Every regulation which is an impediment to celerity in the transportation of passengers or freight imposes a burden on commerce, and every such regulation of interstate commerce is void, if undertaken by a state. Council Bluffs v. K. C. St. J. & B. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 338. Every obstacle to transportation and every burden laid upon it by legislative authority is "regulation."― Railroad Comrs. v. R. Co., 22 S. C. 220.

[14]

Statutes relating to rates and charges.

Long and short haul statute as a regulation of interstate commerce,— see post, § 36, note [9].

While a state regulation forbidding discrimination in rates within the state may affect commerce generally, such a result is too remote to be regarded as an interference with interstate commerce.- Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, 22 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 95.

Mileage book statutes applying only to transportation wholly within the state, are not regulations of interstate commerce but are a valid exercise of the regulative power of the state.- Purdy v. Erie R. Co., 162 N. Y. 42, 56 N. E. 503, 48 L. R. A. 669, affg. s. c. 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 643, 54 N. Y. Supp. 1114.

An Indiana act permitting shippers to recover excessive charges on shipments beginning within the state but going interstate, is valid, and not a regulation of interstate commerce.- Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Wolcott, 141 Ind. 267, 39 N. E. 451.

It is not sufficient objection to a state statute compelling the issuance of mileage books, that it may incidentally affect commerce between the states, if it does not attempt to regulate such commerce.- AttorneyGeneral v. Old Colony R. Co., 160 Mass. 62, 35 N. E. 252, 22 L. R. A. 112.

A statute of Maryland providing that the defendant road should not after a certain date permit its tracks to connect with those of the B. & O. R. Co., unless the latter road should, before that date, so arrange its freight charges upon coal delivered to it from the defendant road for shipment over its lines that the combined charges of the two roads should not exceed the lowest total freight charges upon coal shipped to the same destination over the line of the B. & O., or roads leased or operated by it from any point in Pennsylvania or West Virginia which was as far distant from such destination as the point at which such coal is delivered to the defendant, is invalid as a state regulation of interstate commerce.- State v. Cumberland & P. R. Co., —Md. 66 Atl. 458.

An act fixing a maximum rate of 22 cents per mile for passenger transportation is not unconstitutional as regulating interstate com

merce, if it applies only to trips wholly within the state.- Commissioner of Railroads v. Wabash R. Co., 123 Mich. 669, 82 N. W. 526; affd. 126 Mich. 113, 85 N. W. 466.

A state statute which provides that any carrier which charges "any greater toll or compensation for the transportation, receipt, handling," etc., "of goods or merchandise in violation of the provisions of this act," shall forfeit a certain sum, is void in so far as it attempts to fix rates on interstate shipments.— Jennings v. Big Sandy & C. R. Co., – W. Va. —, 57 S. E. 272.

[15]

Statutes and orders relating to service, facilities and accommodations.

Compelling erection of tracks to facilitate transfer of cars, freight and passengers between connecting carriers not a regulation of interstate commerce,- see post, § 35, note [10].

Whether statute requiring furnishing of cars is a regulation of interstate commerce,- see post, § 37, note [14].

Any command of a state, whether made directly or through the instrumentality of a railroad commission, which orders, or the necessary effect of which is to order the stopping of an interstate train at a given station, is void if it directly regulates interstate commerce.— Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 121, revg. s. c. 74 S. C. 80, 54 S. E. 224.

When an order made under state authority, requiring the stopping of an interstate train at a named point, is assailed as an attempted state regulation of interstate commerce, the question whether such order is void as a direct regulation of such commerce may be tested by considering the nature of the order, the character of the interstate train to which it applies, its necessary and direct effect upon the operation of such train and the adequacy of the local facilities existing at the station where the interstate train has been commanded to stop.- Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 121, revg. s. c, 74 S. C. 80, 54 S. E. 224.

If a railroad is furnishing a locality with proper facilities, an order of a state commission that it stop more trains there, including interstate trains, is an unlawful interference with interstate commerce, but not otherwise.- Mississippi R. Commission v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 203 U. S. 335, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 90.

An order of the North Carolina Corporation Commission requiring a railroad to deliver cars from another state to the consignee on a private siding beyond its own right of way is a burden on interstate commerce, and hence void.- McNeill v. So. R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722.

A state statute requiring the furnishing of cars upon application, having been construed by the courts of that state to apply to applications for cars for shipments out of the state, is an attempt to regulate interstate commerce and is beyond the police power of the state.Houston &T. C. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 491.

The separate coach law of Kentucky, being operative only within the state, and having been construed by its supreme court as applicable only to intrastate commerce, is not an infringement upon the exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.- - Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 21 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 101.

A statute requiring a through train from St. Louis to New York to stop at an Illinois country seat which has already adequate facilities from the defendant railroad, is an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. The distinction between it and a statute as to speed, safety and signal devices, stoppage at drawbridges and similar provisions contributing to the safety, comfort and convenience of patrons, is obvious.- Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 20 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722, revg. s. c. 175 Ill. 359, 51 N. E. 842; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1096, revg. s. c. 143 Ill. 434, 33 N. E. 173, 19 L. R. A. 119.

