TACTICAL FACTORS RELATIVE TO NUCLEAR POWER

Representative MORRIS. Let us assume that the point of view would prevail at this end of this decade that we not build any more carriers. You hope it won't and I think most of us have that same desire. Wouldn't it be better if we built a nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier?

Wouldn't it be a better gamble with this money to build a nuclearpropelled carrier than it would be to build a conventional carrier for the reasons that we haven't explored all the tactical advantages of nuclear propulsion, I don't think, in surface vessels. Particularly not with carriers.

Secretary MCNAMARA. There may be some unknowns in tactics. I don't think there are very many, Mr. Morris. I think there are few unknowns in relation to the advantage of additional numbers. We will be much better off, I am certain, in spending $160 million for additional numbers of escort vessels than we will for a nuclear powerplant in this particular carrier. (See footnote, p. 167 and p. 188.)

In the future when we have different kinds of nuclear powerplants, particularly for surface ships other than carriers, I hope to feel quite differently on this issue. (See footnote, p. 192, and app. 2, pp. 201-229.)

Representative MORRIS. When you made this decision, were you placed in the position of having to make a decision as to whether we would go all nuclear in the Navy or a conventional Navy for the future?

In other words, is this decision a major policy decision, or is this a decision for this particular carrier?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Very clearly for this carrier only.

Representative MORRIS. Do you feel that this decision in any way might prejudice whether or not you would ask for a conventionalpowered carrier or a nuclear-powered carrier in the future if you felt a carrier would be needed?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It wouldn't prejudice it in the slightest. Representative MORRIS. I am just as anxious as anyone else. I may have to face the jury about this time next year if the people demand that I serve again in saving money and pointing out how prudent I am with the taxpayers' money.

But, on the other hand, I keep thinking about some of the things that happened in World War II, particularly during the early stages of it. Maybe we will never have a situation like that again.

I don't know what the next war will be like. I don't think anyone else knows, frankly. But there are times when 2 or 3 minutes made a tremendous difference in whether a ship lived or not. The time you can get a nuclear-propelled craft up to full power and full speed, and the time it takes to get a conventional-powered vessel going seems to me could make a tremendous difference in the survival chances of that ship.

Secretary MCNAMARA. This does depend on whether the conventional-powered vessel has been, in effect, operating under wartime conditions, as I understand it.

Representative MORRIS. I don't think this matters. You can only bring a conventionally powered ship up to full power at a certain rate. (See pp. 88-95.)

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think when the boilers are in full operation, the rate of acceleration is very close.

Representative MORRIS. Say if you had eight boilers and you had all on the line at one time and they were all operating, then there would be probably very little difference in the time it takes to bring the ship up to power?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Representative MORRIS. But you seldom ever have that condition. That is an ideal condition with a conventional-powered ship whereas, it is an ordinary condition with a nuclear-propelled ship?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I agree. But I think the conventionally powered ship in the sensitive combat circumstances that we are discussing could well be in that situation. Probably it would be in that situation.

Representative MORRIS. You could be right. I think it would be more of an ideal condition rather than a condition that would be prevailing throughout the combat zone.

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is a condition that the conventionally powered ship can't maintain as long as the nuclear powered.

Representative MORRIS. It can maintain it only a short time? Secretary MCNAMARA. It is a normal condition with the nuclearpowered ship and the condition is an exceptional situation with the conventionally powered ship but one in which it would find itself in combat sensitive areas.

NUCLEAR POWER COST DIFFERENTIAL

Representative MORRIS. I take it you think there are some grave questions about this actual differential question in costs. Some of the naval witnesses felt it was around 3 percent. I think in answer to Mr. Bates' question you are not convinced there is only a 3 percent difference in 25 years.

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir. I am not. In particular, I would not propose to Congress either of the task forces that the Navy used in preparing their cost estimates because those task forces included ships that far exceed the costs that we could support in relation to the effectiveness of the vessels.

That is true of the conventional ships and the nuclear but it is more true of the conventional than of the nuclear in their illustrative task forces.

Representative MORRIS. In other words, their conventional craft were not truly, representative of what a conventional ship costs?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir. They used $93 million for a DDG versus $38 million for the last DDG we built. I guess it is still being built, as a matter of fact.

They used $154 million for a DLG conventionally powered versus $70 million for the last ship. So these conventional ships far exceed in cost anything that we have recently built and I think they far exceed anything I would support building.

Representative MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman PASTORE. Is there anything further?

1 This DLG was assumed to have the Typhon missile system. See footnote p. 31, regarding cancellation of the Typhon project.

TIMING OF DOD ANNOUNCEMENT ON CVA-67

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr Chairman, there is one matter I would mention if I might. I think it is very unfortunate that this committee was placed in the position it was in by the series of announcements relating to this carrier. I want you to know I have much regretted that. It was not intentional on our part in the slightest. Our moves were necessary because of certain circumstances inside the Department, particularly the resignation of the Secretary of the Navy.

But under no circumstances would we have tolerated intentional implied criticism of the committee or any action that would in any way indicate we hoped to evade review of this problem by the committee. I simply wanted you to know that.

Representative BATES. Mr. Secretary, you indicated that your decision is tentative pending a further study from the Department of Navy.

Secretary MCNAMARA. No. I did indicate I have not received the Department of Navy study as yet. They have several times stated it was their intention to send them to me but they have not done so. Because, I think, there are large complicated questions and they have not finished their reviews.

