charts which I think clarify some of the things that came up yesterday and sort of give our figures and our rationale if I may.1 Chairman PASTORE. All right, sir, you may.

INCREASFD PERFORMANCE OF LATEST NUCLEAR PLANTS

Admiral CONNOLLY. Just a quick review. In Enterprise you had eight reactors. In the proposed CVAN-67, four. The shaft horsepower for Enterprise [classified matter deleted] at least in CVAN-67. Since the proposal of January, Admiral Rickover has advised the Chief of Naval Operations and my office, too, that he is very confident that this figure will match that figure [pointing to chart].

Admiral RICKOVER. The machinery going in is [classified matter deleted]. We will match [classified material deleted] so it will be exactly the same power.

Admiral CONNOLLY. Four reactors with the same power as eight. Now the initial core cost for Enterprise is given here, $64 million. That was $8 million for each of eight cores; $32 million for the four reactors. Exactly half.

Representative BATES. Is that going to change with the new power? Admiral RICKOVER. No, each of the four is twice as powerful as the others. Actually there is four times the energy coming out of this reactor than there was out of the one on the Enterprise. So it will last about twice as long.

Admiral CONNOLLY. Each core being equal to two of the other cores and lasting twice as long, four times the total energy. Now the cost per year breaks down to 3 years at $64 million, is $21 million, and 7 years at $32 million is close to $5 million or a ratio of 4 to 1.

COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CARRIERS

Now this possibly is the chart that will explain the most and in our view is the strongest argument that we have, that we know how to portray in this succinct form. It is a busy chart and I will take time and welcome questions and interruptions. (See enclosure to memo, p. 106.)

The CVA-19 is the Hancock class. The CVA-41 is the Midway class. The CVA-67 is the Forrestal class. That is the one which has been approved and authorized and that we have been directed to build.

NOTIONAL CARRIER

The CVAN-65, of course, is Enterprise. The notional CVA was a study carrier, equal in size, but with a conventional plant, to the CVAN-67 which is the nuclear.

Now we have carefully analyzed the features of an aircraft carrier and a task group by which you evaluate. These came out to be response time, how quickly can you get to the scene of action. How quickly can you go to a theater of emergency?

Having gotten to the scene of action how many sorties can you get off, at what rate can you get them off, how fast can you get them off and how many. Then how long can you stay in the area, how much staying power do you have? How many aircraft do you embark, a very strong measure. How vulnerable, relatively.

Of course all of this is really relative. How much flexibility do you have, how much choice, how much freedom, how ready are you

1 The charts referred to contain classified matter and therefore are not printed in this record.

when you get there? How ready when en route? How ready when you get there? What can you do in a special situation, something we were not prepared for?

We certainly were not prepared for Cuba. There are others that we don't know about that fit in. Long steaming, hold the carrier, hold forces, negotiate and then make a move. Do you make it all the way, two-thirds of the way, three-quarters of the way, a hundred miles offshore, under control; nothing has happened but it is all there ready.

General war. It has taken us a long time and we have a tremendous nuclear capability in our carriers today. Tremendous. I don't have to tell you. Then there is one other smaller factor that put together all the other features such as were mentioned yesterday like the stack corrosion, ABC (Atomic, Biological, and Chemical Warfare) control, and so forth.

Now we have weighted these things. This totals 100. Of course we gave a high weight to response time, to sorties, to staying power. We also gave a high weight to flexibility. That is a big feature in an atomic carrier.

Then we applied these to the various classes of aircraft carriers that we have and in the Hancock class you can see that it falls off in embarked aircraft, it is small, it carries two-thirds, not better than 60 percent. One for the course, par for the course in all items, the normal so to speak, is the Forrestal.

When we got through and averaged it all out it turns out in our judgment, professional as well as study judgment, that the Hancock class is about 80 percent as good as the Forrestal, all things considered, all factors considered. The Midway is about 87 percent as good. Forrestal comes out one.

