such removal and in such case if the proposition to change the county seat be ratified by three-fifths of the votes cast at said election upon the question of such removal then the county seat shall be changed, otherwise not.

A proposition to change the location of the county seat of any organized county shall not again be submitted before the expiration of four years. COUNTY SEAT-REMOVAL.

A special act of the territorial legislature of 1885 authorizing the removal, by majority vote, of a county seat previously located by the vote of two-thirds of all the qualified electors is held to be superceded by, because repugnant to Sec. 3, Art. 9.

Remington v. Higgins. 6 S. D. 313. 60 N. W. 73.

COUNTY SEAT-PETITION FOR REMOVAL-IRREGULAR PROCEEDINGS-RECORDS-MANDAMUS.

Where a taxpayer and resident of a county presented a petition for a change of the county seat to the board of supervisors, and the board met to consider the same on a certain day, and found that the petition was signed by a majority of the legal voters of the county, which finding the auditor was directed to record, but which he failed to do, and the board thereafter willfully, falsely, and fraudulently refused to enter such finding in its records, with intent to falsify the same, the petitioner was entitled to maintain mandamus against the board to compel it to amend the record according to facts under Rev. Code Civ. Proc. § 764, providing that mandamus may be maintained to compel the performance by any board or person of an official duty enjoined by law.

State ex. rel. Andrews v. Boyden et al., County Commissioners et al., 18 S. D., 288. 100 N. W. 763. COUNTY SEAT CHANGE OF LOCATION-SUBMISSION TO VOTE.

At any time before a valid order was entered granting a petition filed under the constitutional provision, a signer of the petition had a right to withdraw his name, after which it could not be counted to make up the specified number.

State ex rel Andrews v. Boyden, 18 S. D. 388. 108 N. W. 897.

§ 4. The legislature shall provide by general law for organizing the counties into townships, having due regard for congressional township lines and natural boundaries, and whenever the population is sufficient and the natural boundaries will permit, the civil townships shall be co-extensive with the congressional townships.

§ 5. In each organized county at the first general election held after the admission of the State of South Dakota into the union, and every two years thereafter, there shall be elected a clerk of the court, sheriff, county auditor, register of deeds, treasurer, state's attorney, surveyor, coroner, and superintendent of schools, whose terms of office respectively shall be two years, and except the clerk of the court, no person shall be eligible for more than four years in succession to any of the above named offices.

8 6. The legislature shall provide by general law for such county, township and district officers as may be deemed necessary, and shall prescribe the duties and compensation of all county, township and district officers. SPECIAL ACTS-CLERKS OF COURTS COMPENSATION.

A law operating upon all and in like manner affecting every person in this state, who is brought within the conditions and relations for which it provides, is not repugnant to a constitutional provision, which requires that all laws relating to courts shall be of general and uniform operation throughout the state. The laws of 1890, c. 81, sec. 10 relating to compensation of Iclerks of courts is not in conflict with Art. 9 sec. 6.

Minnehaha County v. Thorne. 6 S. D., 449. 61 N. W. 688.

ELECTIONS-NOMINATIONS BY PARTY CONVENTION.

The caucus law (Laws 1905, p. 145, c. 107) provides that all party nominations of candidates for county officers shall be made as provided for

in the statute. Section 5 provides when county conventions for the purpose of nominating candidates for county officers shall be held. The statute makes no provision for commissioner district conventions. Prior to the statute, Rev. Pol. Code, § 810, provided that the different counties of the state should be divided into commissioner districts, and the commissioners selected from the districts, and that all conventions for the nomination of county commissioners should be held by the district from which the commissioner was to be selected, and only voters of that district to participate in the convention. Const. Art. 9, § 6, declares that the Legislature shall provide by general law for county officers, and by Rev. Pol. Code, §§ 809-865, county government is intrusted to a board of county commissioners. Held, that the statutory rule regarding party nominations for the office of county commissioner was changed by the act of 1905, and a republican county convention alone could make republican party nominations for such office.

