only ground upon which the denial of the petition was made was because seven issues of the newspaper were not actually "printed" in the city of Watts. The newspaper was circulated there and was a paper local to that community. We think to construe the statute in such a close and literal sense is to narrow its meaning more than was intended by the legislature. The object to be accomplished was to define newspapers in which public notices might be made and which would fairly express such notices to the particular community intended to be reached. If the trial judge is correct in his conclusion, then in any case where perhaps a very large newspaper having all the characteristics of a public journal for the dissemination of general news, through accident or otherwise, is obliged to have its printing done outside of the city or county, as the case may be, even for one issue, its character as a newspaper of general circulation, within the meaning of the code, would be destroyed. Neither could such a journal establish its character in that respect without proving continuous printing of the same without interruption for the period of at least a year within the prescribed limits. The case of Bayer v. Hoboken, 44 N. J. L. 131, is directly in point. There a statute required the printing of a notice in a newspaper "printed and published" within the limits of a municipality. The newspaper in which the publication was made was printed altogether on presses in the city of New York, but was distributed in Hoboken. The court held that such a newspaper was "printed and published" as required by the statute. See, also, Ricketts v. Village of Hyde Park, 85 Ill. 110; Brown's Estate v. West Seattle, 43 Wash. 26, [85 Pac. 854], which cases are cited in Stanwood v. Carson, 169 Cal. 640, [147 Pac. 563]. It did appear and was found to be a fact by the court that during the year in question the name of the newspaper was changed from "The Watts Advertiser" to "The Advertiser." The mere dropping of a part of the wording in the name did not change the character of the newspaper, nor destroy its identity.

We think that on the findings of fact as made by the trial judge, the prayer of the petition should have been granted. The judgment is reversed, with direction to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of petitioner.

Conrey, P. J., and Works, J., pro tem., concurred.

[Civ. No. 1736. Third Appellate District.-October 26, 1917.]

HENRY T. JAMES et al.,

TION

Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT, etc., et al., Respondents.

CERTIORARI-ANNULMENT OF ORDER DISSOLVING PRELIMINARY INJUNC- ABSTRACT QUESTION. - Where a temporary injunction was issued solely for the purpose of preventing the sale of capital stock of a corporation to enforce the payment of an assessment, the validity of a subsequent order dissolving the injunction was immaterial where, prior to the time of application for a writ of certiorari to annul the order, the petitioner had made a voluntary payment of the assessment.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Certiorari originally made to the District Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District to annul an order dissolving a preliminary injunction.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Frank D. McClure, and Franklin P. Bull, for Petitioners.

Frank Freeman, for Respondents.

BURNETT, J.-The application is to annul an order made by said superior court on July 27, 1915, dissolving a preliminary injunction directed to be issued on March 30, 1915, after notice and full hearing in the case of Henry T. James v. P. B. Steifer Mining Co. (a Corporation), pending in said court at the time said orders were made. No appeal was taken from the order granting the injunction.

The contention of petitioner is:

"(1) That the superior court has no jurisdiction to change, modify, dissolve, or otherwise interfere with the temporary injunction granted upon hearing, after an order to show cause, and in full force and effect.

"(2) That any attempt to dissolve the temporary injunction after its issuance, upon hearing, and order to show cause, would require a review of the motion for the injunction, and that the superior court has no jurisdiction to review such a motion. . .

...

"(4) That the statute regulating proceedings on motion for temporary injunction is very general in its terms, covers

the entire subject matter and prohibits the change, modification or dissolution of a temporary injunction, except in cases of mandatory injunction by appeal, and in cases of unlawful diversion of water.

...

"(6) That a writ of certiorari is the proper remedy, because the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction in dissolving the temporary injunction, and plaintiff has no other means of redress.'

