several kinds of Codes; the province of a Code; desirability of a Code; advantages of a Code; adoption of Codes in other States and Territories; the expediency of a Code; the flexibility of a Code; the Political Code of California; the Civil Code; the Code of Civil Procedure; the Penal Code. The topics mentioned are clearly and concisely treated, and the work will be found of great value to those interested in the subject of codification.

The sum in dispute in the case of Twycross v. Grant and others, is £700. The law costs have already reached £4,000, and the case is not yet finished. And this although Mr. Grant has all along conducted his own case in person, and dispensed with the expense of counsel, with their army of solicitors, solicitors' clerks, etc., etc. And yet we were told that the fusion of law and equity was going to make justice so cheap that it would be a positive luxury to go to law.-Irish Law Times. The London Times Berlin correspondent writes: "Dr. von Holtzendorff, the famous professor of international law at Munich, commenting upon the De Tourville trial, protests against the continental practice of proving a crime by a retrospective view of the character and antecedents of the prisoner. The professor's article in the Berlin Gegenwart, showing the excess to which this practice has been carried in the De Tourville trial, attracts general attention."

Mr. R. S. Guernsey, of the New York Bar, in an article in the last number of the American Library Journal, which is a valuable monthly, devoted to the interest of book buyers, and published by F. Leypoldt, 37 Park row, New York, speaks thus concerning legal bibliography: "At the present time we have to rely upon catalogues for knowledge of law books on a given subject. In 1847 there was published in Philadelphia the most complete and comprehensive work of the kind ever attempted in the English language. Its title was 'Legal Bibliography, or a Thesaurus of American, English, Irish and Scotch Law Books, together with some Continental Treatises, interspersed with critical observations upon their various editions and authority,' by J. G. Marvin, counselor at law. It covered 759 pages. The arrangement was by authors' names, and the index was by numerous subjects properly divided, under each of which is only the author's name. The reports were arranged in the same manner, without stating the country, State or court, save in the body of the work under the individual reporter's name. This was a serious detriment to the usefulness of the book. It purported to contain all the titles of all law books, but more than five hundred titles of such books, previously published in Great Britain and the United States, were omitted. No other work of that nature has been published, with the exceptions of catalogues of libraries, necessarily more deficient in the list of books. Useful as Mr. Marvin's work still is, it can only be ranked among alphabetically arranged catalogues. In no branch of literature would a catalogue, classified as I have suggested, become so useful as in that of jurisprudence. We have not now, and never have had, the benefits and advantages which such a properly subject-classified catalogue would give. When we resort to library catalogues we find them all arranged by authors' names (excepting that of the Library of Congress, published in 1869). These, as far as they go, are very useful. Dr. Johnson truly said: 'By means of catalogues only can it be known what

has been written in every part of learning, and the hazard avoided of encountering difficulties which have been already cleared, discussing questions which have already been decided, and digging in mines of literature which former years have exhausted.' If catalogues made in the usual way are so advantageous, how much more useful for this special purpose would one be, arranged as I have suggested! Such a comprehensive legal bibliography of all law books in the English language would now contain more than twelve thousand titles (twice the number of titles contained in Marvin's, and over two thousand more than in any library catalogue), arranged under more than six hundred subjects, and would occupy more than fifteen hundred pages of the usual law book size. Every lawyer who wishes to do his duty to his client, and to obtain a recognized standing, must be a continual student - he should be a bibliographer in his profession. It is his province to be well informed as to the best and latest productions in every department of the law, particularly those relating to his branch of it; by ready knowledge of this kind much time is saved and doubts and fears set at rest, safer counsel can be given, and a better and surer administration of law and justice obtained in the courts, with a certainty which is now not generally deemed characteristic of lawyers and of their science. The editor of the Journal says, however, that since the above was written, the 'Digest of Law Publications' of Robert Clarke & Co., Cincinnati, has accomplished something in this direction."

