by the directors of the corporation.- Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Russell, 115 Ill. 52, 3 N. E. 561.

A receiver may be compelled by mandamus to construct a crossing which the railroad company of which he is receiver was under the duty to construct.- City of Fort Dodge v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 87 Iowa, 389, 54 N. W. 243.

[16]

Ownership of a railroad by a foreign corporation.

A foreign corporation which purchases and operates a railroad within a state must operate the road according to the terms and conditions imposed upon domestic corporations.- St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18, 11 L. R. A. 452n, affd. on other points, 156 U. S. 649, 15 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 484.

§ 3. Public service districts. There are hereby created two public service districts, to be known as the first district and the second district. The first district shall include the counties of New York, Kings, Queens and Richmond. The second district shall

include all other counties of the state.

Territorial jurisdiction of former Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners,- see N. Y. Rap. Tr. Act, § 1, post Appendix A. General rules of statutory construction,- see ante, § 1, notes [23][40].

Power of the legislature to create new civil divisions for regulative purposes.

It is within the power of a state legislature to create special taxing districts and to charge the cost of a local improvement, in whole or in part, upon the property of said district.— Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Porter, 210 U. S. 177, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 647, affg. s. c. 38 Ind. App. 226, 74 N. E. 260, 76 N. E. 179.

The constitution of California divided the state into three districts, “in each of which one railroad commissioner shall be elected.”— Held, that this was a valid provision.- Southern Pac. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 78 Fed. 236.

The act professing to establish a new civil division of the state under the name of the Rensselaer Police District, is unconstitutional, as a colorable and evasive attempt to interfere with local self-government. An existing civil division would be entirely adequate, and as

long as that is the case, the legislature has not power to create a new one. - People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50.

An act constituting the four counties of New York, Kings, Westchester and Richmond, the "Metropolitan Sanitary District of New York," and placing health regulations in such district under the control of a board of commissioners appointed by the Governor and Senate, is constitutional. The legislature has power to create new civil divisions of the state, embracing more than one county, not impairing, however, the county organizations.- Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661.

It is within the constitutional authority of the state to establish new civil divisions thereof, embracing several towns, cities and counties.- People v. Shepard, 36 N. Y. 285.

The Act of 1865 creating a Capital Police District, embracing portions of the counties of Albany and Rensselaer, and the Act of 1866, amending that act by including part of Schenectady county, are constitutional.- People v. Shepard, 36 N. Y. 285.

The act creating the Metropolitan Excise District and a Metropolitan Board of Excise having regulation of the liquor traffic in such district, is constitutional.- Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657.

The act creating a Metropolitan Fire District, and putting the fire department therein under the control of a Board of Metropolitan Fire Commissioners created by the act, is valid.- People v. Pickney, 32 N. Y. 377.

Although general statutes must be enacted by the legislature, the power to make regulations which shall have the force of law in limited localities, may be committed to bodies representing the people of those local divisions.- Clarke v. City of Rochester, 28 N. Y. 605, affg. 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 446.

The legislature may constitutionally create new civil divisions, embracing the whole or parts of various counties, providing the divisions recognized by the Constitution are not abolished or their capacity impaired.- People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532, affg. s. c. 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 344.

The legislature may create special districts for special purposes.— People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, revg. s. c. 9 Barb. (N. Y.)

535.

Local taxation for a given purpose need not be limited by or coextensive with any previously established district.- People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, revg. s. c. 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 535.

4. Commissions established; appointment; removal; terms of office; * [all necessary powers conferred]. There shall be a public service commission for each district, and each commission shall possess the powers and duties hereinafter specified, and also all powers necessary or proper to enable it to carry out the purposes of this act. The commission of the first district shall consist of five members and the commission of the second district shall consist of five members, to be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, one of whom designated by the governor shall, during his term of office, be the chairman of the commission of which he is a member. Each commissioner shall be a resident of the district for which he is appointed.

The governor may remove any commissioner for inefficiency, neglect of duty or misconduct in office, giving to him a copy of the charges against him, and an opportunity of being publicly heard in person or by counsel in his own defense, upon not less than ten days' notice. If such commissioner shall be removed the governor shall file in the office of the secretary of state a complete statement of all charges made against such commissioner, and his findings thereon, together with a complete record of the proceedings.

