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(Munn vs. Illinois), is situated within the limits of a single State. Its business is carried on there, and its regulation is a matter of domestic concern. It is employed in State as well as inter-state commerce, and until Congress acts, the State must be permitted to adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people within its own jurisdiction, even though in doing so those without may be indirectly affected."

On the other hand, in Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S., 465, and Railroad Co. v. Hannan, 95 U. S. 485, there seemed to be a different holding, and in one of these cases it was said: “Whatever may be the power of a State over commerce that is completely internal, it can no more prohibit or regulate that which is inter-state than that which is with foreign nations.”

In Wm. Kaiser v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, Judge McCrary of the Circuit Court of the United States in an opinion delivered October 24, 1884, said: "Since no State law can have any extra territorial force, is it not clear that the attempt to enforce the statutes of each of the several States, in so far as the carriage within such State is concerned, would lead to disputes and conflicts which no State authority would be competent to adjust and determine? These considerations, I think, lead inevitably to a conclusion not only that such commerce is the subject only of national control and regulation, but that any attempt to devolve upon a single State the power to regulate in part would necessarily give to such State the right to discriminate against other States of the Union.”

Previous to this the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Carton & Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 59 Iowa, 151, in reference to the claim made that the law under consideration did not apply to the contracts made for the transportation of freight into other States, said: "Section three of the act, so far as applicable to this case, is as follows: 'The tariff of rates established in the following schedule shall be considered the basis on which to compute the compensation for transporting freights, goods, merchandise or property over any kind of railroad within this State. Some of us think this language excludes contracts for the transportation of freight to points without the State, but as the plaintiffs claim that these were contracts made in Iowa for through shipments to Chicago, and that by tacking the law of Illinois to the law of Iowa thus making it one continuous haul, the rate for the continuous haul being in excess of that authorized by the law of Iowa, such excess

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may be recovered back. We think it is not necessary to put a construction upon the law of this State in this regard, but rest our decision upon another ground.

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If the law of Iowa, conceding that it contemplates the control or regulation of freight to other States, is in that particular void, as being an infraction of the Federal Constitution, it cannot be enforced, and the defendant was not bound to obey it, and could fix its own freight tariff, and the plaintiffs cannot recover for a violation of the statute, whatever other rights they may have. That the act of this State, assuming that its object and purpose was to control and regulate the shipments of freight to other States, is of the character last defined appears to us very clear, and we are not without authority upon this question, and from a source which so far as questions involving the construction of the Federal Constitution are involved, are binding upon this court and all other courts of the Union." The court had said that the Supreme Court of the United States "has always held that the power to enact laws upon subjects in their nature national and not merely local is exclusively with Congress.'

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In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 Howard, 299, it was said: "Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit one uniform system or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation."

The court then cites the cases upon which it relies as holding such a law void. They are as follows:

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Reading Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wallace, 232.
Passenger Laws, 7 Howard, 283.

Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 18 Howard, 421.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1.

Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 Howard, 299.

Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 713.

Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S., 272.

Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wallace, 35.

Railroad Company v. Maryland, 21 Wallace, 456.

State v. Munn, 94 U. S., 113.

C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S., 155.

Peik v. C. & N. W. Co., 94 U. S., 164.

Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S., 485.

R. R. Co. v. Hannen, 95 U. S., 465.

The court concludes as follows: "The plaintiffs claim to recover because the amount of freight money exacted by the defendant was in excess of the rate fixed by law in Iowa. The contract of shipment was an entirety. It cannot be severed and made to apply partly to the shipment in Iowa and partly to that in Illinois. It was the right of the defendant to disregard any laws which sought to regulate shipments to points without the State and make its own contracts. Having done so, the plaintiffs cannot recover under any State law, simply because it is void as being repugnant to the Federal Constitution."

A consideration of the language used by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Peik and Chicago, Burlington & Quincy cases led to a division of views on the extent of the powers of the State over shipments from inside out of, and from outside into the State, and on the 31st of March, 1884, a majority of the Commissioners, Messrs. Coffin and Anderson, in what is known as the "buggy case," ordered the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company "to revise and alter its inter-State distance tariff, so far as it relates to freight shipped from points within this State to points without this State, and from points outside the State to points within the State, as to make it correspond to the Iowa local distance tariff." The Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company refused to obey this order, and denied the authority of the Commissioners to make the same, insisting that it was a plain attempt to regulate and control inter-State commerce. Under the law the case was certified to the courts to de termine whether the order was reasonable and just. In September, 1885, Judge Bayless of the Polk county (Iowa) District Court decided that the Commissioners had no power to make the order, placing his decision entirely upon the authority of Carton v. The Illinois Central Railway, 59 Iowa, 151.

