The decision of the Commissioner of Patents is affirmed, and the clerk is directed to certify these proceedings as by law required. Affirmed. [Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.] BURT v. COATS AND CAMERON. COATS AND CAMERON v. Burt. Decided December 3, 1917. 246 O. G., 1031; 47 App. D. C., 185. 1. INTERFERENCE-DISCLOSURE IN BRITISH PROVISIONAL SPECIFICATION. Contentions of Coats and Cameron as to count 2 carefully considered, but Held that Burt in his provisional specification sufficiently disclosed the elements of this count to enable one skilled in the art to understand their construction and mode of operation. 2. SAME-SAME-SPECIFICATIONS ADDRESSED TO THOSE SKILLED IN THE ART. As to count 3, having in mind that provisional specifications are addressed to those skilled in the art, the statement in Burt's provisional specification that the crank-pin is jointed to the valve-sleeve and the disclosure as to how the valve-sleeve is to move when the crank-pin is actuated by the crank-disk is a sufficient disclosure of the pin on the valvesleeve. B.-SAME-INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC CLAIMS. When dealing with an improvement in a well-developed art and it is established that one party is the prior inventor of the broad subject-matter of that improvement, the more specific counts should be interpreted in the light of the general disclosure. Count 3 awarded to Burt. Mr. J. A. Watson for the appellant, (1112). Mr. H. S. Hill and Mr. R. M. Everett, for the appellees, (1112.) Mr. H. S. Hill and Mr. R. M. Everett for the appellants, (1113.) Mr. J. A. Watson for the appellee, (1113.) PATENT appeals Nos. 1112 and 1113. ROBB, J.: Appeals from decisions of the Patent Office in an interference proceeding. There were three counts before the tribunals below, and they read as follows: 1. A four-cycle engine valve system, comprising a main cylinder having Inlet and outlet ports located substantially in the same plane, at right angles to the axis of the cylinder and near its head, a separately movable valving cylinder having ports that coact with the mean cylinder ports, a piston moving within the valving cylinder, means for oscillating said valving cylinder with less than semi-rotation, to carry the ports into and out of registry laterally, and means for reciprocating said valving-cylinder with a stroke less than the stroke of the piston to carry said ports into and out of alinement longitudinally, for controlling the admission, compression, retention during explosion, and final expulsion of the working medium. 2. The combination with a cylinder of an internal combustion engine having Inlet and exhaust ports, of a sleeve in axial coincidence with said cylinder and having ports adapted to register with said ports of the cylinder, an eccentric longitudinal projection on said sleeve, a crank having its axis substantially perpendicular to the axis of the sleeve, means pivotally connecting said crank to said projection, and means for turning said crank. 3. The combination with a cylinder of an internal combustion engine having inlet and exhaust ports, of a sleeve in axial coincidence with said cylinder and having ports adapted to register with said ports of the cylinder, a pin projecting eccentrically and longitudinally from said sleeve, a rotary member having its axis substantially perpendicular to the axis of the sleeve, and a crank pin connecting said rotary member and pin and having a sliding engagement with one of said parts. The Patent Office tribunals in turn awarded counts 1 and 2 to Burt, and Coats and Cameron have acquiesced in the award as to count 1but have appealed as to count 2. The Examiner of Interferences and the Board of Examiners-in-Chief awarded priority to Burt as to count 3, but the Commissioner, according the count a more strict and technical interpretation, awarded it to Coats and Cameron, and Burt appealed. The invention marks an advance in an art that already was quite well developed and relates to means for operating a single sleevevalve in a four-cycle internal-combustion engine, so as to give the valve both a longitudinal and a lateral or oscillating movement, by which the inlet and exhaust ports of the engine are opened and closed at the proper times. In other words, by this invention simpler means are provided for accomplishing the purpose sought. Neither party has taken testimony, Burt relying upon the filing date of his British provisional specification of August 6, 1909, and his complete specification on February 2, 1910. While Coats and Cameron filed a provisional specification on July 19, 1909, they here rely upon their complete specification filed January 17, 1910. If, therefore, the Burt provisional specification contains a disclosure of counts 2 and 3, here in issue, priority must be awarded him. While we have carefully considered the contentions of Coats and Cameron as to count 2, we nevertheless are convinced that the tribunals of the Patent Office correctly found that Burt, in his provisional specification, sufficiently disclosed the elements of this count to enable one skilled in the art to understand their construction and mode of operation. For the reasons stated by the tribunals of the Patent Office, we affirm their decision as to this count. The Commissioner based his reversal of the decisions of the lower tribunals as to count 3 upon the ground that this count specifies a pin on the cylinder in addition to the crank-pin and that this pin is not described in Burt's provisional specification. Where, as here, we are dealing with an improvement in a well-developed art and it is con vincingly established that one party is the prior inventor of the broad subject-matter of that improvement, the more specific counts should be interpreted in the light of the general disclosure. While no drawing accompanied Burt's provisional specification, he did say thatthe sleeve is slightly longer than the full length of the cylinder, the extra length projecting beyond the lower or outer end of the cylinder itself where it is provided with a pin, projecting from and jointed to its outer circumference, which pin is engaged by a crank disk, or the like. In his American application Burt describes the crank-pin as having its projecting outer end hinged to the ears aforesaid on the lower end of the sleeve, but having in mind that these specifications are addressed to those skilled in the art, it would be giving the word "jointed " in the British specification a strained and unnatural interpretation, we think, to