An engineer of the royal ship Simoon was recently tried and convicted by a court-martial of stealing a parrot. The main issue was the identity of the parrot stolen with the parrot found; and one test of identity was the "talk" of the bird. It was objected, on the part of the prisoner, that evidence of the bird's favorite expressions could not be given, as falling within the rule of law which excludes evidence of what is said in the absence of the prisoner. This objection was overruled, and the evidence was admitted. Thereupon the Daily Telegraph takes upon itself to ridicule the decision of the court-martial, and to ask "whether evidence founded on the conversation of a parrot would be received by any other tribunal save a court martial." It is the fashion, and in our opinion a very absurd fashion, to make game of military justice; but we fail altogether to see any "error" in the proceedings of this court. The rule of law to which we have alluded has nothing at all to do with this piece of evidence. It is obvious that any peculiarity in a man or an animal-whether in size, shape, tone of voice, manner of speech, action, or the like-deserves to be considered upon a question of identity. Evidence that a man stammered in the pronunciation of particular words would certainly be admissible; and probably, also, evidence that he habitually used some strange oath or expression. Evidence that the bay of a dog was deep in tone, or that a woman's voice was excessively shrill, must be at least as good evidence of identity as the length of a dog's tail, or the color of the woman's hair.-Law Journal.-Nearly all the lawyers of St. Louis, without exception, enrolled themselves in militia companies during the late troubles. A reporter of the Globe-Democrat, calling attention to this fact, remarked that the moral effect of it would be to drive the rioters to their holes without striking a blow, as the lawyers of St. Louis were universally known to be "h-ll on the charge."

ALL communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessa rily for publication.

bear the test of time or of abstract justice, and that is by according to recognized non-Christian powers the same rights and requiring from them the same

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, AUGUST 25, 1877.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE communication from the Hon. William Beach Lawrence in relation to the Institute of International Law, appearing in our present issue, will attract the attention of all those interested in the progress of international jurisprudence, both here and in other countries. This organization is liable to be confounded with the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, but it is an entirely distinct body and seeks to accomplish the results aimed at by an entirely different method. Its purpose is to procure an assimilation of legislation in different countries and the recognition of the great principles of public law by means of treaties while the other body desires the adoption of a universal Code. There is no necessary conflict between the two organizations, both having one end in view but each choosing a different mode of reaching it. In fact the mode preferred by the Institute is the one by which the laws of nations are already becoming assimilated, and it must be the most effectual one until the differences between the statutes of the various countries, concerning like subject-matters, are those of form rather than substance. There are, however, some few things in relation to which a general Code is now needed, not perhaps for the purposes of justice, but for those of certainty and convenience. The Institute has already considered very many of the questions at the present day arising between the different powers, and has formulated its conclusions thereon. Other matters will come before its coming conference to be held at Zurich, commencing the 8th of next month. The conference of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations commences at Antwerp a week earlier, so that it will be possible for those desiring to do so to meet with both of the great bodies interested in the advancement of legal science, and we doubt not many will avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered.

The existence of a war between Turkey and Russia will give prominence to the subject of intercourse between the Christian and non-Christian peoples, which is announced for consideration at the coming Antwerp conference. It is matter of congratulation that our own government has already dealt with the question in the only manner which will VOL. 16.- No. 8.

with a Christian sovereignty. The establishment of one rule to govern dealings with nations professing one religious faith and another to govern those with nations professing a different faith involves partiality and probably injustice, at least it raises the suspicion that it does.

It is said that the Irish judiciary have exceedingly lazy positions, a very small part of their time being required for the transaction of business coming before them. This probably accounts for the readiness with which the Lord Justice of Appeals rushes into a quarrel with those with whom he has to do directly or indirectly. It was not long ago that he severely commented upon the decision of another judge in a case which subsequently came before him on appeal, and this led to a meeting of the bar and condemnatory resolutions. A week or two ago he animadverted upon the Irish Reports in language which, like that of the late Parson Brownlow, was not liable to misconstruction. The Council of Law Reporting have retorted and feel that they have vindicated themselves. The last attack of this belligerent judge is directed toward the House of Lords, which, it appears, has not only decided an Irish case in a manner that does not suit him, but has given reasons not in any way complimentary to him in doing so. The attack is made through the medium of a letter to the Times. He takes the pains to say that he is "not going to hint the slightest question as to the correctness of that decision; like every award of the supreme tribunal, it makes its own corrections-it is the law's last word," and then goes on to censure the individual members of the House for remarks made by them in giving judgment, and to intimate that some of them did not know what they were talking about. This last manifesto of Lord Justice Christian must have destroyed whatever sympathy and support he may have had in reference to his previous conflicts with the bar and reporters. In respect to the whole matter, the view taken by the Solicitors' Journal is correct, that while the general public may find a temporary amusement in this exhibition of some very ordinary weaknesses of humanity in the occupant of a high and dignified position in the solemn temple of justice, to all who are concerned with the preservation of that feeling of respect and reverence for the law and its chief administrators which forms so large a part of the foundation on which public order is based, the spectacle can cause nothing but pain. No amount of personal dissatisfaction with any member or members of the supreme tribunal could justify the Lord Justice in endeavoring to lessen that tribunal in the estimation of the public.

