which was the cause of the plaintiff's damage, and to show fully, if he desired to do so, any facts and circumstances which would have absolved him from liability. The judgment is affirmed. A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on January 10, 1918, and the following opinion then rendered thereon: THE COURT.-In denying the application for a hearing in this court after decision by the district court of appeal of the first appellate court, we deem it proper to say that, as we understand the opinion as to the effect of proof that the car in question was owned by the appellant and was being operated by his wife at the time of the accident with his express consent and permission, it is simply that a prima facie case was thereby established, authorizing an inference by court or jury, in the absence of substantial proof to the contrary, that the wife was using the car as the agent of the husband. The application for a hearing in this court is denied. [Civ. No. 1949. Second Appellate District.-November 13, 1917.] SAMUEL BRANNIGAN, Respondent, v. F. B. MILLER, etc., et al., Appellants. APPEAL LACK OF GOOD FAITH-PENALTY.-An appeal from a judg ment in an action for conversion, for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain certain findings, cannot be regarded as having been made in good faith, and is a proper case for the imposition of a penalty for the taking of a frivolous appeal, where reversal is asked merely because of a claimed preponderance of the evidence in favor of the appellant, although the findings are directly and substantially supported by other evidence. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Grant Jackson, Judge. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Cleveland Schultz, for Appellants. Amend & Amend, for Respondent. CONREY, P. J.-Plaintiff recovered judgment against the defendant on account of the unlawful conversion of personal property. The only foundation claimed for the appeal from the judgment is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain two of the findings made by the trial court. Both of these findings of fact are directly supported by the testimony of the plaintiff. Counsel for appellant asks us to take into consideration the fact that the testimony of the plaintiff was contradicted by the testimony of several witnesses introduced by the defendant. In other words, he asks us to reverse a judgment because of a claimed preponderance of the evidence in favor of the defendant, although the findings are directly and substantially supported by other evidence. The rulings against the contention of appellant are uniform and innumerable. Such an appeal cannot be regarded as having been made in good faith. It appearing to the court that this appeal was taken for the purposes of delay, it is ordered that the judgment be affirmed, and that on account of such delay the respondent recover the sum of fifty dollars damages, in addition to the costs. James, J., and Works, J., pro tem., concurred. [Civ. No. 1703. Third Appellate District.-November 13, 1917.] JOHN L. CAMM, Appellant, v. JUSTICE'S COURT, etc., et al., Respondents. CERTIORARI-OFFICE OF WRIT.-The sole office of the writ of certiorari is to test and determine the question of jurisdiction. ID. JUSTICES' COURTS-ERRORS IN EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION-REMEDY BY APPEAL-When a justice's court or police court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action instituted therein and has regularly acquired jurisdiction of the person, the mode for correction of any errors is by appeal, as provided by section 974 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and not by certiorari. 1 ID.-REVIEW OF JUDGMENT RECORD.-In a proceeding in certiorari to SUBSEQUENT DISMISSAL OF ACTION AGAINST MEMBERS-JURISDICTION.-In an action against a club and its individual members, the court acted within its jurisdiction in rendering judgment by default as to the club, while demurrers interposed by individual members to the complaint were pending, and thereafter ordering a dismissal of the action against the individual members when the time within which an appeal might have been taken by the club had expired. ACTION AGAINST CLUB-GOODS SOLD-PLEADING-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.—În an action against a club for goods sold and delivered, allegations that the club was an association doing business and that it had contracted an indebtedness with the plaintiff for such goods is sufficient to authorize the maintenance of the action, without any showing of the specific purposes of the club, or whether it was organized for profit. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sonoma County. Thos. C. Denny, Judge. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. W. H. Early, and A. H. Crook, for Appellant. E. J. Dole, for Respondents. HART, J.