hold that it meant anything other than a hinge-joint. Of course, a rigid joint would have made impossible the desired motion of the valve-sleeve. Giving the word "jointed " the meaning which it would convey to any one familiar with the art, we have the hinge-pin which connects the crank-pin to the valve-sleeve. In other words, the statement in Burt's provisional specification that the crank-pin is jointed to the valve-sleeve and the disclosure as to how the valve-sleeve is to move when the crank-pin is actuated by the crank-disk, is a sufficient disclosure of the pin to which the Commissioner refers. It will not be denied that a hinge-joint is a well-known device, and, in employing such a joint, Burt disclosed a pin projecting eccentrically and longitudinally from said sleeve, for the hinge-joint pin is such an element. The decision is affirmed as to count 2 and reversed as to count 3. [Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.] BORDEN'S CONDENSED MILK COMPANY v. EAGLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY. Decided December 8, 1917. 247 O. G., 245; 47 App. D. C., 191. 1. TRADE-MARKS-OPPOSITION. Court refused to consider evidence of registration that was not offered in evidence and brought to the attention of the Patent Office tribunals. 2. SAME DIFFERENT CLASS OF GOODS-ICE-CREAM CONES AND DAIRY PRODUCTS. Held that a trade-mark for ice-cream cones does not come in competition with a similar trade-mark for dairy products. Mr. W. D. Edmonds for the appellant. Mr. E. T. Fenwick and Mr. L. L. Morrill for the appellee. ROBB, J.: This is a trade-mark opposition proceeding in which the Patent Office dismissed appellant's opposition to the registration by the appellee of of the word "Eagle " as a trade-mark for ice-cream cones. The case was heard upon an agreed statement of fact, and where such an agreement has been entered into the case must be determined in the light of it. (District of Columbia v. Lee, 35 App. D. C., 341.) Turning to the statement in the present case we find that appellant and its predecessors for many years have used the trade-mark "Eagle" on dairy products, comprising― condensed milk, evaporated milk, milk, cream, evaporated cream, buttermilk, and compounds of milk and a food product as, for example, malted milk and condensed coffee. In 1905, a date long subsequent to the adoption and use by appellant, the appellee adopted it, as a trade-mark on ice-cream cones. These cones are a bakery product consisting of a dough, made wholly without milk or any dairy product, and are used as containers for ice cream. In the agreed statement it was stipulated that copies of all certificates of registration of trade-marks "necessary or desirable in this proceeding" might be offered and marked in evidence. Attached to appellant's brief is a copy of a registration on June 17, 1913, of the word "Eagle" as a trade-mark for ice cream. In this registration it is alleged that the mark has been used since November 18, 1912. We can not consider this registration. In the first place, it was not offered in evidence and brought to the attention of the Patent Office, since the Examiner of Interferences states that opposer has not shown that it has ever used the mark "Eagle" on ice cream; it has not even alleged that it has made or sold ice cream. The Assistant Commissioner in his decision said: The opposer not only does not deal in ice-cream cones, but this record does not indicate that it deals in ice cream itself. The stipulation to which we have referred in the agreed statement of fact was not intended to broaden the scope of the issue. Obviously, the registrations there referred to were intended to be limited to the specific issues agreed upon. Moreover, since appellee adopted its mark in 1905 and appellant, according to the registration referred to, did not commence to use the word as a trade-mark for ice-cream until seven years later, it acquired no rights thereby. The sole question to be determined, therefore, is whether the use of the mark by appellee on ice-cream cones and the use of the same mark by appellant on the dairy products heretofore mentioned will be likely to cause confusion. We agree with the Patent Office that it will not. In Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co. (201 Fed. Rep., 510) the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the former company, which made commercial ice-cream, did not come into competition with the latter company which sold dairy products, even though both used the same trade-mark. There is too much difference between dairy products and ice-cream or ice-cream cones to make applicable the rule announced in Simplex Co. v. Gold Car H. & L. Co. (C. D., 1915, 100; 213 O. G., 1117; 43 App. D. C., 28), Fischbeck Soap Co. v. Kleeno Mfg. Co. (C. D., 1915, 158; 216 O. G., 663; 44 App. D. C., 6), and Canton Culvert & Silo Co. v. Consolidated Car Heating Co. (C. D., 1916, 177; 226 O. G., 1799; 44 App. Dec., 491), to the effect that the owner of a trade-mark will not be unduly restricted in the legitimate and natural extension of his business by the registration of the mark to another. The decision is affirmed. Affirmed. [Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.] FIELD et al. v. COLMAN. Decided December 3, 1917. 247 O. G., 246; 47 App. D. C., 189. 1. JURISDICTION-COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, This court is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in an interference case except from a judgment of priority. 2. SAME-SAME-MOTION TO DISSOLVE. An appeal to this court involving the sole question of whether the decision of the Patent Office tribunals on a motion to dissolve an interference should be sustained or denied will not be entertained. Mr. I. U. Townsend for the appellants. Mr. L. L. Miller, Mr. L. S. Bacon, Mr. J. H. Milans, Mr. L. B. Smith, and Mr. W. Orison Underwood for the appellee. PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding affirming the decision of the Board of Examinersin-Chief, which, in turn, affirmed the decision of the Primary Examiner dissolving the interference. A motion to dismiss has been interposed, on the ground that we are without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, because there was no judgment of priority entered by the Commissioner. Not only was there no judgment of priority entered by the Commissioner, but such a judgment could not have been entered, since the case was appealed through the various tribunals of the Patent Office upon the sole question of whether the motion to |