cision already made.- Riddle Co. v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 773, 1 I. C. C. R. 490.

In the absence of statutory authorization, the New York Board of Railroad Commissioners cannot subsequently reconsider or review its action in granting permission to a street railroad to change its motive power. Such permission is in the nature of a franchise.- People ex rel Luckings v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 30 App Div. (N. Y.) 69, 51 N. Y. Supp. 781, affg. 156 N. Y. 693, 51 N. E. 1093.

It seems that the N. Y. Public Service Commission for the Second District has no power to review a final determination of the former Board of Railroad Commissioners.- Petition of the Town Board of Cornwall. Decided by the N. Y. Public Service Commission of the Second District, Feb. 18, 1908.

:

Whether an order made by the former Board of Railroad Commissioners was within the powers of such Board is purely a question of law which the Public Service Commission has no power to determine.Petition of the Town Board of Cornwall. Decided by the N. Y. Public Service Commission of the Second District, Feb. 18, 1908.

[3] When a prior decision will be modified or reversed.

In a case where the relation in freight rates determines where and how business shall be done, the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission fixing or approving a given relation should be reversed only for imperative reasons.— Board of R. R. Comrs. v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co.; 8 Inters. Com. R. 304.

The Interstate Commerce Commission will reverse its decision upon a rehearing, if the new and additional evidence calls for such a reversal.— Bates v. Pa. R. Co., 3 Inters. Com. R 296, 4 I. C. C. R. 281, revg. s. c. 2 Inters. Com. R. 608, 732, 734, 715, 3 I. C. C. R. 435.

[4] Right to rehearing.

The provision of the New York Gas and El. Com. Act that the rates fixed by the Commission shall be the maximum prices for three years and until upon complaint the Commission shall fix a new price, is invalid. To give the corporation no opportunity or right to apply for a rehearing or a new adjustment of rates violates the fourteenth amendment to the U. S. Constitution.- Village of Saratoga v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693, revg. s. c. 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 203, 107 N. Y. Supp. 341.

§ 23. Service and effect of orders;* [grounds for their suspension or abrogation].- Every order of a commission shall be served upon every person or corporation to be affected thereby, either by personal delivery of a certified copy thereof, or by mailing a certified copy thereof, in a sealed package with postage prepaid, to the person to be affected thereby or, in the case of a corporation, to any officer or agent thereof upon whom a summons may be served in accordance with the provisions of the code of civil procedure. It shall be the duty of every person and corporation to notify the commission forthwith, in writing, of the receipt of the certified copy of every order so served, and in the case of a corporation such notification must be signed and acknowledged by a person or officer duly authorized by the corporation to admit such service. Within a time specified in the order of the commission every person and corporation upon whom it is served must if so required in the order notify the commission in like manner whether the terms of the order are accepted and will be obeyed. Every order of a commission shall take effect at a time therein specified and shall continue in force for a period therein designated unless earlier modified or abrogated by the commission or unless such order be unauthorized by this or any other act or be in violation of a provision of the constitution of the state or of the United States.

Provisions as to service and effect of reports and orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission,- see Interst. Com. Act, §§ 14-16, post, Appendix B.

Parallel provisions with reference to the former Board of Railroad Commissioners,- see N. Y. R. R. L., §§ 160-162.

Application for rehearing shall not operate to stay or postpone enforcement of an order of a Commission,- see ante, § 22.

Order of Commission as to switch and sidetrack connections,- see post, § 27, subd. 2.

Order of Commission prescribing changes in the form of schedules of rates, etc.,- see post, § 28.

Order of Commission allowing changes in rates on less than 30 days' notice thereof,- see post, § 29.

Order of Commission permitting a lesser charge for longer than shorter distances in special cases,- see post, § 36.

Order of Commission relieving a carrier from the necessity of having sufficient cars and motive power, etc,- see post, § 37.

• Words in brackets are not a part of section heading as enacted.—Ed.

Order of Commission regulating the distribution of freight cars to shippers, the switching, loading, unloading and weighing the same and demurrage charges thereon,- see post, § 37.

Investigations by Commission to determine whether carriers are complying with the provisions of this Act and orders of the Commission,- see ante, § 45, subd. 2.

Order of Commission prescribing the form of the annual reports of corporations subject to this Act,- see post, §§ 46, 66.

Procedure in an investigation in which an order is to be issued,— see post §§ 48, 72.

Service of orders of Commission,- see also post, § 49.

Order of Commission fixing rates and service,- see post, § 49.

Order of Commission establishing through routes and joint rates,— see post, $ 49.

Order of Commission prescribing the division of joint rates,- see post, § 49.

Order of Commission for repairs or changes in tracks, terminals, motive power, etc.,- see post, § 50.

Order of Commission for changes in time schedules, or the running of additional cars and trains,- see post, § 51.

Order of Commission establishing a uniform system of accounts to be used by corporations subject to this Act,- see post, §§ 52, 66, subd. 4.

Order of Commission granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity, see post, § 53.

Order of Commission approving of transfers of franchises of stock of corporations subject to this Act,- see post, §§ 54, 70.

Order of Commission approving issuance of stocks, bonds, and other forms of indebtedness,- see post, §§ 55, 69.

Summary proceedings to enforce orders of Commission,- see post, §§ 57, 74.