Enterprise comes out 117 percent and about the only feature on it at all that breaks out even is the embarked aircraft is the same as Forrestal. That of course is true as to the notional carrier and also the CVAN. The notional carrier comes out with 108 because it makes out in such areas as flexibility.

It still is tied to the umbilical fuel cord. It still is reliant and dependent, the commander's ability to run his course is dependent on that fuel system that he must know is there.

ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION

Of course the nuclear carrier comes out with the best marks down the board. It loses in no department. We actually believe these to be conservative. We actually believe they are very conservative. It comes out 1.21. This, gentlemen, is the basis really for 6 to 5, 1.20 over 1.00 being 6 to 5.

Chairman PASTORE. Was this shown to the Secretary of Defense? Admiral CONNOLLY. It is in our study, sir, which we have, to which his memorandum refers. It was in a specific memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy; yes, sir.

(The September 26, 1963, memorandum follows:)

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense.

SEPTEMBER 26, 1963.

Subject: Construction of the attack carrier in fiscal year 1963 shipbuilding program. Enclosure: (1) Attack carrier effectiveness comparison.

The purpose of this memorandum is to apprise you of the Navy's views regrading the construction of CVA-67 on the assumption (1) that the construction of this

ship in the fiscal year 1963 shipbuilding program will be approved and (2) under the further alternative assumptions of (a) conventional propulsion or (b) nuclear propulsion.

The Navy continues to recommend a policy of installing nuclear propulsion in surface warships because it will significantly increase their versatility and effectiveness in war or deterrance of war. Increased range, responsiveness, staying power, and reduced vulnerability provided by nuclear propulsion will make naval forces much stronger and more useful as instruments of national policy and power. Nuclear propulsion provides the following specific advantages which substantially increase military effectiveness both offensively and defensively:

(a) Virtually unlimited endurance at high sustained speed which means: (1) Increased tactical flexibility and freedom for independent action. (2) Enhanced opportunity to use evasive transit tracks.

(3) Improved capability to operate in bad weather or to take circuitous routes to avoid storms.

(4) Ability to extend attack along greater perimeter.

(5) Reduced vulnerability to submarine and guided missile attack and freedom from dependence upon replenishment in areas of high threat.

(6) Greatly reduced dependence upon mobile logistic support.

(7) Elimination of concern for loss of fuel oil facilities at the source, prepositioned fuel depots, or en route to the refueling rendezvous.

(8) Ability, under severe threat situations, to operate from distant bases, completely free of logistic dependency, cycling in rapid transits for ammunition and aviation fuel.

(b) Feasibility to design for sealing ship against atomic, biological, and chemical attack due to elimination of air intake required for boilers.

(c) Elimination of corrosive effect of stack gases on radar antennas and aircraft and the hazard of flying through the turbulent path of the exhaust gases. Elimination of stacks and air intakes eases topside arrangements.

(d) Increasing shipboard electric power requirements for new radars, sonars, and missile systems can be accommodated by nuclear reactors without reducing the range of the ship during operational deployments.

In your memorandum to me of April 20 you included this request: "I realize that it is difficult to quantify exactly the increase in effectiveness associated with nuclear propulsion, but I would like you and the Chief of Naval Operations to indicate to me the nuclear-powered force which, in your judgment, would be equivalent in effectiveness to a conventional force." In our most recent study of the relative effectiveness of nuclear and conventional carrier task groups, effectiveness factors have been developed as a basis for measuring task group performance. These factors have been assigned numerical weights and values based on analysis and judgment. Enclosure (1) reports a summary of the results of this study in specific terms of carrier effectiveness. The complete study is currently under review and will be forwarded in the near future. The results show, and our judgment confirms, that five new nuclear-powered task groups with carriers of the proposed CVA(N) 67 design will give the carrier strike force the combat effectiveness of six new conventional task groups with carriers of the CVA-67 design.

