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the Strang suit was transferred to the United States Circuit Court. The suits were heard together, and a decision was made in favor of the North and South Alabama Railroad Company, and subsequently, upon the application of that company, there was a sale ordered and a direction given to first pay the company's claim from the proceeds. From this order the complainants in the two suits appealed. The next day after the appeal was taken the Circuit Court again considered the cause, and, upon the application of those holding claims adverse to that of the company mentioned, ordered a consolidation of the two suits and directed a sale of the property subject to the lien of the company. From this decree the company prayed an appeal to operate as a supersedeas, offering the proper bond. The Circuit Court refused to grant the appeal or accept a supersedeas bond, being of the opinion that the company had no right to appeal or to give bond to supersede the execution of the decree.

The South and North Alabama Railroad Company thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus requiring the Circuit Court to grant the appeal and accept a good and sufficient supersedeas bond. The Supreme Court, in granting the petition, said: This application is resisted upon the general ground that the South and North Alabama Railroad Company cannot appeal, because its rights are not injuriously affected by the decree. That company was a party to each of the suits consolidated for the purposes of the decree. It was, therefore, a party to the suit as consolidated and entitled to be heard upon the pleadings as they stood before the consolidation, since no change in that particular was ordered or deemed necessary by the court. Among the pleadings in the Strang suit, thus brought into the consolidated suit, was the cross-bill of this company praying affirmative relief in the final determination of the cause. It matters not that at a former day in the term a special decree had been rendered upon the subject-matter of the cross-bill, and that an appeal from that decree had been taken, for "a cross-bill is a mere auxiliary suit and a dependency of the original." Cross v. Duval, 1 Wall. 14. As we have said in Ayres v. Carver, 17 How. 595, "both the original and cross-bill constitute one suit" and ought to be heard at the same time. Consequently, "any decision or decree in the proceedings upon the cross-bill is not a final decree in the suit and * * * not the subject of an appeal to this court * * . The decree, whether maintaining or dismissing the bill, disposes of a proceeding simply incidental to the principal matter in litigation, and can only be reviewed on an appeal from the final decree disposing of the whole case. That appeal brings up all the proceedings for re-examination, when the party aggrieved by any determination in respect to the cross-bill has the opportunity to review it as in the case of any other interlocutory proceeding in the case." A cross-bill must grow out of the matters alleged in the original bill, and is used to bring the whole dispute before the court, so that there may be a complete decree touching the subject-matter of the action. 2 Daniel's Ch. 1548. The South and North Alabama Company deemed it necessary for the protection of its rights in the mortgaged property, that in any sale which was ordered, provision should be made for the payment of its claim out of the proceeds, insisting, for that purpose, that its lien was prior in time to that of either of the other mortgage creditors.

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To accomplish this, a cross-bill was necessary, and it was accordingly filed. The decree upon this bill being, under the ruling in Ayres v. Carver, supra, interlocutory only, was superseded by that of July 6, which finally disposed of the cause in a manner entirely inconsistent with its provisions. It is clear, therefore, that the decree, as rendered, did, in effect, deny the company the relief it asked, and that, if there were nothing more in the case, redress might be had by an appeal.

THE RIGHTS OF A FINDER OF LOST PROPERTY.

SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND, JULY 21, 1877.

DURFEE V. JONES.

A bought an old safe, and afterward offered it to B, who refused to purchase it. It was then left with B for sale, B having permission to use it. B found between the outer casing and the lining a roll of bank bills belonging to some person unknown, whereupon A first demanded the money and then demanded the safe and its contents as they were when B received them. The safe was returned, but the money retained by B. Held, that as against A, B was entitled to retain the money. The finder of lost property is entitled to it as against all the world except the real owner, and ordinarily the place where it is found is of no consequence.

SSUMPSIT for money found. The facts appear in the opinion. The case was heard by the court, a jury trial being waived.

A. J. Cushing, for plaintiff.

Francis W. Miner, for defendant.

