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16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 714, affg. s. c. 97 Ky. 675, 17 Ky. L. R. 427, 31 S. W. 476.

The 14th amendment to the U. S. Constitution cannot be invoked to limit the police power of a state.-- Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 357.

The police power only begins where the Constitution ends, and the police power of the state, broad as it is, cannot sustain a legislative act which infringes constitutional guaranties.- Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330, 75 N. E. 404.

Acts passed to protect the public safety, health, comfort, etc., are within the legislative discretion, and not subject to judicial review, if legitimately intended for the purposes indicated.- People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343.

The legislative authority to make regulations for the public health, safety, etc., is subject to judicial scrutiny whether it infringes constitutional guaranties.- In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, affg. s. c. 33 Hun (N. Y.), 374.

It is always a judicial question if any particular regulation is a valid exercise of police power, though the authority of the courts to declare a regulation invalid will be exercised with the utmost caution, and only when it is clear that the ordinance or law declared void passes the limits of the police power and infringes upon rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In re Smith, 143 Cal. 368, 77 Pac. 180.

The Fencing Act is a police regulation to which railroads are subjected by the sovereignty of the state; and it is not within the rightful jurisdiction of any court, state or federal, to arrest the operation of such a law. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Russell, 115 Ill. 52, 3 N. E. 561.

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Whether courts will review the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission on mixed questions of law and fact. See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 206 U. S. 441, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 700, affg. s. c. 10 Inters. Com. R. 505.

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An order merely equalizing rates is not open to the objection that it compels a carrier to do business at a loss, and so takes his property without due process of law. Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 256, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 108, affg. s. c. 48 Fla. 146, 37 So. 657; Seaboard Air L. R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 109, affg. s. c. 48 Fla. 129, 37 So. 314, 48 Fla. 150, 37 So. 658.

The judiciary ought not to interfere with the collection of rates established under legislative sanction, unless they are so plainly and palpably unreasonable as to make their enforcement a taking of property without

just compensation.- San Diego Land Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 19 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 804, affg. s. c. 74 Fed. 79.

The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination.- Chicago & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 462, 702, revg. s. c. 38 Minn. 281, 37 N. W. 782.

Courts will not attempt to formulate and prescribe a course of business as to rates and facilities.- Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 542, 628, revg. s. c. 10 Fed. 210, 869, revg. s. c. 2 Fed. 465, 18 Fed. 517.

The Interstate Commerce Act is not unconstitutional as attempting to vest judicial powers in the Interstate Commerce Commission, as that law does not purport to deprive the courts of their jurisdiction at the suit of a shipper to ultimately determine the question of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a rate.-U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Fed. 305.

The functions of a state railroad commission vested with power to fix rates, etc., are not so purely legislative as to make it not amenable to the control of the courts when it attempts to enforce unjust rates.— Southern Pac. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 78 Fed. 236.

The reasonableness of rates fixed by a municipal ordinance as maximum rates for gas companies is a matter for judicial determination and review.- Capital City Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 72 Fed. 818.

The right of judicial interference with rates exists only when the schedule established will fail to secure to the owners of the property some income or compensation from their investment. As to the amount of such compensation, the legislature is the sole judge. Whether by reducing compensation to a minimum, railroad enterprises shall be discouraged, or by enlarging, encouraged, is a matter for legislative, not judicial determination.- Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866, 1 L. R. A. 744n.

The provision of the N. Y. Gas and El. Com. Act that the rates fixed by the Commission shall be the maximum price for three years and until upon complaint the Commission shall fix a new price is a violation of the fourteenth amendment to the U. S. Constitution.- Village of Saratoga v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693, revg. s. c. 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 203, 107 N. Y. Sup. 341.

Whether the elevated and steam surface railroads within a city should be placed upon the same basis with street surface railroads as to fares and the transfer of passengers, is for the determination of the legisla ture, not the courts.- People v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 187 N. Y. 48, 79 N. E. 838.

If the power to legislate to fix a rate exists, the court has nothing to do with the policy or wisdom of the interference in the particular case, or with the question of the adequacy or inadequacy of the compensation authorized.- People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 22 N. E. 670, 682, 5 L. R. A. 559n; affd. 143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 468.

The claim that a rate fixed by the legislature is excessive is a thing to be addressed to the next legislature, not to the courts.- Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York, 115 App. Div. (N. Y.) 69, 100 N. Y. Supp. 625; affd. 188 N. Y. 334, 81 N. E. 141.

When the legislature has fixed the maximum rate which a public service corporation may charge, the courts have no power to inquire whether the statutory rate is excessive.- Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York, 115 App. Div. (N. Y.) 69, 100 N. Y. Supp. 625; affd. 188 N. Y. 334, 81 N. E. 141.

A corporation may at any time have recourse to the state or federal courts to test the validity of an enactment of the legislature prescribing or regulating the rates to be charged for gas, upon the ground that it is so low that it will deprive the stockholders of the right to a reasonable profit.- Richman v. Consolidated Gas Co., 114 App. Div. (N. Y.) 216, 100 N. Y. Supp. 81; affd. 186 N. Y. 209, 78 N. E. 871. An order of the state Board of Railroad Commissioners that a railroad furnish certain accommodations for freight may be reviewed by the court as to its justice and reasonableness. People v. D. & H. C. Co., 32 App. Div. (N. Y.) 120, 52 N. Y. Supp. 850; affd. 165 N. Y. 362, 59 N. E. 138.

