A state cannot regulate the allowance of terminal elevator charges by the railroads on interstate shipments.-State v. Omaha Elev. Co., Neb.

110 N. W. 874.

The legislature may forbid any advances in railroad rates.- Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Anderson, 72 Neb. 856, 101 N. W. 1019.

[2]

Effect of statutes on existing companies.

The fact that a business was established before the passage of an act regulating the charges therein, does not exempt such business from the application of the statute.— Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, affg. s. c. 69 Ill. 80.

Effect of maximum rates prescribed in N. Y. R. R. L., § 37, upon right of state to further regulate rates.- Dillon v. Erie R. Co., 19 Misc. (N. Y.) 116, 43 N. Y. Supp. 320.

Validity of commission plan of regulation,- see also, ante, § 4, note [14].

Commissions as administrative bodies,- see ante, § 4, note [15].

It is within the power of the Texas legislature to create a state railroad commission and vest it with power to classify and regulate rates.Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1047; Tilley v. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., 5 Fed. 641.

The state may empower a commission to regulate rates and service on the railways of the state.- Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 9 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 47, affg. s. c. 70 Ga. 694.

An act of the Iowa legislature empowering the state Board of Railroad Commissioners to make and enforce a schedule of rates for railroad charges is not an unconstitutional attempt to delegate legislative power. The legislature merely establishes rules and principles, and leaves the execution and details of administration to its creatures.Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866, 1 L. R. A. 744n.

The power of the state to fix rates may be exercised by a commission provided there is a standard fixed by which the commission is to be guided. Village of Saratoga v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 203, 107 N. Y. Supp. 341; revd. on other grounds, 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693.

Where a statute gives to a commission the power to fix maximum rates, it matters not whether the standard by which the commission is to be guided be fixed by common law or by the statute.- Village of Saratoga v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 203,

107 N. Y. Supp. 341; revd. on other grounds, 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693.

Where a statute gives a commission power "within the limits prescribed by law," to fix a maximum rate, the statute is not invalid on the ground that no standard of charges is fixed, since the clause "within the limits prescribed by law," fixes the standard, which is a reasonable rate.- Village of Saratoga v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 203, 107 N. Y. Supp. 341; revd. on other grounds, 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693.

An especially created and skilled tribunal is better qualified to pass on the reasonableness of a rate than is a court or jury.- Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 633, 21 Ky. L. R. 232, 51 S. W. 164, 1012.

A state may vest a commission with power to revise railroad rates upon complaint.-Stone v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 62 Miss. 607.

[5] Acts within power of commission — In general. Power of former Board of Railroad Commissioners to correct abuses in rates and service.- see N. Y. R. R. L., §§ 160–163. Control of former Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners over operation of roads and rates of fare,- see N. Y. Rap. Tr. Act, § 34d, post, Appendix A.

Each Commission shall possess all powers necessary and proper to enable it to carry out the purposes of this Act,- see ante, § 4. Power of Commission to excuse non-compliance with requirements as to filing and posting tariff schedules,- see ante, § 28, note [5].

Power as to connecting carriers,- see ante, § 35, note [9].
Power to conduct investigations,- see ante, § 48, note [1].
Who may grant franchises,—see post, § 53, note [13].

Powers of former Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners, - see post, § 83, note [2].

Congress has power to subject to regulations every carrier engaged in interstate commerce, and to adopt such regulative measures as will destroy favoritism in rates. Therefore, although the Interstate Commerce Act may not contain an express prohibition that an interstate carrier may not become a dealer in commodities transported by it, the court will enforce the provisions and purposes of the Act, even though in so doing it renders it impossible for a carrier to deal in such commodities.- New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U S.) 272.

Prohibition of interstate transportation of lottery tickets is within. the regulative power of Congress under the interstate commerce clause of the U. S. Constitution.- The Lottery Cases, 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 321.

"Commerce," under the interstate commerce clause of the U. S. Constitution, includes navigation, intercourse, communication, traffic, the transit of persons, and the transmission of messages by telegraph.— The Lottery Cases, 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 321.

A state may make reasonable regulations to secure the safety of passengers, even on interstate trains, while within its borders, but can do nothing which will directly burden or impede the interstate traffic of the company, or impair the usefulness of its facilities for such traffic.- Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1096, revg. s. c. 143 Ill. 434, 33 N. E. 173, 19 L. R. A. 119.

A railroad operating exclusively in one state is nevertheless subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission if it enters into an agreement for through rates for shipments to or from outside the state, over its lines, and participates in such through rates.- Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 700.

Elevating, receiving, weighing and discharging grain is not interstate commerce, but the regulation thereof is within the police power of the state.- Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 468, affg. s. c. sub nom. People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 22 N. E. 670, 682, 5 L. R. A. 559n.

Power to regulate commerce includes power to regulate its adjuncts.U. S. v. Adair, 152 Fed. 737.

Power to regulate interstate commerce gives power to enact a law forbidding carriers to discriminate against an employee because of membership or non-membership in a labor union.-U. S. v. Adair, 152 Fed. 737.

The power to regulate interstate commerce authorizes regulation as to all the subjects of such commerce, the persons and corporations engaged in it, and the instruments by which it is carried on.— - Kelley v. Gt. Northern R. Co., 152 Fed. 211.

