Chairman PASTORE. Is it satisfactory to the committee that he be allowed to make his comments now and then return tomorrow afternoon? Representative HOSMER. Will we have a chance to ask Dr. Brown some questions? Chairman PASTORE. Yes, either before we quit at 12-and we have to quit at 12 because we have to be inoculated at 12:15 Representative HOLIFIELD. We are being inoculated now. [Laughter.] Chairman PASTORE. Sit down, Dr. Brown, and proceed. Let's see what happens with this time element. Secretary KORTH. Mr. Chairman, while I would be perfectly happy to return at any time the committee desires, I hope the committee will likewise understand there are many things that I have to do in winding up my own operation which would make it virtually impossible for me to return Chairman PASTORE. This afternoon? Secretary Korth. Yes, sir; I have a number of appointments this afternoon, unfortunately. This is not an indication, however, of a lack of support or a lack of willingness. Representative HOSMER. IS Mr. Nitze prepared to stand in for you at this time? Secretary Korth. Sir, I don't know whether he is prepared to stand in or not. He has not yet appeared before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate nor has there been action taken by the Senate. Chairman PASTORE. How about tomorrow, Mr. Secretary? Chairman PASTORE. Yes. Secretary KORTH. I just don't know what my schedule is, sir. Tomorrow is the next to my last day actually and I do have many matters that unfortunately require my presence in cleaning up in order to turn things over to my successor. Chairman PASTORE. Does this just apply to you? Secretary KORTH. Absolutely. Chairman PASTORE. The rest will come back. Secretary KORTH. Absolutely. Chairman PASTORE. Why don't we have a short statement from Dr. Brown? Then I would hope you could remain long enough to have other members ask their questions. Secretary KORTH. I am perfectly happy to do so. STATEMENT OF DR. HAROLD BROWN, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Dr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am very happy to be here today at your invitation to discuss nuclear propulsion for Navy surface ships. I did not clear this statement, which is not in final form, with anyone in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I did, however, show it to some people in the Navy before I came up and I therefore made some additions and changes which is the reason I do not have a prepared copy. NUCLEAR PROPULSION UNCERTAINTIES Nuclear propulsion may provide a means of achieving a major increase in the combat capabilities of surface warships, as it has done in the case of submarines, but it is not certain at this time that such will be the case. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense has informed the Navy that he is not now in a position to make a basic policy decision on nuclear propulsion in surface warships. The The uncertainties fall into three general areas. First, the costs which would be incurred by an all nuclear policy for carriers and their escorts are not known because the value in such a situation of existing escorts and logistic support ships has not been determined. question of whether and at what rate they should be replaced by nuclear ones in case we go to the policy of an all nuclear surface fleet has not been answered. Second, analyses of the comparative effectiveness of task forces have so far demonstrated the superiority of the nuclear-powered task force in some situations. These however appear to use conflict situations that may in some cases be unrealistic or unlikely. Last, new concepts which would greatly reduce the "logistic tail" of carrier task forces, eliminate surface ship escorts, or permit new ways of operating by going to an all nuclear surface Navy have not been adequately explored. It seems to me it is this last area where the nuclear fleet shows the most promise of competing favorably with a nonnuclear fleet. It is clear, of course, that the nuclear-powered carrier or escort is superior to a nonnuclear one; not necessarily in all kinds of performance. For example, if I remember correctly the nonnuclear carrier has a 1-knot speed advantage over the nuclear one. But, the real choice is not between the same number of conventional shipsSenator JACKSON. What was that, 1 knot? Dr. BROWN. One knot Senator JACKSON. Not on a sustained basis Dr. BROWN. Not on a sustained basis Senator JACKSON. Is that on pickup? Dr. BROWN. It doesn't pick up as quickly. Chairman PASTORE. Let him testify. COST VERSUS NUMBERS Dr. BROWN. The real choice is not between a number of conventional ships and the same number of nuclear ships at the same total cost. The nuclear ships cost more. Therefore if one considers a given amount of money-any amount of money, the choice becomes one between the nuclear force and a larger number of conventional ships that could be procured for that same amount. The problem is not basically one of trying to hold down costs, but