1 L e P Copyright 1918, by The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Saving $347.98 on One Drive-Through the G.T.M. It was the jump-saw drive. The Planters Lumber Company of Jeanerette, Louisiana, had tried all kinds of belts on it. But it was a very hard drive and it ate them up at an expensive rate. They grew hopeless after much experiment, continued to buy the expensive belt that gave a maximum of eight months' service, and let it go at that. One day Mr. DeVerges called. He is a G.T.M.Goodyear Technical Man. They asked him what price he could quote on belting for the jump-saw drive. He said he didn't sell belts as a grocer sells sugar. They asked him what he meant. He explained the Goodyear Plan of Plant Analysis-of having a G. T. M. study each drive carefully and prescribe for it the Goodyear Belt especially manufactured to meet the conditions. They were interested -and took him to the jump-saw. The Blue Streak has already given three times the service of the expensive belts formerly used. Eight months used to be the maximum; the Blue Streak has already given two years-three times as much. If they were buying the old belts at present prices, enough to last two years would cost $388.80-showing a net saving of belting costs of $347.98 in two years on one drive. Much of this saving is due to the G. T. M.'s service, to his careful analysis of conditions and accurate prescription of the right construction to meet them. He has since been asked to analyze other drives has done it has effected very real savings on them. He and many other G. T. M.'s can do the same for you. All of them have been trained in the Goodyear Technical School, all have had exacting experience in plants similar to yours. The G. T. M. service is free-for the economies it effects for purchasers are an unfailing assurance of continuously increasing business for us. Write today to make arrangements for a G. T. M. to analyze your worst belt-devourer. He will call on his next trip through your vicinity. THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY AKRON, OHIO HOSE VALVES GOOD YEAR AKRON WHEN TO SMOKE If you smoke 6 cigars a day- 3 from 1 P. M. (after meal) to 5 P. M. 2 from 7 P. M. (after meal) to 10 P. M. If you smoke 5 cigars a day- 2 from 1 P. M. (after meal) to 5 P. M. 2 from 7 P. M. (after meal) to 10 P. M. If you smoke 4 cigars a day- about 10:30 A. M. I about 1 P. M. (after meal). 1 about 4:30 P. M. 1 about 7 P. M. (after meal). If you smoke 3 cigars a day- I about 1 P. M. (after meal). I about 7 P. M. (after meal). If you smoke 2 cigars a day- If you smoke cigar a day Smoke it after your heavy meal. A good many cigar smokers smoke the wrong kind of cigar. A good many smoke at the wrong times of day. Some men do both. If smoking makes you nervous, it is most likely due to these practices. To help men smoke at the right time of day and to smoke the right kind of cigar, we have prepared the above suggestions. Keep them handy, and follow them as closely as you can. The Girard cigar, which we manufacture, is the most famous cigar in America today, because it "never gets on your nerves. And at the same time, it is a mellow, ripe, rich, delicious Havana smoke satisfying down to the last puff. Real Havana Broker size Any cigar dealer in America can sell you Girards. If he hasn't them in stock, he can get them for you from us. Established 1871 Antonio Roig & Langsdorf Philadelphia Girard Never gets on your nerves total debts surpass thirty billion dollars. Her gross income in normal times was ten billions and net income two billions. Her normal budget was eight hundred million. Annual interest on debts before the last loan was one and a half billions. So that budget and interest already demand three hundred millions more annually than her net income when trade and industry were normal. When skilful management of present wealth fails, or present demand exceeds prospective production, or surplus above necessities is exhausted, that Germany must yield is the inference on this basis of calculation. The wealth of the United Kingdom (Great Britain) was put at eighty-two and one-half billions, and of the whole Empire at one hundred and twenty-five billions, with gross incomes of 10.6 billions and 17 billions, respectively. How has Great Britain financed the war? Chapter III is an illuminating discussion of the whole system of Great Britain's huge financial and fiscal machinery, with her great bank in the foreground. And in connection with this goes a discussion of the rise in price of commodities. An analysis of this chapter would take much space. Sufficient to say, that power has mingled short-term obligations with longterm obligations, so that funding will commence soon after the war, with a corresponding gradual reduction of fixt charges. The conclusion is: "Of the ability of the English to carry this colossal war-debt there can be little doubt." Chapter IV deals with French money and credit. A clear account is given of the entire body of agencies, with the resources, present and prospective, that lie behind the financing of the war, including the Bank of France. And the conclusion is that France is psychologically and economically able to carry her huge burden. Chapter V, on Germany, shows that her financial preparedness for a sudden war was a part of the whole scheme. She started with the advantage of knowing that war was coming. And her entire credit system was fitted to the immediate emergency. But she did not expect so long a war. She has little support from the sale abroad of products of industry and capital. The duration of the war depends upon psychological actors— the willingness of Germans to reduce consumption to the minimum of existence --and the probabilities