DURFEE, C. J. The facts in this case are briefly these: In April, 1874, the plaintiff bought an old safe and soon afterward instructed his agent to sell it again. The agent offered to sell it to the defendant for $10, but the defendant refused to buy it. The agent then left it with the defendant who was a blacksmith, at his shop for sale for $10, authorizing him to keep his books in it until it was sold or reclaimed. The safe was old-fashioned, of sheet iron, about three feet square, having a few pigeon-holes and a place for books, and back of the place for books a large crack in the lining. The defendant shortly after the safe was left, upon examining it, found secreted between the sheet-iron exterior and the wooden lining a roll of bills amounting to $165, of the denomination of the national bank bills which have been current for the last ten or twelve years. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant knew the money was there before it was found. The owner of the money is still unknown. The defendant informed the plaintiff's agent that he had found it, and offered it to him for the plaintiff; but the agent declined it, stating that it did not belong to either himself or the plaintiff, and advised the defendant to deposit it where it would be drawing interest until the rightful owner appeared. The plaintiff was then out of the city. Upon his return, being informed of the finding, he immediately called on the defendant and asked for the money, but the defendant refused to give it to him. He then, after taking advice, demanded the return of the safe and its contents, precisely as they existed when placed in the defendant's hands. The defendant promptly gave up the safe, but retains the money. The plaintiff brings this action to recover it or its equivalent.

The plaintiff does not claim that he acquired, by purchasing the safe, any right to the money in the safe as against the owner; for he bought the safe alone, not the safe and its contents. See Merry v. Green, 7 M. &

W. 623. But he claims that as between himself and the defendant his is the better right. The defendant, however, has the possession, and therefore it is for the plaintiff, in order to succeed in this action, to prove his better right.

The plaintiff claims that he is entitled to have the money by the right of prior possession. But the plaintiff never had any possession of money, except, unwittingly, by having possession of the safe which contained it. Such possession, if possession it can be called, does not of itself confer a right. The case at bar is, in this view, like Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 15 Jur. 1079; 21 L. J., Q. B., 75, A. D. 1851; 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 424. In that case, the plaintiff, while in the defendant's shop on business, picked up from the floor a parcel containing bank notes. He gave them to the defendant for the owner if he could be found. The owner could not be found, and it was held that the plaintiff as finder was entitled to them, as against the defendant as owner of the shop in which they were found. "The notes," said the court, "never were in the custody of the defendant nor within the protection of his house, before they were found, as they would have been if they had been intentionally deposited there." The same in effect may be said of the notes in the case at bar; for though they were originally deposited in the safe by design, they were not so deposited in the safe, after it became the plaintiff's safe, so as to be in the protection of the safe as his safe, or so as to affect him with any responsibility for them. The case at bar is also in this respect like Tatum v. Sharpless, 6 Phila. 18. There it was held, that a conductor, who had found money which had been lost in a railroad car, was entitled to it as against the railroad company.

The plaintiff also claims that the money was not lost but designedly left where it was found, and that therefore as owner of the safe he is entitled to its custody. He refers to cases in which it has been held, that money or other property voluntarily laid down and forgotten is not in legal contemplation lost, and that of such money or property the owner of the shop or place where it is left is the proper custodian rather than the person who happens to discover it first. State v. McCann, 19 Mo. 249; Lawrence v. The State, 1 Humph. 228; McAvoy v. Medina, 11 Allen, 549. It may be questioned whether this distinction has not been pushed to an extreme. See Kincaid v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 139. But, however that may be, we think the money here, though designedly left in the safe, was probably not designedly put in the crevice or interspace where it was found, but that, being left in the safe, it probably slipped or was accidentally shoved into the place where it was found without the knowledge of the owner, and so was lost, in the stricter sense of the word. The money was not simply deposited and forgotten, but deposited and lost by reason of a defect or insecurity in the place of deposit.

The plaintiff claims that the finding was a wrongful act on the part of the defendant, and that therefore he is entitled to recover the money or to have it replaced. We do not so regard it. The safe was left with the defendant for sale. As seller he would properly examine it under an implied permission to do so, to qualify him the better to act as seller. Also, under the permission to use it for his books, he would have the right to inspect it to see if it was a fit depository. And finally, as a possible purchaser, he might examine it, for though he had once declined to pur

chase, he might, on closer examination, change his mind. And the defendant, having found in the safe something which did not belong there, might, we think, properly remove it. He certainly would not be expected either to sell the safe to another, or to buy it himself without first removing it. It is not pretended that he used any violence or did any harm to the safe. And it is evident that the idea that any trespass or tort had been committed, did not even occur to the plaintiff's agent when he was first informed of the finding.

The general rule undoubtedly is, that the finder of lost property is entitled to it as against all the world except the real owner, and that ordinarily the place where it is found does not make any difference. We cannot find any thing in the circumstances of the case at bar to take it out of this rule. We give the defendant judgment for costs.

PRESENTATION OF EXCEPTIONS UPON APPEAL.