216.

State ex rel. Long et al. v. Rexford, County Auditor, 21 S. D. 86. 109 N. W. The following amendment to Section 7, Article IX, was submitted at the general election that was held November 6, 1906, and was adopted by a vote of 35,806 for, and 15,971 against:

§ 7. All county, township and district officers shall be electors in the county, township or district in which they are elected, provided that nothing in this section shall prevent the holding of school offices by any person as provided in section 9, article VII; and provided, further, that the legislature shall have authority to prescribe additional qualifications for superintendent of schools, not inconsistent herewith.

ARTICLE X.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

$ 1. The legislature shall provide by general laws for the organization and classification of municipal corporations. The number of such classes shall not exceed four, and the powers of each class shall be defined by general laws, so that no such corporations shall have any powers, or be subject to any restrictions other than those of all corporations of the same class. The legislature shall restrict the power of such corporations to levy taxes and assessments, borrow money and contract debts, so as to prevent the abuse of such power. CITIES

ORGANIZATION-CHARTERS-RE-ORGANIZATION.

Const. Art. 10, § 1, requiring the legislature to provide by general law for the organization of cities, and Laws 1890, Chap. 37, providing for a system by which cities may surrender their charters and organize under a general law as provided therein, do not repeal the special charter of a city failing to organize under such law.

Tripp v. City of Yankton, 10 S. D., 516. 74 N. W. 447.

CITY COUNCIL TAX LEVY-AMOUNT.

Laws 1890, Chap. 37, Art. 10. § 7, declares that a city council shall at the first regular meeting in September, or within 10 days thereafter, levy a tax for general purposes sufficient to meet the expenses of the year, based upon an estimate furnished by the city auditor, or a committee of the city council. Held, that the legislature not having restricted the powers of municipal corporations, as directed by the Constitution, a city had authority to make a levy of 15 mills for general purposes, 5 mills for interest and sinking fund, and 10 mills for school purposes in 1890.

Henderson v. Hughes County et al., 13 S. D., 576. 83 N. W. 682.

$ 2. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, no tax or assessment shall be levied or collected, or debts contracted by municipal corporations, except in pursuance of law, for public purposes specified by law; nor shall money raised by taxation, loan or assessment, for one purpose ever be diverted to any other.

ARTESIAN WELLS-TAXATION.

Artesian, wells sunk by townships at the expense of the taxpayers, as authorized by Laws, 1891, Chap. 80, and laws 1895, Chap. 103,-the water to be placed in tanks in the public highways, to supply the general public for watering stock and other domestic uses, and to be used for irrigation purposes,— is for a public purpose, within Const. Art. 10.

Miles v. Benton Township et al., 11 S. D., 450, 78 N. W. 1004.

EXPENDITURE-LIMIT OF-TOWN SUPERVISORS POWERS.

Town supervisors have no authority to appropriate or expend in the construction or repair of highways any funds raised for ordinary town charges. Aldrich et al. v. Collins, Supervisor, et al., 3. S. D., 154. 52 N. W. 854. TAX LEVY-TO SATISFY JUDGMENT.

Where the demand upon a city is that it levy a sufficient tax to pay a judgment outstanding against the city, and the alternative writ follows the demand, the court may upon hearing, issue its premptory writ, commanding the city to levy the full amount of the tax it is authorized by its charter to levy, and to pay upon such judgment any surplus in any city fund remaining after the current expenses of the city for the fiscal year have been paid. Such direction to pay upon the judgment such surplus funds is not in violation of sec. 2, Art. 10.

Howard v. City of Huron et al. 6 S. D., 180. 60 N. W. 803. See also Howard v. City of Huron et al. 5 S. D., 539.

CITY TAXES WARRANTS-DIVERSION OF FUNDS.

