signee does not call at the place of delivery for the goods, the risk of the carrier ceases upon the putting of the goods in store with a responsible third person for and on account of the owner.- Fisk v. Newton, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 45.

Where, after delivery of goods for shipment, prepayment of freight is demanded by the carrier, and is refused by the shipper, the carrier holds the goods as warehouseman merely.- Dixon v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 110 Ga. 173, 35 S. E. 369.

[11] Reasonable notice and time for removal of goods from station.

A bill of lading provided: "The goods to be taken from the ship by the consignee immediately the vessel is ready to discharge." The steamer was docked on Saturday, and on that day, between 11 and 12 o'clock in the morning, notice was given the consignee that the goods would be discharged on Monday morning.— Held, that the notice to the consignee was sufficient.- The Kate, 12 Fed. 881.

What is meant by a 66 reasonable time " is such as would give a person residing in the vicinity of the place of delivery, and informed of the usual course of business on the part of the company, a suitable opportunity within the usual business hours, after the goods are ready for delivery, to come to the place of delivery, inspect the goods and take them away.― Pinney v. 1st Div. St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 19 Minn. 251; Derosia v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 18 Minn. 133.

If the consignee does not reside at the place of delivery, but has an agent there to receive the goods, of which the carrier has notice, such agent is entitled to notice of the arrival of the goods and a reasonable time to remove them.- Pinney v. 1st Div. St. P. & P. R. Co., 19 Minn. 251.

Where a consignee resides elsewhere than at or in the immediate vicinity of the place of final destination of goods shipped, and has no known agent there, and his place of residence is unknown to the carrier, the carrier may place the goods in its freight-house, and after keeping them a reasonable time, if the consignee does not call for them, its liability as carrier ceases and it remains liable simply as warehouseman.Derosia v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 18 Minn. 133.

-

Where a car containing freight is set out for removal at the place of destination at 6.00 P. M. on January 22d, and the same was burned eight hours later, the consignee cannot be said to have had a reasonable time to remove the freight.- Scott Co. v. St. L. I. M. & S. R. Co., Mo. App. 104 S. W. 924.

[12] Power of state to regulate.

General power of state to regulate property devoted to public use,— see ante, § 1, notes [1]-[22].

Exemption from public control,- see ante, § 1, notes [16]-[21].

Effect of receivership on power to regulate,- see ante, § 2, note [15].

In the absence of action by Congress, a state may determine, augment, or lessen a carrier's liability.-Martin v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co., 203 U. S. 284, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 100.

In the absence of congressional legislation on the subject, a state may require common carriers, although in the execution of interstate business, to be liable for the whole loss resulting from their negligence, in spite of a contract to the contrary.- Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 24 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 132.

[13] Scope and validity of statutes.

Construction of statutes declaratory of common law,- see ante, § 1,

note [31a].

General rules of statutory construction,

see ante, § 1, notes [23]-[40].

Purpose of regulative acts,- see ante, § 1, note [32].

State statute prohibiting limitation of liability not a regulation of interstate commerce,- see ante, § 25, note [16].

Whether an act regulating bills of lading is a regulation of interstate commerce,— see ante, § 25, note [16].

Whether a statute imposing a penalty for failure to pay claims for

loss or damage within a given time is a regulation of interstate commerce,― see ante, § 25, note [16].

A Georgia statute imposing on the initial or any connecting carrier the duty of tracing the freight and informing the shipper, in writing, when, where, how and by which carrier the freight was lost, damaged or destroyed, and of giving the names of the parties and their official position, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set out in the information could be established, was held by the Supreme Court of that state to apply to shipments outside the state.- Held, that the Supreme Court of the United States must accept that construction of the statute, but the act is void as applied to shipments from Georgia to other states.- Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Murphey, 196 U. S. 194, 25 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 218.

A federal statute requiring a carrier to inform a shipper whether the loss of the shipment occurred on its line, is valid.— Richmond & A. R. Co. v. Patterson T. Co., 169 U. S. 311, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 335.

A state law requiring all bills of lading to be signed by both parties, is valid, as a rule of evidence.- Richmond & A. R. Co. v. Patterson T. Co., 169 U. S. 311, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 335.

A section of the Code of Virgina provided that when a carrier accepted goods for transportation beyond its own lines, it should be deemed to have assumed an obligation for the safe carriage to the point of destination unless the carrier be released from liability by written contract; and that although there be such contract, if such goods be lost or injured, such carrier should be liable unless it give satisfactory proof that the loss or injury did not occur while the goods were in its charge.- Held, that the statute did not attempt to substantially control or regulate contracts for interstate shipments, but simply established a rule of evidence ordaining the character of proof by which a carrier might show its liability to be limited to his own line.- Richmond & A. R. Co. v. Patterson T. Co., 169 U. S. 311, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U.S.) 335.

An Iowa statute provided that "No contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt any corporation engaged in transporting persons or property by railway from liability of a common carrier, or carrier of passengers, which would exist had no contract, receipt, rule or regulation been made or entered into."— Held, that this is a matter of the law of the particular state, and may be changed by its legislature, except so far as restrained by its Constitution or the Constitution or the laws of the United States. This statute is not a regulation of interstate commerce and not a violation of the Constitution of the United States.- Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 289, affg. s. c. 95 Iowa, 260. 63 N. W. 692.

A state statute, providing that no contract shall exempt any railroad from any liability as a common carrier which would have existed if no contract had been made, is not an encroachment on the interstate commerce clause of the U. S. Constitution.- Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 289, affg. s. c. 95 Iowa, 260, 63 N. W. 692.