N the case of Phoenix Insurance Co., plaintiff in error, v. Lanier, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States at the present term, the plaintiff in error complained that certain evidence was improperly admitted, and that incorrect instruction was given to the jury, but the record did not show that any exception was saved to the admission of evidence or to the charge of the court. No bill of exceptions appears to have been made up or signed. In the transcript sent up to the court it was stated that at the trial objection was made to the reception of certain testimony of witnesses, that the objection was overruled, and that the defendant then and there excepted to such ruling of the court and assigned error thereon. And the transcript stated that the judge gave substantially certain instruction to the jury and added, “to which portion of said charge said defendant then and there excepted and assigned the same as error." The Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment, said: "Even if the facts occurred as certified by the clerk, his statement that they occurred does not bring them upon the record so as to make them the subject of review. There is but one mode of bringing upou the record and making a part of it the rulings of a judge during the progress of a trial, or his charge to the jury, and that is by a bill of exceptions allowed and sealed or signed by the judge. It is true that in the hurry of the trial the bill is not often reduced to form and sealed or signed. Generally an exception is only noted by the judge at the time claimed and it is subsequently drawn up, but it is not a bill of exceptions until it has been sealed, or, as is now sufficient, signed. The sealing or signature of the judge is essential for its authentication. And it has been ruled that the judge's notes do not constitute a bill of exceptions. They are but memoranda from which a formal bill may afterward be drawn up and sealed. (Pomeroy v. The Bank of Indiana, 1 Wall. 592.) There it was said: 'when exceptions are taken to the ruling of the court in the course of a trial to the jury, such an entry is frequently made in the minutes of the case, or of the presiding justice, as evidence of the fact, and as a means of preserving the rights of the party in case the verdict should be against him, and he should desire to have the case re-examined in the appellate tribunal, but it was never supposed that such an entry could be of any benefit to the party unless he seasonably availed himself of the right to reduce the

same to writing, and took proper measures to have the bill of exceptions sealed by the judge presiding at the trial, or in other words, such an entry in the minutes can only be regarded as evidence of the right of the party seasonably to demand a bill of exceptions, but it is not the same thing, and it has never been so considered in the Federal courts.' And, again: 'Unless an exception is reduced to writing and sealed by the judge it is not a bill of exceptions within the meaning of the statute authorizing it, and it does not become part of the record.' No such bill is found in the present case."

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

APPEAL.

Appeal to Court of Appeals: claim not involving $500.-Plaintiff brought action to foreclose a mortgage, and defendant holding a judgment of $300, which was a lien on the same premises, claimed a priority over the mortgage therefor. Held, not to constitute a case appealable to this court, under § 191 of the new Code. In any event, either party could not gain or lose over $300. Appeal dismissed. Petrie v. Adams. Opinion by Allen, J.

[Decided Oct. 10, 1877.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Power of legislature to control corporations: requiring railroad company to erect bridge for highway crossing track. -- Chapter 648 of the Laws of 1874 enacted that the Boston and Albany Railroad Company should, within one year, construct a bridge at the point of intersection of its railroad with a turnpike, in such a manner as to conduct the turnpike over the railroad in the manner particularly specified in the act. Held, a valid exercise of the legislative power, both by reason of the general authority of the State to regulate the exercise by railroad corporations of their franchises (Munn v. Illinois, 4 Otto, 113), and of the fact that the company was incorporated under chap. 917 of the Laws of 1869 authorizing the consolidation of railroad corporations, hence taking its charter subject to the right of the legislature to alter or amend it (1 R. S. 600, § 8; Const., art. 8, § 1; Laws 1850, chap. 140, § 48.) Order below affirmed. People ex rel. Kimball v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co. Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided Sept. 25, 1877.]

CONTRACT.

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For personal services: failure to perform through inability of party performing. A contract was made between plaintiffs and defendants, for performances in plaintiffs' theater, by the "Wachtel opera troupe," for a specified sum. The name and capabilities of Wachtel, after whom the troupe was named and who performed in it, had induced the plaintiffs to make the contract, and his capabilities were what they relied on to fill their theater and reimburse them for their expenses, and the presence of the others of the company was but incidental to the employment of him. Held, that the sickness and inability of Wachtel to perform without the fault of plaintiff would constitute a valid excuse for the non-performance of their contract. Contracts for personal services are subject to this implied condition, that the person shall be able at the time appointed to perform them, and if he dies, or without his fault becomes disabled, the obligation to perform is extinguished. Judgment below affirmed. Spalding v. Rosa. Opinion by Allen, J. [Decided Oct. 2, 1877.]

INDORSEMENT.