In your draft memorandum for the President of September 6 relative to attack carrier forces, you point out that the average annual cost of a conventional carrier task group is about "$300 million for each attack carrier with its air groups, escorting vessels, underway replenishment forces, etc." Our study shows that the average annual cost of a nuclear-powered carrier task group will lie between $9 and $19 million more than a conventional task group (3 to 6 percent more); the range of difference depends on the amount of replenishment support assumed. Thus five new nuclear-powered task groups, besides having greater combat effectiveness, will on an annual basis cost between $200 and $250 million less than six new conventional task groups.

Therefore, incorporation of nuclear propulsion in the [classified matter deleted] new carriers proposed in your draft memorandum of September 6 would apply substantial restoration to the loss in airstrike capability accompanying any reduction in CVA force levels that future considerations may dictate.

The CVA-67 is the only ship in the fiscal years 1963 and 1964 programs that will be affected by a decision to construct major combatant surface ships with nuclear propulsion. Therefore I have outlined below methods for funding the construction of CVA-67 under the alternative assumptions of (a) conventional propulsion and (b) nuclear propulsion.

To construct this ship with conventional propulsion requires only the release by your office of funds already appropriated but held in a deferred status. No

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further action is required, though I would suggest, in this case, notification of the chairmen of the congressional committees concerned that we are proceeding with construction.

To construct CVA-67 with nuclear propulsion will require (1) the concurrence of the chairmen of the congressional committees (this concurrence could be obtained with or without formal hearings depending on the desires of the chairmen); (2) cancellation by the President of the previous CVA authorization and his authorization of a CVA(N); and (3) provision of added funding in the amount of $125.8 million. There are three methods for obtaining these funds, e.g., (1) requesting them in a supplemental fiscal year 1964 appropriation; (2) including them in the Navy's fiscal year 1965 shipbuilding budget request (which would require waiving the full funding requirement in order to award a contract prior to passage of the fiscal year 1965 appropriation); or (3) compensation by reprograming of fiscal year 1964 Navy funds. The first two are certain to incur delays and some risk to the CVA program; the last affects other Navy programs. review of the pros and cons of the available methods has led me to recommend that the added cost of nuclear propulsion for CVA-67 be funded through compensation from fiscal year 1964 funds currently in a deferred status. Within the immediate future I will be prepared to propose detailed reprograming actions needed to fulfill this requirement. Although the effect of such reprograming on Navy programs will be serious, the Navy feels that an early start on a nuclearpowered CVA-67 is of such importance that it warrants acceptance of a more stringent level of support for other programs.

A

In summary, the reasons for incorporating nuclear propulsion in CVA-67 are: (a) On a cost-effectiveness evaluation across the board, our study shows that nuclear propulsion is superior to conventional propulsion.

(b) Operational experience derived with the carrier Enterprise, the cruiser Long Beach, and the frigate Bainbridge is exceptional because of advantages of nuclear propulsion and also because of superior engineering plant performance reliability and maintainability.

(c) As Dr. Seaborg cited in his January 1963 memorandum to you, the size and cost of nuclear plants have come down, reactor powers have risenall markedly, and core life has more than doubled. These technical advances are ready to go in the new attack carrier. The Navy has taken appropriate engineering steps to proceed with the construction of a CVAN (as well as a CVA) so that delays would be minimal.

(d) The next opportunity to build a CVAN is several years ahead; today the additional price of nuclear power in a carrier task group-costed over 25 years and discounted-is about 5 percent of the total cost of the task group. I urge you to reach a decision to construct this carrier with nuclear power and that I be directed to proceed with the proper steps to implement your decision. FRED KORTH.

Enclosure: (The enclosure included the same classified table referred to by Admiral Connolly on p. 103. The table assigned overall relative effectiveness values to various carrier task groups as follows: Hancock class 0.79, Midway 0.87, CVA-67 1.0, Enterprise 1.17, notional CVA 1.08, proposed 4-reactor nuclear carrier 1.21).

Notes: (1) These effectiveness factors are identified on the next page.

