ESTIMATE BY DIRECTOR OF MINT OF THE VALUES OF FOREIGN COINS--Continued. Shark fins dutiable as "fish, skinned or boned," at the rate of 14 cents per pound under paragraph 273, tariff act of 1909. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, October 2, 1911. SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of July 20, 1911, with reference to the classification of shark fins, wherein you state that it is your practice to classify such merchandise as dutiable at the rate of three-fourths of 1 cent per pound under paragraph 273 of the tariff act of 1909. You also express the opinion, however, that the contention of the special agent at San Francisco that the merchandise is properly dutiable at 14 cents per pound under the same paragraph as "fish, skinned or boned," is correct, inasmuch as G. A. 297 (T. D. 10744), which is apparently the basis for the present practice, does not appear to be applicable in view of the provision for "fish, skinned or boned," which did not appear in the tariff act of October 1, 1890, under which the said decision was rendered. It appears that the fins are cut from the shark and are boiled, skinned, and prepared for market by drying or preserving, and the department concurs in the opinion expressed that the merchandise is properly dutiable as "fish, skinned or boned," and you are accordingly directed, 30 days from the date hereof, to assess duty upon shark fins at the rate of 14 cents per pound, under the said paragraph 273 of the tariff act of 1909. Respectfully, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, New York. JAMES F. CURTIS, (T. D. 31895-G. A. 7277.) Tops for hatpins. Imitation precious stones, composed of glass or paste, faceted, intended for use as tops for hatpins, are suitable for use in the manufacture of jewelry and dutiable at 20 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 449, tariff act of 1909, as imitation precious stones. United States General Appraisers, New York, September 27, 1911. In the matter of protest 493633-36784 of American Shipping Co. against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of Chicago. Before Board 1 (SHARRETTS, MCCLELLAND, and CHAMBERLAIN, General Appraisers). SHARRETTS, General Appraiser: The articles covered by this protest are imitation precious stones composed of glass or paste, intended for use in the manufacture of hatpins. Duty was assessed thereon at 45 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 109 of the tariff act of 1909, the importers claiming that the merchandise is properly dutiable as imitation precious stones at 20 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 449 of said act. In an advisory report to the collector relative to the classification for duty of these articles the appraiser reports: In view of the principles enunciated in T. D. 30934 (Abstract 23957), where hatpins with heads of imitation precious stones faceted were held to be dutiable as manufactures of glass or paste, return for duty was made under paragraph 109 at 45 per cent ad valorem. These hatpin heads are not parts of jewelry and are not used in the manufacture of jewelry, consequently are not dutiable under paragraph 449, as claimed. In G. A. 6139 (T. D. 26679), affirmed by the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York in T. D. 27397 (suits 4102-4107), this board, in passing upon the dutiability of hatpins, separated them into two classes. The first, which were held to be jewelry, embraced such as were set with paste (imitation precious stones), the heads being ornamented with metal bands, scroll work, or other ornamental metal designs. The second class included hatpins with plain round and faceted paste heads imitating precious stones not set in metal, orna mented or decorated. Following the decision of the court in the case of United States : Schiff (139 Fed. Rep., 549; T. D. 26492), the second class were held not to be jewelry. Abstract 23957, cited by the appraiser, had reference to hatpins similar to those embraced in class 2 of G. A. 6139, supra. The imitation precious stones in question can be and have for years been used indiscriminately in the manufacture of both classes of goods. It is impossible to determine with any degree of certainty whether any imitation precious stones are to be made into jewelry or cheaper articles not so known. We find, however, that they belong to a wellrecognized class of goods known as imitation precious stones, and that they are suitable for use in the manufacture of jewelry, such use being general and material and not merely incidental. We accordingly sustain the claim in the protest that the merchandise is dutiable at 20 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 449 of the act of 1909, the collector's decision being reversed. * * (T. D. 31896-G. A. 7278.) Jewelry Necklace clasps. * A platinum clasp for a necklace, set with a genuine pearl and rose diamonds, is dutiable as "all articles commonly or commercially known as jewelry, or parts thereof, * composed of * * platinum, whether set or not set with diamonds, pearls," etc., under paragraph 448, tariff act of 1909, and not as "snap fas teners, or clasps, or parts thereof, by whatever name known," under paragraph 427 of said act. United States General Appraisers, New York, September 27, 1911. In the matter of protest 470521-36068 of G. W. Sheldon & Co. against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of Chicago. Before Board 1 (SHARRETTS, MCCLELLAND, and CHAMBERLAIN, General Appraisers). SHARRETTS, General Appraiser: The merchandise covered by this protest is a platinum clasp for a necklace, set with a genuine pearl and rose diamonds. It was assessed with duty at 60 per cent ad valorem under the provision in paragraph 448 of the tariff act of 1909 for "all articles commonly or commercially known as jewelry or parts thereof, composed of gold or platinum, set with * * * diamonds, pearls," etc. The importers claim that duty should have been assessed on this article at the rate of 50 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 427 of said act, which provides for "snap fasteners, or clasps, or parts thereof, by whatever name known.” 