not reasonable.-Lough v. Outerbridge, 143 N. Y. 271, 38 N. E. 292, 25 L. R. A. 674, affg. s. c. 68 Hun (N. Y.), 486, 22 N. Y. Supp. 976.

Where there is a question as to the reasonableness of charges by a railroad for the storage of freight, evidence of what are reasonable warehouse charges is admissible.- Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Turner, 143 Ala. 142, 39 So. 30.

That a carrier charges some less than others is evidence tending to show that the higher charge is unreasonable.- Cowden v. Pacific Coast Ss. Co., 94 Cal. 470, 29 Pac. 873, 18 L. R. A. 221.

Rates charged for like goods for like distances may be considered in determining the reasonableness of a particular rate, and whether it is discriminatory. Blair v. Sioux C. & P. R. Co., 109 Iowa, 369, 80 N. W.

While the long existence and use of a rate is an important fact tending to show it is sufficiently high, and properly requires the carriers to explain or justify an increase thereof, it has never been held to be conclusive on the question, unless a settled practice or policy in relation thereto is also shown.- Warren Mfg. Co. v. So. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 447.

While the long prior existence and actual use of lower rates may create an inference or presumption that they are reasonably high, the mere publishing of rates, under which there has been no appreciable movement of traffic, does not show them to be reasonably remunerative to the carrier.— Shiel v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 242.

The existence of a lower rate in the somewhat remote past does not necessarily prove anything of value in ascertaining the reasonableness of a rate existing to-day.- Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Georgia R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 149.

When a railway company advances a rate which has for some time been in force, the fact of its continuance is in the nature of an admission against that company which tends to show the unreasonableness of the advance.- Central Y. P. Assn. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 10 Inters. Com. R. 505.

The presumption that rates long maintained by carriers are reasonable does not operate in a case where such rates have been established by the carriers in compliance with an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.- Proctor v. C. H. & D. R. Co., 9 Inters. Com. R. 440, distinguishing 3 Inters. Com. R. 131, 4 I. C. C. R. 87.

Largely increased business and profits of the carriers at the time advances in rates were made, increase the presumptive force of the prior

maintenance of the lower rates.- National Hay Assn. v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 9 Inters. Com. R. 264.

The continuance of a given rate is not conclusive evidence of the reasonableness of that rate, but when a railway advances a rate which has been for some time in force, the fact of its continuance is in the nature of an admission against that company, which tends to show the unreasonableness of the advance; and the force of this admission becomes great when the advance is contemporaneous with a general decline in the average of railway rates and the lessened cost of service.- Holmes v. So. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 561.

That for many years the carriers who are mainly engaged in the transportation of export flour have published the same rate upon wheat and flour, does not create an irrebuttable presumption against a tariff which places a higher relative charge on flour.- Export & Domestic Rates, 8 Inters. Com. R. 214.

That state legislatures or commissions consider a certain state rate a reasonable maximum does not require that the judgment of Congress or the Interstate Commerce Commission as to the interstate rate should conform thereto.- Savannah Bureau v. Charleson & S. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 601.

A railroad by putting in force a rate of charges furnishes evidence that the rate is profitable, which is more convincing when such rate is long maintained.- Truck Farmers' Assn. v. Northeastern R. Co., 6 Inters. Com. R. 295.

That carriers often put certain rates into effect and maintain them for considerable periods makes it a fair inference that such rates are not too low. In re Excessive Rates on Food Products, 3 Inters. Com. R. 93, 4 I. C. C. R. 48.

When a railroad voluntarily accepts and carries freight on terms made by itself, it furnishes evidence tending to prove that such terms are profitable. When such terms or rates are of long continuance, or are adopted as often as necessary to secure business, the evidence is more convincing that the terms and rates are remunerative.-Coxe Bros. v. Lehigh V. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 195, 229, 3 Inters. Com. 460, 4 I. C. C. R. 535.

In long maintaining a certain rate, a carrier is making evidence that it is not too low.- Logan v. Ch. & N. W. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 14, 19, 431, 2 I. C. C. R. 604.

Actual rates which have been charged by a company have evidentiary value in determining the value of the company's plant and franchises.Kennebec Water Dist. v. Waterville, 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6; 60 L. R. A.

Advances in rates cannot be the result of competition,- see ante, § 26,

note [39].

Removal of competition as justification for advances in rates,- see ante, § 26, note [39].

Competition as justification for disparities in rates,- see ante, § 31, notes [37]-[40].

Competition as justification for discriminations in service and facilities, see ante, § 32, note [10].

Competition as justifying violations of long and short haul rule,— see post, § 36, notes [31]-[35].

Competition may be considered in rate making, and may be even a controlling factor.- Interst. Com. Commission v. L. & N. R. Co., 190 U. S. 273, 23 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 687; East. Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 516; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648, 20 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 209, revg. s. c. 83 Fed. 898, 71 Fed. 835; Interst. Com. Commission v. Ala. Mid. R. Co., 168 U. S. 144, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 45; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 666, revg. s. c. 57 Fed. 948, affg. s. c. 52 Fed. 187; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 700; Interst. Com. Commission v. B. & O. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S). 844, affg. s. c. 43 Fed. 37; Interst. Com. Commission v. Ch. G. W. R. Co., 141 Fed. 1003; Buchannan v. No. Pac. R. Co., 3 Inters. Com. R. 655, 5 I. C. C. R. 7; Pickering Phipps v. L. & N. W. R. Co. (1892), 2 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 229.