It has long been a question of legal ethics whether a lawyer could with propriety advertise his calling in the public prints or otherwise. In some localities a very strict rule exists forbidding the invitation of business in this manner, but in newly settled communities a more liberal custom has prevailed. But the courts have never heretofore, so far as we know, resorted to the public prints to attract litigation to themselves. The court of arbitration, which was a few years ago established by statute for the trial of mercantile controversies arising in New York city, has departed from the custom of judicial tribunals, and a notice now appears in the daily newspapers of New York city inviting those who have disputes of any kind to come and try them in this court, and it is therein intimated that work will be done promptly, although satisfaction is not guaranteed. We suppose this court disposes of the business brought before it in as acceptable a manner as the regular ones do, but experiments of this kind have never done what was anticipated by their originators. The fact is that when two or more men are in a dispute that must be adjudicated by the courts of law, one side is apt to derive benefit from a delay in the determination of the matter, and he will not go to law as long as he can avoid it, and when forced into a lawsuit postpones the decision as long as possible. Therefore nearly one-half of the litigants in causes coming before the courts will not consent to an arbitration whose only effect is to hasten what they wish to defer as long as possible. To make courts of arbitration successful their action must be compulsory, and in such a case they will be but another form of the ordinary tribunal. The experience of the French or other continental peoples on the subject is no guide for us. The judicial organization and mode of procedure there is entirely unlike what it is with us, and the feeling of the people toward the courts and judges is also much different. The people living in countries where the civil law prevails and where a jury trial is either unknown or known only as a sort of experimental institution borrowed from the English have not the utmost confidence in the decisions of the ordinary judiciary. Our people have, however, unbounded confidence in the usual courts; besides, litigation in them is cheaper than it is in the court of arbitration.

The case of De Caux v. De Caux, recently decided in a French court, has attracted a vast amount of attention from the newspapers, and the telegraph from time to time has advised the world at large of the progress of the suit from its inception to its determination. The case is a simple one. An eminent female singer became enamored of the title of a marquis, and he at the same time fell in love with the income derived by her from the exercise of her musical talents. The first result was marriage be

tween the two, and the second domestic quarrels, and these culminated in an action for divorce. The parties being socially and otherwise well known, developments of the suit created a first-class scandal and the suit itself became of more moment in the popular mind than if the jurisprudence of a nation or of the world was to be materially affected thereby. The journals of Europe have been filled with the details of the family bickerings and the mutual infidelities of the husband and wife, and it only needed the implication of a clergyman to make the case the most celebrated social event of the age. The matter is now determined, and unless an appeal and new trial is possible we are done with it for all time. We had nearly forgotten to say that a divorce was granted.

A number of the daily newspapers have expressed a decided condemnation of the attacks made in the Nation upon Judge Dillon, and have spoken in the highest terms of the qualifications of that gentleman for the position he holds. As we anticipated, the calumnies of the dissatisfied suitors have in nowise affected his reputation. Not only have the newspaper press generally manifested their disapprobation of the conduct of the Nation in allowing such calumnies to obtain circulation through its columns, but that journal itself has endeavored to undo the mischief created, by a publication of Judge Dillon's answer to the charges made. The whole matter is an illustration of one of the difficulties necessarily incident to the judicial office. When a controversy is referred to a judge for decision, as a rule each party considers himself to be right, and he is so strongly set in his opinion that no amount of reasoning can change him. The court must of necessity disappoint one party, and sometimes disappoints all parties. Then the rules of law work harshly sometimes, and it is the unpleasant duty of the judge to enforce those rules. That suitors who are defeated should feel unpleasantly is natural, and that they should give utterance to their feelings is also natural; but that circumstance will not excuse slanderous attacks on judges through the newspapers.

Bar Associations are increasing in numbers and in membership in this country, and the prospect is that before many years nearly every county in the Union and in the Dominion of Canada will have its local organization. It appears that in England also, there has, during the last five or six years, been a steady increase in societies of the same character, and the London Law Times hopes for the formation of additional societies in the future. The suggestion made by that journal, that such associations shall maintain law libraries, is a good one and one which has to some extent been put in practice in this country. Attempts more or less successful have

also been made in different States to secure legislative aid in the establishment of local libraries to be controlled by Bar Associations, but such aid does about as much harm as good. A comparatively small tax upon the members of the Bar of almost any county will furnish a good working library, and it is better for the profession to submit to this expense than to appear to depend for what they need the public purse. Besides, the possession of a good library will furnish an inducement to membership in a Bar Association, and will influence those to join who would not be persuaded by other means.

upon

NOTES OF CASES.

