gard to the nature of the contract and the objects intended to be accomplished by it. Applying this principle to the present proviso, and assuming that the plaintiffs are right in their position, that the words used are not to be interpreted literally, it would seem to be reasonable, to hold that they were intended to except from the policy all cases of death caused by the voluntary act of the assured, when his deed of selfdestruction was the result of intention, by a person knowing the nature and consequences of the act, although it may have been done under an insane illusion, which rendered the party morally and legally irresponsible and incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and which, by disturbing his reason and judgment, impelled him to its commission.

"If the suicide was an act of volition, however excited or impelled, it may, in a just sense, be said that he died by his own hand. But beyond this, it would not be reasonable to extend the proviso. If the death was caused by accident, by superior and overwhelming force in the madness of delirium, or under any combination of circumstances from which it may be fairly inferred that the act of self-destruction was not the result of the will or intention of the party adapting means to the end and contemplating the physical nature and effects of the act, then it may be justly held to be a loss not excepted within the meaning of the proviso. A party cannot be said to die by his own hand, in the sense in which those words are used in the policy, whose self-destruction does not proceed from the exercise of an act of volition, but is the result of a blind impulse, of mistake, or accident, or of other circumstances over which the will has no control.

"In seeking to ascertain the intention of parties, some weight is to be given to the practical results, which would be likely to follow from the adoption of a particular construction of the words of a contract. It is reasonable to suppose, that these were in contemplation of the insurers at the time the policy was issued. Certainly, it is fair to infer, that they intended to put some material limitation upon their liability, by the insertion of this proviso. But if it is to be construed as including only the cases of criminal self-destruction, it would

rarely, if ever, effect this object. Those familiar with the business of insurance, and with the results of actions on policies of insurance, in courts of law, know how difficult it is, to establish a case of exemption from liability under an exception in a policy, where it depends on a question of fact to be decided by the verdict of a jury. If this is true in regard to ordinary claims under policies, it is obvious that the difficulty would be greatly enhanced in cases like the present, where it would be sufficient, in order to take a case out of the operation of the proviso, to prove that self-destruction was the result of insanity. It would not be hazardous to affirm, that in all cases where such an issue was to be determined by a jury, between an insurance company and the representatives of the deceased, the act of suicide would be taken as proof of insanity. Such considerations were not likely to have escaped the attention of practical men in framing this general proviso; and in a doubtful case of construction, they are not to be overlooked in giving an interpretation to the words used by them.

"The learned counsel for the plaintiffs have insisted, with great force, on an argument drawn from the context, to show that the proviso was intended to embrace only a case of criminal self-destruction by a reasonable and responsible being. But it seems to us, that the maxim noscitur a sociis, on which they rely, does not aid the construction for which they contend. The material part of the clause is, that the policy is to be void if the assured shall die by his own hand, or in consequence of a duel, or by the hands of justice, or in the known violation of any State, national or provincial law.' Now the first and most obvious consideration suggested by other parts of this clause is, that in enumerating the causes of death which shall not be deemed to be within the risks covered by the policy, one of them is, in terms, made to depend on the existence of a criminal intention. It is a 'known' violation of the law, which is to avoid the policy. This tends very strongly to show, that where an act producing death may be either innocent or criminal, if it is intended to except only such as involve a guilty intent, it is

carefully so expressed in the proviso. The inference is very strong, that if the design was to confine the exception in question to cases of criminal suicide, it would have been so provided in explicit terms. So far, the argument drawn

from the context does not support the plaintiffs' claim.

"Take then another of the causes of death,-death in a duel,-enumerated in the proviso. It seems to us to be a petitio principii, to assume that death in consequence of a duel necessarily implies an act for which the party would be criminally responsible. Why is not this part of the proviso open to the same argument, as that which is urged in regard to the clause relating to self-destruction? A duel may be fought by a party acting under duress, or impelled thereto by an insane delusion, which might blind his moral perceptions and render him legally irresponsible. If so, then the same answer to a defence set up against a claim under the policy would be open under this clause, as the one now urged in behalf of the plaintiffs; and the argument founded on the assumption, that a forfeiture under this part of the proviso necessarily involves a criminal violation of law, falls to the ground. Therefore, the inference that a guilty intention is communicated, from this branch of the proviso to that relating to death by the act of the assured, seems to us to be unfounded.

