Thus, your analysis should present me with the following eight comparisons: (1) A conventional 15-carrier force having 4 escorts of selected displacement per carrier, compared with a nuclear force having 4 escorts per carrier, on an equal-effectiveness basis. (2) Same as (1), but on an equal-25-year-cost basis. (3) A conventional 15-carrier force having 8 escorts of selected displacement per carrier, compared with a nuclear force having 8 escorts per carrier, on an equal-effectiveness basis. (4) Same as (3), but on an equal-25-year-cost basis. (5) A conventional 15-carrier force having a selected number of escorts of approximately 5,000 tons' displacement, compared with a nuclear force having 4 escorts per carrier, on an equal-effectiveness basis. (6) Same as (5), but on an equal-25-year-cost basis. (7) A conventional 15-carrier force having a selected number of escorts of approximately 5,000 tons' displacement; compared with a nuclear force having 8 escorts per carrier, on an equal-effectiveness basis. (8) Same as (7), but on an equal-25-year-cost basis. The above eight comparisons will, I feel, furnish valuable information on the comparative desirabilities of the conventional and nuclear power alternatives. However, I do not mean to be unduly restrictive, and if there are other comparisons you feel would be useful, I will, of course, be glad to have you include them in addition to the eight above. I would caution, however, that the additional assumptions should be fully detailed and quantitatively justified in each case. II. SHORT-RUN PROBLEMS Next, I would like to have your views concerning some of the difficult budgetary problems we would face in the transitional period if we elected to adopt nuclear power for our surface warships. I would like you to do this for two cases, as follows: The First, using the 5-year force structure and financial program as a basis, detail the amount of TOA, year by year (extrapolating as necessary), required to maintain our current capability with conventionally powered forces. sums should include R. & D., investment, and operation for all the elements associated with the carrier-based striking forces (carriers, their air groups, their escorts, logistic ships and their escorts, etc.). Then, maintaining the same annual amount of TOA, detail the shipbuilding program and force structure, year by year, that you would recommend if we were to elect to build all future carrier force combat ships with nuclear power. Second, should the above case result in serious deficiencies in effectiveness during the transition, detail, year by year, the rates of TOA necessary to maintain our effectiveness at its present level. III. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS Enclosure 1 of your memorandum details a number of advantages of the nuclear-powered task force. However, these advantages are treated in qualitative terms. I am sure that the majority of them could satisfactorily be subjected to quantitative analysis. Therefore, I would like you, through the use of appropriate scenarios, to compare the effectiveness of equal-cost conventional and nuclear forces. I think you will agree that a comparative account of the number of attack aircraft sorties delivered as a function of time, day by day, week by week, or month by month would be a useful comparison of effectiveness. Perhaps there will be other quantitative measures of effectiveness you will wish to include. [Classified matter deleted.] This use of scenarios should also enable you to demonstrate the points made in enclosure 1 of your memorandum. For example, you note the higher speeds of nuclear ships and their freedom to engage the enemy immediately upon reaching the combat area as an advantage. The scenarios should allow you to calculate, assuming given initial dispositions and given launch points, just how much sooner the first strikes could be delivered. Of course, you will also have to calculate differences in the buildup of sorties conducted as a function of time, accounting for any differences in total number of embarked attack aircraft. You note that the nuclear force will force enemy submarines into tactics that favor and aid our own anti-submarine-warfare capabilities. The use of scenarios will allow you to calculate the effect of this advantage on the delivery of attack aircraft strikes. In this instance, please detail the number of carrier losses to enemy submarines in both the conventional and nuclear-powered cases, and adjust the total carrier striking power accordingly. You note that the necessity of refueling the conventional force will reduce the tempo of any offensive or defensive effort. This effect can be evaluated through the use of scenarios, and I would like you to detail carefully the additional reduction in tempo caused by the necessity of having to transfer black oil in addition to aviation fuel and ordnance, reflecting this in the tabulation of attack aircraft strikes as a function of time. In addition to these points, there are others which you mention in your memorandum. As a general rule, I would like you to quantify, through the device of the scenario, as many as you can in order that I may fully appreciate your position. Of course, the relative effectiveness of the two forces will depend on the assumptions made. I want to know how the assumptions affect the conclusion and I want to know what assumptions are required to show that nuclear-powered forces are superior to conventional forces of equal cost. I might mention that earlier endeavors of this nature have made good use of opposing analytical teams-one devoted to finding the best use of one alternative-the other to the opposing alternative. As I stated in my memorandum of February 22, I am interested in achieving the most efficient possible naval forces; if nuclear propulsion contributes to this end, then we must take advantage of it. I am grateful to you for raising this important question. Please designate a point of contact for my staff. I would like your study group to work with my Office of Systems Analysis, especially on questions of criteria, method, and appropriateness