ANTICIPATION-Continued.

1. PATENTS-PUBLICATION.-An inventor's own publication of the device for which he seeks a patent more than two years prior to the applition is a disclosure within Revised Statutes, section 4886, (Comp. St., 1916, sec. 9430,) and precludes the patenting of his invention. d Wagner v. Meccano Limited, 231.

2. RULE 75 CONSTRUED AND APPLIED ANTICIPATION AND PRIOR INVENTION DISTINGUISHED.-A patent which discloses an invention in controversy and was granted after the filing of an application therefor, (or other reduction to practice,) on an application filed earlier, does not establish anticipation of that invention. The bar which it establishes, if any, is that of prior invention, as of the date of filing the application on which it was granted. Ex parte Thomas, 11. APPEAL. See Construction of Trade-Mark Statutes, 2; Interferences, 8, 9, 10, 11; Patentability, 1; Priority of Invention, 7.

APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. See Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia; Mandamus, 2.

RIGHT TO MAKE THE CLAIMS OF A DISSOLVED INTERFERENCE IN AN EARLIER APPLICATION.-Where the court dismissed C's appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents dissolving an interference and denying C's motion to amend on the ground that the invention was not disclosed. in an earlier application of C relied upon to carry his date back of a reference cited against the application which was involved in the interference, Held that C is not entitled to have the question reviewed on an ex parte appeal from a decision in that earlier application, denying his right to make the claims therein. *In re Creveling, 145.

APPEAL TO THE EXAMINERS-IN-CHIEF. See Cancelation of Claims, 1. APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. SUIT FOR INFRINGEMENT OF TRADE-MARKS-APPEAL AND CERTIORARI.—An appeal to the Supreme Court in a suit to restrain infringement of a trade-mark, allowed by one of the judges of the circuit court of appeals, dismissed under section 128, Judicial Code, as amended by act of January 28, 1915, (38 Stat., 803, ch. 22, sec. 2;) but, pursuant to stipulation, the transcript of the record filed for the purposes of appeal treated as a return to a writ of certiorari allowed by the Supreme Court. ** United Drug Company v. Theodore Rectanus Company, 369.

APPELATE COURT. See Infringement, 5.

APPLICANT AND PATENTEE. See Interference, 6, 7.

ARMY OR NAVY. See Practice Before the Patent Office.

ASSIGNMENT OF TRADE-MARKS. See Abandonment of Trade-Mark Regis

trations.

ATTORNEYS. See Practice Before the Patent Office.
AUTHORITY OF COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS.

Trade-Mark Statutes, 3.

BAR TO PATENT.

15, 16.

See Construction of

See Anticipation, 2; Claims, 5; Priority of Invention, 14,

BASIC PATENT. See Suits Under Section 4915, Revised Statutes, 2.

BROAD CLAIMS. See Construction of Claims, 3, 7; Delay in Applying for Re

issue, 1; Interference, 12.

84150°-1927

BURDEN OF PROOF. See Interference, 10; Suits Under Section 4915, Revised

Statutes, 2.

CANCELATION OF CLAIMS.

1. APPEAL REQUIREMENT.-The recourse from a requirement of cancelation of claims, on the ground that they are to a different invention from that originally presented, is by appeal to the Examiners-in-Chief, not by petition. Ex parte Pearson, 36.

2. REQUIREMENT-REFERABLE TO LAW EXAMINER-RULE 42.-The basis of the requirement of cancelation of claims, on the ground that they are to a different invention from that originally prosecuted, is the same as that of the requirement of division-viz., that the inventions are independent or are of such a nature that they may not be joined in one application. Both requirements should be referred to the Law Examiner for approval, under Rule 42. Id.

CANCELATION OF TRADE-MARK REGISTRATIONS.

See Construction of

Trade-Mark Statutes, 3; Foreign Registrant; Registration of Trade-
Marks, 6.

1. ADVERSE DECISION IN INTERFERENCE.-Record reviewed and Held that in view of a trade-mark interference decision adverse to the registrant, G., it was proper, on motion of B., to cancel G.'s mark. * Great Bear Spring Company v. Bear Lithia Springs Company, 203.

2. INTERFERENCE. The law of February 20, 1905, applies to all registrations, and a registration under the law of 1881 may be canceled as an incident to an interference decision. Hudnut v. Phillips v. Mack, 74. 3. SAME ON DECISION ADVERSE TO A REGISTRANT INTERFERANT HIS REGISTRATION MAY BE CANCELED.-An interference between an applicant and a registrant necessarily involves both the question of right to register and the question of right to remain on the register, or validity of the existing registration, for it is necessary to remove an interfering registration from the register in order to make apparent and effective the award of right of registration to the applicant, and where the final decision in a trade-mark interference necessitates a holding that a registrant was not entitled to his registration and the prevailing interferant in effect moves for cancelation, Held that an order of cancelation will be forthwith entered. Id.