whether any amount of money, large or small, is better spent on nuclear or on conventional ships. (See p. 78.) Considering the matter of investment costs, the total investment depends on the cost of constructing the escorts and logistic support ships, as well as the carriers. To the extent that existing escorts and logistic support ships can meet the needs of conventional carriers, fewer new ships are needed for the conventionally powered forces. This, of course, can be used as an argument never to change over to nuclear power, but that is not my intention. I do not hold with that argument. What it does show is that there is a lengthy time-perhaps 10 years or more, if one does convert to all-nuclear ships-during which you will have a mixed force in the surface Navy which, perhaps, may be degraded below either pure force 17 or else you have an enormous initial investment if you decide to junk the old conventional escorts before their natural retirement time. In other words, there is a potential barrier to get over before you get to an all-nuclear Navy even if the all-nuclear Navy turns out to be better per dollar than a conventional force. Exact numbers here depend on the tactical obsolescence of these ships, and this is a matter the Navy intends to study in the coming year. We can estimate the range of the possible cost variation in terms of the fiscal year 1963 carrier. If it is assumed that all new escort and logistic support ships must be procured for both the nuclear-powered and conventional carriers, then the nuclear force costs $184 million more than a force based on the conventional carrier. This is an underestimate of the effect of an all-nuclear decision on this matter because you don't get the full advantage of an all-nuclear fleet if you have a nuclear carrier and nonnuclear escorts. On the other hand, if it is assumed that logistic support ships in existence or under construction will be used for both the nuclearpowered and conventional carriers, and that existing escorts will be used with the new conventional carrier, but that new nuclear escorts must be bought for nuclear carriers, then approval of the nuclearpowered carrier with nuclear escorts would call for expenditures of $725 million more than in the case of the conventional carrier. is an example of what I said before. If you decide to go to all nuclear, there are other costs; I think clearly an overestimate of the real cost. All you could say, at present, is that additional investment costs associated with the approval of nuclear power for fiscal 1963 carrier-and I mean all the investment costs, not just the ones that have to be made in fiscal 1963-lie somewhere between these limits.18 OPERATING COST ESTIMATES This It appears that the operating costs of future nuclear-powered carriers may not be much more than for conventional carriers. According to the Navy estimates the annual operating costs for a nuclear-powered version of the fiscal year 1963 carrier would exceed the costs of its conventional counterpart by some 22 percent or $3.5 million. Comparing the cost of a nuclear carrier with improved reactors and a large conventional carrier using Enterprise hull, the difference is about 13 percent or some $2.2 million. It should be noted that the Navy estimates of operating costs for future nuclear-powered carriers are about half the annual operating costs estimated for the Enterprise in 1963-69. While the future nuclear-powered carriers would no doubt be less costly to operate than the Enterprise—and I am convinced they would be-it has not been demonstrated that a reduction of over 50 percent would be assured because manpower costs alone are more than one-half the 17 See pp. 47 and 51. 18 See pp. 64, 70, and 123. estimated operating costs. Since we would be going to four reactors the manpower cost associated with the nuclear propulsion part would go down, but the other manpower costs may well remain relatively fixed (See pp. 125-128.) Representative HOSMER. Attributable or not attributable to nuclear power. Dr. BROWN. Not attributable to nuclear power. Representative HOSMER. Then they have no place in our discussion. Dr. BROWN. They do because they are part of the manpower costs that went into the estimate of relative operating costs. But reducing the overall operating costs by 50 percent will then require perhaps much larger reductions in nonpersonnel costs. The differences in the operating costs of conventional and nuclear escorts are more marked. That is, there is more difference in the smaller vessels than there is in the nuclear carriers. According to some Navy estimates, the nuclear frigate costs $1.4 million, or 34 percent, more to operate per year than the nonnuclear version. The nuclear destroyer costs $1.4 million or 54 percent more than its nonnuclear counterpart to operate for a year. When the costs of operating extra logistic support ships are added to the conventional carrier costs, the net increase in annual operating costs, according to