scribed as bounded upon a building, the line extends only to the eaves, or the outermost limits of the building. Carbrey vs. Willin, 7 Allen, 364, 370; Millet vs. Fowle, 8 Cush., 150.

As to the rights of a grantee of land bounded upon a "place," (a court open only at one end,) see Rogers vs. Parker, 9 Gray, 445. In Peck vs. Smith, 1 Conn., 103, it is said that an intention in the grantor, to withhold his interest in a road to the middle of it, after parting with his right in the adjoining land, is never to be presumed; and that there was no instance where the fee of a highway, as distinct from the adjoining land, was ever retained by the vendor. See also, Chatham vs. Brainard, 11 Conn., 60; Champlin vs. Pendleton, 13 Conn., 23.

The following important general rules of construction, for the ascertainment of boundaries, are given by Professor Greenleaf, in a note to section 301, volume 1, of his work on Evidence: "The object, in cases of this kind, is to interpret the instrument, that is, to ascertain the intent of the parties; and the rule to find the intent is, to give most effect to those things about which men are least liable to mistake. On this principle, the things usually called for in a grant, that is, the things by which the land granted is described, have been thus marshalled. First. The highest regard should be had to natural boundaries. Second. To lines actually run and courses actually marked at the time of the grant. Third. If the lines and courses of an adjoining tract are called for, the lines will be extended to them, if they are sufficiently established, and no other departure from the deed is thereby required; marked lines prevailing over those which are not marked. Fourth. To courses and distances, giving preference to the one or the other according to circumstances. Words necessary to ascertain the premises must be retained; words not necessary for that purpose may be rejected, if inconsistent with the others. The expression of quantity is descriptive, and may well aid in finding the intent where the boundaries are doubtful." If a map or plan is referred to for further description, the lines, courses, distances, &c., are to have the same effect as if expressly recited in the convey

ance. That a boundary inadvertently inserted may be disregarded, see Parks vs. Loomis, 6 Gray, 467, 472.

In relation to a reference to the grantor's title deeds, or to other papers, see Dana vs. Middlesex Bank, 10 Met., 250, 255; Melvin vs. Locks and Canals, 5 Met., 15, 27; Light vs. Godard, 11 Allen, 5. Doubtful words and provisions in a grant are to be taken most strongly against the grantor, he being supposed to select the words used. Adams vs. Frothingham, 3 Mass., 352, 361; 2 Met., 240; 2 Cush., 331. But see ante, Chapter XVI, Section 9, "Of the construction of Insurance Policies."

A grant of any principal thing is taken to carry with it all which is necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the thing granted, and which it is in the power of the grantor to convey. Johnson vs. Jordan, 2 Met., 739; 2 Cush., 331. Land occupied by buildings, or other works designed for a particular purpose which comprehends its practical, beneficial use and enjoyment, is properly designated and conveyed by a term which describes the purpose to which it is thus appropriated. Johnson vs. Raynner, 6 Gray, 107, 110. Thus the grant of a well carries the soil covered by and used with it; the conveyance of a wharf and dock includes the flats lying in front.

A conveyance, or the exception in a conveyance, of a mill, carries with it, by necessary implication, the land commonly used with it, and the right to the water course furnishing its power, to the mill-gear and machinery, connected and used therewith and being part thereof. Ashby vs. Eastern Railroad Co., 5 Met., 368; Forbush vs. Lombard, 13 Met., 109; Wooley vs. Groton, 2 Cush., 305; Allen vs. Scott, 21 Pick., 25; Richardson vs. Bigelow, 15 Gray, 154-6; Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co. vs. Chandler, 9 Allen, 159; New Ipswich Factory vs. Batchelor, 3 N. Hamp., 190; Kent, 4 vol., 547, 8,9; Crocker, "Common Forms," 10, 16.

Sometimes, to the specific description is added some such clause as gives reference to the title deeds of the grantor, or to other papers; and, for the convenience of those who have subsequent occasion to look up the title to the estate con

veyed, such a reference to previous conveyances, and to the place of their record in the registry of deeds, is very desirable. Incumbrances upon the estate, and exceptions and reservations out of it, may properly be inserted immediately after the description; but should, in all cases, be mentioned under, and excepted from, the covenants.

Together with all the appurtenances thereto belonging.”– This expression does no harm, is so usually inserted, and has become so familiar, that, though without legal effect, it has been retained in this form. It may be retained or rejected at the pleasure of the parties, without enlarging or diminishing the effect of the deed; as whatever would be included in such an expression will pass, without mention, as an appurtenance. Brown vs. Thissell, 6 Cush., 254.

All easements upon lands of a stranger, such as rights of way, drainage, light and air, which have been used by the grantor in connection with the estate, will pass by a conveyance, though not expressly mentioned. Underwood vs. Carney, 1 Cush., 285; Mendell vs. Delano, 7 Met., 176, and cases therein referred to. But see, in connection herewith, Ammidown vs. Bull, 8 Allen, 293.

