal duties being the tending of the electric railway converters of said International Railway Company, and an electric railway converter converting electric energy for the use of said Niagara Junction Railway Company. It is necessary that said power plant should be operated continuously in order to continuously supply electricity to said railroad corporations and other public utilities, and the employés of the defendant in said power plant are divided into three shifts, each on duty 8 hours at a time, and at the end of the week the shifts are changed so that during the week. the men of each shift have 8 hours of work followed by 16 continuous hours of rest; but at the end of the week as the shifts are changed, the men of the first shift have only 8 hours of continuous rest, those of the second shift 16 hours of continuous rest, and those of the last shift 32 hours of continuous rest. The said Long was employed in one of these shifts, and had 16 continuous hours of rest each day except that on one day in each three weeks he would only have 8 continuous hours of rest and another day in each three weeks he would have 32 hours of continuous rest. The defendant claims: (1) That said section 8a is unconstitutional; (2) that said power plant is not a factory within the meaning of the word "factory" as defined in section 2 of the Labor Law. [1] 1. I think this act in question is a valid exercise of the police power of the state, because it has a reasonable connection with public health, welfare, and safety. From time immemorial it has been considered necessary for the physical welfare of the individual that he should have one day's rest in seven, and laws securing this have been held constitutional. People v. Havnor, 149 N. Y. 198, 43 N. E. 541, 31 L. R. A. 689, 52 Am. St. Rep. 707; Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164, 20 Sup. Ct. 666, 44 L. Ed. 716; 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 388. In Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 16 Sup. Ct. 1086, 41 L. Ed. 166, the following words of Mr. Justice Field, delivered in a California case, are quoted with approval: "Its requirement is a cessation from labor. In its enactment, the Legislature has given the sanction of law to a rule of conduct, which the entire civilized world recognizes as essential to the physical and moral well-being of society. Upon no subject is there such a concurrence of opinion, among philosophers, moralists, and statesmen of all nations, as on the necessity of periodical cessations from labor. One day in seven is the rule, founded in experience and sustained by science." The state is interested in building up strong, virile citizens to till its soil and develop its industries in times of peace and to defend it in times of war, and, by appropriate laws within reasonable bounds, can guard the health and welfare of the individual from the cradle to the grave. Sunday is the day generally selected as a day of rest, because it is the day "regarded as sacred by the greatest number of citizens" and "causes the least inconvenience." This statute does not close down this power plant and stop these railroads on Sunday. The state recognizes the great inconvenience which would result therefrom, and leaves the day of rest to be selected to any of the seven days of the week. [2] 2. Section 2 of the Labor Law, at the time of the commission of the offense complained of and of the rendition of the judgment appealed from, defined the term "factory" as follows: "The term 'factory,' when used in this chapter, shall be construed to include any mill, workshop or other manufacturing or business establishment and all buildings, sheds, structures or other place used for or in connection therewith, where one or more persons are employed at labor, except power houses, barns, storage houses, sheds and other structures used in connection with railroad purposes, other than construction or repair shops, subject to the jurisdiction of the public service commission under article three of the Public Service Commissions Law." The defendant asserts that, as 30 per cent. of its output of electrical power was distributed to the railroad corporations above named, and used by them to operate their respective railroads, its power plant is a power house "used in connection with railroad purposes," and there fore within the exception contained in the definition of the term "factory" as above quoted, and that it was the intention of the lawmakers to except all power houses supplying electricity for the operation of railroads in order to avoid hampering or impeding the public service. With this contention I cannot agree. I think the "power houses" referred to in the exception are such as are incidental to railroad purposes. The power plant of the defendant is the principal thing here, and the distribution of a part of its power to railroads an incident of its business. If a power house of a nonrailroad corporation which supplies some of its electrical energy to a railroad is used in connection with railroad purposes, then a storage house, in which some portion of a railroad's equipment is stored, or a shed from which lumber or rails are shipped to a railroad for its use are each used in connection with railroad purposes, even though such storage house and shed are owned, controlled, and used by those not engaged in the railroad business. Furthermore, the power houses referred to in the exception are such as are "subject to the jurisdiction of the public service commission under article three of the Public Service Commissions Law." This power house is not subject to the jurisdiction of the public service commission under said article 3; that article only includes "common carriers, railroads, street railroads, railroad corporations and street railroad corporations," and the meaning of these terms is defined in section 2 of article 1 of the Public Service Commissions Law. The power house of the defendant is an "electric plant" as defined in subdivision 12 of section 2 of said article, and the defendant an "electrical corporation" as defined in subdivision 13 of said section 2, and is subject to the jurisdiction of the public service commission under article 4 of the Public Service Commissions Law, and not under article 3 thereof. The punctuation of the statute in the above quoted definition of the term "factory" shows that the words "subject to the jurisdiction" refer to and qualify the terms "power houses, barns, storage houses, sheds and other structures," and not solely the terms "construction or repair shops," as there is a comma after the word "purposes" and another between the word "shops" and the word “subject." The punctuation of statutes in this state may be resorted to, in determining the intention of the Legislature, when the meaning is not plain. Tyrrell v. City of New York, 159 N. Y. 239, 53 N. E. 1111. Section 2 of The Labor Law was amended so as to define the term "factory" as above quoted by chapter 529 of the Laws of 1913, the statute prior to this amendment reading as follows: "The term 'factory,' when used in this chapter, shall be construed to include also any mill, workshop, or other manufacturing or business establishment where one or more persons are employed at labor." This section 2 was again amended by chapter 512 of the Laws of 1914 to define the term "factory" as follows: "The term 'factory' when used in this chapter, shall be construed to include any mill, workshop, or other manufacturing or business establishment and all buildings, sheds, structures or other places used for or in connection therewith, where one or more persons are employed at labor, except power houses, |