7680 VOL 21-11--18 A provision for "clasps, by whatever name known," standing alone, would seem to be more specific than that for "jewelry," but where the word "clasps" is coupled with and probably intended to be synonymous with "snap fasteners," and is included in a paragraph devoted wholly to buttons or parts of buttons, we must presume that the snap fasteners or clasps provided for therein are in the nature of, or serve the same purpose or use as, buttons commonly used on gloves and shoes. All of the enumerated articles in paragraph 427 are intended for utilitarian purposes, while the clasp in question is a part of a necklace intended to adorn the person, serving no useful purpose, and is not ejusdem generis with the articles specified in paragraph 427. We find the merchandise in question is a part of a necklace, commonly or commercially known as jewelry, composed of platinum and set with precious stones, and hold that it is more specifically provided for in paragraph 448 than in paragraph 427 of said act. The protest is accordingly overruled, the collector's decision being affirmed. (T. D. 31897-G. A. 7279.) Toy magic-lantern slides. Glass slides for use with toy magic lanterns are not dutiable at 45 per cent ad valorem as "glass slides for magic lanterns" under paragraph 107, tariff act of 1909, but are dutiable at 35 per cent ad valorem as "parts of toys" under paragraph 431 of said act. --United States v. Borgfeldt (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 370; T. D. 31455) followed. United States General Appraisers, New York, September 28, 1911. In the matter of protest 418292, etc., of B. Illfelder & Co. against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York. Before Board 1 (SHARRETTS, MCCLELLAND, and CHAMBERLAIN, General Appraisers). SHARRETTS, General Appraiser: On the evidence and the appraiser's report we find the merchandise in question to be glass slides for toy magic lanterns. Duty was assessed on these slides at the rate of 45 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 107 of the tariff act of 1909, the importers claiming the same to be dutiable as toys or parts of toys at 35 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 431 of said act. The same issue as here presented was decided by this board in favor of the importers in G. A. 7020 (T. D. 30613), and upon review by the United States Court of Customs Appeals the decision of the board was affirmed (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 370; T. D. 31455), on authority of which we sustain the protests covering the merchandise in question, the collector's decision in each case being reversed. (T. D. 31898-G. A. 7280.) Jurisdiction-Steamship "Altenburg.” IMPORTED MERCHANDISE. The steamship Altenburg, arriving in the port of Philadelphia "in the ordinary course of navigation," is not imported merchandise within the meaning of the tariff act of 1909; and the Board of United States General Appraisers has no jurisdiction over a case involving an exaction of duties on such vessel, paid under protest. A subsequent conversion of the vessel into "scrap" held not to alter this rule. United States General Appraisers, New York, September 30, 1911. In the matter of protest 481310 of J. G. Hitner against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of Philadelphia. Before Board 2 (FISCHER, HOWELL, and COOPER, General Appraisers). FISCHER, General Appraiser: The protestant, having purchased the iron steamship Altenburg, then lying in the port of Habana, Cuba, caused the same to be propelled under her own steam into the port of Philadelphia, at which place she arrived, according to the papers in the case, on January 8, 1910. The vessel appears to have been properly entered and the usual tonnage and port dues paid. After that, the protestant, finding that the said vessel could not be sold as a vessel, caused the same to be broken up and converted into scrap. That quite some time elapsed before this was done is evident from the date upon which the collector, finding that the vessel had been dismantled and made into scrap, caused the importer to enter such scrap under informal entry. The order for appraisement was issued from the collector's office on July 27, 1910, and duty was assessed against said importation at the rate of $1 per ton under the provisions of paragraph 118, tariff act of 1909, as scrap iron. The importer claims that the vessel was not "imported merchandise," that it had legally entered the country as a "vessel," and that its subsequent change of character did not subject it to assessment of duty under the tariff law. We are satisfied that if the importer's contention herein is correct, this board is without jurisdiction to entertain the case. In re Fassett (142 U. S., 479); G. A. 5092 (T. D. 23560). If the vessel is not imported merchandise, then the action of the collector in exacting a duty is not reviewable under subsections 14 and 15 of section 28 of the act of 1909. We find it necessary to enter into a consideration of the merits to determine whether the imported article is merchandise. The record would show that the vessel Altenburg arrived under her own power. There is some dispute here as to whether the vessel did arrive in that manner or was towed in by another vessel, but this we do not consider important, for in either event it arrived on its own bottom and was allowed entry under our navigation laws. It arrived at the port of Philadelphia "in the ordinary course of navigation." The sole question to be determined is whether a vessel arriving in that |