conveyed to him, and then filed a petition in bankruptcy and was adjudicated a bankrupt.

The Huffakers defended the present action upon the ground that the property in question was held by the husband in trust for the wife, and was therefore rightly reconveyed to her.

The only question raised upon this appeal is as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings that defendants "willfully testified falsely as to material facts in said cause" and "that the deed made, executed, and delivered by E. Huffaker, defendant herein, to Jennie B. Huffaker,

was given by said defendant E. Huffaker to said Jennie B. Huffaker, his wife, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the creditors of him, the said E. Huffaker."

The only witnesses produced in the case were the defendants, who were called by the plaintiff, and their testimony in terms supports the allegation of their answer that the property was held by E. Huffaker in trust for the benefit of his wife, and therefore it is contended that there is no evidence to support the findings in question, and that the trial court was not justified in rejecting the uncontradicted testimony of the defendants.

The general rule that the uncontradicted testimony of a witness may not be disregarded by the trial court of course has its limitations, and, as is pointed out in Davis v. Judson, 159 Cal. 121, 128, [113 Pac. 147], "The most positive testimony of a witness may be contradicted by inherent improbabilities as to its accuracy contained in the witness' own statement of the transaction; or there may be circumstances in evidence in connection with the matter which satisfy the court of its falsity; the manner of the witness in testifying may impress the court with a doubt as to the accuracy of his statement and influence it to disregard his positive testimony as to a particular fact; and as it is within the province of the trial court to determine what credit and weight shall be given to the testimony of any witness, this court cannot control its finding or conclusion denying the testimony credence, unless it appears that there are no matters or circumstances which at all impair its accuracy." (See, also, Clark v. Tulare Lake Dredging Co., 14 Cal. App. 414, 432, [112 Pac. 564].)

The fact that the property in suit stood of record in the name of E. Huffaker raises a presumption that title thereto was vested in him, and the fact that he transferred it to his

wife without a valuable consideration in contemplation of insolvency made the transaction presumptively fraudulent as to existing creditors. (Civ. Code, sec. 3442.) These presumptions standing alone are sufficient to support the judgment, for the court was not bound, as has been seen, to accept the uncontradicted statement of the defendants against presumptions satisfying the mind of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2061, subd. 2; Bellus v. Peters, 165 Cal. 112, [130 Pac. 1186]; Prewett v. Dyer, 107 Cal. 154, 159, [40 Pac. 105]; Sarraille v. Calmon, 142 Cal. 651, [76 Pac. 497]; Clark v. Tulare etc. Co., supra.)

The circumstance that the trial court, having seen and observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying, had an advantage when judging of the character of the testimony not accorded to us, coupled with other significant circumstances shown in the record, readily explains why the court below disregarded their testimony.

First, the excuse given by the Huffakers that the conveyance of the undivided one-half interest in the property was made by Mrs. Huffaker to her husband to better enable him to handle it for her benefit does not commend itself to us as having much weight or credence; we are unable to see how any benefit would inure to the wife from such an arrangement. In one part of his testimony, Huffaker avoided as long as possible making an explanation of why he had claimed the property in question as his own when he applied for a bond to a certain bonding company, and his explanation in that regard was unsatisfactory. During the examination of Mrs. Huffaker she was led to believe that unless there had been an accounting between her and her husband her case would likely be lost. Accordingly she testified that there had been accountings between her and her husband, but in this connection, while she had testified that at different times. each had collected rents of the property and kept them; that when her husband worked on the property, as he sometimes did, she allowed him for carpenter work the same wages per hour that she would pay an experienced carpenter, nevertheless she was compelled to admit that there had never been a settlement of accounts in writing; that there never had been an understanding of how much was due from one to the other, nor had any money ever passed between them to square the account.

These witnesses were evasive and their testimony was equivocal, and, therefore, we think the court was justified in rejecting their testimony as unworthy of belief.

Judgment affirmed.

Kerrigan, J., and Richards, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 2181. First Appellate District.-December 11, 1917.] In the Matter of the Application of ALAMEDA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION for the Disbarment of E. HUFFAKER.

ATTORNEY AT LAW-DISBARMENT UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE-INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.-In this proceeding for the disbarment of an attorney at law upon the charge of unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude, the evidence is held insufficient to sustain the charge, although he attempted to avoid a judgment obtained against him in a civil action by deeding his property to his wife and filing a petition in bankruptcy.