"The only remaining clause is, that which provides for the case of death by the hands of justice. This, undoubtedly, implies that the person insured has been found guilty of a criminal act by a judicial tribunal, according to the established forms of law. But it is not correct, to say that it necessarily involves the existence of a criminal intent, because it might be shown that the conviction of the assured was erroneous, and that he was in fact innocent of the crime for which he suffered the penalty of death. So far, therefore, as any argument can justly be drawn from the connection in which the words, as to self-destruction, stand in relation to other parts of the proviso, it leads to the conclusion, that it was not solely death occasioned by acts of the assured involving criminal intent, or a wilful violation of law, by a per

son morally and legally responsible, which was intended to be excepted from the risks assured by the insurers; but that, with the exception of death in a known violation of law, the proviso embraces all cases where life is taken in consequence of the causes specified, without regard to the question, whether at the time the assured was amenable for his act, either in foro conscientiæ or in the tribunals of justice.

"It may be added, that a departure from the literal terms of a contract is always attended with great difficulty and danger, because it is apt to lead to great latitude of construction, and to give uncertainty to the language which the parties have adopted to express their meaning. It certainly never should be extended beyond the clear intent of the parties, as derived from other parts of the agreement, or the subject matter to which the contract relates. This position may be illustrated by reference to another part of the policy declared on. The proviso, which precedes that on which the present question has arisen, contains the stipulation that the policy shall be void if the assured, without the consent of the defendants in writing, shall during certain portions of the year visit the more southerly parts of the United States, or shall pass without the settled limits of the United States. If the assured in a fit of insanity should wander from his home and go within the prohibited territory, would the policy be void? If he was taken prisoner and went thither with his captors would he lose his claims under the policy?— These and similar questions which might arise under other clauses of the policy seem to show, that it is more safe to adhere to the strict letter of the contract, and to hold parties to the salutary rule, which requires them to express in clear and unambiguous terms any exceptions which they desire to engraft on the general words of a contract.

"So far as the adjudicated cases bear on the question which we have considered in the present case, the weight of authority is against the claim of the plaintiffs under the policy. In the case of Borradaile vs. Hunter, 5 Man. & G., 639, where the policy contained a proviso very similar to that found in the policy declared on: it was held that the policy

was avoided, as the proviso includes all cases of voluntary self-destruction, and was not limited to acts of criminal suicide. From this opinion there was a dissent by the Chief Justice. In Cliff vs. Schwabe, 3 C. B., 437, a similar decision was made by the exchequer chamber, two of the judges. dissenting. These cases seem now to be regarded as having settled the law in England in conformity with the opinion of the majority of the judges. Dufaur vs. Professional Life Ass. Co., 25 Beav., 602.-A different opinion was arrived at in Breasted vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 4 Hill, (N. Y.), 74, and 4 Selden, 299, from which, however, several of the most learned justices of the court of appeals dissented.

“In 1 Phil. Ins., § 895, it is stated that any mental derangement, sufficient to exonerate a party from a contract, would render a person incapable of occasioning the forfeiture of a policy under a clause like the one in question. In support of this proposition no authorities are cited, except the cases above named of Borradaile vs. Hunter, and Breasted vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., as reported in 4 Hill. If it is intended by it, to assert that the principle, on which a contract made with an insane person is held to be void as to him, applies to this clause, so as to exclude from its operation all cases of self-destruction occasioned by insanity, it seems to us that the position is untenable. The reason of the rule, which exempts a person from liability on a contract into which he entered when insane, is, that he is not deemed to have been capable of giving an intelligent assent to its terms. But this rule is not applicable, where a contract is made with a person in the full possession of his faculties, and he subsequently in a fit of insanity commits a breach of it, or incurs a penalty under it. He is then bound by it. His mind and will have assented to it. No subsequent mental incapacity will absolve him from his responsibility on it, unless from its nature it implies the continued possession of reason and judgment, and the action of an intelligent will. A party may be liable on an unexecuted contract after he has lost the use of his mental faculties, as he may be held