Representative BATES. Until you have received that, if you are going to receive it

Secretary MCNAMARA. They have told me the essence of it, and assuming they come in as they state they will, it would not affect my decision.

Chairman PASTORE. The decision of the Defense Department for CVA-67, conventional, is irrevocable.

(See

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I think our decision simply is not to go back to Congress to ask for $160 million more. footnote, p. 167 and p. 189.)

Chairman PASTORE. It stands?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; I think so. I have tried to review this matter again since this committee started its hearings. I have reviewed the testimony that you supplied to me, although I have not seen one of the day's hearings.

Chairman PASTORE. If I must say so, though, I am a little confused in precisely what the position is insofar as public consumption is concerned.

I think it stands now that the decision to abide by the authorization which authorized a conventional aircraft carrier stands. I can understand that part of it. I can understand your reasons for your decision. I am a little disturbed about where we stand with reference to our research and development vis-a-vis with the position of the Department of Defense as to the future of the nuclear-propelled surface ship Navy.

I don't quite understand your position. You said that you have certain doubts about exaggerations which are being made in order to justify the difference in the cost.

Then you say that you are impressed with the performance and the maneuverability of nuclear propulsion. Then you go on so far as to say that you recommend very strongly that we continue a high level of a research and development program for nuclear surface ship propulsion but you don't seem to say specifically what the justification for it will be I mean in terms that can be talked about.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would be quite happy to suggest it. First, I think that within the next 5 to 6 years we are not likely to build more than [classified matter deleted] aircraft carriers. I don't know whether they will be conventional or nuclear. I hope they will be nuclear.

But that is not the real potential for the use of nuclear power in surface ships. The real potential for the use of nuclear power in surface ships is in the literally tens of major ships that we will be building other than these [classified matter deleted] aircraft carriers. (See p. 26.)

The potential for nuclear power in those ships is very great indeed. We will utilize nuclear power in those ships only if we can reduce the size and weight of the powerplant and the cost of the powerplant, but particularly the size and weight so that it won't carry with it the huge penalties in shipbuilding costs. (See note on p. 191.)

I think that is what the $50 million should be directed to. I understand that is one of the major objectives of the program, to reduce the size and weight of the reactors for these large, but not as large as aircraft, carrier ships. I strongly favor this program. (See app. 2, pp. 201-229.)

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman PASTORE. Do the three representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission desire to say anything at this point? You remain mute?

Dr. TAPE. Mute.

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I ask them if we have just a second, do you agree it is worth continuing the reactor development program for surface ships?

Mr. PALFREY. Yes; we should have a review and refocus on whatever is necessary.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., Wednesday, November 13, 1963, the committee adjourned.)

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1

A TREATISE ON NUCLEAR PROPULSION IN SURFACE SHIPS

(Prepared at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations by the Chairman, Ship Characteristics Board, to provide background information for statements and discussion, April 5, 1961)

1. Introduction

PART I. INFORMATIVE

a. The whole new era of submarine operations that resulted from the utilization of nuclear propulsion rested in large measure on two decisive aspects: First, the elimination of the requirement for oxygen for the main engines which provided the protracted capability for remaining submerged; and, second, the greatly increased endurance for high sustained speeds. These led to innovational changes in operational concepts, of which the Polaris nuclear submarine weapon system is one and the potent ASW submarine is another.

b. The protracted endurance for high-speed operations potential can be applied to surface ships with even greater emphasis, for their average operational speeds are greater and consequently generate the need for more frequent refueling. The recognition of this potential led to the construction of three nuclear propelled surface ships, one CVA (N), one CG (N), and one DLG (N), to explore the benefits in a variety of combatant ships. The other aspect of protracted submergence has no currently identifiable parallel for surface ships.

2. Relative costs

a. When the inclusion of nuclear propelled surface ships in the shipbuilding programs is being considered, the increased cost is the governing factor. The current progress of the nuclear propulsion program, with 13 submarines completed and 30 more authorized or under construction (Jan. 1, 1961) and the 3 surface ships now being built, has provided sufficient information to permit a usable estimate of the relative costs of the four principal elements involved, i.e., initial construction, personnel requirements, fuel consumption and upkeep, maintenance and overhaul, of similar ships with nuclear and conventional power. These have been prepared for a 20-year life of ship and have included estimates for the amortization of the cost of delivering and storing Navy standard fuel oil (NSFO) in the deployed areas. These studies indicate that the current classes of nuclear powered surface ships will cost about 1.5 times, or slightly less, as much as their conventionally powered counterparts. These are dollar comparisons and do not reflect the fact that the endurance of nuclear powered ships is many times that of the conventionally powered ships. The figure for submarines is of a similar order, but the comparison is less valid since the nuclear submarines have capabilities that the conventional submarines can never attain. The prognosis of developments for reducing these cost ratios is very encouraging. b. These factors are based on estimates, and sometimes extensive extrapolations, which are subject to considerable adjustments as further experience is gained in the submarine program, and later on with the nuclear surface ships after they have been completed and operated at sea. The uncertainties are particularly acute in the upkeep and overhaul aspects where experience is very limited due to the newness of nuclear power, and new weapons systems and electronic equipment. However, these ratios are considered sufficiently valid to be useful planning figures.

c. The effect upon individual appropriations may vary somewhat from the overall factor of 1.5 for the surface ships. For example, the cost of the first cores is included in the SCN appropriation, even though this cost was removed from the SCN portion of the computations and applied to the fuel cost to pro