and were well known by the said R. R. Rogers to be false, fraudulent, and untrue." There was a further statement in the information that the said Rogers was not then and there the owner of the apartments, and that the same were not then and there free of encumbrance. Counsel argue from this that such statement is a statement affecting the ownership of the apartments as distinguished from the lease and furniture. The information first charged that the representations were that appellant was the owner of the furniture and lease. We do not concede that this latter statement in any wise limited the effect of the general allegation that each and all the pretenses and representations "so made as aforesaid" were untrue, but were we to concede logic to such construction, it still appears that the appellant represented that he was the owner of the leasehold interest, which was an interest in the realty and which representation would be negatived by the allegation that he was not in fact the owner of the apartments, if the latter allegation is deemed to refer alone to the realty. However, the general allegation was present asserting that all of the representations made were untrue, and this we think sufficient. We find nothing in the case of People v. Terrill, 127 Cal. 99, [59 Pac. 836], to change our view upon this matter, and cite in support of our holding People v. Hamberg, 84 Cal. 468, [24 Pac. 298], and the argument of the decision in People v. Bryant, 119 Cal. 595, [51 Pac. 960]. All the acts of the defendant, as illustrated by the evidence in this case, show beyond any question a deliberate intent to secure money of the complainant fraudulently and without returning anything of value therefor. The swindle as planned and carried out was without shadow of excuse or palliating circumstance. No other points are presented or relied upon which we think are entitled to any consideration here. The judgment is affirmed. Conrey, P. J., and Works, J., pro tem., concurred. [Civ. No. 1910. Second Appellate District.—October 25, 1917.] E. H. JONES, Respondent, v. AMERICAN POTASH COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant. APPEAL-ALTERNATIVE METHOD BRIET INSUFFICIENT RECORD.-On an appeal taken from a judgment under the alternative method, the judgment must be affirmed where the appellant fails to print in its brief sufficient of the record to properly present the points relied upon for reversal. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Fred H. Taft, Judge. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Robert L. Hubbard, for Appellant. Horace S. Wilson, for Respondent. THE COURT.-This appeal is taken under the alternative method from a judgment entered against defendant. A number of points appear to be made in the brief of appellant, all of which refer to the evidence presented to the trial court. It is urged, among other things, that the findings and judgment are not supported by the evidence; that the court erred in excluding certain evidence, etc. No part of the record is printed in the brief of appellant, except three paragraphs from the findings of the court. Appellant has utterly failed to print in his brief any other matters to which he desires to call the attention of the court. Necessarily, in order to properly consider the points made as to the insufficiency of the evidence and as to the alleged errors of the court in excluding offered testimony, we should have before us the testimony received and offered. The result is that the only order that can properly be made by this court is one in affirmance of the judgment for want of any showing why the same should be reversed. (Marcucci v. Vowinckel, 164 Cal. 693, [130 Pac. 430]; Wills v. Woolner, 21 Cal. App. 528, [132 Pac. 283]; Miller v. Oliver, 174 Cal. 404, [163 Pac. 357]; Pasadena Realty Co. v. Clune, 34 Cal. App. 33, [166 Pac. 1025]; McKinnell v. Hansen, 34 Cal. App. 76, [167 Pac. 887]; California Sav. etc. Bank v. Canne, 34 Cal. App. 768, [169 Pac. 395].) The judgment is affirmed. [Cv. No. 1721. Third Appellate District.-October 25, 1917.] E. B. PERRIN, Appellant, v. CARRIE M. MILLER et al., Respondents. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-INTERPRETATION OF WORDS.-The words of a statute must be interpreted according to their common acceptation, and where a word having a technical as well as a popular meaning is used in a statute, the courts will accord to it its popular signification. DISMISSAL OF ACTION-FAILURE TO BRING TO "TRIAL"-CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 583, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.—As used in section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for the dismissal of an action not brought to trial within five years after answer filed, the word "trial" has reference to the hearing and determination of the issues of fact, and not of law. ID.-EXPIRATION OF STATUTORY PERIOD ABSENCE OF WRITTEN STIPULATION EXTENDING TIME-ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED.-Under section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that an action shall be dismissed unless brought to trial within five years after the filing of the answer, except where the parties have stipulated in writing that the time may be extended, an action is not brought to trial by the filing and hearing of a demurrer to the answer, and where more than six years had elapsed from the filing of the answer and no written stipulation extending time had been entered into, the action was properly dismissed, notwithstanding plaintiff's attorney was relying on an alleged oral understanding that the trial might be taken up at the pleasure of plaintiff's attorney. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tehama County. John F. Ellison, Judge. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. A. E. Bolton, and Randolph V. Whiting, for Appellant. C. E. McLaughlin, and C. P. McLaughlin, for Respondents. 85 Cal. App.-9 HART, J.-The appeal is by the plaintiff from a judg ment of dismissal because of his failure to bring the action to trial within five years after the answer was filed, pursuant to the provisions of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Said section, so far as applicable here, reads: “... Any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the court in which the same shall have been commenced or to which it may be transferred on motion of the defendant, after due notice to plaintiff or by the court on its own motion, unless such action is brought to trial within five years after the defendant has filed his answer, except where the parties have stipulated in writing that the time may be extended." The complaint in this action was filed on October 20, 1908, and the answer and cross-complaint on January 5, 1909. A demurrer to the answer and cross-complaint was filed on February 1, 1909, more than six years before the motion to dismiss the action was made. While the record discloses the fact that said demurrer was overruled, it does not show at what date such action was taken, but it is stated in respondents' brief that it occurred more than five years before the making of the motion to dismiss. Said motion to dismiss the action was heard upon affidavits. C. E. McLaughlin, attorney for defendants, whose affidavit was dated May 14, 1915, deposed that at no time since the answer was filed had any stipulation been entered into, in writing or otherwise, extending the time in which said action might be brought to trial; that, in September, 1913, affiant and A. E. Bolton, attorney for plaintiff, had a conversation in substance as follows: That said Bolton said to affiant: "We must arrange to try the case of Perrin v. Miller. It should have been tried before this, but Perrin has had so much trouble with the government, and has been so annoyed, and so much of my time has been taken up in connection with his difficulties, that we have never seen our way clear to try the case"; that affiant replied to said statement: "We are ready to try the case at any time, but a date must be fixed which will not interfere with my other engagements." The affidavit of A. E. Bolton, attorney for plaintiff, referring to said conversation with Judge McLaughlin in 1913, was in practical accord with the latter's statement regarding the troubles of his client with the government, and pro ceeded: "That affiant does not remember the exact conversation that took place at that time, but as affiant understood the substance thereof, said McLaughlin said he would take up the trial of said cause at the pleasure of affiant; and affiant assured said McLaughlin that there was no disposition on the part of affiant or said Perrin to put off the trial of the case; that the difficulties arose by reason of the condition of the affairs of said Perrin." It is also stated that "affiant, by reason of the understanding of affiant, was taken by surprise" when he learned from Judge McLaughlin, in March, 1915, that his clients were insisting that the cause be dismissed, and "that affiant had relied upon said understanding." Appellant, in his brief, says that, "After the demurrer of the plaintiff to defendant's answer and cross-complaint had been overruled, no notice of the overruling of the demurrer was given to the plaintiff," and further states: "If the action was brought to trial by the filing and hearing upon the demurrer to the answer, then the action had been brought to trial and was pending, and could not be dismissed." The following cases are cited holding that "a trial is the examination before a competent tribunal of the facts or law-that is, when a court hears and determines any issue of fact or of law for the purpose of determining the rights of the parties, it may be considered a trial." (Tregambo v. Comanche M. Co., 57 Cal. 504; Redington v. Cornwell, 90 Cal. 62, [27 Pac. 40]; Flagg v. Peterbaugh, 98 Cal. 136, [32 Pac. 863]; Botto v. Vandament, 67 Cal. 332, [7 Pac. 753]; Goldtree v. Spreckels, 135 Cal. 669, [135 Pac. 1091].) Appellant then says: "At the time of the enactment of section 583 in 1905, the word 'trial' had by these decisions been given a distinct meaning." Said section 583 was first before the supreme court in the case of Romero v. Snyder, 167 Cal. 216, [138 Pac. 1002], wherein it was said that the section fixes "a maximum period of five years, upon the expiration of which the delay is declared to be sufficient as a matter of law and the dismissal is made mandatory." In Larkin v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 719, [Ann. Cas. 1917D, 670, 154 Pac. 841], the court said: "Unless the parties have, in effect at least, stipulated in writing that the action need not be brought to trial within five years from |