THE HE case of Ross v. Doland, 29 Ohio St. 473, was an action by the bona fide holder for value, before maturity, of a promissory note, against the maker, whose signature was obtained by fraudulent representations as to the nature of the instrument, and in most of its features resembled the case of De Camp v. Hamma, ante, p. 111. But in this respect it differed: At the time the instrument, which was a printed blank, was signed, the amounts which it contained when it came into plaintiff's hands had not been filled up, and the filling up thereafter was without defendant's authority. The court held defendant liable, saying that "the signing and delivery of a printed form with blanks, which, when filled up in accordance with the tenor and apparent purpose of the paper, makes it a negotiable promissory note, is such carelessness in the signer as will estop him from denying the authority for filling the blanks as against an innocent holder before maturity and for value." The decision accords with that in Garrard v. Hadden, 67 Penn. St. 82; 5 Am. Rep. 412, where it is held that the maker of a promissory note in the usual form is negligent in leaving a blank between the words indicating the amount for which the note is drawn and the word "dollars; " and if the blank is filled up after delivery so as to increase the amount, the alteration being imperceptible, the maker will be held liable to an innocent purchaser. But in Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427; 7 Am. Rep. 661, the payee of a promissory note drawn upon a printed form added, without the maker's consent, after its delivery the words "ten per cent" in the blank after "interest at," and the court held the note to be void, even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value. See, as supporting this conclusion, Worrell v. Gheen, 39 Penn. St. 388; Goodman v. Eastman, 4 N. H. 455; Bruce v. Westcott, 3 Barb. 374. See, as supporting the principal case, and in direct conflict with Holmes v. Trumper, Rainbolt v. Eddy, 34 Iowa, 440; 11 Am. Rep. 152, where the alteration of a promissory note after delivery by filling a blank left therein, so as to make the note draw interest at ten per cent, was held not to

invalidate it in the hands of an innocent purchaser. See, also, Abbott v. Rose, 62 Me. 194; 16 Am. Rep. 427, and the following cases, where alterations willfully made, having an effect to alter the liability of the maker of an instrument, are held to be forgeries, and the instrument void: State v. Stratton, 27 Iowa, 420; 1 Am. Rep. 282; Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425; 4 Am. Rep. 395; Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 396; 10 Am. Rep. 382. See, also, notes to cases, 7 Am. Rep. 661; 10 id. 389; 11 id. 153; 17 id. 97.

In the case of Atkinson v. Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks Co., 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 761, decided on the 13th of June last, by the Court of Appeal of the English High Court of Justice, the question. whether, where a statute creates a public duty, with a penalty for a failure to perform such duty, a private person injured through such failure can recover, was involved. By a statute governing defendant, a waterworks company which undertook to supply water to a certain district, it was provided that defendant should keep its pipes charged with water at a specified pressure, and allow all persons to use such water for extinguishing fires; and a penalty of £10 was imposed for a neglect of this duty. Plaintiff's premises, consisting of a dwellinghouse and other buildings, situated in the district mentioned, took fire, and owing to the pressure in the defendant's pipes not being as much as that required by statute, the fire could not be extinguished, and the premises were burned. The plaintiff brought action against defendant for his loss, and the court held, reversing the decision of the Court of Exchequer, that the only remedy was the penalty imposed by the statute, and that no action would lie.

The decision is in apparent conflict with that in Couch v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402. In that case plaintiff, a seaman who had served on board defendant's vessel, sued defendant for failing to provide a proper supply of medicines for a voyage, which defendant was required to do by statute, in consequence of which failure plaintiff suffered from illness, and the court sustained the action. See, also, Wolverhamton W. W. Co. v. Hawkesford, 28 L. J. Rep. 242; Dundale West. Ry. Co. v. Tapster, L. R., 1 Q. B. 697. See, however, as sustaining the principal case, Stevens v. Jeacocke, L. R., 11 Q. B. 731, though in that case the statute did not impose an affirmative duty on defendant, but only deprived him of the right to fish in the high seas. And the general rule is, that where a new right is given by a statute, and a remedy provided for the violation of it, the party is strictly confined to this remedy. See Renwick v. Morris, 7 Hill, 575; Dunlap v. Knapp, 14 Ohio St. 64; Cole v. Muscatine, 14 Iowa, 296; Butler v. State, 6 Md. 165; Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch. 398; Victory v. Fitzpatrick, 8 Md. 281; Henniker v. Contoocook, etc., 9 Fost. 146; Babb v. Mackey, 10 Wis. 871.