-Plaintiff filed, in the superior court of Sonoma County, a third amended petition asking for a review of the proceedings of the defendant, the justice's court, in an action in said justice's court, commenced on the seventh day of April, 1915, in which H. S. Smith, one of the defendants herein, was plaintiff and the Sonoma County Good Roads Club and some thirty individuals, including this plaintiff, were defendants. A demurrer to said petition was sustained, without leave to amend, and judgment was entered dismissing the action. From this judgment plaintiff appeals. It appears from the petition that, on April 13, 1915, a summons was issued in said action of Smith v. Sonoma County Good Roads Club et al., and was served on each of said individual defendants by delivering to each of them a copy of said summons attached to a copy of the complaint; that, on the fourteenth day of April, 1915, each of said individual defendants filed a demurrer to said complaint; that, while said demurrers were pending and undisposed of, a judgment by default was entered in said justice's court against the Sonoma County Good Roads Club, an association, in the sum of $264.25; that, on "the twenty-sixth day of July, 1915, and after the time in which an appeal might have been taken from said judgment by default, and while the said demurrer of each of said individual defendants was pending and undisposed of," said cause of action against the individual defendants was dismissed; that, on the thirteenth day of August, 1915, an execution was issued out of said justice's court directing the sheriff to levy upon the property of said Sonoma County Good Roads Club; that said execution was returned unsatisfied, and, on August 14th, an execution was issued against the individual property of this plaintiff. It is then alleged in the petition that, on the 16th of August, 1915, upon being advised of the issuance of said execution against his individual property, plaintiff instituted a suit in equity in the superior court, praying that said H. S. Smith and the sheriff be enjoined from levying said execution upon his individual property; that said superior court denied the prayer of plaintiff in said equity suit; that it was because plaintiff believed that his proper remedy was by suit in equity for an injunction that he did not immediately, on the sixteenth day of August, 1915, institute this action; "that at no time between the 21st of April, 1915, when said judgment by default was entered, and the twenty-sixth day of July, 1915, when said individual defendants were dismissed, did plaintiff believe, or have any reason to believe, or know that said defendant H. S. Smith claimed, or pretended to claim that said default judgment was binding upon plaintiff and his property"; and that he believed he was absolved in toto from any judgment obtained in said action. The petition then alleges: "That said plaintiff was during the times mentioned in said complaint, and is now, a member of said Sonoma County Good Roads Club, an association; that said association was not at any of the time mentioned in said complaint, or at any other time, and is not now an association composed of two or more persons associated in any business under a common name; that, on the contrary, said Sonoma County Good Roads Club was and is a nontrading, unincorporated association composed of voluntary members of the public generally and was at all times mentioned in said complaint engaged in instilling, promoting, furthering, and advancing the interests of the public of the state of California, in repairing, maintaining, and improving the streets, roads, highways, and byways of and in the county of Sonoma." It is also alleged that plaintiff moved, in said justice's court, to set aside and recall said execution, which said motion was denied. Attached to the petition is a copy of the complaint of H. S. Smith, filed in the justice's court, against said club and this plaintiff and others as defendants. The allegations of said complaint are: That, within four years last past, the Sonoma County Good Roads Club became indebted to plaintiff, upon an open book account, in the sum of $264.25, for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered; "that the defendant the Sonoma County Good Roads Club is an association doing business at the city of Santa Rosa . . . ; that the defendants above named other than the said Sonoma County Good Roads Club are each and all officers of said club or members of said club and were members of said club at the time that said goods, wares, and merchandise were sold and delivered to said club and said debt incurred." It is elementary that the sole office of the writ of certiorari is to test and determine a question of jurisdiction, and our code so declares. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1068.) That section provides: "A writ of review may be granted by any court, except a police or justice's court, when an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board, or officer, and there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy." From a judgment rendered in a civil action in a justice's or a police court an appeal may be taken to the superior court (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 974), and thus a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is afforded for the correction of errors occurring at the trial of such actions in said courts or for erroneous judgments rendered in actions triable and tried therein. When, therefore, such courts have under the law jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action instituted therein and have regularly acquired jurisdiction of the person of the party proceeded against in such action, the mode for the correction of any errors which may have been made |