very letter, she speaks of another doctor than Dr. Hawley, under whose treatment she had been, we can have no doubt the jury must have found the fraud submitted to them. are, therefore, satisfied that the case was correctly put to the jury, on the question of fraud, as well as upon the question of warranty; and that it was correctly disposed of by the jury. We do not advise a new trial."

One assured signed a declaration stating " that his age did not exceed twenty-nine years, that he had had small-pox or cow-pox, and had not had certain other specified diseases, that no proposal to insure his life had been declined at any office, that he was in good health and ordinarily enjoyed good health, and that he was not aware of any disorder or circumstance tending to shorten his life, or to render any insurance on his life more than usually hazardous, unless something stated in answer to some questions which preceded the declaration might be so considered."

In an action on the policy by the administrator of the assured, it appeared that two years previous, and again a year thereafter, the deceased had had two successive and severe billious attacks. Medical men had expressed different opinions as to the effect of these attacks upon his health, but it did not appear that the unfavorable opinions had ever been communicated to the assured.

The judge instructed the jury that, "if the assured honestly believed, at the time he made the declaration, that the billious attacks had no effect upon his health, and did not tend to shorten his life or to render an insurance upon it more than usually hazardous, the fact that he was aware of those attacks, even though (without his knowledge) they really had such a tendency, would not defeat the policy." The direction was held to be correct. Jones vs. Provincial

Ins. Co., 3 Com. Bench, (N. S.), 65.

Where representations in regard to his health are made by a husband, whose life is insured by his wife for her sole use, which representations are made part of the policy, subsequent declarations, in regard to his health, while negotiating for a surrender of the policy, are not admissable in evidence in at

suit brought by the wife on the policy. Fraternal M. Life Ins. Co. vs. Applegate, 7 Ohio, (N. S.), 292.

Statements in an application for a life policy, upon the faith of which the policy is expressed to be made, with a stipulation that, if they shall be found in any respect untrue, the policy shall be void, are warranties, and if untrue, even in a point immaterial to the risk, will avoid a policy. Miles vs. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Gray, 580.

Where, in a policy of insurance upon life, the representation was made that the insured was sober and temperate, and in good health, if the representation was true at the time it was made, the subsequent habits of the assured will be no bar to a recovery upon the policy. Reichard vs. Manhattan Ins. Co., 31 Mo., 518.

One T. effected a policy on his life, with a condition thereon indorsed that, "in case any fraudulent or untrue statement was contained in any of the documents addressed to, or deposited with the company, in relation to the within assurance, whether by the payee, the assured, or any referee or other person, then the policy should be void." Among the documents referred to, was one called a "personal statement," which contained, amongst others, the following questions: "4. Whether he had, since infancy, any, and what, other disease (than those enumerated in a preceding question) requiring confinement?" "8. How often has medical attendance been required?" "9. How long did such attendance continue ?" "10. For what disease or diseases?" "11. For what period confined to the house or bed?" "12. How long is it since these circumstances occurred?" "13. Name, and address of the medical attendant or attendants employed on occasion of such disease?" The answers to these questions were as follows: To the 4th, "No;" to the 8th, "Two years ago;" to the 9th, "About one week;" to the 10th, "Disordered stomach;" to the 11th, "A week;" to the 12th, "One year;" and to the 13th, "Dr. R., Rock Ferry." It ap peared that the attendance of Dr. R. was in December 1855; that in January 1856, the assured had had a relapse, when he was attended by one Dr. C.; and that in February, while

at Birmingham, he had another severe illness, when his life was despaired of, and on which occasion he was attended by three other medical men. Held, that the untruth of the above answers avoided the policy, notwithstanding the jury found that no material information had been withheld from the insurers, and it was conceded that there was no intentional fraud. Cazenova vs. British &c. Ass. Co., 6 C. B., (N. S.), 437.

In a few cases upon life policies, questions of construction have arisen. The words, "settled limits of the United States," have been held equivalent to, "established boundaries of the United States," and a party; who was thus restricted by a condition of his policy, was held to be at liberty to take the overland route to California, and if he should die in the wilds on the south fork of the Platte, that his representatives would be entitled to recover. Carter vs. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 22 N. Y., 427. The case, however, was settled by a divided court, Selden, Bacon, Denio, Wright and Welles, concurring in the above; and Comstock, Davies and Clarke, dissenting.