Respondent contends that, if these statutory provisions, (Chap. 21, Laws 1891), allow the city taxes of one year to be paid in warrants of preceding years, they violate section 2 of article 10 of the Constitution. This he claims on the theory that the tax assessed for the purpose of meeting the expenses of one year would be thus diverted to the payment of the expenses of a different year. We do not think this provision can be fairly so interpreted. We think the term "purpose" is so used with reference to the specific objects for which money may be raised by taxation.

Western Town Lot Co. v. Lane, 7 S. D., 604. 65 N. W. 17. See also 7. S. D. 5: 62 N. W. 982.

PUBLIC REVENUE-PARTICULAR FUNDS.

Comp. Laws, §§ 1671-1679. inclusive. As the effect of this law is to keep the public revenue in the particular fund to which it belongs, and to prevent any diversion of the same or application thereof to a purpose other than that for which the money was raised by taxation, loan or assessment, we find its various provisions in perfect harmony with section 2 of Article 10 of the Constitution of this state.

State ex rel. City of Huron v. Campbell, 7 S. D., 572. 64 N. W. 1125. INDEBTEDNESS-WARRANTS-VALIDITY OF.

A city has no authority to incur indebtedness for expense of a campaign to secure the selection of the city as the capital of the state. Warrants issued in payment of such expenses are void. Warrants issued by a city for current expenses, after the constitutional indebtedness has been reached, but in anticipation of a tax already levied, are valid to the extent of the taxes levied.

Shannon et al. v. City of Huron, 9 S. D., 356. 69 N. W. 598.

§ 3. No street passenger railway or telegraph or telephone line shall be constructed within the limits of any village, town or city without the consent of its local authorities.

TELEPHONE RIGHTS OF CITY COUNCIL-RIGHTS OF CORPORATIONS.

1. This section limits the power of the legislature in granting rights to telephone companies, but does not grant legislative power to municipal councils; and though the legislature may not authorize the construction of any telephone system in any city without the latter's consent, the city has no

power to impose any conditions or establish any regulations other than those permitted by the legislature.

2. Under Rev. Civ. Code, sec. 554, a domestic corporation engaged in building and operating a telephone system may construct its lines over public grounds, streets and highways, subject to control of proper municipal authorities as provided by the Constitution Art. 10, sec. 3, subject to Art. 6, sec. 12.

Missouri River Telephone Co. v. City of Mitchell, 22 S. D.

ARTICLE XI.

REVENUE AND FINANCE.

116 N. W. 67.

The following amendment to Section 1, Article XI, was submitted at the general election that was held November 6, 1906, and was adopted by a vote of 33,285 for, and 19,895 against:

§ 1. The legislature shall provide for an annual tax, sufficient to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the state for each year, not to exceed in any one year two mills on each dollar of the assessed valuation of all taxable property in the state, to be ascertained by the last assessment made for state and county purposes.

And whenever it shall appear that such ordinary expenses shall exceed the income of the state for such year, the legislature shall provide for levying a tax for the ensuing year, sufficient, with other sources of income, to pay the deficiency of the preceding year together with the estimated expenses of such ensuing year. And for the purpose of paying the public debt, the legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay the annual interest and the principal of such debt within ten years from the final passage of the law creating the debt, provided that the annual tax for the payment of the interest and principal of the public debt shall not exceed in any one year two mills on each dollar of the assessed valuation of all taxable property in the state as ascertained by the last assessment made for the state and county purposes.

Provided, that for the purpose of establishing, installing, maintaining and operating a hard fiber twine and cordage plant at the state penitentiary at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, the legislature shall provide for a tax for the year 1907 of not to exceed one and one-half mills on each dollar of the assessed valuation of all taxable property in the state, as ascertained by the last assessment made for state and county purposes.

STATE

TAXATION-LIMITATIONS-PUBLIC

POWERS.

DEBT

LEGISLATIVE

1. Const. Art. 11, § 1, relates to three distinct items of taxation: (1) The annual tax for "the estimated ordinary expenses of the state;" (2) taxation to pay deficiencies from preceding years; (3) taxation to pay the public debt.

