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The regulation of the price of gas by the state or municipalities is not the exercise of a police power which cannot be abridged by contract. State ex rel. St. Louis v. Laclede Gas Co., 102 Mo. 472, 14 S. W. 974, 15 S. W. 383.

The charter of a gas company is a contract between it and the state, and if the charter empowers the company to fix the price of its product, subsequent legislative action, state or municipal, cannot diminish the rates so fixed.-State ex rel. St. Louis v. Laclede Gas Co., 102 Mo. 472, 14 S. W. 974, 15 S. W. 383.

The right to regulate tolls may be transferred by a legislature to a private corporation.- Sloan v. Pac. R. Co., 61 Mo. 24.

If rights bestowed by charter are inconsistent with, or embarrass the power which legislatures cannot part with, then such renunciation by the legislatures is of no avail, and does not bind their successors.— Sloan v. Pac. R. Co., 61 Mo. 24.

A state may, in chartering a corporation, deprive itself of the power to regulate or tax it.-St. Louis v. Boatmens' I. & T. Co., 47 Mo. 150.

[17]

Necessity for consideration for such grant.

Where a legislature makes an irrevocable grant of any essential prerogative of sovereignty, it must be upon consideration, and, in case of corporations, contemporaneous with the creation of the franchise.-Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140.

[18] - When exemption exists.

A city, having entered into a contract whereby a company was granted the right to furnish water to the inhabitants of that city at a price not to exceed a fixed maximum, cannot, by subsequent ordinances, rightfully violate the contract rights of the company in respect to the amount which the company may lawfully charge.— Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Water Co., 206 U. S. 496, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 762.

A contract between a city and a public service corporation as to rates does not bind the city for the term thereof to permit the specified rates to be charged even though they are no longer reasonable.Tampa W. W. v. Tampa, 199 U. S. 241, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 23.

A city ordinance providing that the rate of fare for one passenger shall not be more than five cents is a contract which gives the company the right to charge a rate of fare up to five cents, and the city can not reduce the five-cent rate established by the company without its consent.- Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' St. R. Co., 184 U. S. 368, 22 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 410.

The clause of the charter of a railroad corporation providing "that it shall be lawful for the company from time to time to fix,

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regulate, and to receive the toll and charges by them to be received for transportation," etc., does not grant to the company an exemption from the power of the state to control fares and freights.- Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 334, 388, 1191.

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A railroad was authorized by its charter "to demand and receive such sum or sums of money for the transportation of persons and property, and for the storage of property, as it shall deem reasonable." The Constitution of Wisconsin provides that all acts for the creation of corporations within the state may be altered or repealed by the legislature at any time after their passage."- Held, that the legislature had the power to limit the amount of charges for fares and freights.— Peik v. Ch. & N. W. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, affg. s. c. Fed. Cases, No, 11,138.

The charter received by a street railroad corporation from a city provided that the latter should not reduce fares below five cents. A later contract between the company and city provided that "in the construction, maintenance and operation" of its lines, the company should be subject to the present and future ordinances of the city.Held, that this did not enable the city to reduce fares below five cents. -Minneapolis St. R. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 155 Fed. 989.

The Texas statute of 1853, which authorizes the legislature to fix the rates to be charged by railroads, and provides that no reductions shall be made in the rates of a company unless, during the previous ten years, it shall have earned, above bona fide expenditures, a net profit of 12 per cent. per annum, does not create such a contract between the state and railroads subsequently incorporated thereunder, as to deprive the state of the right to adopt other measures of rate regulation, or exempt the corporations from the provisions of such future legislation.Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Storey, 149 Fed. 499.

A railroad which has received grants of land and right of way from the government and is declared by various acts of Congress to be a post and military route and national highway for postal, military and other governmental services, is not free from state regulation as to rates.- St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark 101, 15 S. W. 18, 11 L. R. A. 452n, affd. on other points, 156 U. S. 649, 15 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 484.

An ordinance fixing the rates of a water company for a period of thirty years did not give the right to charge such rates during that period, as the ordinance was simply a declaration on the part of the village that such rates were reasonable at that time.- Rogers Park W. Co. v. Fergus, 178 Ill. 571, 53 N. E. 363.

Although a railroad was incorporated under a law which authorized it to regulate the time and manner in which property should be trans

ported and the compensation to be paid therefor, the legislature may still regulate rates and service thereon.- Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 38 Ind. App. 439, 78 N. E. 338.

The charter of the B. & O. Railroad provided that it might, in addition to its main line, construct lateral lines "in any direction whatsoever,"-Held, that an act which provides that no tracks for a steam railway shall be laid within certain territory is void as to it, as impairing the obligation of contract.- Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Waters, 105 Md. 396, 66 Atl. 685.

An act fixing the maximum charges to be made by railroads is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contract, where the charter of a railroad merely gives the right to make some charge but does not give the right to make any charge it may see fit.- Blake v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 19 Minn. 418, affd. 94 U. S. 180.

While the charter of a private corporation is admitted to be a contract which the legislature cannot, without the consent of the corporation, alter in any material respect, the provision of a railroad charter fixing the maximum charge for the transportation of passengers or freight is in legal effect nothing more than a license, which may at any time be changed by legislative enactment.- Railroad Co. v. Transp. Co., 25 W. Va. 324.