Of the members of the commission in each district first appointed hereunder, one shall hold office until February first, nineteen hundred and nine, one until February first, nineteen hundred and ten, one until February first, nineteen hundred and eleven, one until February first, nineteen hundred and twelve, and one until February first, nineteen hundred and thirteen; the term of office of each commissioner so appointed shall begin on the first day of July, nineteen hundred and seven. Upon the expiration of each of such terms, the term of office of each commissioner thereafter appointed shall be five years from the first of February. Vacancies shall be filled by appointment for the unexpired term.

Parallel provisions as to Interstate Commerce Commission,— see Inters. Com. Act, §§ 11, 24, post, Appendix B.

Constitutional provisions as to appointment, etc.- see N. Y. Const., Art. X, § 2.

Appointment, term of office, and vacancies in office of Commissioner of Gas & Electricity,- see N. Y. Gas & El. Com. Act, § 3.

• Words in brackets are not a part of section heading as enacted.-Ed.

Parallel provisions as to former Board of Railroad Commissioners,

-see N. Y. R. R. L., §§ 150, 151.

Parallel provisions as to the former Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners,- see N. Y. Rap. Tr. Act, § 1.

Eligibility of commissioners,-see post, § 9.

General rules of statutory construction,- see ante, § 1, notes [23][40].

Public Service Commissioners not local officers,- see post, § 5, note [3].

Effect of failure to take, or delay in filing, oath of office,- see post, § 9, note.

Qualifications of commissioners,- see post, § 15, note [2].

[1] Appointment.

Constitutionality of appointment of local officers by state officials,see post, § 5, note [7].

The exercise of the power of appointment to office is a purely executive act.-Ackeley's Case, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 35.

[2] Residence of local officers.

Under the N. Y. Public Officers Law, a local officer must be a resident of the local subdivision within which his official functions are to be exercised, and when he ceases to be a resident his office becomes vacant. - Matter of Buhler, 43 Misc. (N. Y.) 140, 88 N. Y. Supp. 195.

[3] Term of office.

While "until," as an adverb of time, is usually a word of exclusion, it always includes the date which follows, when the connection and manifest intention so require.- People v. Fitzgerald, 180 N. Y. 269, 73 N. E. 55.

The legislature may change the term of any office not created or regulated by the Constitution.- Long v. Mayor, 81 N. Y. 425.

There is nothing in the N. Y. Constitution which expressly or by implication restrains the legislature from altering or changing the term of any office which it has once fixed.- People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128, affg. s. c. 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 310.

[4] Resignation.

The provision of the N. Y. Revised Statutes that an officer "shall continue to discharge the duties of his office, although his term of office

shall have expired, until a successor in such office shall have qualified," does not apply to an officer who has resigned, but his power and tenure terminate with his resignation.- Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378.

The resignation of a drainage commissioner is complete when it is received by the county judge. No formal act by the latter is necessary to give it effect.— Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378.

The acceptance of an incompatible office, operates as a resignation by the incumbent from the office then held by him.-People ex rel. Henry v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375; People ex rel Whiting v. Carrique, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 93.

Unless otherwise provided, an office becomes ipso facto vacant on the resignation of the incumbent.- Gilbert v. Luce, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 91.

[5] Effect of vacancies on power of remaining members.

The policy of law is to guard against the failure of a public service, and a grant of power and duty in the nature of a public office to several does not become void or inoperative upon the death or disability of one or more.- - People ex rel. Kingsland v. Palmer, 52 N. Y. 83.

[6] Removal from office - Power in general.

The legislature may lodge the power to remove from statutory offices in boards or other officers, subject to statutory regulations.Attorney-General v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L. R. A.

699.

The policy of government would be inherently defective if no remedy of a summary nature could be had to remove from office a person who neglected his duty or was guilty of malversation in the administration of his office.- Clay v. Stuart, 74 Mich. 411, 41 N. W. 1091.

If a state Constitution commits to the legislature the whole subject of the removal of given officers, the mode in which it shall be done, including the causes, charges, notice, investigation, determination, and everything necessary for the accomplishment of the object, are in the discretion of the legislature.— Clay v. Stuart, 74 Mich. 411, 41 N. W. 1091.

[7]

Whether an executive or a judicial act.

The removal of a sheriff by the governor is an executive not a judicial act.- Matter of Guden, 171 N. Y. 529, 64 N. E. 451, affg. s. c. 71 App. Div. (N. Y.) 422, 75 N. Y. Supp. 794.

The act of a governor in removing an officer is not the exercise of a judicial function.- Lynch v. Chase, 55 Kan. 367, 40 Pac. 666; State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hawkins, 44 Oh. St. 98, 5 N. E. 228.