CHANGE IN DEGREE. See Construction of Specifications and Patents, 2.
CITIZENSHIP. See Jurisdiction of the Courts.

CLAIMS. See Amendment of Applications, 3; Cancelation of Claims; Construc

tion of Claims; Construction of Specifications and Patents, 1, 4, 5; Delay in Applying for Reissue, 1, 3; Estoppel; Infringement, 3, 4, 8; Interference, 1, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13; Laches; Particular Patents, 5, 7, 10. 12; Priority of Invention, 2, 7, 14, 15, 19.

1. INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC.-When dealing with an improvement in a well-developed art and it is established that one party is the prior inventor of the broad subject-matter of that improvement, the more specific counts should be interpreted in the light of the general disclosure. Count 3 awarded to Burt. * Burt v. Coats and Cameron. Coats and Cameron v. Burt, 131.

2. PATENTABILITY-DISCLOSURE OF APPLICATION.-Record reviewed and Held that the appealed claims cannot be predicated upon the disclosure of this application without forcing upon them a meaning which robs them of their sense. Ex parte Creveling, 5.

CLAIMS-Continued.

3. DIVISION-CARBON PILE.-Held that carbon piles have attained a distinct status in the art as subjects of invention independently of the systems in which they are to be used. Id.

4. ELECTION-RHEOSTAT AND SYSTEM.-Where C. elected to claim a system of which the carbon rheostat is an element, Held that he is estopped from afterward claiming the rheostat per se in that application. *In re Creveling, 145.

5. FORCE OF LIMITATIONS.-If a claim to the invention in controversy includes limitations which are not embraced in the tangible subjectmatter upon which the claims in such a patent are based and if those limitations state material and substantial parts of that invention, the patent does not establish the bar of prior invention, even though the difference did not require invention; but if the limitations merely state the operative environment of the invention in controversy then they do not state "material and substanial " that invention and the patent does establish the bar. Thomas, 11.

parts of Ex parte

6. ALTERNATIVE.-Where claims 1 and 2 are for combinations in the usual form and claim 3 is for "the combination above set forth," plus certain additional matter, Held that this imports into claim 3 an alternative meaning depending on whether the additional matter is to be combined with the features of claim 1 or claim 2. Ex parte Holst and Leers, 44.

7. SAME.-Held that a subsequent claim can only refer back to a single combination for additional matter, in accordance with the longestablished practice against allowing alternative claims. (Ex parte Hulbert, C. D., 1893, 74; 63 O. G., 1687.) Id.

8. PRACTICE IN EX PARTE BROWN NOT EXTENDED.-Held that the practice outlined in ex parte Brown (C. D., 1917, 22; 235 O. G., 1355) is not extended beyond what was indicated therein.

Id.

9. REJECTION.—Where the inventor's disclosure was fully contained in his original specification, his claims thereunder having been rejected, a substituted claim should not be read as purporting to cover withdrawn suggestions of variant structures, so as to invalidate the same, it appearing that the suggestions were withdrawn where the rejection of claims that were appropriate was acquiesced in.—a Rudd Mfg. Co. v. Long-Landreth-Schneider Co. et al., 295. 10. MEANING CLEAR CONSIDERATION OF THE PRIOR ART NECESSARY.Where the Examiners-in-Chief in their decision said: "If their meaning is clear and includes Jepson, no consideration of the prior art need be given; if, however, there is no point to the claims when read on Jepson, we do not understand that we are concluded from a consideration of the prior art." Held that as they found, in effect, that according to the normal meanings of the words used the claims read on the applications of both parties it cannot be correctly said that they erred in not considering the prior art. *Creveling v. Jepson, 209.

CLASS OF MERCHANDISE. See Construction of Trade-Mark Statutes, 1; Function of Trade-Mark; Goods of the Same Descriptive Properties; Prior Adjudication; Registration of Trade-Marks, 10, 12, 14; Similarity of Trade-Marks, 1; Trade-Mark Interference; Trade-Marks, 1.

COLOR. See Prints and Labels, 2.

COMBINATION. See Amendment of Applications, 2, 4; Claims, 6, 7; Disclosure of Invention, 2; Equivalents; Infringement, 4, 8; Invention, 7; Particular Patents, 3.

COMMERCIAL SUCCESS. See Invention, 5; Particular Patents, 8. EXTENSIVE SALE OF THE MECHANISM.-Where the assemblage of the old elements and their operation in the manner indicated may save time and the mechanism may meet with a readier sale than other similar devices, Held that these things may result from mechanical skill and commercial enterprise and do not necessarily involve invention. **Grinnell Washing Machine Company v. E. E. Johnson Company, 363.

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS. See Practice Before the Patent Office, 1, 2. COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS. See Abandonment of Applications; Appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia; Construction of Trade-Mark Statutes, 3; Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia; Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents; Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Patents; Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 1, 4, 5; Mandamus; Registration of Trade-Marks, 10; Suits Under Section 4915, Revised Statutes. CONCEALMENT OF INVENTION. See Abandonment of Invention; Priority of Invention, 17.