Where a grantor has been accustomed to using his own adjoining land, for his convenience in the occupation of the land conveyed, such use will not warrant the grantee in claiming such an easement, unless it is mentioned in his deed, or is reasonably necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the estate conveyed. Grant vs. Chase, 17 Mass., 443; Thayer vs. Payne, 2 Cush., 327, 331; Randall vs. McLaughlin, 10 Allen, 366; Parker vs. Bennett, 11 Allen, 388.When a right of way may be considered thus "reasonably necessary," see Pettengill vs. Porter, 8 Allen, 1; 7 Allen, 364; 10 Allen, 366; 2 Met., 234. A conduit, conveying water to the land sold from another part of the lands of the grantor, will pass, as being necessary or appurtenant to the estate granted. Kent, vol. 4, 549. See, upon this general subject, United States vs. Appleton, 1 Sumner, 492.

Benefits arising out of covenants running with the land con

veyed, will pass to the grantee, though not mentioned or referred to in the deed: and, if they do not run with the land, no mention made of them in the deed can give the grantee the benefit of them. It is, however, desirable that they be named in the conveyance, for the double purpose of keeping them in memory, and in showing that the grantor intended that whatever rights he had therein, should pass.

"And all the estate, title and interest, dower, and rights of dower and homestead," &c. Wherever it is designed that the conveyance should include a release, by the wife of the grantor, of her rights of dower and homestead in the estate, appropriate words, signifying such intent to release, must, in some part of the deed, precede her signature. The release of dower and homestead is sometimes regulated by statute. At common law, it may be released by apt words in the deed, executed by the wife jointly with the husband, either as an original conveyance or a subsequent release. But where no such release was had or intended, at the time of the conveyance, the release should be upon new consideration to the wife, which should be expressed in the deed.

That the words importing a release are necessary, see Kent, vol. 4, 60; 7 Mass., 14, 20; Learned vs. Cutler, 18 Pick., 9; Powell vs. M. & B. Ma'f'g Co., 3 Mason, 347. In New Hampshire such words of release are not required. Burge vs. Smith, 7 Foster, 332. A deed, inoperative as to the husband, will not bar the wife's dower. A writing not sealed or acknowledged will not be sufficient. Giles vs. Morse, 4 Gray, 600. Of course, no release of dower is required in States in which, like Connecticut, the wife is entitled to dower only in lands of which her husband dies seized. Nor is it anywhere required, either of dower or homestead, where the seizin of the grantor has been only instantaneous, as where the same transaction, in which the husband acquires title, takes the estate out of him: thus, where conveyance is made to him, and he at the same time mortgages back to secure the purchase money, the wife will only become entitled to dower, subject to mortgage. Upon this subject, see Kent, vol. 4, 38,

39 and on; New England Jewelry Co. vs. Merriam, 2 Allen, 390; Hebrook vs. Finney, 4 Mass., 566. In King vs. Stetson, 11 Allen, 407, the same rule was applied where the mortgage was given to a third person.

In this part of the deed, clauses are sometimes inserted, which are designed to involve the grantee in obligations and implied covenants. And, wherever the language used shows an intention that the grantee should perform certain acts for the benefit of the grantor or of any third person, and the grantee accepts the deed, the law implies a promise on his part to perform; and an action may be maintained against him. Western R. R. vs. Babcock, 6 Met., 353, 357; Pike vs. Brown, 7 Cush., 133; Felch vs. Taylor, 13 Pick.

Whether such implication may amount to an implied covenant, creating rights in favor of the grantor in land, the title to which is not derived to the grantee through the deed containing the proviso, quere,-and see Dyer vs. Sanford, 9 Met., 395. That it ought not so to extend to other lands, would seem to result from the fact, that no effective notice of such incumbrance upon such other land is given in the registry of deeds.

The most common illustration of an implied promise, raised by the acceptance of a deed by a grantee, is, where a deed conveying an estate subject to a mortgage contains the words, after recital of the incumbrance, "which said grantee is to assume and pay," or words equivalent thereto.

As to amount of damages arising from breach of this implied covenant, see Brewer vs. Worthington, 10 Allen, 329. See also, upon this general subject, Braman vs. Downe, 12 Cush., 227, 229; Jewell vs. Draper, 6 Allen, 434.

Where an estate is conveyed by a deed of warranty simply "subject to" a mortgage, the grantee does not thereby become personally bound to pay off the mortgage debt. Strong vs. Converse, 8 Allen, 557.

If it be designed that the estate shall not only remain liable for payment of the debt or the discharge of the incumbrance, but that it should be assumed by the grantee, and his title be made to depend upon its discharge, so that the