ID.- NATURE OF ACCUSATION - BENEFIT OF DOUBTS.- An accusation against an attorney in disbarment proceedings is in the nature of a criminal charge, and all intendments are in favor of the accused, and he should be given the benefit of doubts arising from conflict of evidence.

PROCEEDING for the disbarment of an attorney at law.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

C. L. Colvin, Phil M. Carey, and Walter J. Burpee, for Bar Association.

Rodolph Hatfield, and E. Huffaker, for Respondent.

THE COURT.-This is a proceeding for the disbarment of E. Huffaker, an attorney at law, upon the application of the Alameda Bar Association.

The charge upon which the accusation is founded recites that the accused, while acting as attorney for one John Gray, was guilty of unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude and dishonesty. The facts as alleged in the accusation may be stated in substance as follows:

The accused was employed by Gray as an attorney to represent him in certain litigation in which Gray was involved, and that during the course of the employment Gray deeded to the accused certain real property to be held in trust by him for the purpose of disposing of the same and turning the proceeds over to said Gray. Subsequently Gray was convicted of a felony and sentenced to the state penitentiary. That during the time he was serving his term Huffaker fraudulently and unlawfully, and without the knowledge or consent of Gray, mortgaged the property so conveyed to him in trust for the sum of one thousand eight hundred dollars and converted the same to his own use. That thereafter Gray commenced an action for the recovery of this amount, in which action it was determined that Gray was indebted to Huffaker for legal services rendered in the sum of $1,247.15, and that $284 had been paid thereon, leaving a balance due from Gray to Huffaker on account of such services in the sum of $963.15, and judgment was thereupon rendered in favor of Gray for a balance of $832. No motion for a new trial was ever made in this action and no appeal taken from this judgment. Upon the rendition of the judgment Huffaker deeded all his property to his wife, and filed a petition in bankruptcy, and listed the said judgment in favor of Gray as his only debt, for the purpose, it is alleged, of defeating the same.

It further appears from the accusation that a portion of the sum of one thousand eight hundred dollars so obtained by Huffaker was delivered to Jennie B. Huffaker, his wife, which portion was used by her to satisfy a mortgage existing against property owned by her.

Thereafter Gray brought a second action against both Huffaker and his wife, in which action the trial court found that Huffaker had wrongfully received the sum of $836.35 from Gray, and that said sum was used for liquidating an indebtedness upon property belonging to his wife, and rendered judgment against the Huffakers in said amount.

By reason of the above-enumerated facts it is prayed that the license of accused to practice law be revoked and that he be disbarred as an attorney at law.

By his answer Huffaker admits the receipt of the sum of one thousand eight hundred dollars, but denies that he ever

held the same as trustee for Gray, but, on the contrary, claims the same as attorney's fees due him from Gray.

At the hearing of this application Huffaker testified in effect that he had represented Gray in nine actions, criminal and civil, besides rendering him other services of a legal nature; and that after the conviction of Gray upon a felony charge, and during his incarceration in San Quentin, Gray had expressly agreed to pay the sum of $1,750 in full satisfaction of this claim, and had authorized Huffaker to mortgage the property held in trust by him for this amount, and to pay himself out of the funds so received, and to convey the property subject to the mortgage to one Anderson-which was done. On the other hand, Gray, while admitting the demand of Huffaker and of an indebtedness in some amount, denied that he ever agreed to pay the sum of $1,750, or that he had ever authorized a hypothecation of his property. He admitted, however, that he had authorized the conveyance to Anderson. This is the only oral testimony directly upon the subject. The dispute over the transactions between Gray and the accused has been the subject of extended litigation before the courts; and while it has finally been determined that the amount claimed by Huffaker was in excess of that to which he was entitled, still we cannot say from the evidence presented in the record before us in this particular proceeding that there was moral turpitude or dishonesty practiced on the part of Huffaker. True, the evidence of Gray supports the charge, but it is in direct conflict with that of the accused, and is impaired by reason of the fact that Gray has been convicted of a felony.

An accusation against an attorney in disbarment proceedings is in the nature of a criminal charge, and all intendments are in favor of the accused (In re Haymond, 121 Cal. 385, [53 Pac. 899]), and he should be given the benefit of doubts arising from conflict of evidence. (In re Stephens, 84 Cal. 81, [24 Pac. 46].)

The further act of the accused in deeding his property to his wife and filing his petition in bankruptcy for the purpose of attempting to defeat the original judgment is, in the absence. of an explanation, subject to adverse criticism. This is conceded by the accused; but as an excuse for these acts on his part he testified that during the trial of the original action against him and at the time of the acts complained of he was