The term "railroad," as employed in our general legislation, relates to institutions of a quasi-public character, to highways or roads constructed by the authority of the state, with fixed metallic rails upon which public carriers may propel their carriages, or cars, speedily in the transportation of passengers and freights. Any way or road having these characteristics is a railroad.- McCleary v. Babcock, Ind., N. E. 453.

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[9] Various public services within the scope of the act defined. Elevation of grain not interstate commerce,- see post, § 25 note [5]. The business of elevating and storing grain is a public service.Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 857; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, affg. s. c. 69 Ill. 80.

66

The transportation" of freight, or of the subjects of commerce, for the purpose of exchange or sale, is a constituent of commerce itself. - Reading R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 232.

"Transporting, receiving, delivering, storage, or handling" of property includes demurrage.- Michie v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co., 151 Fed. 694.

The words "transportation," "charges," " receiving," and "accessorial services," as used in the Interstate Commerce Act, defined and applied.- Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 74 Fed. 803, affg. s. c. 57 Fed. 1005; affd., 167 U. S. 633, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 986.

"Elevation" signifies the unloading of grain from cars, or from grain-carrying vessels, into a grain elevator, and loading it out again after a period of not to exceed ten days.- Allowances to Elevators by C. Pac. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 99.

The "treatment," or grading, cleaning, and clipping, of grain, is not properly a part of "elevation," as the word is strictly used.Allowances to Elevators by U. Pac. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 99.

The retention of grain in an elevator longer than ten days is storage, not elevation.— Allowances to Elevators by U. Pac. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 99.

The Interstate Commerce Act does not apply to "transportation" by team or wagon, nor an arrangement entered into by a railroad for transportation of its freight or passengers by wagon.- Cory v. Eureka Springs R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 286.

An electric lighting corporation which uses the public streets, etc., is a public service corporation.- Armour Packing Co. v. Edison E. L. Co., 115 App. Div. (N. Y.) 51, 100 N. Y. Supp. 605.

66 Switching" or transfer service" occurs only in connection with transportation" of the freight over a railway, and where the entire

trans

service is rendered on spur-tracks of a railroad company it is portation" and not "switching," for which transportation and not switching charges may be made.- Dixon v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 110 Ga. 173, 35 S. E. 369.

[10] Depots and stations defined.

The word "depot" is not necessarily limited to a place provided for the convenience of passengers while waiting for the arrival or departure of trains. It applies also to buildings used for the receipt and storage of freight.- Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U. S. 304, 11 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 779.

The place where a railroad corporation is accustomed to receive, deposit and keep ready for transportation or delivery the merchandise carried by it is a "depot," within the general signification of the word. - Maghee v. Camden & A. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 514.

The words "depot or station " in the law mean a place at which trains stop, not merely for wood and water, but for the transaction of the ordinary business of the company, the receiving of and delivering of freight and passengers.- State v. New Haven & N. Co., 37 Conn. 153. A regular depot" or "station" is a fixed place on the line of the carrier, equipped with suitable buildings and furnished with the necessary officers and servants for the regular transaction of business, for the receipt and delivery of freight, and the comfort and convenience of passengers. Land v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 104 N. C. 48, 10

S. E. 80.

The term warehouses and depots" includes the entire station of the road, including the platforms for handling cotton, etc.- Hill & M. v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 7 Tex. Ct. R. 336, 812, 75 S. W. 874.

[11] Corporations as persons.

The word "person "" or "persons," used in a regulative statute as to public services, includes corporations.- Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 418, affg. s. c. 64 Fed. 165; Covington & L. Turnpike Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 198, revg. s. c. 14 Ky. L. R. 689, 20 S. W. 1031; Charlotte R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 12 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 255, affg. s. c. 27 S. C. 385, 4 S. E. 49; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 9 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 207; Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 8 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 737; Santa Clara Co. v. So. Pac. R. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1132; People v. Mulholland, 82 N. Y. 324, affg. s. c. 19 Hun (N. Y.), 548; U. S. Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 46.

[12] Effect of various forms of ownership and control upon power of state to regulate - In general.

Orders of Commission binding on successors of companies affected,see post, § 23, note [3].

Liability of trustees conducting railroad,- see post, § 40, note [1].

The law will strip a corporation of every disguise, and enforce a responsibility according to the very right, in despite of their artifices. -York & Md. R. Co. v. Winans, 17 How (U. S.) 30.

The manifest purpose of the statutes regulating interstate commerce is, as was said by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 10 Inters. Com. R. 385, to strike through all pretense, all ingenious device, to the substance of the transaction itself and the courts will recognize and give effect to such purpose.-U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrig. Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 145 Fed. 1007, 147 Fed. 169.

While a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons. Hence, where the transit company was organized and is owned by the officers and stockholders of another corporation, viz., the shipper, the latter will be considered as an association of individuals owning the former.-U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrig. Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 145 Fed. 1007, 147 Fed. 169.

[13]

Ownership of controlling amounts of stock.

Ownership of controlling amounts of the stock of a railroad and power to change the management, does not give present control of the corporate property and business.-Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Mo. Pac. Co., 115 U. S. 587, 6 Sup. Ct. R. 194.