2. The legislature is limited to a two-mill tax for the first and third items mentioned; but when a dificiency is shown to exist, resulting from the excess of ordinary expenses over the fund available for that purpose; the legislature has power to levy an assessment sufficient to meet the dificiency, without regard to the two-mill limitation, and the money raised for such deficiency must be used exclusively for its payment, and cannot be diverted to any other use.

3. Const. Art. 11, section 8, provides that "no tax shall be levied, except in pursuance of law, which shall distinctly state the object of the same, to which the tax only shall be applied." Art. 12, section 2, provides that "the general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the state, the current expenses of state institutions, interest on the public debt and for common schools. All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills each embracing but one object, and shall require a two-thirds vote of all the members of each branch of the legislature." Held, that the two-mill limitation applies only to the items embraced within the "general appropria

tion bill," which items constitute the "ordinary expenses," within the meaning of Article 11, section 1, but as to "all other appropriations" to meet the extraordinary expenses of the state the legislative power is controlled only by their sense of justice, as expressed by a two-thirds vote of all the members of each house.

4. A law providing for the levy of a tax for an extraordinary expense must clearly state its object, and the tax so raised cannot be diverted to any other use.

In re Limitation of Taxation, 3 S. D., 456. 54 N. W. 417.

§ 2. All taxes shall be uniform on all property and shall be levied and collected for public purposes only. The value of each subject of taxation shall be so fixed in money that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property. Franchises and licenses to do business in the state, gross earnings and net income, shall be considered in taxing corporations and the power to tax corporate property shall not be surrendered or suspended by any contract or grant to which the state shall be a party. The legislature shall provide by general law for the assessing and levying of taxes on all corporate property, as near as may be by the same methods as are provided for assessing and levying of taxes on individual property.

TAXATION-EXEMPTION - STATUTES - DEDUCTION OF INDEBTED

NESS.

1. Construing Art. 11, Sec. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7. Held that Act March 9, 1891, § 18, in providing for the deduction of indebtedness from the amount of credits and personal property, and section 19, prescribing what indebtedness should not be deducted and the manner of verification of deductions, while no provision is made for deducting the same from the value of the real estate of tax payers, provide for unequal taxation, are in conflict with the Constitution, and void.

2. Such sections of the revenue act also produce inequality and want of uniformity in taxation, and are unconstitutional, in that they permit the dededuction from personal property of indebtedness held within the state but permit no deduction of indebtedness held without the state.

In re Assessment and Collection of Taxes. 4 S. D., 6, 54 N. W. 810.

LIQUOR LICENSE-POLICE REGULATION-FEE.

Laws 1897, Chap. 72, provides for an annual license fee of $400, beginning July 1st, to be paid in advance to the county, treasurer by retail liquor dealers, or a pro rata sum in case application is made after July 1st. all licenses expiring the following June 30th. It requires each applicant to file an approved bond with the county treasurer, and allows the authorities of a city, organized town, or township to levy and collect an additional license, which must be paid before the applicant can engage in the trafic. Such authorities may refuse to grant a license if they deem the applicant unfit, and in that event the money paid to the county treasurer shall be returned to the applicant on the warrant of the board of county commissioners. Section 7 pro

vides that all such moneys received by a county treasurer shall by him be placed to the credit of the general fund of the county, and, on each license granted, he "shall transmit the sum of $150 to the state treasurer," which shall be placed to the credit of the general fund of the state. Held, that the statute is a police regulation, and the license fee is not therefore a tax, within Const. Art. 11, requiring uniformity of taxation.

State ex rel. Grigsby, Atty. Gen. v. Buechler, County Treasurer, 10 S. D. 156. 72 N. W. 114.

ARTESIAN WELLS-ASSESSMENT FOR.

Laws 1889, Chap. 14 § 15, subd. 3, providing for a direct artesian well assessment on lands for construction of such a well and water courses, to be adjusted "with reference to the relative distance of such lands from the well itself and the water courses," violate Art. 11, Sec. 2.

Turner v. Hand County, 11 S. D., 348. 77 N. W. 589.