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The charter of a railroad does not exempt it from the operation of subsequently adopted constitutional provisions, but an express contract between the state and the company is necessary to accomplish that result. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, 22 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 95.

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Exemption from legislative control as to rates can be derived from a corporate charter only by language so clear and unmistakable that it cannot be reasonably construed consistently with the reservation of the power by the state.-Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 9 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 47, affg. s. c. 70 Ga. 694.

The power to limit the amount of charges by railroad companies for transportation is a power of government and if it can be transferred at all, it can only be by words of positive grant, or something which is in law equivalent.- Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. R. (U. S.) 334, 388, 1191.

Every presumption is that the state has not, in granting a charter to a public service corporation, renounced or restricted its right to regulate the rates and service of such corporation.-Stone v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 62 Miss. 607.

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The franchise or contract between the state and a corporation, by which the latter secures certain immunity from the exercise of governmental authority, is personal, and cannot be assigned or transferred unless the state by the same or a subsequent law authorizes such transfer.- Rochester R. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U. S. 236, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 469, affg. s. c. 182 N. Y. 99, 74 N. E. 953, 70 L. R. A. 773.

A corporation cannot receive by transfer from another corporation an exemption from state interference which is inconsistent with its own charter or with the constitution or laws of the state then applicable, even though, under legislative authorization, the exemption is. transferred by words which clearly include it.- Rochester R. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U. S. 236, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 469, affg. s. c. 182 N. Y. 99, 74 N. E. 953, 70 L. R. A. 773.

The rule that a special statutory exemption from control as to rates, etc., does not pass to a new corporation succeeding others by consolidation or purchase, in the absence of express direction to that effect in the statute, is applicable where the constitutent companies are held and operated by one of them, under legislative authority.- People's Gas L. & C. Co. v. Chicago, 194 U. S. 1, 24 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 520, affg. s. c. 114 Fed. 384

A special statutory exemption or privilege, such as immunity from taxation or a right to fix and determine rates of fare, does not accompany the property in its transfer to the purchaser, in the absence of express direction to that effect in the statute.- St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 15 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 484, affg. s. c. 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18, 11 L. R. A. 452n; Chicago U. Traction Co. v. City of Chicago, 199 Ill. 484, 65 N. E. 451, 59 L. R. A. 631.

The immunity from taxation which a railroad corporation enjoys does not pass to the purchaser of the property of such corporation, except with the consent of the legislature.- Wilson v. Gaines, 103 C. S. 417, affg. s. c. 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 546.

[21] - Effect of reorganization or consolidation.

A corporation formed by the consolidation of existing corporations is subject to the constitution and laws as existing at the time of consolidation, and exemptions enjoyed by the constituent companies do not continue in favor of the new corporation if the constitution at that time forbids exemptions.- Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Vicksburg, 209 U. S. 358, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 510.

While two street railway corporations may be so united by one of them taking over the stock and franchises of the other, that the latter may continue to exist and also to hold an exemption under its fran

chise, that is not the case where its stock is exchanged for that of the former and by operation of law it is left without stock, officers, property or franchises. Under such circumstances, it is dissolved by operation of the law which brings about this condition.- Rochester R. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U. S. 236, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 469, affg. s. c. 182 N. Y. 99, 74 N. E. 953, 70 L. R. A. 773.

Where, after a new constitution has been adopted, a railway previously incorporated consolidates with other roads or accepts new privileges from the state, all franchises and privileges acquired are taken subject to the provisions of the new constitution.- San Antonio Traction Co. v. Altgelt, 200 U. S. 304, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 261.

The right of a railroad to charge fare at a specified rate per mile, secured to it by special act, is a privilege or franchise in the nature of property, is alienable, and is not lost by the subsequent consolidation of the road into a general system.- Parker v. Elmira, C. & N. R. Co., 165 N. Y. 274, 59 N. E. 81, affg. s. c. 27 App. Div. (N. Y.) 383, 49 N. Y. Supp. 1127.

A corporation reorganized under the reorganization acts of 1874 and 1876 is an entirely new and different corporation from the original one.- People ex rel. Schurz v. Cook, 110 N. Y. 443, 18 N. E. 113.

A railroad corporation which is the successor of one which had the general right to fix its rates, is nevertheless subject to a state statute, passed before the reorganization, requiring the issuance of mileage books at a prescribed price.- Horton v. Erie R. Co., 86 App. Div. (N. Y.) 379, 83 N. Y. Supp. 733, 65 App. Div. (N. Y.) 587, 72 N. Y. Supp. 1018.

[22] Source and extent of state legislative power.

The legislature of a state does not look to the state constitution for power to pass laws regulating public service companies, but only to determine whether the sovereign legislative will has been in any manner restricted or limited by that instrument.- Platt v. Le Cocq, 150 Fed. 391.

The question whether an act is a valid exercise of legislative power is to be determined solely by reference to constitutional restraints and prohibitions. The legislative power has no other limitation. An act will not be declared void because deemed to be opposed to natural justice and equity.- Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509.

An act within the legitimate exercise of legislative power is valid, unless some restriction or limitation is found in the constitution.People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401.

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