team. Public interest is our goal and I know we all try to serve to the best of our ability and as conscientiously as we can.

As I announced yesterday, the Secretary of Defense has been invited to testify at a later date.

I am happy that we have before us today representatives of the Navy, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Defense Department, experienced in nuclear propulsion, including operational personnel who have firsthand experience with the performance of nuclear ships. We want to obtain firsthand information on what can be accomplished with nuclear propulsion. Such information is vital to arriving at any decisions on the use of nuclear power for the ships of the future, in my opinion.

First I would like to call on the Honorable Fred Korth to summarize for us the considerations that went into the decision to go nonnuclear on the next aircraft carrier.

Mr. Secretary, we welcome you and we welcome also your colleagues from the Navy. We also welcome, of course, Dr. Seaborg and his colleagues as well as the members from the Department of Defense. Please feel free to call on any of your people whom you wish to assure we obtain firsthand information on all the factors involved in this problem.

Mr. Secretary, you are at liberty to proceed in any way you like. STATEMENT OF HON. FRED KORTH, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Secretary KORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should like to say Admiral McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations, and I have statements which we would like to submit for your consideration. We likewise have with us members of our staff and members from the operating nuclear forces who will be available to help in answering any questions which you or the other members of the committee may see fit to ask in this important matter which we will discuss today.

I should like to introduce some of those at this time and ask them to rise if they will:

Dr. James H. Wakelin, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development;

Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, commander of the Antisubmarine Warfare Force of the Pacific Fleet and prior to that commander of the First Nuclear Task Force in the Navy;

Captain dePoix, who is now attending the War College here in Washington, but prior to that time was commanding officer of the Enterprise;

Capt. Raymond E. Peet, commanding officer of the U.S.S. Bainbridge; and

Capt. Eugene Wilkinson, former commanding officer of the U.S.S. Long Beach.

These persons I am sure will be able to place before you the salient points of the matter we are to discuss here today.

If I may, sir, I should like to begin with the presentation of my formal statement.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman PASTORE. Mr. Holifield.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman I would like to ask this question and it relates to the statements which are about to be given.

Is it customary for you and your colleagues, who are here this morning, when preparing to give a statement, to give your statements in advance to the Secretary's office for clearance?

Secretary KORTH. There is no ironclad rule or requirement, Mr. Holifield. I did not submit my statement to the Secretary of Defense for clearance, as a matter of fact. This was not in violation of any rule whatsoever. I was a little late in the preparation of my statement and actually some changes were even made this morning.

Representative HOLIFIELD. All right. Thank you.

Secretary KORTH. I would have no objection to submitting it although there is no requirement that it be submitted.

Representative HOLIFIELD. I just wanted to know if there was a requirement that statements to be presented before this committee be censored by the Department of Defense or whether these are statements actually prepared by yourself and these others?

Secretary KORTH. This is correct, sir. There was no requirement nor was it submitted for any clearance whatsoever.

Representative BATES. Mr. Chairman, at 10:30 a.m., it is necessary for me to go to the conference on the Senate military public works bill, but I would like to ask whether or not the presentation today will include the long-range factors in comparing conventional against nuclear costs.

Secretary KORTH. This will not be included in my formal presentation as a matter of statistical reference, but certainly those are available.

Representative BATES. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that information be afforded to us including the pro rata cost of tankers and so forth for something like a 20- or 25-year period? (See pp. 107 to 125.)

Secretary KORTH. This certainly can be given you within the area of present calculations, yes.

Representative BATES. Thank you.

Secretary KORTH. May I proceed, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman PASTORE. Yes.

Secretary KORTH. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I am deeply grateful for this opportunity to appear before you this morning, for I am especially interested in the timely matters which you have so properly decided to examine. We are this Nation and its people in a very formative period, a time of change, a period when new concepts of national power are seeking expression.

Unless the Navy prepares for possible war in peacetime, then it will be unprepared for modern war, and will have increasingly less peacetime effectiveness-cost or otherwise.

Within the past year, the Soviet Union has been classed officially as a major maritime power in every sense except surface striking power. By 1970, their merchant fleet will exceed our own. They are taking to the sea out of military and mercantile necessity, and it is at sea that they will at last become vulnerable to the traditional interests and influence of the Western Allies-all of whom are essentially maritime in nature, and largely dependent upon American seapower for backbone. The basic question now before us is simple: Will we meet the future challenges at sea with modern, high-speed, nuclear-powered surface forces, or will we continue the shortsighted budgetary expedient of hamstringing our new ships already too few in number— with obsolete engines?

