FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR PROPELLED CARRIER Representative PRICE. Are there any other funds in the shipbuilding category that are not expended? Secretary KORTH. No, sir. There are none that I know of that are available for this purpose. As I stated earlier, one of the alternatives which was suggested to the Secretary of Defense was that the $125 million required for nuclear propulsion be taken from funds which are presently withheld on other programs, not shipbuilding programs, and, in effect, that we get repaid for that in the next budget. (See p. 106.) Representative PRICE. At any rate I would not attach too much weight to this argument. Secretary KORTH. This is the Secretary of Defense's firm conviction and you, again, would have to ask him to respond to that. CVA-67 AUTHORIZATION HISTORY Representative PRICE. The Secretary was acting to begin with on requests from a congressional committee to consider this conversion so I would not anticipate any delay from Congress in getting additional funds for that conversion. I don't think there is too much weight to be attached to that argument. I happen to be on the Armed Services Committee of the House. That carrier was programed in the 1963 authorization bill as a conventional carrier. This would indicate the Navy had requested a conventional carrier. Secretary KORTH. This was the approved program. Representative PRICE. Before it was submitted to Congress was there any request on the part of the Department of Navy to the Department of Defense for approval to submit this as a nuclear powered carrier? Secretary KORTH. It was, as I recall, initially submitted to the office of the Secretary of Defense as a nuclear carrier. Representative PRICE. Then it did not receive approval from the Department of Defense? Secretary KORTH. That is correct. Representative PRICE. So it was submitted then to the Congress as a conventional carrier. Secretary KORTH. Conventional; that is correct, sir. Representative PRICE. I think every member of this committee has the feeling, regardless of what statements may be made to the contrary, that this decision and action by the Secretary is a policymaking decision and action for the moment at least. I believe this would be one of the largest capital ships to be built in the next few years. Secretary KORTH. That is correct, sir. Representative PRICE. If they were considering a policy for a nuclear powered Navy, I certainly think they would like to have this be a nuclear powered ship. Representative WESTLAND. Will the gentleman yield? Representative WESTLAND. I am very much interested in the way you are going into the appropriations procedures. I think we ought to nail down, if we can, some of these dates. We have been talking about fiscal year 1963, and someone might think this was the calendar year. Actually, that would have been done in the calendar year 1962. Representative PRICE. It would have been acted on in Congress in 1962. Representative WESTLAND. Actually, you have to go further back than that. The Navy certainly would prepare its budget request in 1961. Secretary KORTH. That is correct, sir. Representative WESTLAND. So now you are back 2 years. At that time you had the Enterprise under construction. You had these other nuclear vessels under construction. I can well imagine we might want to get some experience with these nuclear-powered ships that were under construction then and that would come to sea-be commissioned in 1962 before Congress said, "Let's go ahead and build another one." I think these dates are terribly important from the point of view of Congress saying that you should have a conventional carrier. You might well say in 1961, "Let's authorize another carrier here. After you have had a little experience with the Enterprise, we will take another look." Secretary KORTH. This was certainly one of the factors which entered into our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that the CVA-67, that is the one that was authorized in fiscal year 1963, be nuclear propelled. Representative PRICE. It was acted on by Congress in Chairman PASTORE. There is a man in the back who is getting a little excited. Mr. SHAW. That history isn't the way it happened. A year after we got authority for Enterprise, we were authorized $35 million for long-lead items for the nuclear powerplant for the next carrier. When we came to the following year we didn't buy the long-lead items because we didn't get the carrier. When we went back to get the nuclear carrier, we were told we couldn't get a nuclear but could get a conventional one. That carrier is America, CVA-66, which is now under construction with conventional propulsion. Representative PRICE. Are you talking about the second carrier? Mr. SHAW. Yes, sir. The carrier now under consideration, CVA67 is the second carrier since the Enterprise. We were waiting to get experience with the Enterprise. This is what we really had to do. If this carrier had gone through on July 1, 1961, it would have been conventional as you say. Representative PRICE. The Chairman of the Joint Committee and I think Mr. Vinson also wrote letters to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense supporting the conversion of this carrier Chairman, these letters should be inserted in the record. (The Joint Committee chairman's letter of March 1, 1963, to the Secretary of Defense is on p. 3). Chairman PASTORE. Do we have that letter? I don't know what position Mr. Vinson took. I would be interested to know that. Secretary KORTH. I don't recall such a letter. Representative PRICE. Mr. Bates, another member of the House Armed Services Committee, and I joined the chairman of this committee in recommending this to be a nuclear carrier. Secretary KORTH. That is true, sir, but I do not recall a letter from Chairman Vinson. Chairman PASTORE. Admiral Rickover. Admiral RICKOVER. I believe there was a statement of policy by the Armed Services Committee during their hearings on the fiscal year 1962 shipbuilding program that all surface warships over 8,000 tons should be nuclear powered. That statement was issued prior to the consideration of the carrier we are discussing now, which is the fiscal year 1963 program. Also it was subsequent to the consideration of this particular carrier by Congress that we learned of the experience we had with the Enterprise and, second, we were able to develop a greatly improved four-reactor carrier. We made significant advancements in increasing the power and extending the fuel life of the reactors. Dr. Dr. Seaborg cited these advancements in his letter of January 7, 1963, to the Secretary of Defense. (See p. 80.) These are pertinent contributions that should be taken into account in making a decision as to whether you go nuclear or