of assumptions. APPENDIX 7 ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy. program. I have received your memorandum of September 26, 1963, subject as above, in which you urge me to reach a decision to construct the fiscal year 1963 carrier with nuclear power. I note that the Navy's study of the relative effectiveness of nuclear and conventional carrier task forces is still under review and will be forwarded later. My original intent in requesting a comprehensive study of nuclear propulsion was to expand the particular issue of the fiscal year 1963 carrier to a general policy issue. Although I shared your concern about thus delaying the start of the fiscal year 1963 carrier, I felt this to be preferable to building a conventionally powered carrier if nuclear propulsion could really offer outstanding advantages. However, on the basis of the analysis available to date, I am not convinced that a net advantage is in prospect. While it is clear that nuclear propulsion would result in some desirable characteristics, the increased cost (particularly in ship construction) remains a serious disadvantage. As a minimum, I am confident that construction of the fiscal year 1963 carrier with conventional rather than nuclear power would not result in any serious loss in effectiveness. In addition, I find objections, not the least of which are further delay and uncertainty, to all of the three methods you suggest for financing the additional $125.8 million required for nuclear propulsion of the fiscal year 1963 carrier. Considering the state of the legislative calendar and the previously expressed attitudes on the subject of certain key congressional leaders, it is doubtful, to say the least, that congressional approval of a shift to nuclear propulsion for the fiscal year 1963 carrier would be either swift or sure. As a result, I believe that the fiscal year 1963 carrier should proceed on the conventionally powered basis as authorized by the Congress. I would like you to take the proper steps to proceed with the construction as soon as possible. Though I had hoped to be able to include the fiscal year 1963 carrier in a general policy decision regarding nuclear propulsion, I would like to stress that this decision is motivated by concern over further delay, and does not represent a general policy decision. When the results of your current study have been received, we should review again the possible application of nuclear propulsion to future carriers and escort ships. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. program. I was surprised to receive your memorandum of October 9 in which you asked me to take the proper steps to proceed with construction of the fiscal year 1963 aircraft carrier with conventional power rather than nuclear power. Your memorandum included the following points: (a) Your decision is motivated by concern over further delay in the start of construction of this carrier and does not represent a general policy decision. (b) When you receive the current Navy study of nuclear propulsion in surface warships we should review again the application of nuclear propulsion to future carriers and escort ships. (c) On the basis of the analysis available to you to date you are not convinced that a net advantage is in prospect for nuclear power in this carrier. (d) You find objections to all three methods I have suggested for financing the additional money required for nuclear power in the fiscal year 1963 carrier. (e) Considering the state of the legislative calendar and the previously expressed attitude of certain key congressional leaders it is doubtful that congressional approval of a shift to nuclear propulsion would be either swift or sure. The outstanding performance of our nuclear surface ships to date and the result of the Navy's detailed analytical studies in the past year have made me increasingly aware of the importance of applying nuclear propulsion as rapidly as possible to the surface fleet. For example, as indicated to you in my memorandum of September 26, our most recent study shows that five new nuclearpowered carrier task groups will provide more combat capability than six new conventional task groups for significantly less overall cost. In your February 22 memorandum to me on this subject you stated that: "As a general guide, I am interested in achieving the most efficient possible naval forces, defining efficiency as achieving the most beneficial military results for a given expenditure. If nuclear propulsion permits an increase in this efficiency then advantage should be taken of it." In your memorandum of April 20, 1963, you reiterated this point and stated "if nuclear propulsion contributes to this end, then we must take advantage of it." The Chief of Naval Operations and I believe that nuclear propulsion does contribute to achieving the most efficient possible naval forces and that it offers outstanding advantages. In view of the widely recognized success of the naval nuclear propulsion program, the fact that we have already delayed the start of construction of the new carrier 9 months while studying the implications of nuclear propulsion, and the fact that based on the shipbuilding program you have proposed there will not be another opportunity to build a nuclear surface ship for several years, a decision not to put nuclear power in the fiscal year 1963 carrier cannot help but have widespread and important effects. I earnestly request that you reconsider the decision on the method of propulsion for the fiscal year 1963 carrier and I assure you that we in the Navy stand ready to assist you in this reconsideration by discussing with you, forthwith, the following: (a) The important military advantages nuclear propulsion provides. (b) Your views on the relative effectiveness of nuclear and conventional warships. (c) Your objections to my suggested methods for financing the additional funds required to apply nuclear propulsion to the fiscal year 1963 carrier in order to try to find a method satisfactory to you. (d) How we may assist you in discussions with key congressional leaders regarding the advantages of nuclear propulsion in surface ships in the hope that a way may be found to gain swift congressional approval of the shift to nuclear propulsion. FRED KORTH. APPENDIX No. 9 CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF THE "ENTERPRISE," "LONG BEACH," AND THE "BAINBRIDGE" Rear Adm. CARLTON B. JONES, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, Chief of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy, DEAR ADMIRAL JONES: The committee would appreciate knowing what the construction costs of the nuclear-propelled ships Enterprise, Long Beach, and the Bainbridge were. The committee would also appreciate knowing how much of the cost of each of these ships is attributable to the nuclear fuel costs. In addition, the committee would like to know how much more the nuclear propulsion plants in each of these ships cost than conventional propulsion plants. Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated. JOHN T. CONWAY, Executive Director. Mr. JOHN T. CONWAY, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, Executive Director, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, DEAR MR. CONWAY: In response to the questions contained in your letter of December 2, 1963, the Chief, Bureau of Ships, has furnished the enclosed information. It is assumed that in requesting the differential between nuclear and conventional plants, the total differential is desired between the ships named and the estimated cost of the same basic ships if they had been designed and constructed with identical weapons and electronics but having conventional propulsion equipment. If I can be of further assistance to you in this matter, please do not hesitate to call on me. Sincerely yours, C. B. JONES, Costs of nuclear propulsion in the “Enterprise,” “Long Beach,” and “Bainbridge” 1 It should be noted that the Enterprise, Long Beach, and Bainbridge were not only the first surface nuclearpowered warships in the world but also incorporated novel features in nonpropulsion areas. Therefore, substantial first-design costs were required in both the nuclear propulsion and nonpropulsion areas. APPENDIX 10 [Excerpt from U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1963] (See p. 157, March 1963 Proceedings) James Strong, Commander, U.S. Navy-Today we lay down oil-fired ships instead of nuclear-powered ships, because we can get them cheaper by a ratio of 3 to 2. One well-known admiral has pointed out that this makes about as much sense as it would to lay down sailing ships again for an even better cost ratio. Although many of the Proceeding's readers may have read and considered this well-publicized comparison, I wonder how many readers are aware of a parallel situation and the attendant public storm that blew when navies changed from coal to oil. In 1912, the Royal Navy faced this issue. Although some smaller ships were oil fired, all the heavier ships being laid down were coal fired. Liquid fuel offered several advantages: several knots' increased speed, rapid maneuvering, 40 percent greater radius of action for the same weight of coal, easier and less frequent refueling, and reduced engineroom manning. Balanced against this were two considerations which, at the time, seemed almost overriding. Oil-fired ships cost a great deal more money-you could get three coal-fired dreadnoughts for the price of two oil-fired dreadnoughts. Even more important, there were no oil supplies within the British Isles. Beside the strategic disadvantages of tying a fleet to foreign sources of fuel were the tremendous costs of creating a fleet oil reserve with the attendant tanks and tankers. But in 1912 the Royal Navy took the plunge, spent the money, built the ships, established the oil reserves, and the rest of the world's navies followed close behind. The performance of the oil-fired H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth class at Jutland justified the decision, and there has been little consideration given to coal since that time. But was it really an expensive step to take? In 1922, Winston Churchill computed that the Government's necessary investment of 2,200,000 pounds sterling in the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. alone had already resulted in an estimated financial profit of 1,800 percent. In his words, this was sufficient to pay "for all the program of ships, great and small of that year (1912) and for the whole prewar oil fuel installations; *** we may not unreasonably expect that ultimately the mighty fleets laid down in 1912, 1913, and 1914, the greatest ever built by any power in an equal period, were added to the British Navy without costing a single penny to the taxpayer." What is the lesson we can learn from this today? A complete change to nuclear power offers the Navy an increased capability at least as valuable as that which was offered by the change to fuel oil in 1912. Although it may be more expensive to build nuclear ships, this additional expense is a very economical method of developing nuclear power. Future dividends from the accelerated development of nuclear power can repay manyfold today's expenditure for nuclear ships. There may be another lesson in this yarn. The British Admiralty had built oil-burning destroyers as early as 1908, but, as Churchill relates it: "Shocked at the expense [they had] reverted for 2 years to 27-knot coal-burning flotillas. I was too late to stop the last bevy of these inferior vessels, but I gave directions to design the new flotilla to realize 35 knots' speed without giving up anything in gunpower, torpedoes, or seaworthiness. I proposed to the board that if money ran short, we should take 16 of these rather than 20 of the others. Building slow destroyers. One might as well breed slow race horses." The end of the oil-coal vacillation in the Royal Navy ended the day that Winston Churchill assumed responsibility for the Admiralty. The naval profession had been unable to make the break-it had to be imposed from above. Must we wait for a Churchill to impose on us the benefits of nuclear power? Cannot we see them ourselves and seek them ourselves, whatever the cost? |