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The dollar amounts for the new propulsion plants are large, but only in terms of initial investment. They are not the huge, unmanageable sums they appear to be when they are compared with the going price of weapons system investments which are built around these plants.

We are faced with a critical block obsolescence problem. Scores of new ships must be laid down each year if we are to keep up the strength we now have. Most of them do not need nuclear power-that is, the advantages so obtained for other than our major combatant ships would not be significant enough to warrant the expense until the price can be brought down further. But it would be nothing short of tragic if the surface striking forces of the U.S. Navy in the seventies and beyond continued to receive new ships with old engines.

During the nearly 2 years that I have been Secretary of the Navy I have had occasion to witness at firsthand numerous technological advancements and many changes for the better. There have been instances when honest differences of opinion have led us to the best solution to the problem at hand, and ultimately to the most realistic defense. Perhaps the most vivid struggle that can be called immediately to mind-though it was before my time was the one which led to the development of the Polaris program-the marriage of a nuclearpowered submarine and a ballistic missile which is now a major element of our vital strategic deterrent strength.

Because able and dedicated men have exercised the right to differ, not only among themselves, but with time-honored concepts, we have broken away from the traditions of peacetime unpreparedness, which, in the past, tied the hands of the military services until hostilities were practically under way. We have adopted, for the first time in our history, a policy of strength maintained over the long term. This genuine farsighted view of preparedness is mandatory. We must not fall into a cheap, convenient practice of preparing for peace-with all the shortcuts that route entails-rather than preparing for war, with all the sacrifices such a course demands. No one knows war, and therefore abhors it, any more than the military and naval officers of our services. Likewise, no one knows better than they the dreadful risks involved in accepting planned obsolesence. Many a war has been lost, and none has ever been averted, by preparing for peace instead of for war.

The magnitude and impact of changes in technology on our naval strength and strategy is sometimes cloudy to the general public, and for that matter almost equally unclear to those who, in the Navy, and other services, and the Department of Defense, are busily occupied with meeting the challenges that are so demanding each and every day. There is hesitancy in high places to make the transition from oil to nuclear power, boldly and unequivocally. There is understandable reluctance to make the leap into the future, for the command decision required will affect generations of Americans yet unborn.

During the past 22 months, thousands of hours have been devoted to discussions between skilled professional naval experts and our Nation's outstanding scientists and engineers. These talks have been reinforced with detailed studies, personal observations, and conversations with those in our operating forces stationed throughout the world. In this connection, to my knowledge there is unanimous support for nuclear propulsion among the key scientists and engineers that

have reviewed this matter. For example, the Naval Research Advisory Committee has urged that the Navy "go nuclear." One letter from its Chairman in December 1962 pretty well summarized their feelings and if I may, I would like to read it to you now.

Chairman PASTORE. Before you do, could we have placed in the record the membership of that Advisory Committee?

Secretary KORTH. Yes, sir. We will furnish that to you. They are outstanding scientists.

(The information is as follows:)

NAVAL RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Chairman: Dr. E. A. Walker, president, the Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa.

Vice Chairman: Mr. G. Norton, Institute for Defense Analyses, Washington, D.C. Dr. W. H. Brattain, member of technical staff, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, N.J.

Dr. H. Brooks, dean, Division of Engineering and Applied Physics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Dr. W. A. Fowler, Kellogg Radiation Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif.

Dr. C. C. Furnas, chancellor, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, N.Y.

Mr. E. H. Heinemann, vice president-engineering, General Dynamics Corp., New York, N.Y.

Dr. R. A. Kern, Temple University Hospital, Philadelphia, Pa.

Dr. A. B. Kinzel, vice president-research, Union Carbide Corp., Union Carbide Building, New York, N.Y.

Dr. E. R. Piore, vice president for research and engineering, International Business Machines Corp., New York, N.Y.

Dr. I. I. Rabi, Department of Physics, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. Dr. R. Revelle, university dean of research, University of California, and director, Scripps Institute of Oceanography, Berkeley, Calif.

Dr. F. Seitz, president, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.

Dr. C. G. Suits, vice president and director of research, General Electric Co., Schenectady, N.Y.