Requirements of a state statute as to the contents and effect of a bill of lading are void, as to interstate shipments, if in conflict with the Interstate Commerce Act.- Baird v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 41 Fed. 592.

An interstate contract of shipment is an entire contract, and the laws of the state as to bills of lading, etc., are void in so far as they attempt to regulate interstate commerce.- Carton v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 59 Iowa, 148, 13 N. W. 67.

An act making the specification of weights in bills of lading conclusive evidence of such weights is unconstitutional.- Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Simonson, 64 Kan. 802, 68 Pac. 653, 57 L. R. A. 765.

A state law prohibiting a carrier from limiting its liability by a stipulation in the bill of lading will be upheld, though it affects the performance of a contract in another state.- Brockaway v. Express Co., 168 Mass. 257, 47 N. E. 87; Fonseca v. Cunard Ss. Co.. 153 Mass. 553, 27 N.

E. 665, 12 L. R. A. 340n; St. Joseph & G. I. R. Co. v. Palmer, 38 Neb. 463, 56 N. W. 957, 22 L. R. A. 335; Fairchild v. Phila. W. & B. R. Co., 148 Pa. 527, 24 Atl. 79; Pittman v. Pac. Exp. Co., 24 Tex. Civ. App. 595, 59 S. W. 949; Davis v. Ch. M. & St. P. R. Co., 93 Wis. 470, 67 N. W. 16, 1132, 33 L. R. A. 654.

A Texas statute providing that carriers shall not restrict their common law liability applies only to shipments beginning and ending in Texas.Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Sherwood, 84 Tex. 125, 19 S. W. 455.

A state statute prohibiting carriers from limiting their common law liability may apply to interstate shipments beginning within the state.Pittman v. Pac. Exp. Co., 24 Tex. Civ. App. 595, 59 S. W. 949.

[14] Liability of carriers on through shipments.

Liability of railroad for transportation and delivery of passengers and freight received by it to be transferred to points on connecting railroads,- see N. Y. R. R. L., § 48.

Liability of connecting carriers for delay in transportation,- see post, note [29].

Liability of connecting carrier for through transportation of passengers,― see ante, § 35, note [31].

An initial carrier will not be held liable beyond its own lines unless a contract so extending its liability is made out by clear evidence.— Myrick v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 107 U. S. 102, 1 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 425, revg. s. c. Fed. Cases, No. 10,001.

Making a through rate on the receipt of cattle does not establish the liability of the initial carrier beyond its own line.- Myrick v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 107 U. S. 102, 1 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 425, revg. s. c. Fed. Cases. No. 10,001.

Whenever two or more railroad companies are connected together, any company owning either of said roads receiving freight to be transported to any place on the line of either of said roads is liable as common carrier for the delivery of such freight at its destination.Smeltzer v. St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 158 Fed. 649.

A carrier cannot make the owner of goods liable for the negligence of a connecting carrier.— Sherman v. Hudson R. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 254, affg. s. c. 5 Daly (N. Y.), 521.

In the case of the carriage of property over two or more railroads constituting a connecting line, neither company is agent of the owner of the goods; each exercises an independent employment as a contractor with the owner.— Sherman v. Hudson R. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 254, affg. s. c. 5 Daly (N. Y.), 521.

The duty of each intermediate carrier is to transport the goods safely to the end of its route, and deliver them to the next carrier on the route beyond.- McDonald v. Western R. Co., 34 N. Y. 497.

As a general rule, the liability of a carrier terminates upon proper delivery to a connecting carrier.- Isham v. Erie R. Co., 112 App. Div. (N. Y.) 612, 98 N. Y. Supp. 609; McLendon v. Wabash R. Co., 119 Mo. App. 128, 95 S. W. 943.

Liability depends not upon the distance the goods are to be carried, the number of the carriers, or the marks upon the goods showing their ultimate destination, but upon the terms of the contract, and if by its terms the contract of the initial carrier covers all the lines between the point of shipment and the destination of the goods, then such carrier is liable for the faithful performance of duty by all the carriers, and each one is entitled to such exemption as is contained in the contract of carriage. But where the first carrier only contracts to carry to and deliver to another carrier, such connecting carrier is not entitled to any exemptions by virtue of that contract of carriage, and the fact that it was known at the time of shipment that the goods would go over different lines does not change the liability of the carrier unless it stipulate therefor.Robinson v. N. Y. & T. Ss. Co., 63 App. Div. (N. Y.) 211, 71 N. Y. Supp. 424.

That a clerk of the initial carrier stated to a shipper that the goods would be sent to their destination is not evidence of a special contract to transport the goods beyond the company's own lines.- Weis v. St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 97 N. Y. Supp. 993.

The receipt of goods marked for a destination beyond the terminus of the receiving carrier's line, without an express undertaking to deliver at that point, creates no liability on the initial carrier except to carry to its terminus and deliver to the connecting carrier.- McLagan v. Ch. & W. R. Co., 116 Iowa, 183, 89 N. W. 233.

[15] Limitation of liability on through shipments.

Effect of limitation by initial carrier to transportation within the state upon interstate character of shipment,-see ante, § 25, note [2].

If the carrier's contract is to transport the freight over its own route, and to deliver it to another carrier, the fact that the contract stipulates the charge for the entire distance does not make it a through contract, so as to entitle succeeding carriers to the benefit of the limitations of liability therein contained.- Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 49 N. Y. 616, affg. s. c. 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 480.

A stipulation in the contract that the carrier is not to be liable after the property is ready for delivery to the next carrier or to the consignee,