INTERFERENCE-REDUCTION TO PRACTICE.--Where after reduction to practice an inventor puts aside his invention for approximately two years until he discovers that his rival has placed the invention upon the market, Held that he is not entitled to an award of priority over his more diligent rival. *Dreckschmidt v. Schaefer and Holmes, 120.

CONCEPTION OF INVENTION. See Priority of Invention, 11. CONCURRENT DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNALS OF THE PATENT OFFICE. See Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents; Interference, 10; Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia; Priority of Invention, 17; Suits Under Section 4915, Revised Statutes, 1, 3; Tribunals of the Patent Office.

1. PRIORITY-UNIFORM DECISIONS.-In order to secure a reversal of the uniform decisions of the Patent Office tribunals, Held that appellants must make out a very clear case of error. *Jobski and Griswold, Special Administrators of Bryant, deceased, v. Johnson, 140.

2. INTERFERENCE— -MANIFEST ERROR.-" The three tribunals of the Patent Office, all experts, concur in awarding priority to Jepson. Where this is so, especially in a case of this character, we have repeatedly held that we will not disturb the decision of the Patent Office unless manifest error has been committed.' (Lindmark v. Hodgkinson, C. D., 1908, 540; 137 O. G., 228; 31 App. D. C., 612; Murphy v. Meissner, C. D., 1905, 592; 114 O. G., 1830; 24 App. D. C., 260; Stone v. Pupin, C. D., 1902, 550; 100 O. G., 1113; 19 App. D. C., 396; Podlesak v. McInnerney, C. D., 1906, 558; 120 O. G., 2127; 26 App. D. C., 399.)" *Creveling v. Jepson, 209.

CONDITIONS EXISTING BY REASON OF A STATE OF WAR.
FEES-DELAY.-Delay in payment of patent fees to this Government be-

cause the German Government for a time refused to allow its citi-
zens to pay such fees Held to be a "condition arising out of war."
Ex parte Philipp and Schmidt, 8.

CONFUSION OF THE PUBLIC. See Registration of Trade-Marks, 10; Similarity of Trade-Marks, 3, 4; Trade-Marks, 4; Unfair Competition in Trade.

CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION. See Construction of Trade-Mark Statutes, 3; Mandamus, 5; Priority of Adoption and Use, 2; Property Rights. CONSTRUCTION OF CLAIMS. See Claims 3, 4; Infringement, 6; Priority of Invention, 20.

1. PATENTABILITY-COUPLING FOR STAY-WIRES.-Claims for a coupling for stay-wires Held unpatentable in view of the prior art. *In re Sunderland, 143.

2. SAME-PRINTING-PRESS-INK-FOUNTAIN CONTROL.-In an application for an ink-fountain having regulating devices, individual operating means therefor, and electric controlling devices located at a point remote from the fountain Held that a claim was patentable over the prior art, although not limited to electric controlling devices. *In re Bechman, 186.

3. SAME SAME.-Certain claims not limited to centrally-located controlling devices for adjusting the individual regulating devices of printingpress-ink-fountains Held to be too broad in view of the art of record.

*Id.

4. ISSUE CONSTRUED-LAMPLIGHTERS.-Where the issue in an interference recites igniting mechanism that is operable by a sweep of the palm of the hand, Held that a device in which a corresponding mechanism is arranged to be operated by the thumb or finger, although it may be operated by a sweep of the hand, comes within the terms of the issue. *Hendler v. Hansen, 188.

5. RIGHT TO MAKE THE CLAIMS.-In the pavement disclosed by B.'s application, where reinforcing-plates of expansion-joints for concrete sections rest upon the prepared foundation and the application contains a statement that the plates may be of less width, Held that this forms no basis for incorporating an additional figure in a substitute application showing the plates out of contact with the foundation, for the purpose of contesting an interference with a patent, the counts of the issue being construed as limited to reinforcing means "supported by the concrete out of engagement with the earth roadbed." *Ficklen v. Baker, 190.

6. QUALIFYING CLAUSE.-A clause at the beginning of the claims of a mechanical patent, stating the purpose of the device, is not to be ignored as not describing any element, but is a modifying clause, to be read upon every element thereafter described. Schram Glass Mfg. Co. v. Homer Brooke Glass Co., 269.

d

7. INTERFERENCE-SCOPE OF ISSUE.-While the claims in an interference must be construed as broadly as the state of the art will allow, they cannot be construed so as to ignore the limitations which give them life in order to cover the disclosure of one of the parties. Gammeter v. Lister, 37.

8. PATENTABILITY-SAND-DISINTEGRATOR.-The appealed claim for a sanddisintegrator compared with the cited art and Held to be unpatentable thereover. *In re McNeal, 201.

CONSTRUCTION OF RULES. See Anticipation, 2; Cancelation of Claims, 2; Costs; Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia; Double Patenting; Interference, 1, 3, 5, 12.