"Operation or control" of a railroad, under N. Y. R. R. L., § 101, necessarily means the control of the operation of the road, and not merely a control of the corporation or individuals who operate it. A person or corporation owning a majority of stock in a corporation cannot be said to be in control of the management of the property of the corporation. "Control" means the direct operation or control of the specific railroad, and not the indirect control over a corporation which owns a road, by its stockholders.- Senior v. N. Y. City R. Co., 111 App. Div. 39, 97 N. Y. Supp. 645; affd. 187 N. Y. 559, 80 N. E. 1120. [14]

Leasing of operating rights.

Liability of lessor of a railroad for failure to see to it that lessee performs its public duties,- see post, § § 40, note [1].

Power of railroads to lease or consolidate,- see post, § 54, note [4]. Powers, duties and obligations of carriers as affected by lease.— see post, § 54, note [5].

A railroad corporation of one state, by leasing and operating a railroad in another state, subjects itself to such local legislation in the latter state as would have been applicable to the corporation owning the road, if no lease had been made.- Stone v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 116 U. S. 347, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 348, 388, 1191.

Where a corporation formed under the General Railroad Law has leased its lines without legislative authority, the lessees are, as to the public, to be regarded as the agents of the corporation, which is responsible to the public for the manner in which the road is operated. Abbott v. Johnstown, G. & K. H. R. Co., 80 N. Y. 27; distinguishing Norton v. Wiswall, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 618.

The lessee of a railroad is liable for its non-compliance with a statutory requirement as to fence-guards.- Tracy v. Troy & B. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 433, affg. s. c. 55 Barb. (N. Y.) 529.

The Seaboard Air Line R. Co., controlled the Florida West Shore Ry. Co., under a contract which gave the former "right, license or permission to operate" the latter, etc.- Held, that this brought the former within the regulative power of the state commission.- State v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 48 Fla. 129, 37 So. 314, affd. 203 U. S. 261, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 109.

The company owning a railroad is responsible for the acts of its lessees.- Nelson v. Vermont & C. R. Co., 26 Vt. 717.

Receiver of railroad a common carrier,- see ante, note [7].

Effect of receivership on proceedings before Commission,- see post, § 48, note [6].

Receivers not liable to penalties,- see post, § 56, note.

Effect of receivership on enforcement of orders of Commission,— see post, § 57, note [15].

Jurisdiction of the U. S. Circuit Court to appoint a receiver in cases of railroads engaged in interstate commerce exists by reason of diversity of citizenship of the parties to the litigation and not because the railroads are engaged in interstate commerce.- Re Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 219.

A receiver appointed by a federal court to take charge of a railroad must operate it according to the laws of the state in which he is operating it.- Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584, 20 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 819.

The maintenance and use of the property and franchise of a railroad in the hands of a receiver with a view to the public convenience is proper.- Miltenberger v. Logansport, C. & S. W. R. Co., 106 U. S. 286, 1 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 140.

The public have rights in a railroad with which a creditor or mortgagee cannot interfere. A court of equity ought in most cases to authorize a receiver of railroad property to keep it in repair and operate it so that the public may not suffer from a disuse of the franchise.—Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126.

Reorganization of a street railway system in hands of receivers discussed.- Merchants' L. & T. Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co., 158 Fed. 923.

Power of a court to transfer the property of a street railway company in the hands of receivers to a reorganization company by lease, operating agreement or otherwise.- Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago N. Traction Co., 158 Fed. 913.

The functions of the receivers of a street railway corporation are to hold the property intact, operating it as efficiently for the public service as their resources will permit, to ascertain the liabilities, marshal the assets, and eventually, unless in the meantime some entirely solvent concern able to liquidate all obligations and succeeding to owners' and lessee's interests shall appear to take it off their hands, to sell it to the best advantage and apply the proceeds ratably to the payment of the liabilities.- Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. N. Y. City R. Co., 157 Fed. 440.

The receivers of a street railroad company, in operating the property of such road, must first consider the traveling public. The service already performed by the roads must be kept up and improved so far as may be. Directions of the Public Service Commission should be carried out by the receivers so far as the income from operating the roads will permit. The receipts should be devoted first to maintenance and to operation. Next are certain fixed charges such as rentals, interest on bonds, etc.- Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. N. Y. City R. Co., 157 Fed. 440.

The assumption of the control of a railroad by a court through a receiver devolves upon that court a duty to the public in the continued operation of the road.- Townsend v. Oneonta, C. & R. S. R. Co., 88 App. Div. (N. Y.) 208, 84 N. Y. Sup. 427.

A receiver of a ferry company will not be allowed to discontinue the operation of a ferry so as to inconvenience the public although the ferry is being operated at a loss.- Knickerbocker Trust Company v. Brooklyn Ferry Co., Misc. (N. Y.) —, — N. Y. Sup.

The mere fact that the property of a railroad corporation may be in the hands of a receiver does not relieve the corporation from the operation of reasonable police regulations.- Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Russell, 115 Ill. 52, 3 N. E. 561.

The effect of the appointment of a receiver for a railroad corporation is simply to give him the temporary management of the railroad, under the direction of the court, instead of the manager appointed

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