1. Waiver of demand and notice: what does not amount to. - Plaintiff, the holder of a promissory note indorsed by defendant, was applied to by the maker for an extension, which he agreed to give if the note was kept secure. Subsequently, and before the note was due, plaintiff had an interview with defendant in relation to the matter and stated to him that he would extend the time if the note was kept secure. Defendant then said he "guessed that could be fixed and he would get Kingsbury (the maker) in." Plaintiff then went out to find the maker, but did not do so. Held, not sufficient to dispense with need of demand and notice to hold the indorser. Judgment below reversed. Ross v. Hurd. Opinion by Andrews, J.

2. What amounts to waiver of laches of holder of note. The note was not presented when due for payment, and no notice was given to defendant. At the end of the time for which the extension was asked the maker asked for a further extension, and an interview was had between the maker, plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff then spoke to defendant about the extension and defendant replied "you and Kingsbury can fix that as you are a mind to." The maker then asked plaintiff whether he "would have a new note or what." Plaintiff said, "I would let the old note stand just as it was." Defendant then said, "then I will waive protest." Held, a waiver of the previous failure to present for payment and give notice, and that the defendant thereupon renewed his liability. (Turnbull v. Thorn, 16 Johns. 152; Story on Prom. Notes, §§ 359, 362.) Ib.

3. Consideration not necessary to give effect to promise to waive demand and notice. To give effect to a promise by an indorser to not take advantage of the laches of the holder of a note in failing to demand payment and give notice, a new consideration moving between the parties is not necessary. Ib. [Decided Oct. 2, 1877.]

PARTIES.

Action to restrain formation of village corporation: when injunction denied for defect of. — An action was commenced to restrain certain persons from proceeding to incorporate a village under the provisions of chap. 291 of the Laws of 1870. The persons made defendants were those who signed the notice required by the act and the town officers who would be inspectors of the election. A temporary injunction was dissolved, and the election was held; a majority of votes determined in favor of the incorporation, and the proceedings were perfected and village officers chosen. A supplementary complaint demanded that all these acts be declared void. Held, that the village itself and the trustees exercising the franchise thereof were necessary parties, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction in the action without their being parties. Judgment below affirmed. People ex rel. Kingsland v. Clark. Opinion per Curiam. [Decided Sept. 25, 1877.]

PRESUMPTIONS.

Presumption of ownership of crops from possession of agricultural land. The law raises no presumption as to the character of the occupation of one cultivating the farm of another with the instruments of husbandry, beasts of the plow teams and domestic animals of the owner of the farm, or as to the right of either to the growing crops and products of the farm, but leaves it a question of fact to be determined by a jury upon the

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Defense of title in a stranger: when not available. In an action of replevin for certain personal property defendant set up that plaintiff, having title to the property, pledged the same to defendant's wife to secure a debt due her from plaintiff, and that the property was in her possession as such pledgee. No connection of the defendant with the title of his wife was alleged. Held, that plaintiff had title and right of possession against all the world but the wife, and the answer of defendant was no defense to the action, as against plaintiff he had no right of possession of the property. Judgment below reversed. Stowell v. Otis. Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided Oct. 2, 1877.]

WILL.

1. Construction of: joint tenancy and tenancy in common: perpetuities: devise of estate in trust.-By a will the residuary estate of the testator was devised to trustees in trust for the grandchildren of the testator, "share and share alike, and is to be paid and conveyed to each of said children as they each become of age, in equal shares," and a direction was given that "in the meantime," i. e., until the termination of the trust the income of the estate should be applied to the support of the grandchildren. There were nine grandchildren at the death of testator. Held, that the will created a tenancy in common and not a joint tenancy; that the trust terminated as to each share when the beneficiary arrived at the age of twenty-one years; that there was no unlawful suspension of the power of alienation. Under the will the trustees took the legal title to the residuary estate upon separate and several trusts in favor of each of the nine grandchildren, and each of the grandchildren a vested remainder in fee on his or her share upon the termination of the trust at his or her majority. Judgment modified and as modified affirmed. Stevenson v. Lesley. Opinion by Andrews, J.

2. Whether devisees take per stirpe or per capita: after-born children.-The testator, when the will was made, had nine grandchildren, four, the issue of a deceased daughter, and five, the issue of a son, who survived him. Held, that the distribution between the grandchildren was to be per capita, not per stirpe. Held, also, that a child of the son, born subsequent to the death of the testator and before the time for the distribution of any part of the corpus of the estate had arrived, was entitled to a share therein. Ib. [Decided Sept. 25, 1877.]

RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS.

DISCHARGE.

Discharge obtained by fraud: decree annulling discharge. A discharge obtained by fraud will be vacated. A decree annulling a discharge cannot be set aside except upon due notice to the parties to be affected thereby. Sup. Ct., Dist. Columbia. In re Augenstein, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 252.

JUDGMENT.

When provable as a debt.-A judgment recovered pending the bankruptcy proceedings in an action begun before, and based upon a provable debt, is itself provable. A creditor having such a judgment has an interest in the question of discharge and a right to be heard thereon. Such judgment will be released by a discharge duly granted to the bankrupt judgment debtor. U. S. Dist. Ct., Nevada. In re Stansfield, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 268.

LIMITATION.

When suit barred by section 5057.—A suit by an assignee to recover debts due the estate is barred by the limitation contained in section 5057, where the summons was not issued within two years from the time when the cause of action accrued, although the petition in such suit was filed within such time. U. S. Circ. Ct., W. D. Missouri. Walker, assignee, v. Towner, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 285.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. Real estate belonging to partnership: rights of bankrupt partner.--In a contest between the assignee and third parties to ascertain their respective rights as to real estate which had been purchased by the bankrupt and such parties under an agreement to furnish the outlay and share in the profit and loss equally, it is necessary to adjust the partnership dealings to the time of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy and ascertain the exact interest of the bankrupt and each of his partners in such transaction. U. S. Dist. Ct., Vermont. Thrall v. Crampton, assignee, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 261.

2. Lien of partner of bankrupt.-Where there are partnership debts still outstanding, on which the bankrupt's partner is liable, such partner is entitled to a lien upon such real estate until the debts are paid, and to indemnify him in case he is compelled to pay them. Ib.

PRACTICE.

1. Setting off exempt property.-A register has no authority to set off exempt property to the bankrupt, nor to direct the assignee in the matter. U. S. Dist. Ct., Colorado. In re Peabody, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 243.

2. Irregular order.-An ex parte order approving the schedule of property set aside to the bankrupt, or confirming a report of sale of assets, made on the day such schedule or report is filed, is irregular, and therefore not binding upon the creditors. The bankrupt court has power to set aside such orders at any time during the pendency of the proceedings, where an aggrieved party moves therefor within a reasonable time after notice. Ib.

3. Rights of creditors.-Creditors are not bound to except to the schedule of exempt property within twenty days after it is filed, where the assignee has failed to file it within twenty days after the assignment. Ib.

4. Exemption in Colorado.--Under the statute of Colorado a merchant is not entitled to an exemption of $200 worth of goods as "stock in trade;" he is entitled to a horse, as a 66 working animal," but not to a buggy. Ib.

5. Misconduct of assignee.-On an application by the assignee for his discharge, any misconduct on his part in respect to the estate is a proper subject for examination. Ib.

6. Issue of fraud.-Every fact which is relied on to

establish fraud should be distinctly stated and verified; and the creditor raising the issue should give security for costs. Ib.

7. Cost of keeping property covered by lien.-Where property taken by the assignee is charged with a lien, the reasonable cost of keeping and disposing of it, including the assignee's fees, should be charged upon it. No charge can be allowed for the services of an auctioneer, unless it be shown that such services were necessary; nor can such fund be charged with attorney's fees for services rendered to the assignee in his contest with the lienor respecting such property. Ib.

PREFERENCE.

1. Mortgage executed with view to.-Where the mortgage sought to be set aside was executed within the time specified in the bankrupt act, with a view to give a preference, the fact of repeated promises to pay, which were not kept, together with knowledge on the part of the creditor of a large amount of debts due by the bankrupt at or prior to that time which he was unable to pay, held, to be reasonable cause for the creditor to believe that the insolvency which in fact existed did exist. U. S. Dist. Ct., Vermont. In re Armstrong; Root v. Hilliard, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 275. 2. Knowledge of creditor, what constitutes.-Where the creditor taking such mortgage knew of other unsecured debts which his debtor could not pay, and that a large part of the property was common to all from which to get their pay, held, that he knew that the mortgage was made in fraud of the provisions of the bankrupt law. Ib.

REAL ESTATE.

1. Character of distributable assets not determined by bankrupt law. -The bankrupt law does not prescribe any rule or furnish any method for ascertaining the character of distributable assets. That is a subject of preliminary judicial inquiry, to be determined by legal principles of recognized controlling applicability. U. S. Circ. Ct., W. D. Pennsylvania. In re Zug & Co., 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 280.