The power to regulate commerce embraces all the instrumentalities of such commerce.- Snead v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 151 Fed. 608.

The Mississippi Railroad Commission cannot force an interstate carrier to adopt tariffs, freight rules, regulations and classifications of freight, etc., in respect to the transportation of goods from points within the state to points without, for that would be a regulation of interstate commerce.- Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Sessions, 28 Fed. 592.

A state cannot adopt any regulation which does or may operate injuriously upon the commerce of other states.- Kaeiser v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 18 Fed. 151.

The Interstate Commerce Commission possesses no common law jurisdiction or powers.-Jones v. St. L. & S. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 167.

It is doubtful whether a case could arise under which the Interstate Commerce Commission would be warranted, if it had the legal authority, in directing carriers to prefer export to domestic traffic.- Matter of Proposed Advances in Freight Rates, 9 Inters. Com. R. 382.

The Interstate Commerce Commission may not interfere with transportation arrangements made by the federal commissioners of emigration. - Savery v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 695, 2 Inters. Com. R. 210, 2 I. C. C. R. 338.

The legislature has not invested the N. Y. Board of Railroad Commissioners with the function of granting or withholding relief based upon contractual obligations. People ex rel. Loughran v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 158 N. Y. 421, 53 N. E. 163, affg. s. c. 32 App. Div. (N. Y.) 158, 52 N. Y. Supp. 908.

A common carrier has absolute control of his property and power to make reasonable rules and regulations concerning it, except only to the extent that it has been devoted to a public use.― Barney v. Oyster Bay & H. S. Co., 67 N. Y. 301.

The Texas Railroad Commission has power to correct abuses defined by law, but not to enact a law or rule defining given acts or conditions as an abuse.- Railroad Commission v. Houston & T. C. R. Co., 90 Tex. 340, 38 S. W. 750.

The provisions of a constitution giving the legislature power to pass laws to regulate rates, correct abuses and prevent unjust discriminations and extortion, invest that body not only with power to legislate as to rates, but to correct all abuses of franchises as well as abuses connected with, or growing out of the exercise of such franchises.- Railroad Commission v. Houston & T. C. R. Co., 90 Tex. 340, 38 S. W. 750.

Power of Interstate Commerce Commission to fix rates,- see Interst. Com. Act, § 15, post, Appendix B.

Power of Commissions to regulate rates and service of gas and electrical corporations,- see post, §§ 66, 67, 71, 72.

Power of state to vest a commission with power to fix rates,—see ante, § 4, note [14].

Whether the regulation and fixing of rates is a judicial or administrative function,- see ante, § 4, note [18].

Determination as to reasonableness and justice of a rate, a judicial question, see ante, § 4, note [19].

When Interstate Commerce Commission will leave adjustment of rates to state commissions,- see ante, § 25, note [20].

Meaning of term "rate,"

"

What is a rebilling rate,”

see ante, § 26, note [26].

see ante, § 26, note [27].

Right of carriers to determine reasonableness of rates in the first instance, see also, ante, § 26, note [32].

Power to prohibit rates unreasonably low,- see ante, § 26, note [46]. Power to grant relief from long and short haul provision,- see ante, § 36, note [11].

Relief from long and short haul rule granted only upon petition and after investigation,- see ante, § 36, note [12].

The Interstate Commerce Commission has no power to fix rates in the first instance. Interst. Com. Commission v. Ala. Mid. R. Co., 168 U. S. 144, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 45, affg. s. c. 74 Fed. 715, 69 Fed. 227; Interst. Com. Commission v. C. N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 896; Jewett v. Ch. M. & St. P. R. Co., 156 Fed. 160; So. Pac. Co. v. Colorado F. & I. Co., 101 Fed. 779; Interst. Com. Commission v. Northeastern R. Co., 83 Fed. 611, affg. 74 Fed. 70; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. No. Pac. R. Co., 83 Fed. 249; Interst. Com. Commission v. Lehigh V. R. Co., 74 Fed. 784; Interst. Com. Commission v. Northeastern R. Co., 74 Fed. 70; affd. 83 Fed. 611.

The Interstate Commerce Act (as it stood March 30, 1896) did not expressly or by implication confer on the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to itself fix rates. It is argued that the power to pass on the reasonableness of existing rates implies a right to prescribe rates. The reasonableness of the rate, in a given case, depends on the facts, and the function of the Commission is to consider these facts and give them their proper weight. If the Commission, instead of withholding judgment in such a matter until an issue shall be made and the facts found, itself fixes a rate, that rate is prejudged by the Commission to be reasonable.- Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 700.

That a provision giving a prima facie or conclusive force to rates fixed by a state commission is unconstitutional, will not invalidate the power of the commission to fix rates, nor the rates fixed by the commission.Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1047.

The power with respect to rates conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission by the Interstate Commerce Act is wholly inconsistent with the right of courts to pass upon the reasonableness of an established rate.- Kiser Co. v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 158 Fed. 193.

The power to initiate and establish rates for interstate transportation rests with the carrier, subject to the limitations prescribed by law that such rates shall be reasonable and just in themselves and not unjustly discriminatory between persons, places or kinds of traffic and subject also to the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission, when satisfied, after full hearing upon complaint made, that the rates demanded, charged or collected by the carrier are unjust and unreasonable, or unjustly dis