here are favorable to Germany through the settled dominance of government over individual initiative. Chapter VI deals with the United States. The analysis covers wealth, production, exports and imports, and the entire financial machinery employed in carrying on the operations just prior to and during the war, with the story of fluctuations in credits, balances, rates of exchange, and trade in general. The national wealth in 1912 was estimated at one hundred and eighty-seven billions. We loaned to foreign Powers between August, 1914, and October, 1917, over four billions, and have not felt it. The possibility of financing the finish to a victory seems evident. The conclusion, then, seems to be (so far as general economic conditions indicate): the Allies (with the United States) are in a greatly superior condition. But the ultimate failure of Germany depends in part on the failure of psychological stamina in her people. If they endure a state of sustaining life nearly primitive, they may pull through. Military means are not here taken into account. One may not presume to praise Professor Laughlin's volume. All one can say is that it is indispensable to those who study the war from the financial angle. The ap pendix of documents, tables, etc., and the charts liberally supplied throughout the text are of the highest value. II MUNROE SMITH ON GERMANY'S GUILT Smith, Munroe. Militarism and Statecraft. 12mo, pp. 286. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. $1.50. Postage, 12 cents. That Bismarck has been known as the man of "blood and iron," in the sense that he was a militaristic instigator of wars, is due to regarding externals rather than to consideration of realities in his fixt policies, as shown in his diplomatic and political procedure. That his diplomacy had for its purpose to avoid wars when possible, that it was essentially non-aggressive, and that in contrast with it German diplomacy in postBismarckian Germany has tended consciously toward war under militaristic pressure, is Professor Smith's principal thesis. The "Iron Chancellor," he says, distinguished between "a policy that aimed to realize or defend national interests" (Interessen politik) and one which "aimed at power" (Macht politik), and he consistently "employed the latter term as one of censure." "Working for prestige" (auf Prestige wirtschaften) was a phrase which he often used, and carried "a still stronger note of censure." Indeed, he. constantly took account of "the imponderables," i.e., of national or world-wide sentiment, conscience, resentment at aggressiveness, and the like. His "most famous saying" was: "If we attack, the whole weight of the imponderables, which weigh much heavier than material weights, will be on the side of our adversaries whom we have attacked. .. Success depends essentially upon the impressions that are produced in our own and other countries by the origin of the war; it is important that we be the ones attacked." His constant efforts, therefore, made for the control of the militarists by the diplomatic-political staffs, since the former are one-sided in their views and look only at immediate advantages. Had this wise rule been observed in 1914, Dr. Dernburg would not have been compelled to admit as early as 1915 that "Germany has few friends in the world." Professor Smith's volume contains four essays: Military Strategy versus Diplomacy in Bismarck's Time and Afterward; Diplomacy versus Military Strategy, How the Central Empires Might Have Played the Diplomatic Game; The German Theory of Warfare and the Results of its Application, and German Land-Hunger and Other Underlying Causes of the War. The first develops the positions indicated above. The second we may call the final clinching of the proof of Germany's guilt before the world in producing the blood-bath of the nations. The third is an examination from the standpoint of international law of the Teutonic theory of frightfulness and its normal consequences: "In treating international law as negligible; in ignoring the opinions, the sentiments, and the conscience of neutral nations which express material and spiritual interests that are superior to the selfish interests of any single state and are the reservoir from which new international law is steadily drawn-the German theory of warfare leaves out of its calculations no less a factor than the world." The last essay is a keen analysis of motives as proved by claims and events. We say there is a demonstrable higher quality in Nettleton leathers, welts, insoles, lining, shank, counter, heel and findings. There is a demonstrable greater skill in the cutting and fitting of Nettleton uppers, in the lasting, inseaming, stitching and finishing. This care in selecting materials, this exact workmanship is reflected in the utmost foot comfort, a recognized superendurance and the great genteelness of Nettleton appearance. The perfection of these details is lost in the quiet refinement of Nettleton elegance, but a careful appraisal will multiply your genuine appreciation of the minute thoroughness of our shoemanship. A trip to the Nettleton dealer in your city will acquaint you with the wide range of Nettleton styles. The officer is holding our Service Boot Extraordinary No. 34. U. S. Army Officers have set the seal of their approval on Nettleton Military Footwear Extraordinary. A. E. NETTLETON CO., Syracuse, N. Y. Largest Manufacturers in America of Men's Fine Shoes Exclusively Vict "HIS M RE Sthe world's on the It is easy for you to enjoy a will the greatest musical art of al the world-if you have the instru ment which brings the magnif cent interpretations of the greates artists into your home. 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