2. Local law governs tenure of real estate.-As to questions touching the tenure of real estate, the Federal courts are to be governed by the laws and decisious of local tribunals of the country where such real estate is situated. Ib.

NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

THE proceedings of the Annual Meeting held in the Assembly Chamber on Tuesday last were -aside from the address of the President-not of a very interesting character, and need encroach but slightly upon our space. The Chamber was comfortably filled, and it was a noticeable feature that a large proportion of those present were men of position and ability at the Bar.

After the President's address, which was received with great enthusiasm, an attempt was made to elect a large number of honorary members from among the public men of this continent, whether occupying judicial positions or not, but wiser counsels prevailed and all such nominations were sent to the committee on that subject.

The Executive Committee gave a brief, generalized report, but which was unimportant because it gave no details of the work done.

The Treasurer, Mr. Rufus W. Peckham, on the other hand, gave facts instead of fancies. He reported that he had received during the year $3,357 and had dis

bursed $1,500, leaving a balance of $1,857. Admission fees had been received from 356 members, which may. therefore, be considered the numerical strength of the Association at this time.

Mr. John F. Seymour, chairman of the Committee on Grievances, made a short report touching on contracts with clients to share recoveries, and on the fact that persons who are not members of the bar assume frequently the privileges of attorneys, but no action or recommendation was reported.

The Hon. Matthew Hale reported from the Committee on Law Reform, that a majority of the members were not in favor of the repeal of the New Code; but were in favor of the adoption of the remaining nine chapters. The Committee, however, doubted the propriety of some of the changes made by the Commissioners, and regretted that so many verbal alterations had been made with no substantial object to be attained. The report concluded with a recommendation that the Committee meet in this city, in January, for consultation and conference regarding the Code.

Mr. Elliott F. Shepard, from the Committee on Prizes, reported that they had received 25 essays, and that the prize had been awarded to Mr. Walter Howe, of New York. The Committee also recommended that another prize be founded, to be called the New York State Bar Association Prize, and to be opened to a wider range of competitors.

The Hon. Sanford E. Church then presented Mr. Howe with the prize-$250 gold-and accompanied it with some well-timed advice to the Association, and some well-turned compliments to Mr. Howe.

A Committee of two from each judicial district was appointed to nominate officers, and, after advising, reported as follows:

President. Hon. J. K. Porter.

Vice-Presidents. First district, Charles O'Conor, N. Y.; 2d district, John M. Mason, Yonkers; 3d district, Samuel Hand, Albany; 4th district, Platt Potter, Schenectady; 5th district, William C. Ruger, Syracuse; 6th district, Horatio Ballard, Cortland: 7th district, James L. Angle, Rochester; 8th district, Myron H. Peck, Batavia.

Executive Committee - First district, E. F. Shepard, Albert Mathews, C. A. Hand; 2d district, Wm. M. Irvin, A. E. Suffern, George J. Greenfield; 3d district, Esek Cowen, M. T. Hun, R. H. King; 4th district, H. E. Smith, Stephen Brown, J. R. Putmau; 5th district, Albertus Perry, G. N. Kennedy, J. D. Kernan; 6th district, G. M. Diven, J. M. Glover, Charles L. Kennedy; 7th district, M. W. Cooke, Wm. Rumsey, J. H. Camp; 8th district, D. H. Bolles, Franklin D. Locke, Henry A. Childs.

Committee on Admissions - First district, Lewis L. Delafield, Benj. F. Dunning, Charles A. Peabody, Henry D. Sedgwick; 2d district, John J. Armstrong, Wm. H. Robertson, Walter Farrington, D. P. Barnard; 3d district, Peter S. Danforth, Irving Browne, Arthur C. Butts, Hugh W. McClellan; 4th district, Robert S. Hale, Frothingham Fish, James Gibson, Jr., L. W. Russell; 5th district, Ward Hunt, Jr., J. G. Vann, R. H. Tyler, Joseph Mullin, Jr.; 6th district, O. P. Hurd, O. W. Chapman, M. J. Shoecraft, L. L. Bundy; 7th district, A. J. Abbott, F. A. Macomber, F. O. Mason, Ralph T. Wood; 8th district, A. P. Laning, D. P. Richardson, H. C. Kingsbury, John T. Joyce.

Committee on Grievances - First district, Fred. R. Condert, H. E. Howland, Charles F. Stone; 2d district, Theo. F. Jackson, John G. Wilkin, Hamilton Fish, Jr.;

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