The court has no right to interfere with rates fixed by legislative authority, solely on the ground of their unreasonableness. Fraud, arbitrary action, and violation of constitutional guaranties are the sole grounds for equitable interference.- Spring Valley W. W. v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. 286, 22 Pac. 910, 6. L. R. A. 756.

The power of the legislative department to regulate the compensation charged for public services by franchise-holding corporations is subject to the limitation that such compensation must be reasonable, and it is a proper subject of judicial inquiry and determination whether under the guise of regulation such compensation has not been made so inadequate as to practically result in confiscation.— Leadville Water Co. v. Leadville, 22 Col. 297, 45 Pac. 362.

In an appeal to the courts from an action of a state railroad commission, the court has to determine (1) whether the rates were fixed in due form; (2) whether the law under which the commission acted is valid; (3) whether the rates themselves are reasonable and hence valid.- Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. Hunt, - Ind. App., 79 N. E. 927.

The final test of the reasonableness of rates fixed by a state commission is with the judiciary.—Stone v. N. J. & C. R. Co., 62 Miss. 646. The courts have no general supervisory jurisdiction over passenger and freight rates.- Raritan R. R. Co. v. Middlesex & S. T. Co., 70 N. J. L. 732, 58 Atl. 332.

Under the Texas statute, the courts may review as to their reasonableness, the rates fixed by the state Railroad Commission, even though it is not contended that such rates are confiscatory or violative of constitutional guaranties.- Railroad Commission of Texas v. Weld, 7 Tex. Ct. R. 122, 73 S. W. 529, revg. s. c. 3 Tex. Ct. R. 805, 4 Tex. Ct. R. 302, 68 S. W. 1117.

It is for the courts to determine whether rates and regulations prescribed under legislative authority are reasonable and proper- City of Madison v. Madison Gas & Elect. Co., 129 Wis. 249, 108 N. W. 65.

[10] Judicial restraint of orders-In general.

The judiciary ought not to interfere with rates fixed under legislative authority unless they are so plainly unreasonable as to make their enforcement equivalent to the taking of property for public use without such compensation as, under the circumstances, is just both to the owner and the public.- San Diego L. & T. Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 19 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 804, affg. 74 Fed. 79; Cedar Rapids W. Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa, 234, 91 N. W. 1081.

Courts have the power to inquire whether a body of rates prescribed by legislative authority is unjust and unreasonable and such as to work a practical destruction of rights of property, and if found so to be, to restrain its operation.- Covington & L. Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 198.

A court of equity cannot properly interfere with, or in advance restrain, the discretion of a governmental body in the exercise of legislative powers granted to it by the state.- New Orleans W. W. Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 471, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 161.

There is a remedy in the courts for relief against legislation establishing a tariff of rates which is so unreasonable as to practically destroy the property of companies engaged in the carrying business, by making it impossible to earn fair returns thereon.- St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 15 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 484, affg. 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18, 11 L. R. A. 452n.

A court of equity may restrain the enforcement of rates found unreasonable, but has no power to fix new ones, or to enjoin a commission from establishing new ones.- Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1047.

Federal courts have jurisdiction to set aside or suspend an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which results from misconception or misapplication of the law to conceded or undisputed facts. Decision of the U. S. Circuit Court of the 8th Circuit, June 30, 1908, - Fed. A state railroad commission is subject to suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in respect to its orders, rules and regulations.- Central of Ga. R. Co. v. McLendon, 157 Fed. 961.

It is not unnatural that a body having the powers of a corporation commission should imagine itself the state, but it is in reality a mere agency of the state, and may be restrained from executing an unconstitutional act, or from doing an unconstitutional thing under a constitutional act.- Southern R. Co. v. Greensboro I. & C. Co., 134 Fed. 82; affd. 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722.

The judiciary ought not to interfere with rates established under legislative sanction, where the body making the rate has the power to act, unless they are plainly and palpably so unreasonable as to make their enforcement equivalent to depriving the complainant of reasonable returns on its investment.- Palatka Waterworks v. City of Palatka, 127 Fed. 161.

The courts may enjoin the enforcement of rates made by a state railroad commission.- Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Brown, 123 Fed. 946. Whether rates complained of, made by a state commission, are reasonable, etc., is not open to judicial inquiry, in a suit to enjoin the discretionary action of the commissioners in fixing such rates.— Railroad Comrs. v. Pensacola & A. R. Co., 24 Fla. 417, 5 So. 129, 2 L. R. A. 504.

The courts may determine, on an application for an injunction, whether the rates fixed by legislative authority as the maximum charges for gas are just and reasonable.- People's Gas L. & C. Co. v. Hale, 94 Ill. App. 406.

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An order merely equalizing rates should not be enjoined on the ground that it compels a carrier to do business at a loss and so takes his property without due process of law.- Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 256, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 108, affg. s. c. 48 Fla. 146, 37 So. 657; Seaboard Air L. R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 109, affg. s. c. 48 Fla. 129, 37 So. 314, 48 Fla. 150, 37 So. 658.

That failure to obey an unauthorized and void order of a state railroad commission would subject the company to large numbers of individual actions and heavy penalties, gives a court jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of the order, to avoid multiplicity of suits and afford a more efficacious remedy than could be had at law.― Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith, 128 Fed. 1.

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