A state commission, the same as railway managers, should take into account "commercial necessity" and conditions of competition, in fixing reasonable rates.- State v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 80 Minn. 191, 83 N. W. 60; affd. 186 U. S. 257, 22 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 900.

The action of a railway company in reducing a rate upon complaint of a shipper is not conclusive evidence that the rate was unreasonable before the reduction, but when the traffic manager of that company, after a careful examination of the facts, makes the reduction, such action is in the nature of an admission against the reasonableness of the obnoxious rate at the time of the reduction.- Holmes v. So. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 561.

That a carrier reduces a rate is not, in itself, proof that the former rate was unreasonable, since the reduction may have been warranted by a decrease in the cost of transportation or increase in the volume of traffic.- Loud v. South Car. R. Co., 4 Inters. Com. R. 205, 5 I. C. C. R.

A reduction by a railroad of its tariff below the rate fixed by a commission, affords no basis for an arbitrary reduction of the commission's maximum standard to the voluntary low rate of the carrier.- Southern R. Co. v. Atlanta Stove Works, 128 Ga. 207, 57 S. E. 429.

In a proceeding as to the reasonableness of rates fixed by the North Dakota commission, evidence in the form of statistical tables as to the business of the company may be received and considered for what it is worth, although covering only occasional or alternate months, where it was not controverted that such months were average and typical.Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Keyes, 91 Fed. 47.

In a proceeding as to the reasonableness of rates fixed by the North Dakota commission relevant statistical tables were properly received, over the objection of the attorney-general, where such tables were prepared by forty or fifty clerks under the direction of the general officers of the company, who were sworn although the clerks were not, the company, however, allowing the fullest and freest access to the tables, the sources of information, etc., and offering to swear any or all of the clerks. This was the only practicable method of compiling such information, and the attorney-general must have been satisfied with the correctness of the testimony, else he would have investigated its trustworthiness.- Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Keyes, 91 Fed. 47.

It may well be doubted whether a railroad company can rely, as evidence in its own behalf, upon a report made and filed by it.- Seaboard Air L. R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 109, affg. s. c. 48 Fla. 129, 37 So. 314, and 48 Fla. 150, 37 So. 658.

A sworn statement of the value of a line of railroad, made by it to the state comptroller for purposes of taxation, is evidence of the value of the road, and may be considered in determining the reasonableness of rates or charges fixed by a state commission, but it is not conclusive on the company for the latter purpose.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Brown, 123 Fed. 946.

The return made by a railroad company to a state board of equalization, as to the value of the property for taxation, is competent but not conclusive evidence before a state board of railroad commissioners, in determining the reasonableness of rates.- Southern Pac. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 87 Fed. 21.

To make a financial statement of a railroad in any way conclusive as a measure of its legitimate earnings, it must give, in addition to its fixed charges and capital account, the history of that capital account,

the value of the stock and various securities involved, as well as the actual cost and value of the property itself.- Grain Shippers' Assn. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 158.

Where a railroad has rendered a report to the Commissioner of Railroads as to its net and gross receipts, and the commissioner has ordered the company to put in effect a schedule of rates based on such report, the burden is on the railroad of showing that such report erred in purporting to include only intrastate traffic, but that it did in fact include interstate traffic and hence was not a proper basis of computation.- Commissioners of Railroads v. Wabash R. Co., 123 Mich. 669, 82 N. W. 526; affd. 126 Mich. 113, 85 N. W. 466.

Upon the question of the reasonableness of a rate, a witness may give an opinion as evidence, but that opinion must depend upon reasons which are in the main capable of being considered and comprehended. If a freight agent believes that the rate which he makes is a reasonable one, he must have some reason for that belief. Let him state his reason along with his opinion, and the opinion will be entitled to credit according as his reason commends itself to the judgment of the trier.Board of R. R. Comrs. v. C. N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 380.

If a witness pronounces a rate unreasonable but bases his opinion wholly on a comparative table which tends to sustain but does not establish his conclusion, his opinion is of no weight as evidence.— Board of R. R. Comrs. v. C. N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 380.

[72] What rates are reasonable.

Facts showing reasonableness of rates,- see also ante, § 26, note [37]. Where 16.43 per cent. of the total freight business of a carrier is in one commodity, and the rate fixed by a state commission for that commodity is nearly two mills per ton higher than the average on such road for all classes of freight, the court will not say that such a rate is confiscatory. Seaboard Air L. R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 109, affg. s. c. 48 Fla. 129, 37 So. 314, and 48 Fla. 150 37 So. 658.

It is not confiscation nor a taking of property without due process for the state to prescribe water rates which allow an income of six per centum on the then value of the property actually used, even though the company previously had been permitted to charge rates yielding one and one-half per cent. per month.- Stanislaus Co. v. San Joaquin C. & I. Co., 192 U. S. 201, 24 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 241.