An Ohio statute requiring all trains, including interstate trains, to stop at places of more than 3,000 inhabitants, is within the powers of the state, and is not a regulation of interstate commerce.- Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 19 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 465, affg. s. c. 8 Ohio Circ. Ct. 220.

A state statute requiring every railroad to stop at all county seats all its regular passenger trains running wholly within the state, is not a regulation or unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce, as applied to a train connecting with an interstate train.- Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 430, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 627, affg. s. c. 57 Minn. 385, 59 N. W. 487.

A Mississippi statute, requiring all passenger railroads aside from street railroads to provide equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races, having been construed by the supreme court of the state to apply solely to commerce within the state, is not in violation of the commerce clause of the U. S. Constitution.- Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, 10 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 348, affg. s. c. 66 Miss. 662, 5 L. R. A. 132.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana having decided that a state law requires all carriers of passengers to make no distinctions as to race, color, etc., and that this applies to interstate traffic while within the state, such law is unconstitutional in so far as it relates to transportation be

tween the states, for it is a regulation of interstate commerce, within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.- Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, revg. s. c. 27 La. Ann. 1.

A state may enact that all carriers of coal therein shall provide track connections with all mines within its borders, even though such connections are to be used for interstate as well as state traffic.- Red Rock F. Co. v. B. & O. R. Co., 11 Inters. Com. R. 438.

An act of Tennessee providing that all railroads within the state shall provide separate equal accommodations for white and colored persons, to which conductors must assign passengers, is, in its application to a passenger journeying from one state to another upon an interstate railroad line, an invasion of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.- Carrey v. Spencer, 36 N. Y. Supp. 886.

A state act requiring separate coaches for white and colored passengers is void as to interstate trains, but otherwise valid.- Hart v. State, 100 Md. 596, 60 Atl. 457.

Laws of a state providing for equal separate accommodations to white and colored persons are a valid exercise of state authority although they affect and impose burdens upon interstate commerce.- Smith v. State, 100 Tenn. 494, 46 S. W. 566, 41 L. R. A. 432.

A Texas statute providing that any carrier subject to the act shall be liable for unjust discrimination, does not apply to discriminations as to the delivery of freight shipped from another state. Fielder v. Mo. K. & T. R. Co., 92 Tex. 176, 46 S. W. 633.

A state statute imposing a penalty upon a carrier for failure to furnish cars within six days after written demand therefor by a shipper, is void as a regulation of interstate commerce.- Texas & P. R. Co. v. Allen, 17 Texas Ct. R. 256, 98 S. W. 450.

A state statute providing for penalties for the failure of a railroad corporation to furnish cars on demand, is valid as to intrastate commerce although invalid as to interstate commerce.- Allen v. Tex. & P. R. Co.,

Tex. —, 101 S. W. 792.

A state cannot regulate discrimination between individuals as to terminal facilities and necessary switching of cars and delivery at terminal points, with respect to freight brought from another state.Fielder v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 42 S. W. 362.

[16]

Statutes relative to conduct of business.

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. 209, chap. 647) prohibits any combination whatever to secure action which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce between the states, or restricts, in that regard, the liberty of a trader to engage in business. This act is broader in application than the prohibition of restraints of trade at common law. If the purpose of a combination is to prevent any inter

state transportation of an article, the fact that the means operated at one end before physical transportation began and at the other after the physical transportation had ended is immaterial. The Act cannot be held inapplicable because the defendants were not themselves engaged in interstate commerce.- Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U.S.) 301.

Any rule prescribed for the conduct of interstate commerce, in order to be within the competency of Congress under its power to regulate commerce among the states, must have some real and substantial relation to or connection with the commerce regulated. There is not such a relationship between the membership of an employee of a railroad company in a labor organization and the carrying on of interstate commerce as will enable Congress, in the regulation of interstate commerce, to make it a criminal offense for a railroad company engaging in interstate commerce or any officer or agent of the same to unjustly discriminate against any employee on account of his membership in a labor organization. Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 277.

The rules prescribed for the construction of railways, and for their management and operation, designed to protect persons and property, are strictly within the scope of the local law.- Chicago, M. & St. P. R, Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 289.

The Georgia legislature forbid running of freight trains on Sunday, and defendant was indicted under that statute.- Held, that although the law to a limited extent affects interstate commerce, it is not a regulation of interstate commerce, nor an invasion of federal jurisdiction, but a police regulation sustained by the Constitution, and will be upheld in the absence of Congressional legislation. Nothing in the act shows it was intended as a regulation of interstate commerce.-Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1086, affg. s. c. 90 Ga. 396, 7 S. E. 1009.

A state statute which requires from the agent of every express company not incorporated under the laws of that state, a license before he can carry on any business for the said company within that state, and also requires a statement to be filed in the auditor's office showing that the company is possessed of an actual capital of $150,000, exclusive of stock notes, is void as a regulation of interstate commerce.— · Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 11 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 851.

A state statute requiring engineers to be examined as to color signals, etc., is within the power of the state, even as to interstate trains.— Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 9 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 28, affg. s. c. 83 Ala. 71, 3 So. 702.

An Alabama act requiring the examination and licensing of all railway engineers is not a regulation of interstate commerce.- Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 564.