The foregoing propositions are apparently supported by the decision of the supreme court in the carefully and thoroughly considered case of United Railroads of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. 755, [Ann. Cas. 1916E, 199, 151 Pac. 129], but respondents in their brief point out that in February, March, October, and November, 1915, petitioners herein paid severally the full amount of the assessment on their respective shares of capital stock, and the company is sued to them receipts therefor, and said assessments have been marked paid on the books of said company. Since the said temporary injunction was issued solely for the purpose of preventing the sale of said capital stock to enforce the payment of said assessment and the payment has been voluntarily made, the continuance in force of said writ would seem to be a matter of no practical importance. It is not to be presumed, of course, that the directors of the corporation will attempt to make a sale to accomplish a purpose that has already been accomplished by the voluntary act of petitioners. It can be said that the subject matter of the litigation, as far as this proceeding is concerned, has been fully settled and adjusted. In other words, the actual controversy between the parties has ceased to exist as a live question. It is therefore no longer of any legal consequence whether petitioners are right in their contention that the order attempting to dissolve the injunction is entirely void. By the payment of said assessment they have made it virtually an abstract proposition of law upon which no rights herein depend, and wherein really no relief can be afforded. (Franklin v. Peers, 95 Va. 602, [29 S. E. 321]; Morton v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 496, [4 Pac. 489]; People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645, [21 Pac. 540]; Estate of Baby, 87 Cal. 200, [22 Am. St. Rep. 239, 25 Pac. 405].)

It may be said that petitioners make no reply to this contention of respondents, and we must conclude that they have no reply to make.

The writ is discharged.

Chipman, P. J., and Hart, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 2478. Second Appellate District.-October 26, 1917.] JOHN C. CLINE, Sheriff, etc., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT, etc., et al., Respondents.

WRIT OF REVIEW-REMEDY BY APPEAL.-The writ of review does not lie when the petitioner has a right of appeal from the order which he seeks to have reviewed.

ID. EXECUTION-SALE OF PROPERTY WITHOUT INDEMNITY BOND-ORDER UPON SHOW CAUSE PROCEEDINGS - REMEDY BY APPEAL. - Where a sheriff refuses to make a sale of property under execution until furnished with an indemnity bond by reason of the service upon him of a written claim under section 689 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and he is thereafter ordered upon show cause proceedings to make the sale without the bond, his remedy is by appeal from the order, and not by writ of review, the order having, as to him, the effect of a judgment.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Review originally made to the District Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District to annul an order of sale of property under writ of execution.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Loewenthal, Loeb & Walker, for Petitioner.

A. W. Ashburn, for Respondents.

CONREY, P. J.-In this proceeding a writ of review has been issued whereby the petitioner seeks to obtain judgment annulling an order made by the superior court of Los Angeles County. In an action wherein one E. O. Lenox was plaintiff, judgment was entered against several defen lants, one of whom was Max Goldschmidt. A writ of execution upon that

judgment was duly issued and placed in the hands of the petitioner as sheriff of Los Angeles County. Pursuant to instructions in writing by the attorney of Lenox, the sheriff levied upon all the right, title, and interest of Max Goldschmidt in and to certain personal property described as property of Goldschmidt Brothers, it being claimed by Lenox that Max Goldschmidt was a partner in that firm. After the levy had been made, one Herman Goldschmidt served upon the sheriff a written claim, verified by his oath and made out in accordance with the provisions of section 689 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming as his property the said property levied upon by the sheriff and setting out the right of said Herman Goldschmidt to the possession thereof. Thereupon the sheriff informed the plaintiff's attorney that he would not make sale of the property unless the plaintiff would deliver to the sheriff a bond in the sum of three hundred thousand dollars to indemnify the sheriff against such third party claim. The plaintiff declined to furnish the indemnity bond and the sheriff refused to proceed further in the matter without indemnity. Thereupon Lenox, by his attorney, filed in said action an affidavit which stated the foregoing facts and the circumstances in full detail, and asked that the court order the sheriff to advertise for sale and sell the interest of Max Goldschmidt in said property without requiring the delivery of any bond by the plaintiff. An order to show cause was issued and served upon the sheriff, and a hearing was had before the court upon the above-mentioned affidavit and counter-affidavits. The court determined the matter against the sheriff, granted the motion of Lenox, and ordered the sheriff "to sell the interest in the partnership property without requiring bond." The principal facts are not only stated in the petition, but are admitted by the return filed herein. Together with its return, respondent court demurred to the petition, and has moved the court for an order dismissing this proceeding upon several grounds, of which one is that the petitioner has a right of appeal from said order of the superior court.

The writ of review does not lie when the petitioner has a right of appeal from the order which he seeks to have reviewed. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1068; Stoddard v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 303, [41 Pac. 278].).