Dr. F. E. Terman, provost, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

Dr. J. N. Adkins, Executive Director, Naval Research Advisory Committee, Washington, D.C.

Secretary KORTH. This is dated December 18, 1962:

MY DEAR MR. KORTH: At the last Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) meeting, there was discussion on powerplants for naval ships. We also met one evening with Adm. George Anderson and obtained further background in developing the views that will be expressed below. The Naval Research Advisory Committee consists of men who have had a great deal of experience in jugding and pushing forward contemporary technology in this country. They also have an appreciation of naval problems due to long and intimate association with the Navy.

First, we would like to urge that all future major combatant surface ships have nuclear powerplants. We realize the ships may be more costly than conventional powerplants. However, we are impressed by some facts. The ships now being built and which will be built in the next few years are going to be in service at least through the 1980's-and probably to the turn of the century. Nuclear power in ships will certainly reduce the need and dependence for fossil fuel. In this uncertain world, looking ahead for the next 20 to 30 years, this is most important. In addition, in actual operation, the nuclear-powered ship has less reliance on the supply line. Very often detailed analysis confuses the issues in making bold technical decisions. In nuclear-powered ships we may be in this situation. One would urge that a command decision be made rather than further studies and further detailed cost understanding be undertaken. One is always impressed with the classic example in the First World War: the British introduction of tanks. Much time and many lives were lost by failure to make a command decision.

The Committee also would like to urge the initiation of a vigorous engineering program for improved propulsion plants for ships. This program should reflect

the general state of technology in the naval environment 10 years from today rather than the technological developments in the next 2 or 3 years. There are two aspects to this program: (1) Lightweight nuclear powerplants; and (2) lightweight conventional powerplants. With regard to the former, NRAC's views are that if the Navy adopts the policy that all new major combatant ships be propelled with the currently developed nuclear powerplants or their improvement only then does it make sense to start a major development program for the lightweight nuclear plants. Our best estimate is that an improved nuclear powerplant will not appear in the first prototype ship for about 10 to 12 years. This long-range program can only be attained in this time period with vigorous prosecution. The cost of this development program may run as high as a billion dollars over this period of years.

NRAC believes that, in addition, a vigorous development program for lightweight conventional powerplants is required. This requirement is independent of the nuclear powerplant decisions. A lightweight conventional powerplant will contribute to the development of nuclear technology, may provide a significant operational capability much sooner, and give the Navy an opportunity for testing and proving the lightweight propulsion machinery. The more conventional fossil fuel type of powerplant, we are sure, will be a continuing requirement.

The views expressed here represent the consensus of the members of the Naval Research Advisory Committee at the last meeting. We feel that there has been sufficient analysis to indicate the direction of future work. Detailed analysis will modify the details of the program but not the main ideas expressed.

I do hope that, from time to time, we may write to you on these technical matters.

This was signed by D. E. R. Piore, Chairman, Naval Research Advisory Committee.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, at this point may I ask a question to clarify a term used in the letter?

Would you explain to us the difference between a lightweight conventional powerplant and, I suppose, a lightweight nuclear powerplant and a heavyweight nuclear powerplant?

Secretary KORTH. A lightweight plant would be used on lighter escort ships, below 8,000 tons in effect, as a par cutoff point.

Representative HOLIFIELD. So this reference to lightweight plants would be to support vessels rather than major carriers?

Secretary KORTH. That is correct, sir. That is my understanding. Chairman PASTORE. Are there any further questions on that point? Representative PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could have identification of Dr. Piore at this point.

Secretary WAKELIN. Dr. Piore, sir, is vice president of International Business Machines Corp., for research and development.

Secretary KORTH. All of these people, and I know that all of us here in this room, are honestly and sincerely concerned over our ability to retain our position of strength so as to insure the freedom of the seas. To this end, significant changes in weapons systems and in propulsion systems have been made and will continue to be made in the future.

I am firmly convinced that nuclear propulsion strongly contributes to the greatest possible efficiency of our naval forces, and that it does offer outstanding proven advantages and revolutionary potential which far outweigh any possible disadvantages set down by those who may differ in the premise.

The use of nuclear power will add significantly to the versatility and effectiveness of our naval task forces. The increased range, the responsiveness, the staying power and the reduced vulnerability will make these forces much stronger and much more useful as instruments of national policy and power.

It is true that this newest form of propulsion is more expensive than the older, but this is a phenomenon experienced by a new product