In Ruse vs. The Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., the same court held, that a prospectus, distributed by a Life Insurance Company, and importing that it is careful to prevent forfeitures, is inadmissible to vary or control an express provision in a policy for life, by which it is to be determined upon the failure to pay the premium on the first day of each succeeding year. 23 New York, 516.

In Tayler vs. Etna Life Ins. Co., 13 Gray, 434, it was held, that a person whose life is insured by a policy, which permits him to pass by sea between certain ports "on first class decked vessels," does not forfeit the policy by going as a steerage passenger in such vessel.

It was held also, that under a policy of life insurance, payable in a stipulated time "after due notice and proof of the death," a physician's certificate of death is not an essential part of the proof, unless expressly required by the policy or by a usage of the company made known to the plaintiff before he took the policy.

It was claimed on behalf of the company, that the stipu lation, that the insured should go on a first class decked vessel, required, by necessary implication, that the party should go as a first class passenger on such vessel, and that a steerage passenger would have been charged a higher rate, or declined by the company. But the court said, they did not know, judicially or otherwise, that life is less safe in the steerage than in any other apartment of a vessel.

In a policy of life insurance, made in Boston, and in the application for insurance referred to and made a part of the policy, the assured was described as residing at Valparaiso. The policy contained a printed permission to the insured, to visit certain foreign countries, among which South America was not included. An indorsement on the policy gave permission to the insured to reside at Valparaiso, upon payment of a sum not named, leaving a blank for the amount. It was held, that the insured had the right to reside at Valparaiso without further permission or payment; and that a sum paid by the payee of the policy and agent of the insured, without authority from him or knowledge of the provisions of the policy, for permission for his principal to reside at Valparaiso for one year, did not vary the contract, and might be recov ered back from the insurers. Forbes vs. American Mut. Life

Ins. Co., 15 Gray, 249.

Fourth. Of Suicide, and of Death by one's own hand. Suicide, committed by a person, who understands the nature of the act and intends to take his own life, though committed during insanity, avoids a policy of life insurance, which provides that it shall be void if the assured shall die by his own hand. Dean vs. American Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Allen, 96.

An able and exhaustive opinion was delivered in this case by Chief Justice Bigelow; and he cites, in favor of the result arrived at by the court, some English cases as follows: "So far as the adjudicated cases bear on the question which we have considered, the weight of authority is against the claims of the plaintiffs under the policy. In the case of Borradaile vs. Hunter, 5 Manning & Granger, 639, where the pol

icy contained a provision very similar to that found in the policy declared on, it was held that the policy was avoided, as the proviso included all cases of voluntary self destruction, and was not limited to acts of criminal suicide. From this opinion there was a dissent by the Chief Justice. In Cleft vs. Schwabe, 3 C. B., 437, a similar decision was made by the Exchequer Chamber, two of the judges dissenting. These cases seem now to have settled the law in England in conformity with the opinion of a majority of the judges. Dufaur vs. Professional Life Assurance Company, 25 Beavan, 602."

He then mentions the fact that a different opinion was arrived at in Breasted vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 4 Seld., 299. In that case it was held, that a provision in a life policy, that it should be void if the assured "shall die by his own hand," had reference to an act of criminal self destruction, and that the self destruction of the insured, while insane and incapable of discerning between right and wrong, was not within the provision.

In this case, it will be seen that the facts differ so widely from the case of Dean, in 4 Allen, that the decisions can hardly be deemed radically opposed to each other. In the first, the deceased "understood the nature of the act, and intended to take his own life;" while in the second, it is found that he was " incapable of discerning between right and wrong." The two cases, and the cases referred to in them, present a pretty full view of both sides of the question; but the authority of the case in New York is greatly weakened by the dissent of four out of the nine judges who sat in the

cause.

In the case of Dean vs. Amer. Life Ins. Co., 4 Allen, 96, it was claimed, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the real cause of the death of the insured was his disease,-insanity,—and that it was not correct to say, that his death was." caused" by" his own hand." That his hand was not guided by his will, but by the superior force of disease, and that it was like a case in which the hand was guided and controlled by the superior physical power of another person. The case of Breasted vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company was referred