(2) There is a difference in effectiveness between CVA-67 and older Forrestals because of improved JP-5 and ammunition storage and a larger embarked air group, but the two are still sufficiently similar for the purposes of this comparion. (a) Sorties in the first 10 days are a function of response time and embarked aircraft but each of these may have other effectiveness values and therefore a separate category is used. If it were not, then the weight for response time and embarked aircraft would be higher.

EXPLANATION OF EFFECTIVENESS FACTORS

1. Response time.-Average response differential for first, second, and third CVA to respond. Takes account of probable sea state induced speed reductions in the case of Hancock and Midway class ships.

2. Sorties. Average number of attack sorties, at median response ranges for first 10 days after alert. Effectiveness is degraded somewhat by lack of longrange aircraft capability in Hancock and Midway class.

3. Staying power. The number of consecutive days on strike stations and/or percent of time on station over a given period.

4. Embarked aircraft.-Number and type of embarked aircraft 2 available for all aircraft missions: AAW, RECCO, ASW, as well as attack.

5. Vulnerability. Measures vulnerability not as an exact function of time alongside but considers the added risk associated with the fact that subs may stalk the replenishment group and wait for period of high vulnerability. Also considers the relative effectiveness of different armanemt and protective systems; and vulnerability of the logistic pipeline.

6. Task force flexibility. This factor takes into account the degree to which the operational commander is free from logistic constraint to dispatch units for independent action, "trade" forces, avoid weather, and enhance deceptive tactics. This is particularly applicable to the employment of escorts.

7. Readiness and reliability.—A factor which considers adequacy of size and equipment, safety, standards of construction, the ship as a weapon platform. 8. Special force capability.-Ability of the task group to act as an "elite" force, capable of quick strike operations, or the maintenance of a militant presence in vital areas.

9. General war capability.—Effectiveness of the force which could survive a nuclear exchange and retain an organized, flexible offensive capability.

10. Other factors.-Possible advantages that accrue primarily to the nuclear group in areas of advancement of nuclear technology, ABC defense, corrosion control, island design, stockpiling of nuclear fuel, and potential for modernization. Representative BATES. Was that the first study or the second

study?

Admiral CONNOLLY. That is the second study. The final study, the last one we have done.

Representative MORRIS. Was your question: "Was it shown to the Secretary of Defense?" and your answer is "Yes"?

Admiral CONNOLLY. The memorandum was sent to the Secretary of Defense. I have to assume that it was handled and he saw it. Representative HOSMER. You don't know whether he actually eyeball saw it?

COST COMPARISONS

Admiral CONNOLLY. No, sir; I can't testify to that. If I may I would like to come back to costs again. You have heard these costs before with respect to the carrier, $278 million against $403 million for the nuclear. Now just to put other things in perspective, the frigate, the DLG prices out at $191 million. The $191 million is the Typhon ship. This [classified matter deleted] million is the Typhon nuclear frigate.

The guided missile destroyer at [classified matter deleted] million is conventional, at [classified matter deleted] million is nuclear. Representative BATES. We don't have any Typhon yet.

Admiral CONNOLLY. No, sir. These were in our study and these were in our proposals.

Representative BATES. You don't have bids on them or anything? Admiral CONNOLLY. No, sir. We were quite far along with getting ready for this one as a Typhon ship. As you heard yesterday, Typhon did not come as fast as we had hoped and therefore we deferred it.

Now here is the $403 million minus $278 million, gives you $125 million. Where that money went, you heard that yesterday, too, but I would like to remind you of it; $13 million is a bigger ship. It carries 50 percent more aviation fuel and 50 percent more ammunition. Actually [classified matter deleted] tons of ammunition and [classified matter deleted] million gallons of JP-5.

2 The table indicates the same number of aircraft embarked in the conventional CVA-67, the Enterprise, the notional CVA, and the proposed new 4-reactor carrier, CVA N-67. See testimony to this effect on p. 104.