An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, and on the second day of December, A. D. 1886, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District Court, and held that the Commissioners had no authority to make the order, and that to do so was to attempt to interfere with inter-State commerce.

After reviewing the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Com.

pany v. The State of Illinois, where it says "that a statute of a State intended to regulate or tax, or to impose any other restriction upon the transmission of persons or property from one State to another is not within the class of legislation which the State may enact, and is void"-7 Supreme Court Reporter, 4-the court says: "The question being one of the construction of the constitution of the United States, the holding of that tribunal is binding on every other court in the land. The judgment of the Circuit Court is in accord with that holding. It is also in accord with the holding of this court in Carton v. The Illinois Central Railway Company, 59 Iowa, 149.”

The opinion of the Commissioner that dissented in the above case was based upon the rulings of the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Carton v. Illinois Central Railway Company, and that of Judge McCrary in the case of William Kaiser v. The Illinois Central Railway Company, rendered October 24, 1883. It closes with the following: "If the Federal Courts regard it as incumbent upon them to follow the rulings of the Supreme Court of the State, it seems to me that a commission created by State authority is going beyond its powers when it attempts to do what the court says the State in its sovereign capacity cannot do."

On the 25th of October, 1886, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois heretofore cited, namely: People of the State of Illinois vs. The Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court, and is reported to have said: "When it is attempted to apply to transportation through an entire series of States a principle of this kind, and each one of the States or of half a dozen States shall attempt to establish its own rates of transportation, its own methods to prevent discrimination in rates or to permit it, the deleterious influence upon the freedom of commerce among the States, and upon the transportation of goods through those States cannot be overestimated. That this species of regulation is one which must be, if established at all, of a general and national character, and cannot be safely and wisely remitted to local rules and local regulations, we think is clear, from what has already been said. And if it be a regulation of inter-state commerce, as we think we have demonstrated it is, and as the 1llinois court concedes it to be, it must be of that national character, and the regulation can only appropriately be by general rules and principles which demand that it should be done by the Congress of the United States, under the

commerce clause of the constitution. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, which was adverse to the railroad, is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.”

Chief Justice Waite delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Associate Justices Bradley and Gray concurred, conceding "that Congress might, if it saw fit, regulate the matter under consideration, but not having done so it is held that the State does not lose its power to regulate the charges of its own railroads in its own territory, simply because the goods or persons transported have been brought from or are destined to a point beyond the State border."

It may now, we think, be regarded as settled by the highest authority binding upon all, that the powers of the State as to regulation and control are confined to strictly domestic commerce, and do not extend to shipments from the State to points outside, or to shipments from points outside the State to points within. That such shipments are to be regarded as an entirety, and cannot be divided so as to deal with the portion exclusively within the State. That discriminations made with reference to such shipments cannot be prevented, punished or restrained by the laws of the State. In this view of the situation, what the State may do becomes a subject of serious inquiry.

In speaking upon this subject, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Stone et al. v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S., 307, Chief Justice Waite, delivering the opinion, said: "The line between the exclusive power of Congress and the general powers of the State in this particular is not everywhere distinctly marked, and it is always easier to determine when a case arises whether it falls on one side or the other, than to settle it in advance, so that it may be in all respects strictly accurate." Again, in the same case, speaking of the powers of the State, it is said: "So it (the State) may make all needful rules and regulations of a public character for the government of the company while operating its road in that jurisdiction. In this way it may certainly require the company to fence so much of its road as lies within the State; to stop its trains at railroad crossings; to slacken speed while running in a crowded thoroughfare; to post its tariffs and time-tables at proper places, and other things of a kindred character affecting the comfort, the convenience or the safety of those who are entitled to look to the State for protection against the wrongful or negligent conduct of others." Scanning with care the several utterances of the Supreme Court

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