General rules of statutory construction,— see ante, § 1, notes [23]-[40]. Power of federal courts to review the construction put upon state statutes by state courts,- see ante, § 1, note [33].

Right of Commission to appear by counsel on an appeal from its decision, see ante, § 12, note.

Rehearing before Commission,- see ante, § 22, notes [1]-[3].

Burden of proof on appeal from order requiring building of connecting switch,- see post, § 35, note [37].

Power of courts to revise order refusing relief from long and short haul rule,- see post, § 36, note [18].

Judicial enforcement of orders,- see post, § 57, notes.

[1] Effect of orders-Validity presumed.

It will be presumed that a state railroad commission, in fixing a rate, acted with a full knowledge of the situation, and its conclusions will not

be upset unless shown affirmatively to be erroneous.- Seaboard Air L. R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 109, affg. s. c. 48 Fla. 129, 37 So. 314, 48 Fla. 150, 37 So. 658.

Rates fixed by a state commission are presumptively reasonable, and the burden is on the carrier to show the contrary.- Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 22 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 900, affg. s. c. So Minn. 191, 83 N. W. 60.

Where a railroad commission has fixed rates without full and complete inquiry into the facts, there is no presumption that the rates so fixed are in fact reasonable and just.- Cumberland T. & T. Co. v. R. R. Comm., 156 Fed. 823.

Section 5 of the act creating the Texas Railroad Commission provided that rates fixed by it shall be held conclusive, until finally found otherwise. The constitutionality of the provision discussed but not decided. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1047.

A provision giving a prima facie or conclusive force to rates fixed by a state commission, if unconstitutional, will not invalidate the power of the commission to fix rates, nor the rates fixed by the commission.— Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct R. (U. S.) 1047.

To give a commission power to fix rates which shall be final and conclusive and deny the carrier the right to question in court the reasonableness of the rates, is unconstitutional.- Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. ▾ Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 462, 702, revg. s. c. 38 Minn. 281, 37 N. W. 782.

While a rate fixed by a state railroad commission is subject to judicial review, there is no presumption to begin with that it is invalid, but the contrary.- Central of Ga. R. Co. v. McLendon, 155 Fed. 974.

Rates fixed by a state commission are prima facie reasonable.- Seaboard Air L. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 155 Fed. 792.

A bill seeking to restrain the enforcement of two statutes regulating rates and an order of the Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission promulgated under the authority of a legislative act, is not multifarious, since the order has the same effect as a legislative act, and all the matters sought to be restrained amount to legislation that has been put forth by the state.- Perkins v. No. Pac. R. Co., 155 Fed. 445.

Prima facie it is to be presumed that the rate fixed by the state to be charged for gas is a proper one, and the burden is on the complainant to show it is not.- Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. 150.

Rates fixed by a commission authorized so to do, are presumptively reasonable.- Matthews v. Board of Corp. Comrs., 106 Fed. 7.

The word "fix," used as to rates of a gas campany, means to make fast, firm and immovable, and makes the action of the tribunal conclusive, in the absence of fraud or gross misconduct amounting to bad faith.— Logansport & W. V. Gas. Co. v. Peru, 89 Fed. 185.

The presumption that a rate fixed by Congress is reasonable cannot be overcome except by a showing as to receipts and expenses over an adequate period.- Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. U. S., 76 Fed. 186.

An act authorizing a state railroad commission to fix just and reasonable rates and making the order of the commission conclusive evidence of the reasonableness of such rates, would be unconstitutional; but an act making such order "sufficient" evidence will not be overthrown, in the absence of a holding by the state court that "sufficient" in the act means conclusive. Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Trammell, 53 Fed. 196.

The presumption is, in proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission, that the rates fixed by a state railroad commission are reasonable, and the burden of proof is on the carriers to show the contrary. - Bradham v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 11 Inters. Com. R. 464

The presumption is in favor of the reasonableness of an ordinance requiring a street railway to run cars at specified intervals, and the burden is on the company to show the contrary.- Mayor v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co., 133 N. Y. 104, 30 N. E. 563, revg. s. c. 15 N. Y. Supp. 297. In the passage of regulations within the scope of its authority from the legislature, it will be presumed that the body entrusted with the making of regulations as to the running of street cars, etc., acted in the exercise of a judgment upon facts, and for reasons calling for such action. Mayor v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co., 133 N. Y. 104, 30 N. E. 563, revg. s. c. 15 N. Y. Supp. 297.

The decisions of the N. Y. Board of Railroad Commissioners have no binding or conclusive authority, but are merely advisory and recommendatory.- People v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co., 103 N. Y. 95, 8 N. E. 369. An act of the legislature declaring any circumstance or evidence prima facie proof of a fact, is constitutional.- Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y. 262. On an appeal from an order of the N. Y. Gas and Electricity Commission, the presumption is in favor of the order appealed from.- Village of Saratoga v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 203, 107 N. Y. Supp. 34; revd. on other grounds, 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693.

The court will not reverse a finding of the N. Y. Board of Railroad Commissioners that public convenience and necessity require the construction of a railroad, unless it is made clearly and decisively to appear that such determination was based on erroneous legal principles or was contrary to the clear weight of evidence.- People ex rel. Terminal R. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 53 App. Div. (N. Y.) 61, 65 N. Y. Supp. 597; affd. 164 N. Y. 572, 58 N. E. 1091.