Navy estimates, for a nuclear-powered task force ranges from $2 to $4.4 million per year depending on whether the conventional carrier is small or large. TOTAL COST COMPARISONS In examining the situation, of course, it is desirable to compare nuclear-powered and conventional ships which are similar in all respects except propulsion. The Navy has provided cost data on a carrier which meets these requirements. It is a conventional carrier on the Enterprise hull and called the CVA-L or CVA-B in some Navy examinations. The total Navy estimated investment and operating cost of six conventionally powered CVA-B's with all the required support ships, but no aircraft is about $500 million more through 1977 than a five carrier nuclear-powered force. If you compare six conventional and five nuclear, which is a kind of comparison the Navy suggested in one of its answers, and if you discount expenditures in the future on these two forces at 15 percent annually, to reflect the fact that a premium attaches to current as opposed to future expenditures-that is, you have to put up money now that is more difficult than having to put it up some years from now-then the smaller nuclear-powered force is slightly more costly than the larger conventional force. However, this depends strongly on whether you take 15-percent discount or 5-percent discount or zero-percent discount. If you take zeropercent discount, then the nonnuclear-the six nonnuclears are $500 million more than the five nuclears. Actually the situation is still more complex because if aircraft costs are counted, then, because there are fewer of the nuclear carriers, the aircraft on them costs less money, but, of course, the relative effectiveness is also less if they are all engaged at the same time. If the aircraft on the five nuclears are all flying and the aircraft on the six nonnuclear are all engaged, the second group is going to be more effective. (See pp. 104-122.) Representative HOSMER. What about Admiral Hayward's statement that there is another squadron on the Enterprise? Dr. BROWN. I have taken the same size hull and, therefore, in the hypothetical nonnuclear we would have the same complement. Representative HOSMER. Then we are not talking about facts really. We are talking about hypotheses. These are illustrations you are giving here. Dr. BROWN. Yes, Mr. Hosmer, but if we are talking about the late 1960's we are talking about a hypothesis in investment. I am addressing myself to the general question rather than the 1963 carrier in this part of my discussion. Representative HOSMER. That may be true but it scems more like a rationalization than it does an examination to me Dr. BROWN. Perhaps you will want to examine my statement in the record a little more closely and I think you will find what I am talking Representative HOSMER. You will be gone then. Dr. BROWN. I will always be available, Mr. Hosmer. COST-EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISON Whether the increased effectiveness of nuclear-powered carriers will outweigh the disadvantages of reduced numbers is the key question which must be decided before construction of the next carrier after the fiscal year 1963 carrier is started. The unlimited endurance of the nuclear-powered task force and freedom from refueling en route to an operating area offer advantages. At medium levels of operation, when ship fuel is needed more frequently than aviation fuel or ordnance, the nuclear-powered carrier will have fewer replenishment periods. This decreases the time in which the carrier is highly vulnerable; namely, refueling. It does not change the situation with respect to the need of replenishment fuel and ordnance. The "logistic tail" for these items is the same for both kind of carriers. You have more fuel on the bigger carrier whether it is nuclear or non-nuclear and if you take the alternative, the CVA-B, it is the same size. It is not an alternative I am advocating. (See pp. 103-128.) Representative BATES. You claim it takes the same amount of fuel. Representative HOSMER. This is a hypothetical ship he is talking about. Chairman PASTORE. Let him talk. Let him finish his statement. Dr. BROWN. I will proceed; yes, sir. It does change the frequency at which the ship has to be replenished and studies have shown the nuclear one has to be replenished if it is operating at fairly high levels of attack at about weekly intervals because there has to be replenishment of aviation gas and ordnance. The nonnuclear one has to be replenished about twice as often. because it also must replenish its oil. The nuclear-powered carrier is no faster than the conventional carrier, but the advantage of sustained high speed would enable the nuclear task force to respond more quickly to surprise attacks against oversea areas in a conflict using conventional weapons. The history of surprise attack indicates on study that a response to a surprise attack should be made within [classified matter deleted] if it is to be effective. |