conventional. All this additional technical information has been available for some time. Chairman PASTORE. Another interesting point to me is the timing. Was the decision that this should be a conventional aircraft carrier made before the Cuban situation? Secretary KORTH. Would you state that again, sir? Chairman PASTORE. The point I am getting at is whether this request for this additional aircraft carrier was Secretary KORTH. Was made prior to? Chairman PASTORE. Prior to the Cuban situation. Did we have experience with the Enterprise in the Cuban situation? Secretary KORTH. No, sir. Admiral McDONALD. Yes. Secretary KORTH. Not before this ship was authorized. Chairman PASTORE. I am talking about the ability to change having made the request for conventional when we actually had critical experience Secretary KORTH. This is true Chairman PASTORE. With a nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier. Chairman PASTORE. I am hoping that we will receive some testimony as to what the performance was. Secretary KORTH. You will have that, sir. SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR SURFACE SHIP AUTHORIZATION Representative PRICE. Mr. Chairman, just for the purpose of our record I would like to clear up the background information on the authorization of nuclear naval ships because of the manner in which some of these items are listed. It states here: Four nuclear-powered surface warships have been authorized as follows: Fiscal year 1957: Enterprise. Fiscal year 1958: Long Beach. Fiscal year 1959: Bainbridge. Next is the point that has confused me and I think you should clarify for the record. Fiscal year 1960: None. Fiscal year 1961: None requested. Does "none" for fiscal year 1960 mean that none was requested or that none was authorized after a request? Mr. LEIGHTON. They were not requested by the Department of Defense nor approved. They were not in the submission to the Congress in 1960. There were no nuclear surface ships in the Department of Defense request to Congress in the years 1960, 1961Representative PRICE. Nor in 1962? Mr. LEIGHTON. Nor in 1962. Representative PRICE. I asked the question because our record in 1960 indicates "none," but I did not know whether that was none requested or none authorized. Mr. LEIGHTON. In 1962 none were requested but one was added by Congress. Representative PRICE. None requested in 1962. Secretary KORTH. But one was added by Congress. Representative PRICE. The Truxtun was added by Congress. We added it in the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate went along with it. In fiscal year 1963 a destroyer leader was approved but was canceled by the Secretary of Defense because the missile system wasn't ready and that particular missile was the Secretary KORTH. Typhon, sir Representative PRICE. I understand it is still not ready. Secretary KORTH. That is correct, sir. Admiral Anderson and I in testifying before the various committees when we made the request stated that we would tell the appropriate committees as developments occurred whether the system was available and we would make a full disclosure later on, which we did.15a Representative PRICE. In fiscal year 1964, none was requested. Secretary KORTH. That is right. Representative PRICE. In fiscal 1964, did you seek any approval from the Defense Department to submit a request for authorization of a nuclear-powered ship? Secretary KORTH. Did we have any in the initial—I am not talking about the final? (Question directed to Navy staff.) Mr. SHAW. Yes, in the original program there were two Typhons. Secretary KORTH. There were two DLGN Typhons initially in the Navy's program for the 1964 budget. 15a The Secretary of Defense announced the cancellation of the Typhon missile development program on Jan. 7, 1964. Representative PRICE. Typhons? Secretary KORTH. Yes, sir, but in view of the experience we had with the DLGN Typhon in the 1963 program, the Secretary of Defense I am sure this was the reason-asked for the elimination of it and we did not feel we could justify the Typhon installation at that time. Representative PRICE. This was a nuclear-powered destroyer- Representative PRICE. All right. Next is fiscal year 1965. Secretary KORTH. That has not yet been formalized or determined. Representative PRICE. Is there any indication that the Navy would be interested in a nuclear-powered ship of any type? Secretary KORTH. Yes, sir; we are interested in surface ships in the DLGN type, but there has been no determination on this and it would be premature actually to speak, I believe, to that at this time. Representative PRICE. There is none planned right now. Secretary KORTH. What do you mean? Do you mean planned by the Navy? Representative PRICE. You said there had been no determination. Secretary KORTH. No determination. That is correct. Representative PRICE. No determination and, therefore, none planned or is there some in your planning which awaits determination? Secretary KORTH. The determination has not yet been made on the Navy's program for nuclear surface ships. That is a correct statement. Representative PRICE. Then there are no future plans for nuclearpowered ships through the next several fiscal years. Secretary KORTH. Oh, yes. Yes, sir; but when you say "planning, there is a great deal of difference from what the actual determination is in the final analysis and what is finally approved. Certainly the Navy embraces the concept of nuclear power for surface ships. Representative PRICE. This might be an appropriate place for you to comment on the inquiry made by Mr. Bates before he left the room. The House Armed Services Committee has been concerned for quite a few years about the future planning of the Navy, as you know, because you and the Navy have testified before the Armed Services Committee. You certainly have been thinking about what you are going to do about this nuclear propulsion. Secretary KORTH. That is correct. Chairman PASTORE. May I interrupt at this point for just a moment while I think out loud with my colleagues? We will have to continue this afternoon, of course, and I would hope the Secretary could come back with his colleagues and the members of the committee will be given every opportunity to interrogate these witnesses. I have been told Dr. Brown, who is here from the Defense Department, won't be able to be here this afternoon, but he will return at 3:30 tomorrow afternoon. He has been nodding his head from time to time as if he really wanted to say something this morning before he left. Dr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to make a few remarks that this committee might want to consider. 16 See footnote, pp. 180-181, for a summary of changes that have taken place since the CVA-67 was authorized with conventional propulsion in 1962. |